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2026 (3) TMI 152
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....its Directors apart from key officials of the company, 25 defaulters and others. The FIR was registered on a complaint of Shri Pankaj Ramnaresh Saraf, Director of M/s Vostok Far East Securities Ltd. The allegation was that payments were received towards trader's contracts offered by M/s NSEL for various commodities. The complainant and other investors were cheated by M/s NSEL by creating a false impression of being a proper spot exchange with correct risk management system, thereby induce them to trade on the said exchange. It was further revealed that the certified warehouses of M/s NSEL lacked adequate capacity and in some cases, had no stocks at all. Consequently, genuine investors were defrauded of their investments due to serious misappropriation, as M/s NSEL allowed trading in commodities by sellers, without ensuring that goods of appropriate quantity and quality are stored in exchange- controlled warehouses. The aforesaid resulted in a case of cheating with criminal conspiracy. 3. After registration of the FIR, investigation was conducted and it was found that criminal breach of trust with the complainant has been caused for a sum of Rs. 202 Lakhs and Rs. 5600 Crores appr....
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....of land for real estate township projects at Titwala, Thane. 8. The investigation further revealed involvement of the accused in the commission of crime and accordingly the Provisional Attachment Order was caused by the respondents. It was even the immovable properties of the appellant finding receipt of the proceeds of crime by him. The appellant Yogesh Deshmukh was the land aggregator based in Tiwala. 9. The statement of the appellant Yogesh Deshmukh was recorded under section 50(2) of the Act of 2002 on 22-01-2014. He purchased land from various farmers and consolidated the same into 3 parcel agreement dated 11-02-2013, 05-03-2013, 17-09- 2013. He handed over the possession of land under those agreements to Vihang group. The sale agreement between the appellant and M/s Vihang Aastha Housing Projects LLP included a land parcel of Jagannath Yadav whose statements were recorded on 08.04.2021. It was to the effect that the sale agreement for certain parcels of the land were cancelled in the year 2008 itself and no agreement in respect of those transactions was executed. They did not sell the land parcels to the appellant and thus land parcels were in their possession. They wer....
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....Order would cease to exist if not confirmed within a period of 180 days from the date of Provisional Attachment Order. In the instant case, the impugned order was passed beyond the period of 180 days thus it would cease to exist. 13. The counsel for the appellant further submitted that the allegation against the appellant is for receipt of the consideration from M/s Vihang Aastha Housing Projects LLP (earlier name as M/s Vihang Housing LLP, renamed as M/s Vihang Aastha Housing Project LLP) for a sum of Rs. 10.50 Crores without acquisition of the land from the seller/agriculturist. The statements of the agriculturist or the owner of the land revealed that they did not receive the amount towards the sale consideration. Mr Jagannath Jadhav also submitted the copy of cancellation agreement. In spite of cancellation of agreement to sell for the land parcel, appellant Mr. Yogesh Deshmukh entered into sale-cum-development Agreement with M/s Vihang Aastha Housing Project LLP of the said land parcel without any prior consent from landowners. It is with a further categorical statement that the land was not sold to the appellant. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the sta....
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....by Shri Mohit Agarwal for the land parcels which, according to him, were acquired from the seller/agriculturist by making the payment and accordingly receipt of Rs. 10.50 Crores from M/s Vihang Housing Projects LLP cannot be said to be the proceeds of crime. The fact, however, remains that the agriculturist/seller have denied about the sale agreement with the appellant and M/s Vihang Housing Projects LLP. They had, in fact, entered into agreement of sell but was cancelled in the year 2008 itself. Another transaction was entered for 28 lakhs of rupees in respect of the other land parcel but no agreement was executed for it and thereby no sale took place. Relevant paras of the impugned order dated 08.02.2022 to indicate allegation against the appellant are quoted hereunder: "5.21 The sale agreement between Yogesh Deshmukh and M/s Vihang Aastha Housing Projects LLP included land parcels having survey numbers 114/4, 114/7, 115/3, 140/9, 143/8, 143/11, 160/1, 160/2, 145/12B & 142/1/B/4. Statement of Mr. Jagannath Jadhav (owner of some of the land parcels as per revenue records) was recorded on 08.04.2021 under Section 50(2) & (3) of PMLA, 2002. wherein he stated that he entered....
