TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2025 (1) TMI 1669
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....f all connected appeals. 3. This appeal arises from the judgment and order dated 30.10.2012 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in First Appeal No. 408 of 2012 by which the High Court allowed the appeal filed by the respondents herein-original plaintiffs and thereby, set aside the order passed by the 5th Additional District Judge, Bhopal in Civil Suit No. 25A/2011 rejecting the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, "the CPC") . 4. The facts giving rise to this appeal may be summarised as under : - Respondent no. 1 namely, Smt. Prabha Jain instituted Civil Suit No. 25A/11 praying for the following reliefs: - "a. It be declared that the disputed sale deed and the mortgage deed described in para 6 above are a nullity and it be declared that the defendant numbers 4 and 5 had no right to sell the disputed plot, to the defendant number 3 and the possession taken by the defendant number 2 is against the law and the grant of loan by the defendant number 1 on the security of the plot is against the law. b. That the possession of the plot of land shown in slanted red lines in the plan attached to th....
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....ecovery Tribunal. If the sale deed is held to be wholly or partially invalid it will immediately affect the validity of the mortgage of that property. The jurisdiction of civil court is ousted in respect of matters which the Debts Recovery Tribunal is empowered to decide. Absence of a provision to enable the Debts Recovery Tribunal for holding an enquiry on a particular question is indicative that jurisdiction of civil courts on that question is not excluded. The above question relating to the validity of the sale deed and its consequent effect on the mortgage are matters which the Debts Recovery Tribunal is not empowered to decide. The provision for appeal under section 17 of the SARFAESI Act by "any person" does not oust the jurisdiction of civil court on matters which cannot be decided by the Debts Recovery Tribunal. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the civil court to decide these matters cannot be held to be ousted under section 34 of the SARFAESI Act. 10. We also disagree, with the finding of the trial court that proper Court fee has not been paid by the plaintiff. The plaintiff is not a signatory or party in the sale deed as well as in the mortgage deed. She is, theref....
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....ubject plot under Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act and published an advertisement for the purpose of putting it to auction. The Plaintiff filed a suit in a civil court praying inter alia for the following reliefs: 1. For a declaration that the sale deed executed by Sumer Chand Jain in favour of Parmeshwar Das Prajapati is illegal ("first relief") 2. For a declaration that the mortgage deed executed by Parmeshwar Das Prajapati in favour of the Bank is illegal ("second relief") 3. For being handed over the possession ("third relief") In the suit, the bank filed an application under Order VII, Rule 11 of the CPC raising the following contentions : a) Suit is barred under Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act. b) Plaint is written on insufficiently stamped paper . 10.2.2012 : The Civil Court rejected the plaint on the following grounds : 1. The suit is barred by Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act. 2. The plaintiff has not paid the proper court fee. 09.04.2012 : The Plaintiff filed First Appeal before the High Court challenging the judgement dated 10.2.2012. 30.10.2012 : The High Court set asi....
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....e jurisdiction to determine whether "any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of Section 13 taken by the secured creditor" are in accordance with the Act or Rules thereunder. 15. The plaintiff in her suit has prayed for 3 reliefs: a) The first relief is in relation to a sale deed executed by Sumer Chand Jain in favour of Parmeshwar Das Prajapati. b) The second relief is in relation to a mortgage deed executed by Parmeshwar Das Prajapati in favour of the bank. c) The third relief is for being handed over the possession of the suit property. 16. So far as the first and second reliefs are concerned, they are not in relation to any measures taken by the secured creditor under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act. Rather, they are reliefs in relation to the actions taken prior to the secured creditor stepping into the picture and well prior to the secured creditor invoking the provisions of the SARFAESI Act. 17. Therefore, the Tribunal would have no jurisdiction under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act to grant the declarations sought in the first and the second reliefs. 18. Further, the SARFAESI Act is enacted essentially to provide a speedy me....
