TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1961 (4) TMI 4
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....effect from July 1, 1946. For three periods, commencing from October 1, 1947, and ending on March 31, 1950, it was assessed to sales tax on its turnover of the relevant periods, which consisted inter alia of purchases alleged to have been made on behalf of two other jute mills outside Bihar, namely, the Raigarh Jute Mills and the Bengal Jute Mills, and also of despatches of jute said to have been made to the dealer's own firm in Calcutta for sale in Calcutta. For the assessment period commencing on October 1, 1947, and ending on March 31, 1948, the appellant claimed a deduction of (a) Rs. 6,58,880-5-9 on the ground that the said amount represented purchases made on behalf of the aforesaid two jute mills, and (b) Rs. 1,62,662-13-3 being despatches of jute made to the dealer's own firm in Calcutta. Similarly, for the next assessment period commencing on April 1, 1948, and ending on March 31, 1949, the appellant claimed a deduction of certain amounts (the exact amounts being irrelevant for our purpose) on the two grounds mentioned above from the relevant turnover. The claim of the appellant was that purchases made on behalf of the two jute mills aforesaid and the despatches of jute ma....
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....appellant to the High Court with regard to the third period of assessment, the High Court directed the Board of Revenue to state a case on the following question : "Whether the petitioner is entitled to claim a deduction on account of sale of mustard seed to the extent of Rs. 1,00,513-11-9 to Messrs. Panna Lal Binjraj as sales made to a registered dealer under the Schedule to Bihar Finance Act (11 of 1949) read with the Bihar Sales Tax Act (XIX of 1947)." By an order dated January 21, 1957, the High Court answered the question against the appellant. The finding of the High Court was thus expressed : "We are satisfied that the petitioner was not entitled to deduction of the amount of the price of mustard seed sold to Messrs. Panna Lal Binjraj for the purpose of manufacture because there is no mention in the certificate of registration granted to Messrs. Panna Lal Binjraj that mustard seed could be sold to them for the purpose of manufacture free of tax. As the conditions imposed by the proviso to section 5 have not been satisfied in this case, the sales tax authorities rightly decided that deduction of the price of mustard seed sold to Messrs. Panna Lal Binjraj cannot be granted ....
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....rd to two of the assessment orders the High Court held that no questions of law arose at all; with regard to the third assessment order the High Court held that only one question of law arose and it answered that question against the appellant. Can the appellant now ignore these orders of the High Court and ask us to consider on merits the orders of the Board of Revenue passed on the two revision applications for the first two periods and the orders of the Board in the reference case holding that no question of law arose out of the assessment order for the third period ? This is the question, taken as a preliminary point, which we have to answer in these three appeals. The question has to be considered with regard to (a) the scope and ambit of article 136 of the Constitution ; (b) the practice of this court; and (c) the question must also be considered in the context of the scheme of the Act under which the assessments were made, appeals and revisions in respect thereof were heard, and the scope and effect of section 25 of the Act under which the Board was asked to refer certain alleged questions of law to the High Court and the High Court was asked to direct the Board to state a c....
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.... Board to refer to the High Court any question of law arising out of such an order ; if for reason to be recorded in writing the Board refuses to make such reference, the applicant may under sub-section (2) of section 25 apply to the High Court against such refusal. If the High Court is not satisfied that such refusal was justified, it may require the Board to state a case and refer it to the High Court. When a case is referred to the High Court, it decides the question of law raised thereby by a judgment containing the grounds on which the decision is founded. The Board then disposes of the case according to the decision of the High Court. This in short is the scheme of section 25. It is manifest that under this scheme questions of fact are dealt with by the assessing authorities, subject to appeal and revision; but on questions of law the decision of the High Court is the decision according to which the case has to be disposed of. Section 23 of the Act says that save as provided in section 25, no assessment made and no order passed under the Act or the rules made thereunder by the Commissioner or any person appointed under section 3 to assist him shall be called into question in ....
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....hich come up before different kinds of tribunals and in a variety of other cases. The only uniform standard which in on opinion can be laid down in the circumstances is that the court should grant special leave to appeal only in those cases where special circumstances are shown to exist ... Generally speaking, this court will not grant special leave, unless it is shown that exceptional and special circumstances exist, that substantial and grave injustice has been done and that the case in question presents features of sufficient gravity to warrant a review of the decision appealed against." Pritam Singh's case was a case of criminal appeal, but the same view was reiterated in Dhakeswari Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, which was an income-tax case. It was there observed : "The limitations, whatever they be, are implicit in the nature and character of the power itself. It being an exceptional and overriding power, naturally it has to be exercised sparingly and with caution and only in special and extraordinary situations. Beyond that it is not possible to fetter the exercise of this power by any set formula or rule." We shall deal with this decision in greater det....
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....ecial leave to appeal against the order of the Tribunal; this court granted special leave and in the appeal filed in pursuance thereof quashed the order of the Tribunal. But the decision in Dhakeswari's case, must be read in the light of the special circumstances which existed there. It was found by this court that the Tribunal had violated certain fundamental rules of justice in reaching its conclusions, and that the assessee had not had a fair hearing; therefore, it was held that it was a fit case for the exercise of the power under article 136. The decision proceeded really on the basis that the principles of natural justice had been violated and there was in reality no fair trial. In the appeals before us no such or similar ground is alleged so as to attract the exercise of our power under article 136. In Moti Ram v. Commissioner of Income-tax the appellant did not make any application under section 66(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, but obtained special leave of this court in respect of the order of the Tribunal in the special circumstance that his property was attached and proceeded against for the recovery of the tax. The question of the propriety of the grant of special le....
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....reference to the High Court under section 66(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act, and the learned judges of the High Court dismissed that application. No appeal has been preferred against that at all. The present appeal is against the decision of the Tribunal itself. It is no doubt true that this court has decided in Dhakeswari Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax that an appeal lies under article 136 of the Constitution of India : to this court against a decision of the Appellate Tribunal under the Indian Income-tax Act. But seeing that in this case the appellant had moved the High Court and a decision has been pronounced adverse to him and this has become final, obviously it would not be open to him to question the correctness of the decision of the Tribunal on grounds which might have been taken in an appeal against the judgment of the High Court." In Chimmonlall Rameshwarlall v. Commissioner of Income-tax the facts were these. Four appeals were filed with special leave granted by this court under article 136 which were directed against the orders of the Appellate Tribunal refusing to state a case on an application made to it under section 66(1). No appeals were filed ag....
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....under article 136 in such a way as to bypass the High Court and ignore the latter's decision, a decision which has become final and binding on the parties thereto, by entertaining appeals directly from the orders of a Tribunal. Such exercise of power would be particularly inadvisable in a case where the result may be a conflict of decisions of two courts of competent jurisdiction, a conflict which is not contemplated by sections 23, 24 and 25 of the Act. On the contrary, the object of these sections is to avoid a conflict by making the decision of the assessing authorities final on questions of fact subject to appeal, revision or review as provided for by section 24 and the decision of the High Court subject to an appeal to this court, final on questions of law under section 25 of the Act. To ignore the decision of the High Court on a question of law would really nullify the statutory provisions of section 25 of the Act. It remains now to consider one last argument urged on behalf of the appellant, Learned counsel for the appellant has draw n our attention to article 133 of the Constitution and has pointed out that when the High Court refuses a certificate under article 133, it is....