AI Drafter 
TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2026 (1) TMI 313
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....s from the "relevant date." For the purpose of refund of unutilized input tax credit under the inverted duty structure, the term "relevant date" is defined in Explanation (2)(e) to Section 54. 3. Up to 31.01.2019, the term "relevant date" was defined to mean "the end of the financial year in which such claim for refund arises." However, by virtue of the Amendment Act No. 31 of 2018, which came into force with effect from 01.02.2019, the definition of "relevant date" was substituted to mean "the due date for furnishing the return under Section 39 for the period in which the claim for refund arises." 4. The petitioner submits that the amended provision of Section 54(1), which came into effect from 01.02.2019, operates prospectively and not retrospectively, unless its retrospective application is beneficial to the assessee. Therefore, for periods where the right to claim refund had already accrued prior to the amendment, the un-amended definition of "relevant date" would continue to apply. 5. It has been submitted that in the present case, the refund claims under Section 54(3)(ii) pertain to the periods 01.07.2017 to 31.03.2019, corresponding to Financial Years 2017-18 and 20....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....ctions filed by the respondents, it is submitted that pursuant to the CGST Amendment Act, 31 of 2018 dated 29.08.2018, Section 54 of the CGST Act, 2017 was amended, and the "relevant date" was prescribed as the due date for furnishing the return under Section 39 for the period in which the claim arises. The said amendments were made effective from 01.02.2019, in terms of which the due date for filing the return for the period July 2017 to January 2018 fell prior to March 2020. However, for February 2018 onwards, the due dates for filing returns fell in March 2020 and thereafter. 10. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that in view of the amendment made to Section 54 vide the CGST Amendment Act 31 of 2018 dated 29.08.2018, which came into effect from 01.02.2019, refund claims filed on or after the said date would be governed by the amended provisions of Section 54 of the CGST Act, even if the refund claims pertain to a period prior to 01.02.2019. 11. It has further been submitted that the CBIC, vide Notification No. 13/2022-Central Tax dated 05.07.2022, excluded the period from 01.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 for the purpose of computation of the limitation period for filing ....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....fter referred to as the said Act) read with section 20 of the Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (13 of 2017) and section 21 of the Union Territory Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (14 of 2017) and in partial modification of the notifications of the Government of India in the Ministry of Finance (Department of Revenue), No. 35/2020-Central Tax, dated the 3rd April, 2020, published in the Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II, Section 3, Sub-section (i), vide number G.S.R. 235(E), dated the 3rd April, 2020 and No. 14/2021-Central Tax, dated the 1st May, 2021, published in the Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II, Section 3, Sub-section (i), vide number G.S.R. 310(E), dated the 1st May, 2021, the Government, on the recommendations of the Council, hereby,- (i) ................ (ii) .............. (iii) excludes the period from the 1st day of March, 2020 to the 28th day of February, 2022 for computation of period of limitation for filing refund application under section 54 or section 55 of the said Act. 2. This notification shall be deemed to have come into force with effect from the 1st day of March, 2020. [F. No. CBIC-20001....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
.... if such claims pertain to periods prior to 01.02.2019. Accordingly, it is argued that the due date for filing the return for the period July 2017 to January 2018 fell prior to March 2020, and therefore, lies outside the scope of the exclusion period provided under the said Notification. 17. The issue that therefore arises for consideration is whether the amendment effective from 01.02.2019, which curtailed the period prescribed for filing refund applications, can be applied so as to divest or curtail the vested right of the petitioner in relation to the period preceding the amendment. 18. The right to claim refund with respect to period preceding the amendment cannot be curtailed by the amendment. The amended Section cannot operate retrospectively so as to take away a vested right. This amendment must be treated as prospective unless it is given retrospective effect. The vested right of the petitioner cannot be unilaterally revoked or curtailed by a subsequent amendment to the statute unless the amendment expressly provides for retrospective application. Thus, even though the amendment came into force on 01.02.2019, it cannot curtail the rights vested in the petitioner. 1....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....so as to make it unpractical for him to avail of the remedy. This principle has been followed by this Court in many cases and by way of illustration we would like to mention New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shanti Misra [(1975) 2 SCC 840 : (1976) 2 SCR 266]. The husband of the respondent in that case died in an accident in 1966. A period of two years was available to the respondent for instituting a suit for recovery of damages. In March 1967 the Claims Tribunal under Section 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 was constituted, barring the jurisdiction of the civil court and prescribed 60 days as the period of limitation. The respondent filed the application in July 1967. It was held that not having filed a suit before March 1967 the only remedy of the respondent was by way of an application before the Tribunal. So far the period of limitation was concerned, it was observed that a new law of limitation providing for a shorter period cannot certainly extinguish a vested right of action. In view of the change of the law it was held that the application could be filed within a reasonable time after the constitution of the Tribunal; and, that the time of about four months taken by the r....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
.... by this Court in Bano Saiyed Parwaz v. Chief Controlling Revenue Authority & Inspector General of Registration & Controller of Stamps that the limitation provision in stamp law (to seek refund of stamp duty) should not be enforced so as to oust the remedy when the applicant is otherwise not blameworthy." 20. Thus, even though the amendment came into force on 01.02.2019, it cannot curtail the right which had already vested prior thereto. Therefore, the un-amended definition of „relevant date' would continue to apply. 21. This apart, amendment to Section 54 which changed the definition of relevant date w.e.f. 01.02.2019 cannot be applied retrospectively to the period prior to the amendment to curtail the petitioner's right to refund within the originally stipulated time. It is well settled that every statute is presumed to operate prospectively unless the same is expressly made retrospective, substantive amendments which alter or curtail the scope of tax payer vested rights are presumed to be prospective unless the legislation unequivocally provides otherwise. 22. In The State of Maharashtra & ors. vs. Prism Cement Limited & anr. (Civil Appeal No. 13928 of 2015), the ....