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.... 3. The Mortgage by Q in favour of the bank was invalid as it was a mortgage by Q who had no title. 20. The answer to the aforesaid would depend on whether Q's adoption was valid or not. If the adoption is valid, Q had title and the mortgage in favour of the bank would be valid. If the adoption was invalid, Z would be the owner & Q's mortgage would be invalid. The civil court will have jurisdiction to decide upon the validity of the adoption, not the DRT. 21. By way of third relief, the plaintiff is seeking possession. 22. The suit is of 2011. Hence, the SARFAESI Act as applicable prior to the 2016 Amendment will have to be examined. Section 17 (as it stood prior to the 2016 amendment) is reproduced below: "17. Right to appeal .- (1) Any person (including borrower) aggrieved by any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of Section 13 taken by the secured creditor or his authorised officer under this Chapter, may make an application along with such fee, as may be prescribed, to the Debts Recovery Tribunal having jurisdiction in the matter within forty-five days from the date on which such measure had been taken: Provided that different f....
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....m the date of such application: Provided that the Debts Recovery Tribunal may, from time to time, extend the said period for reasons to be recorded in writing, so, however, that the total period of pendency of the application with the Debts Recovery Tribunal, shall not exceed four months from the date of making of such application made under sub-section (1). (6) If the application is not disposed of by the Debts Recovery Tribunal within the period of four months as specified in subsection (5), any part to the application may make an application, in such form as may be prescribed, to the Appellate Tribunal for directing the Debts Recovery Tribunal for expeditious disposal of the application pending before the Debts Recovery Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal may, on such application, make an order for expeditious disposal of the pending application by the Debts Recovery Tribunal. (7) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the Debts Recovery Tribunal shall, as far as may be, dispose of the application in accordance with the provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993) and the rules made thereunde....
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.... II. Now, the question that arises is this: whether the Plaintiff being not in possession could have sought for from the DRT under the unamended Section 17(3)? In our considered view for the following two reasons, the plaintiff could not have sought from DRT the relief of being given possession: 1. Plaintiff is neither a borrower nor a person claiming under/through the borrower. Plaintiff has a claim independent of and adverse to the borrower. 2. Plaintiff was not in possession. Hence, the question of DRT "restoring" possession to Plaintiff did not arise. III. Hence, Plaintiff could not have sought from DRT, the relief of being handed over the possession. DRT would have no jurisdiction to grant such relief to her. Hence, the Plaintiff's third relief in her suit is also not barred by Section 34 of the SARFAESI ACT. IV. The bank may contend that even if the plaintiff cannot seek the relief of being handed over possession under the expression "restore the possession .... to the borrower", she can still seek that relief under the widely worded expression appearing at the end of Section 13(3): "and pass such order as it may consider approp....
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....ore the possession of secured assets or management of secured assets to the borrower or such other aggrieved person, who has made an application under sub-section (1), as the case may be; and (c) pass such other direction as it may consider appropriate and necessary in relation to any of the recourse taken by the secured creditor under sub- section (4) of section 13." 24. Even if we would have been persuaded to take the view that the third relief is barred by Section 17(3) of the SARFAESI Act, still the plaint must survive because there cannot be a partial rejection of the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the CPC. Hence, even if one relief survives, the plaint cannot be rejected under Order VII, Rule 11 of the CPC. In the case on hand, the first and second reliefs as prayed for are clearly not barred by Section 34 of the SARFAESI ACT and are within the civil court's jurisdiction. Hence, the plaint cannot be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC. 25. If the civil court is of the view that one relief (say relief A) is not barred by law but is of the view that Relief B is barred by law, the civil court must not make any observations to the effect that relief....
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....ll such matters which may be taken cognizance of by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, apart from those matters in which measures have already been taken under sub-section (4) of Section 13. 51. However, to a very limited extent jurisdiction of the civil court can also be invoked, where for example, the action of the secured creditor is alleged to be fraudulent or his claim may be so absurd and untenable which may not require any probe whatsoever or to say precisely to the extent the scope is permissible to bring an action in the civil court in the cases of English mortgages. We find such a scope having been recognized in the two decisions of the Madras High Court which have been relied upon heavily by the learned Attorney General as well appearing for the Union of India, namely, V. Narasimhachariar [AIR 1955 Mad 135], AIR at pp. 141 and 144, a judgment of the learned Single Judge where it is observed as follows in para 22: (AIR p. 143) "22. The remedies of a mortgagor against the mortgagee who is acting in violation of the rights, duties and obligations are twofold in character. The mortgagor can come to the court before sale with an injunction for staying the sale if ....