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.... and asked about his wrong doing at that time; that Yogesh Deshmukh has told that he would pay them Rs. 2.60 Crores and requested not to file any police complaint in the matter; that Yogesh Deshmukh has paid them total Rs. 50 Lakhs (wherein Rs. 20 Lakhs by Cheque and Rs. 30 Lakhs by Cash and the same amount they have distributed within his 5 sister- in-Laws, 2 Brother-in-Laws and kept one part for himself); that till date, they have not received remaining amount from Yogesh Deshmukh; that till date they are having possession of the land parcels 141/6, 143/7, 143/10 and 114/8 and they are doing agricultural work on the same. 5.23 In this regard, statement of Mr. Vilas Baliram Dalvi (landowners as per revenue records) was recorded on 08.04.2021 under section 50(2) & (3) of PMLA, 2002. wherein he submitted that he entered into a deal with Mr. Yogesh Deshmukh in respect of land parcels having survey no. 147/1/A/3 only: that Mr. Yogesh Deshmukh has made Registered Agreement for the said land parcel i.e. Survey No. 147/1/A/3; that Yogesh Deshmukh has not provided the copy of the Registered Agreement for the said land parcel i.e. Survey No. 147/1/A/3; that Yogesh Deshmukh has mad....
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.... facts were discovered on recording of the statements of agriculturist and thereby the respondents found a case for receipt of the proceeds of crime by the appellant and was used to the extent of Rs. 1.34 Crores to purchase the land/properties. The remaining amount out of Rs. 10.50 Crores was used to purchase 11 properties during the crime period and have been provisionally attached as a consequence thereof. It is thus not correct to state that three properties out of it were purchased prior to the commission of crime. The impugned order otherwise detailed out the payments received by the appellant from M/s Vihang Aastha Housing Project LLP which is reproduced hereunder: S/N Date Account No Name of Account Holder Amount (in Rs. ) 1. 12.12.2012 01751000066455 Yogesh Narayan Deshmukh 20000000 2. 15.12.2012 01751000066455 Yogesh Narayan Deshmukh 5000000 3. 18.02.2013 01751000066455 Yogesh Narayan Deshmukh 15000000 4. 22.04.2013 01751000066455 Yogesh Narayan Deshmukh 45000000 5. 11.09.2013 01751000066455 Yogesh Narayan Deshmukh 20000000 Total payments received by M....
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....ingly remaining amount out of Rs. 10.50 Crores was taken to be the proceeds of crime. The provisional attachment is for the value of Rs. 3,74,71,900/- and accordingly it is less than the proceeds of crime in the hands of the appellant even if Rs. 1.34 Crores is deducted from Rs. 10.50 Crores. Our attention was drawn to the current market value of the properties which is shown to be of Rs. 16,70,520/-. However, as per the definition of "value" given under Section 2(zb) of the Act of 2002, it has to be taken on the amount disclosed in the sale deed and if it is not mentioned, then the fair market value on the date of its acquisition and if it cannot be determined, then the date on which the said property was possessed by the person. The fair market value cannot be assessed on the current value but has to be on the date of its acquisition and accordingly it was to be taken for a sum of Rs. 3,74,71,900/- which is far less than the proceeds in the hands of the appellant. The definition of value given under Section 2(zb) of the Act of 2002 is quoted hereunder: "Value" means the fair market value of any property on the date of its acquisition by any person, or if such date cannot....
