TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2025 (11) TMI 1317
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.... Limited ("STIPL") filed its return of income on 30thOctober 2007, declaring a total income of INR 26,53,092. 4. Thereafter, the erstwhile assessee, STIPL merged with the Petitioner, Shell India Markets Private Limited, with effect from 01st April 2008, pursuant to a Scheme of Amalgamation approved by the Hon'ble High Courts of Karnataka and Madras vide orders dated 22nd February 2010 and 24th February 2010, respectively. The Scheme of Amalgamation provided inter alia that upon the Scheme becoming effective, STIPL shall stand dissolved without undergoing the process of winding up. 5. The Petitioner, by way of submission dated 21stSeptember 2010, brought to the attention of the then Assessing Officer, the fact of the aforesaid amalgamation/merger and the name of the merged entity [i.e. the Petitioner]. The Petitioner also furnished copies of the orders passed by the Hon'ble High Courts. However, the then Assessing Officer proceeded with the assessment proceedings and issued inter alia a notice under Section 143(2) of the Act on 19th November 2010 in the name of 'STIPL', which was not in existence as on that date. Thereafter, a final Assessment Order dated 07th October 2011 und....
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.... No. 1 issued a notice under Section 142(1) of the Act, wherein he relied upon Section 260 of the Act to justify the proceedings and required the Petitioner to submit various details within 15 days. This notice also purports to provide an opportunity of being heard with respect to "all issues raised in under Section 148 of the Act (reasons for reopening)". 10. The Petitioners have, by this Petition, challenged the notice under Section 143(2) dated 17th July 2025 and the notice under Section 142(1) dated 28th August 2025. Submissions on behalf of the Petitioner 11. Mr. Mistri, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Petitioner, has assailed the legality and validity of the impugned notices on various grounds set out in the Petition. The main contentions urged were- (i) there was no "finding or direction" by the High Court when dismissing the revenue's appeal of the type that would enable the revenue to apply Sections 150 or 153(6) of the Act; (ii) assuming for the sake of argument that it was held that the High Court's order contained such a finding or direction, the relevant statutory provisions had not been adhered to when seeking to undertake further p....
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.... 120 ITR 14 (SC)]. 14. Mr. Mistri contended that the impugned notice under Section 143(2) of the Act, was clearly issued beyond the period of limitation prescribed in the proviso to Section 143(2). He submitted that the impugned notice under Section 143(2) has been issued contrary to the statutory period of three months from the end of the financial year in which the return was furnished and is, invalid and bad in law for this reason as well. Further, the Petitioner contends that, the conditions prescribed under Section 143(2) are not attracted, since the provision stipulates that the Assessing Officer may issue a notice only after being satisfied that it is expedient or necessary to scrutinize the return of the assessee. Mr. Mistri contended that no such satisfaction, as required by law, has been recorded or demonstrated by Respondent No. 1 in the present case. 15. It is urged that even assuming for the sake of argument it is held that the High Court order contains a "finding or direction" as contemplated by Sections 150 and 153(6) of the Act, further proceedings against the Petitioner could not be taken by merely issuing the impugned notice under Section 143(2) of the Act. ....
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....ths as provided under Section 153(6) of the Act, reckoned from the end of the month in which this Court's order was received by the Revenue authorities. Mr. Gupta contended that the present case does not require reassessment under Section 148 but is simply an assessment pursuant to the High Court's findings. In support of this contention, he referred to certain observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rajinder Nath V/S Commissioner of Income Tax [(1979) 120 ITR 14 (SC)], extracted in the affidavit in reply dated 3rd November 2025. Mr. Gupta, for Respondent No. 1, accepted that in view of the plain language of the order of this Court, no direction can be said to have been issued, but contended that the judgement contains a finding that the income is to be assessed in the hands of the Petitioner/amalgamated company. It was urged that the original period of limitation for passing an order of assessment was not applicable, and the extended limitation period under Section 153(6) of the Act became available for passing an assessment order in the hands of the Petitioner. Mr. Gupta submitted that the interpretation canvassed by the Petitioner would make the provisions of Section 153(6)....
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....ell for consideration of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as used in the provisions of Section 153(3)(ii) of the Act. The question before the Court was whether there was any finding or direction within the meaning of Section 153(3)(ii) of the Act in the order passed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, in consequence of which, or to give effect to, the assessments in question could be made within the extended period of limitation. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that in order to fall within the ambit of the phrase, "finding" given in an appeal, revision or reference arising out of an assessment must be a finding necessary for the disposal of the particular case, that is to say, in respect of the particular assessee and in relation to the particular assessment year. As regards the expression "direction" in Section 153(3)(ii) of the Act, it was observed that it was well settled that it must be an express direction necessary for the disposal of the case before the authority or Court. It must also be a direction which the authority or Court is empowered to give while deciding the case before it. It was held that the meaning of the expressions "finding" and "direction" in Section 153(3)(ii)....