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....ective names. Original title deeds of all the abovementioned properties were duly deposited with the Bank at the time of availing of the loan. 11. Since they committed default in re-paying the loan, the Bank issued notice under Section 13(2) of the Securitisation Act and took steps under Section 13(4) of the Securitisation Act in respect of properties on 1-3-2004. Auction notice was duly published in the newspapers on 30-9-2005. No objection was raised by the plaintiffs and the suit land was auctioned on 8-11-2005, which was settled in favour of the highest bidder, the appellant herein. The entire auction price was paid by the auction-purchaser and the sale in his favour was duly confirmed. Respondents 7 to 9 challenged the sale notice, as already indicated, by filing Application No. 19 of 2005 before the DRT, Jabalpur, which was dismissed on 21-7-2006. No appeal was preferred against that order and that order has attained finality. 12. We notice, at this juncture, Respondents 1 to 5 filed Civil Suit No. 16A/07 in the Court of the District Judge, Barwani against the appellant, as well as the Bank and Respondents 6 to 9, alleging that the family members Respondents....
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....uch persons so that they can invoke the provisions of Section 17 of the Securitisation Act, in case the Bank (secured creditor) adopt any measure including the sale of the secured assets, on which the plaintiffs claim interest. XXX XXX XXX 22. The scope of Section 34 came up for consideration before this Court in Mardia Chemicals Ltd. [Mardia Chemicals Ltd. V. Union of India, (2004) 4 SCC 311] and this Court held as follows: (SCC p. 349, para 50) "50. It has also been submitted that an appeal is entertainable before the Debts Recovery Tribunal only after such measures as provided in sub- section (4) of Section 13 are taken and Section 34 bars to entertain any proceeding in respect of a matter which the Debts Recovery Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal is empowered to determine. Thus before any action or measure is taken under sub- section (4) of Section 13, it is submitted by Mr Salve, one of the counsel for the respondents that there would be no bar to approach the civil court. Therefore, it cannot be said that no remedy is availa....
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....quently, if any aggrieved person has got any grievance against any "measures" taken by the borrower under sub-section (4) of Section 13, the remedy open to him is to approach the DRT or the Appellate Tribunal and not the civil court. The civil court in such circumstances has no jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceedings in respect of those matters which fall under sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Securitisation Act because those matters fell within the jurisdiction of the DRT and the Appellate Tribunal. Further, Section 35 says, the Securitisation Act overrides other laws, if they are inconsistent with the provisions of that Act, which takes in Section 9 CPC as well. 25. We are of the view that the civil court jurisdiction is completely barred, so far as the "measures" taken by a secured creditor under sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Securitisation Act, against which an aggrieved person has a right of appeal before the DRT or the Appellate Tribunal, to determine as to whether there has been any illegality in the "measures" taken. The Bank, in the instant case, has proceeded only against secured assets of the borrowers on which no rights of Respondents 6 to ....
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....ote the relevant observations made by the Bombay High Court as regards the Jagadish (supra) : "21.3. In Jagdish v. Heeralal (supra), the appellant was an auction purchaser, who was not put in possession, acquired knowledge that civil suit for declaration of title, partition and permanent injunction was pending, in which a plea was raised, that the respondent nos. 1 to 5 therein being the sons/grandsons of deceased Premji, constituted a HUF engaged in agriculture and the auctioned property was purchased in the names of the respondent nos. 7 to 9 out of the funds of the HUF and the houses were also purchased in the names of the respondent nos. 6 to 8, out of the same HUF funds and therefore a declaration that the properties were HUF properties and the respondents nos. 1 to 5 had a right and share therein was claimed. The Bank filed an application raising a preliminary objection under Section 9 of C.P.C. in the suit regarding the bar of jurisdiction as contained in Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act, which was upheld. However, in a challenge to the said order, accepting the preliminary objection, the High Court, in appeal, considering that the plaint raised a question of title on....