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....appellant for commission of crime has been found. The only argument raised was to challenge the attachment of three properties out of four. However, no argument was raised for the property acquired subsequent to the commission of crime i.e., fourth Property. 11. It was submitted that the properties acquired prior to the commission of crime had no nexus with the crime and thus could not have been attached. It was not obtained or derived directly or indirectly out of criminal activities relating to the scheduled offence. The respondent could not show nexus of three properties with the crime out of four attached by them. 12. The reference of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Pavana Dibur (supra) and also of Kerala High Court in the case of Satish Motilal Bidri (supra) has been given. To analyze the issue, we may quote the definition of `proceeds of crime' given under Section 2(1) (u) of the Act of 2002, which is quoted thus.: "(u) "proceeds of crime" means any property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence or the value of any such property [or where such propert....
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....taken to be the property of equivalent value. The case in hand falls in the second category of the definition of "proceeds of crime" because proceeds are not available and, therefore, the property of equivalent value is attached. 15. The argument has been made in reference to the judgment of Kerala High Court in the case of Satish Motilal Bidri (supra) and the judgment of Apex Court in Pavana Dibur (supra) to hold that the properties acquired prior to commission of crime would not fall in the definition of "proceeds of crime". We are unable to accept the arguments which may otherwise make second part of the definition of "proceeds of crime" to be redundant. It would be for the reason that if the definition is taken only in two parts leaving the middle part, then it would be difficult for the enforcement agencies to protect the property till completion of the crime to save the victim from crime committed by the accused. It would be for the reason that if the property acquired prior to commission of crime would not fall in the definition of "proceeds of crime", then the accused would commit the crime and immediately proceeds would be siphoned off or vanished so that it may n....
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....the source of (or consideration for) its acquisition is the product of specified crime, the essence of "money laundering" being its projection as "untainted property" (Section 3). This would include such property as may have been obtained or acquired by using the tainted property as the consideration (directly or indirectly). To illustrate, bribe or illegal gratification received by a public servant in form of money (cash) being undue advantage and dishonestly gained, is tainted property acquired "directly" by a scheduled offence and consequently "proceeds of crime". Any other property acquired using such bribe as consideration is also "proceeds of crime", it having been obtained "indirectly" from a prohibited criminal activity within the meaning of first limb of the definition. 107. In contrast, the second and third kinds of properties mentioned above would ordinarily be "untainted property" that may have been acquired by the suspect legitimately without any connection with criminal activity or its result. The same, however, are intended to fall in the net because their owner is involved in the proscribed criminality and the tainted assets held by him are not traceable, o....
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....parties after referring to the object of the Act of 2002 which was enacted out of the international convention. The Delhi High Court has discussed the issue elaborately and otherwise if we apply the judgement of Kerala High Court in the case of Satish Motilal Bidri (supra,) it would be making the second limb of the definition of "proceeds of crime" to be redundant. The counsel who appeared before the Kerala High Court did not argue that the definition of "proceeds of crime" has three limbs and unfortunately the view expressed by Delhi High Court in Axis Bank (supra) was not discussed elaborately while it was cited by the counsel. 20. The Ld. Single judge of Kerala High Court did not subscribe the judgment aforesaid, rather applied the judgment of Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Seema Garg Vs. Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement, reported in 2020 SCC OnLine Punjab & Haryana 738. With due respect, we are unable to apply the judgment of Kerala High Court going against Para 68 of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra). The judgment of Seema Garg (Supra) has been dealt with by the Delhi High Court in the case of Praka....
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....arly and in unambiguous terms includes not only property derived or obtained directly or indirectly as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence but also the value of any such property. Seema Garg thus seems to gloss over the statutory imperatives underlying the deployment of the phrase ―or the value of any such property and the concept of deemed tainted properties enunciated in Axis Bank. On a plain textual interpretation of Section 2(1)(u) as well as in the backdrop of the amendatory history of that provision, this Court finds itself unable to agree with the line of reasoning adopted in Seema Garg. As held hereinbefore, affirmation of Seema Garg would amount to virtually deleting the phrase ―or the value of any such property from Section 2(1)(u). That would not only violate the well settled tenets of statutory construction but would clearly amount to the Court rewriting the provision itself in a manner that it stands deprived of vital and purposive content. The Court further notes that Axis Bank had enunciated important safeguards which would apply in respect of third-party interests in deemed tainted property. Those caveats duly secure and protect....
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....such property or ―property equivalent in value held within the country or abroad. To the aforesaid limited extent, properties purchased prior to 01 July 2005 may also become vulnerable and subject to action under the Act. However, enforcement action against such properties would have to satisfy the tests and safeguards as propounded in Axis Bank with the learned Judge observing that in such a situation it would have to be established that the person accused of money laundering had an interest in such property at least till the time that he indulged in the proscribed criminal activity. The learned Judge further observed that bona fide rights acquired by third parties prior to the commission of the predicate offense would stand saved." 21. The issue aforesaid was not raised in the case of Pavana Dibur (supra). The counsel appeared therein did not elaborately argue the issue by referring to the definition of "proceeds of crime" having three limbs to give meaning to each limb for the interpretation of the definition of the "proceeds of crime". The reference of Para 68 of the judgment of three judges Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra) ....
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.... of the definition of proceeds of crime. In the second limb, which refers to "the value of any such property" would indicate any other property which was acquired prior to the commission of crime and it would be attached only when the proceeds directly or indirectly obtained or derived out of the criminal activity is not available. It may be on account of siphoning off or vanished by the accused. In those circumstances the property of equivalent value can be attached. The word "the value of any such property" signifies without any embargo that it should be the property purchased after the commission of crime or prior to it rather it would apply in both the eventuality in the given circumstance. Thus, we are not in agreement with the counsel for the appellant who has questioned the attachment in reference to the property acquired prior to commission of crime. We are not going even further that the properties have nexus with the proceeds out of the crime but even in given circumstances and scenario that the property was acquired prior to commission of crime then, also under certain circumstances, it can be attached for "the value of any such property." 23. At this stage, it ....
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.... 3.3. The aforesaid observations made by the Supreme Court enable this Bench to re- examine the entire issue, as in the considered opinion of this Bench, the judgment passed in Seema Garg's case (supra) is no longer a good law. This Court has taken this view due to the subsequent interpretation by the Supreme Court, which has superseded the legal principles established in Seema Garg's case (supra). 3.4. It is evident that the original (unamended) definition of phrase 'proceeds of crime' was structured into two distinct parts. The first part relates to the property derived or obtained directly or indirectly by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence, whereas, the second part relates to the value of any such property where the proceeds of crime are not traceable. This clearly means that if the property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, from the proceeds of a crime of scheduled offence is not traceable, then any property of equivalent value falls within the scope of the expression 'proceeds of crime'. In 2015, the amendment restructured the definition into three parts to cover the property taken or held ....
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.... Country then the property equivalent in value held within the Country or abroad can be made liable to be attached. This position has been explained by the Delhi High Court in an elaborate manner in Axis Bank's case (supra) and Prakash Industries case (supra). 3.6. It is not disputed that the Supreme Court in Vijay Madanlal Chaudhary's case (supra) was examining the scope of the '2002 Act' including definition of phrase 'proceeds of crime'. The submission put forth by the learned counsel that the phrase 'or the value of any such property' is superfluous was rejected by the Court and it was held that the definition of 'proceeds of crime' is wide enough to not only include to the property derived or obtained as a result of criminal activity related to a schedule offence but also any other property of equivalent value. 3.7. While interpreting a statutory provision, it is the bounden buty of the Courts to interpret it in manner so that each word used by the statute conveys a meaning it was assigned by the Legislature. The words used in statute are of utmost significance. The Court cannot widen or restrict the provisions on its o....