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.... the DRT Act had been enacted in 1993. The legislature is presumed to be aware of the fact that the Tribunal constituted under the DRT Act would not have any jurisdiction to entertain any matter, wherein the subject-matter of the suit is less than Rs 10 lakhs." (emphasis supplied) 32. In Robust Hotels Private Limited & Ors. v. EIH Limited & Ors. reported in (2017) 1 SCC 622, this Court held that Section 34 bars the jurisdiction of civil court for (i) suits or proceedings relating to matters that the Debts Recovery Tribunal or Appellate Tribunal can decide under this Act, and (ii) no injunction may be granted by any court or authorities regarding actions under this Act or the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993. Therefore, the bar of jurisdiction of civil court has to correlate to the abovementioned conditions. This finding is central to the matter: the bar of jurisdiction correlates with the conditions mentioned in Section 34. The relevant paragraphs are: "31. The scope and ambit of Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 have been considered by this Court in several cases. It is sufficient to refer to the judgment of this Court in Nahar ....
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....ranted by any court or other authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act or under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993." Thus the bar of jurisdiction of civil court has to correlate to the abovementioned conditions. For the purposes of this case, we are of the view that this Court need not express any opinion as to whether suits filed by EIH were barred by Section 34 or not, since the issues are yet to be decided on merits and the appeal by Robust Hotels has been filed only against an interim order." (emphasis supplied) 33. In Authorised Officer, SBI V. Allwyn Alloys Private Limited & Ors. reported in (2018) 8 SCC 120, this Court, while dealing with a case in which the unregistered memorandum of understanding (which would not confer any right, title and interest) was subsequently created after the equitable mortgage, held that in such facts and circumstances, the suit was barred under Section 34. The relevant paragraphs are as under: "2. The Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT) as well as the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal (DRAT), after examining the plea take....
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....by DRT and DRAT but opined that the same involved factual issues warranting production of evidence and a full-fledged trial. The approach of the High Court as already noted hitherto is completely fallacious and untenable in law. 12. Be that as it may, since we are setting aside the impugned judgment [Meherangiz J. Rangoonwalla v. SBI, 2016 SCC OnLine Bom 8878] of the High Court, we direct that Writ Petition No. 7480 of 2014 shall stand restored to the file of the High Court to its original number for being decided on its own merits and in accordance with law. As the proceeding for recovery is pending since 2010, concerning the equitable mortgage created by Respondents 2 to 4 in respect of the subject flat and having failed to repay the loan amount, which is quite substantial, we request the High Court to dispose of the writ petition expeditiously, preferably by the end of July 2018." (emphasis supplied) 34. In Madhav Prasad Aggarwal & Anr. v. Axis Bank Limited & Anr. reported in (2019) 7 SCC 158, this Court declared that under Order VII Rule 11, plaint cannot be rejected in part or against one of the defendants. The plaintiff's claim was based on allotment letter....
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....0 crores in respect of which a mortgage deed is said to have been executed between the builder and the bank. That transaction came to the notice of the plaintiff(s) concerned only after publication of a public notice on 13-9-2016 in Economic Times, informing the general public that the said project (Orbit Heaven) has been mortgaged. The sum and substance of the assertion made by the appellant (s) is that the appellant(s) were kept in the dark whilst the mortgage transaction was executed between the builder and the bank whereunder their rights have been unilaterally jeopardised, to receive possession of the flats concerned earmarked in the allotment letter(s) and in respect of which the appellant (s) concerned have paid substantial contribution and the aggregate contribution of all the plaintiff(s) would be much more than the Loan amount given by the bank to the builder in terms of the mortgage deed for the entire project. In this backdrop, the appellant (s) concerned had asked for reliefs not only against the builder but also the parties concerned joined as the defendant (s) in the suit(s) filed by them and including Respondent 1 Bank. XXX &nb....