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....e Bench was never called upon to analyse the contentions based upon Section 2(i)(u) of 2002 Act, whereas, in Vijay Madanlal Chaudhary's case (supra) the Court directly answered the aforesaid question. Hence, there is no substance in the first argument of learned counsel for petitioner". 24. The judgments referred to above answer the legal issue raised by the appellants which permits provisional attachment of the property acquired even prior to the commission of crime if the proceeds of crime is not traceable in the hands of the person. 25. It would be relevant to refer the Table given under Para 6.28 of the Provisional Attachment Order to describe the properties attached by the respondents along with the date and the value on which it was acquired. It is reproduced hereunder: Sr. No. Date of Registration Seller Buyer Name Description of Properties Purchase amount (in Rs. ) 1. 20.12.12 Shri Sidhivinayak Construction Yogesh Deshmukh Flat No.701, 7 floor, A Wing, Sanjeevani Apartment, Chikanghar, Kalyan 3500000 2. 03.07.13 Kadarabad Vasudevra Rao and Nirja Kadrabad Rao Yogesh Deshmukh Vrindavan Vatika Building No.02, A Wing,....
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....gment of Supreme Court in the case of Suo Motu Writ Petition No. 03/2020 decided by the order dated 10.01.2022, the period of covid from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 has to be eliminated for counting 180 days and in those circumstances, the impugned order remains within 180 days thus would not be hit by Section 5(3) of the Act of 2002. The issue aforesaid has been discussed by this Tribunal elaborately in the case of M/s SKS Ispat & Power Ltd. Vs. Directorate of Enforcement (Appeal No.4462/2022) dated 06.03.2025. Relevant paras of the order are quoted hereunder: "16. The counsel for the appellant company further submitted that the Adjudicating Authority failed to confirm the order of attachment within the period of 180 days from the date of the order of attachment and, therefore, it ceased to exist as per Section 5 (3) of the Act of 2002. The issue aforesaid has already been settled by this Tribunal in reference to the order of the Apex Court in Suo Motu Writ Petition No.03/2020 decided by the order dated 10.01.2022. The operative portion of the said judgment is quoted hereunder: "5. Taking into consideration the arguments advanced by learned counsel and the impact ....
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.... Writ Petition No.03/2020 decided by the order dated 10.01.2022, a detailed judgement was given by the Apex Court in the case of Prakash Corporates v. Dee Vee Projects Limited reported in MANU/SC/0180/2022 wherein it explained its earlier judgment in the case of S. Kasi v. State Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 2020 decided on 19.06.2020. The relevant paras of the judgment (supra) are quoted hereunder: "10.3. With reference to the decision of this Court in the case of S. Kasi v. State Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 2020 decided on 19.06.2020, it has been argued on behalf of the Respondent that a 3-Judge Bench of this Court has specifically ruled that the said order dated 23.03.2020 in SMWP No. 3 of 2020 is not applicable to all the applications; and benefit of the order of extension of limitation cannot be taken by police while filing chargesheet Under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19736. Further, with reference to the decision in the case of Sagufa Ahmed (supra), it has been argued that what was extended in SMWP No. 3 of 2020 was only the period of limitation and not the period upto which delay could be condoned in exercise of discretion conferred by the statute....
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....stand extended until further orders. Further clarification was also made for exclusion of the period from 14.03.2021 in regard to the other period(s) prescribed under different laws. In this order dated 27.04.2021, this Court took note of the orders earlier passed in the matter and thereafter, observed and directed as under: Supreme Court Advocate on Record Association (SCAORA) has now through this Interlocutory Application highlighted the daily surge in COVID cases in Delhi and how difficult it has become for the Advocates-on-Record and the litigants to institute cases in Supreme Court and other courts in Delhi. Consequently, restoration of the order dated 23rd March, 2020 has been prayed for. We have heard Mr. Shivaji M. Jadhav, President SCAORA in support of the prayer made in this application. Learned Attorney General and Learned Solicitor General have also given their valuable suggestions. We also take judicial notice of the fact that the steep rise in COVID-19 Virus cases is not limited to Delhi alone but it has engulfed the entire nation. The extraordinary situation caused by the sudden and second outburst of COVID-19 Virus, thus, requires extraord....
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....asi-judicial proceedings, whether condonable or not, shall stand extended. Ultimately, the said MA No. 665 of 2021 was disposed of on 23.09.2021 with this Court issuing directions similar to those contained in the order dated 08.03.2021 but while providing that in computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal, application or proceeding, the period from 15.03.2020 till 02.10.2021 shall stand excluded. 19.6. We are not elaborating on other directions issued by this Court but, when read as a whole, it is but clear that the anxiety of this Court had been to obviate the hardships likely to be suffered by the litigants during the onslaughts of this pandemic. Hence, the legal effect and coverage of the orders passed by this Court in SMWP No. 3 of 2020 cannot be unnecessarily narrowed and rather, having regard to their purpose and object, full effect is required to be given to such orders and directions". After the judgment aforesaid, an elaborate judgment was given by Telangana High Court in the case of Hygro Chemicals Pharmtek Pvt. Limited Vs. Union of India & Ors. reported in MANU/TL/1003/2023. Detail finding on the issue has been given and for that relevant ....
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....might be faced by lawyers/litigants to file their applications physically. The relevant paragraphs of In re: Limitation (supra) are extracted below: 1. This Court has taken suo motu cognizance of the situation arising out of the challenge faced by the country on account of Covid-19 virus and resultant difficulties that may be faced by litigants across the country in filing their petitions/applications/suits/appeals/all other proceedings within the period of limitation prescribed under the general law of limitation or under special laws (both Central and/or State). 2. To obviate such difficulties and to ensure that lawyers/litigants do not have to come physically to file such proceedings in respective courts/tribunals across the country including this Court, it is hereby ordered that a period of limitation in all such proceedings, irrespective of the limitation prescribed under the general law or special laws whether condonable or not shall stand extended w.e.f. 15-3-2020 till further order(s) to be passed by this Court in present proceedings. v) Subsequently, the limitation period was extended vide In re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation (hereinafte....
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....mitation, 2022 (supra), the period from 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 shall be excluded to compute the period of 12 months under Section 29A of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996. Similarly, Section 12A(3) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 provides an outer time period of three months within which pre-institution mediation shall be completed. However, by virtue of In re: Limitation, 2022 (supra), the period from 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 shall be excluded to compute the period of 3 months. Therefore, In re: Limitation, 2022 (supra) states that wherever a statute prescribes a maximum period within which proceedings have to be completed, the period from 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 shall be excluded to compute such maximum period. vii) To decide the applicability of In re: Limitation (supra) in computation of 180 days for confirming the provisional attachment of property, it is apposite to discuss the nature of time frame prescribed under Section 5 of the PMLA. For the sake of convenience, Section 5 is extracted below: 5. Attachment of property involved in money-laundering.- 29[(1) Where the Director or any other officer not below the rank of Deputy Director authorised....
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....ope, in the manner as may be prescribed and such Adjudicating Authority shall keep such order and material for such period as may be prescribed. (3) Every order of attachment made under sub-section (1) shall cease to have effect after the expiry of the period specified in that sub- section or on the date of an order made under sub-section (3) of Section 8, whichever is earlier. (4) Nothing in this section shall prevent the person interested in the enjoyment of the immovable property attached under sub-section (1) from such enjoyment. Explanation. -For the purposes of this sub-section, "person interested", in relation to any immovable property, includes all persons claiming or entitled to claim any interest in the property. (5) The Director or any other officer who provisionally attaches any property under sub-section (1) shall, within a period of thirty days from such attachment, file a complaint stating the facts of such attachment before the Adjudicating Authority. xvii) Similarly, the Calcutta High Court in Hiren Panchal (supra) held that vide orders in In re: Limitation (supra), the Apex Court extended the period of limitation to saf....