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....ned Single Judge that bar under Section 34 will not come in the way of the appellant- plaintiffs. The Division Bench also opined that the averments in the plaint concerned do not spell out the case of fraud committed by the Bank and/or the builder. As a result of which, the Court held that the suit (s) instituted by the appellant (s) did not come within the excepted category predicated in Mardia Chemicals Ltd. [Mardia Chemicals Ltd. V. Union of India, (2004) 4 SCC 311] and thus the plaint against Respondent 1 Bank was not maintainable, being barred by Section 34 of the 2002 Act. XXX XXX XXX 10. We do not deem it necessary to elaborate on all other arguments as we are inclined to accept the objection of the appellant (s) that the relief of rejection of plaint in exercise of powers under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC cannot be pursued only in respect of one of the defendant (s). In other words, the plaint has to be rejected as a whole or not at all, in exercise of power under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC. Indeed, the learned Single Judge rejected this objection raised by the appellant (s) b....
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....me of the reliefs claimed against Respondent 1 in the suit concerned is barred by Section 34 of the 2002 Act or otherwise, such objection can be raised by invoking other remedies including under Order 6 Rule 16 CPC at the appropriate stage. That can be considered by the Court on its own merits and in accordance with law. Although, the High Court has examined those matters in the impugned judgment the same, in our opinion, should stand effaced and we order accordingly. 13. Resultantly, we do not wish to dilate on the argument of the appellant(s) about the inapplicability of the judgments taken into account by the Division Bench of the High Court or for that matter the correctness of the dictum in the judgment concerned on the principle underlying the exposition in Nahar Industrial Enterprises Ltd. v. Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corpn. [Nahar Industrial Enterprises Ltd. v. Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corpn., (2009) 8 SCC 646 : (2009) 3 SCC (Civ) 481] to the effect that DRT and also the appellate authority cannot pass a decree nor is it open to it to enter upon determination in respect of matters beyond the scope of power or jurisdiction endowed in terms of Section 17 o....
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....ned and therefore the assignment deed can be said to be "fraudulent". 10. The aforesaid cannot be accepted. By that itself the assignment deed cannot be said to be "fraudulent". In any case, whether there shall be legally enforceable debt so far as the plaintiff appellant herein is concerned even after the approved resolution plan against the corporate debtor still there shall be the liability of the plaintiff and/or the assignee can be said to be secured creditor and/or whether any amount is due and payable by the plaintiff, are all questions which are required to be dealt with and considered by the DRT in the proceedings initiated under the SARFAESI Act. 11. It is required to be noted that as such in the present case the assignee has already initiated the proceedings under Section 13 which can be challenged by the plaintiff-appellant herein by way of application under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act before the DRT on whatever the legally available defences which may be available to it. We are of the firm opinion that the suit filed by the plaintiff-appellant herein was absolutely not maintainable in view of the bar contained under Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act. ....
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....civil courts is barred only in respect of suits and applications of the nature specified in the Third Schedule to the Act and in respect of suits or applications based on a cause of action in respect of which any relief could be obtained by means of a suit or application of the nature specified in the Third Schedule. The civil court has no jurisdiction to entertain a suit or proceeding with respect to any matter arising under the Act or the Rules made thereunder, provided that a remedy by way of a suit, application or appeal or otherwise is provided in the Act. 6. The legal position of the question of jurisdiction which is stated above requires examination of the various entries in the Third Schedule. That schedule is divided into three parts, the first of which is called "Suits", the second is called "Applications", and the third is called "Appeals". We are concerned in this appeal with the 35 entries which are comprehended in the first part which deals with suits. It is common ground, and the High Court has not held to the contrary, that none of the specific Entries 1 to 34 is applicable to the suit filed by the appellant Bank. The argument is that the residuary Entry 35....
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....Rajasthan Cooperative Societies Act, 1965 (Act 13 of 1965) or a Cooperative Society registered or deemed to be registered as such under the said Act or any Scheduled Bank or any other institution notified by the State Government in that behalf." The High Court is in error in saying that "it cannot be disputed" that the mortgage was executed by Respondent 1 in pursuance of the provisions of Section 43. The business of the Bank, insofar as lending transactions are concerned, is not to lend moneys on mortgages but the business is to lend moneys. In this particular case, the Bank lent a certain sum of money to Respondent 1 in the usual course of its commercial business and nothing could be further removed from the contemplation of the Act than such a transaction. It is only by way of a collateral security that the obtained a hypothecation bond and a deed of mortgage from Respondent 1 and a letter of guarantee from Respondents 2 and 3. The entire judgment of the High Court is based on the assumption that the mortgage was executed in pursuance of Section 43 of the Act and, therefore, residuary Entry 35 of the Third Schedule is attracted. Once it is appreciated that the mortgage ....