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....ds, what was being protected by the orders of the Supreme Court was the right to remedy, not the right to take away a remedy under a given statute. The respondents before this Court seek to do the latter. The only step taken by the ED is the order of the provisional attachment dated 30th September, 2021. No other steps were taken by the ED before the petitioners reply on 3rd January, 2022 or before the expiry of 180 days period on 31st March, 2022. By its inaction and failure to act in terms of Section 5(1)(b) or the other conditions of the said section, the ED has made itself vulnerable to Section 5(3) of the PMLA. The petitioner in turn has been given the breather of exhaustion of the 180 days window from 1st April, 2022 and the ED cannot now revive the proceedings after more than 80 days have passed from the end point of the 180 days period. 21. In Gobindo Das, the Appeal Court disagreed with the view of the Adjudicating Authority being a "non-litigant". The Division Bench was also disturbed by the fact that the bank accounts of the writ petitioners have been debited leaving the balance at zero despite the order of attachment. Prakash Corporates dealt with the prescribe....
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....onal attachment order within 180 days. xix) It is true that provisional attachment of property has an effect of potentially depriving a person of his property. However, right to personal liberty and right to property stand on a different footing and cannot be equated. This is evident from the fact that the urgency in concluding proceedings dealing with a person in jail is much higher than a person whose property is provisionally attached. Further, under Section 5(4) of the PMLA, the person whose property is provisionally attached can still enjoy such property till the same is confiscated. Even in cases of confirmation of provisional attachment, a person can still enjoy such property till the same is confiscated. xx) In Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra), the Apex Court held that provisionally attached properties which are confirmed can still be enjoyed by a party till a confiscation order is passed. xxi) Therefore, provisions prescribing timelines and which deal with police investigation upon which a person's liberty is dependent has to be strictly construed. On the other hand, where timeline is prescribed for attachment of properties and due to unforeseen ....
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....: 2020 SCC OnLine SC 529], this Court also noticed that a coordinate Bench of the same High Court had already held [Settu v. State, 2020 SCC OnLine Mad 1026] that the said order dated 23-3-2020 [Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In re, (2020) 19 SCC 10 : (2021) 3 SCC (Cri) 801] did not cover the offences for which Section 167CrPC was applicable but, in the order [S. Kasi v. State, 2020 SCC OnLine Mad 1244] impugned, the other learned Single Judge of the same High Court took a view contrary to the earlier decision of the coordinate Bench; and that was found to be entirely impermissible. In any case, the said decision, concerning the matter of personal liberty referable to Article 21 of the Constitution of India and then, relating to the proceedings to be undertaken by an investigating officer, cannot be applied to the present case relating to the matter of filing written statement by the defendant in a civil suit. xxiii) Further, a Division Bench of Madras High Court in S. Prasanna v. The Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement, Government of India 47 held that the decision in S. Kasi (supra) is not applicable to compute the period of 180 days under Section 5(3) o....
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....e cannot be caused to it by not excluding the period from 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022. One litigant's interests cannot be protected at the cost of another. This Court would further like to stress that the provisionally attached properties can still be enjoyed under Section 5(4) of the PMLA. xxvi) The reasoning in Hiren Panchal (supra) that what was protected under In re: Limitation (supra) was institution of proceedings and not proceedings which were already initiated cannot be accepted in light of the decision in Prakash Corporates (supra) which held that In re: Limitation (supra) cannot be narrowly applied. xxvii) Lastly, the decisions in S. Kasi (supra),Vikas WSP Ltd. (supra), Gobindo Das (supra) and Hiren Panchal (supra) cannot be applied for the simple reason that In re: Limitation (supra) was further clarified in In re: Limitation 2022 (supra) wherein the Court at Para 5.4 (extracted supra) held that where time period is prescribed for termination of proceedings, the period from 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 shall be excluded. In the present case, Section 5(3) of the PMLA states that provisional attachment of properties will cease to have effect after a lapse of 180....