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....ed, whereafter the mortgage was executed in favour of the Bank. 39. This Court in M.P. Wakf Board v. Subhan Shah (Dead) by LRs. reported in (2006) 10 SCC 696 has held that the Tribunal in absence of any power vested in it cannot transgress beyond the four corners of the Act. The relevant paragraphs are: "28. The Tribunal had been constituted for the purposes mentioned in Section 83 of the 1995 Act. It is an adjudicatory body. Its decision is final and binding but then it could not usurp the jurisdiction of the Board. Our attention has not been drawn to any provision which empowers the Tribunal to frame a scheme. In absence of any power vested in the Tribunal, the Tribunal ought to have left the said function to the Board which is statutorily empowered therefor. Where a statute creates different authorities to exercise their respective functions thereunder, each of such authority must exercise the functions within the four corners of the statute." (emphasis supplied) 40. The Constitution Bench in Om Prakash Gupta v. Dr. Rattan Singh & Anr. reported in 1962 SCC OnLine SC 111, has declared that the tribunals being creatures of the statute have limited jurisdiction. T....
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....ext of the provisions of the RDB Act, 1993, and whether such a suit can be transferred to the DRT with or without consent. This Court held: (a) That civil court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit is not ousted. (b) In the absence of any power, the independent suit cannot be transferred to the DRT. (c)As there is no power, the transfer of the suit cannot be done with or without consent. (d) That the barring of jurisdiction of the civil court is to be strictly interpreted and not to be readily inferred. (emphasis supplied) 42. The relevant paragraphs are: "39. On a plain reading of the provisions, the conclusion reached was that Section 17 of the RDB Act bars the jurisdiction of the civil court only in respect of applications filed by the Bank or financial institution. This provision did not bar the jurisdiction of the civil court to try a suit filed by the borrower. There was also an absence of provisions in the Act for transfer of suits and proceedings except Section 31, which relates to pending suit proceedings by a bank or financial institution for recovery of debt. XXX XXX....
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....im by the Bank is ousted, but it is the matter of choice of that defendant. Such a defendant may file a counterclaim, or may be desirous of availing of the more strenuous procedure established under the Code, and that is a choice which he takes with the consequences thereof. XXX XXX XXX 47. We may also refer to the judgment of this Court in Transcore [Transcore v. Union of India, (2008) 1 SCC 125 : (2008) 1 SCC (Civ) 116] opining that DRT, being a Tribunal and a creature of the statute, does not have any inherent power which inheres in civil courts such as Section 151 of the Code. 48. We now draw our attention to Chapter 5 of the RDB Act, which deals with recovery of debt determined by DRT. Section 25 of the RDB Act prescribes the mode of recovery of debts, which takes place pursuant to a certificate issued under sub-section (7) of Section 19 to recover the amount of debt specified in the certificate by any of the modes specified therein. The expanse of the reliefs the defendant may claim in the suit proceeding can certainly go beyond mere adjustments of the amounts of claim, for whic....
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.... filed by the borrower against the Bank or financial institution cannot be transferred to be tried along with application under the RDB Act, as it is a matter of option of the defendant in the claim under the RDB Act. However, the proceedings under the RDB Act will not be impeded in any manner by filing of a separate suit before the civil court. (b) If the answer is in the affirmative, can such transfer be ordered by a court only with the consent of the plaintiff? Since there is no such power with the civil court, there is no question of transfer of the suit whether by consent or otherwise." (emphasis supplied) HOW TO INTERPRET THE CLAUSES WHICH BAR THE CIVIL COURT'S JURISDICTION 43. This Court in Dwarka Prasad Agarwal (Dead) by LRS. & Anr. V. Ramesh Chander Agarwal & Ors. reported in (2003) 6 SCC 220 (3 Judge Bench) has explained that bar of jurisdiction of the civil court is not to be readily inferred. Such a provision requires strict interpretation. It was further held that this Court would lean in favour of construction which would uphold the retention of the civil court's jurisdiction. The relevant paragraphs are: "22. The dispute be....