TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2006 (9) TMI 630
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....7303 of 2004, 8548 of 2004, 9035 of 2004, 9036 of 2004, 9039 of 2004, 9829 of 2004, 12446 of 2004, 18136 of 2003, 3951 of 2004, 3952 of 2004, 3953 of 2004, 3954 of 2004, 3955 of 2004, 3956 of 2004, 6815 of 2004, 6816 of 2004, 6817 of 2004, 8544 of 2004, 8545 of 2004, 8546 of 2004, 3041 of 2003, 22663 of 2005, 22664 of 2005, 22665 of 2005, 22666 of 2005, 23749 of 2005 Honourable Mr. Justice J.M. Panchal And Hon'ble Smt. Justice Abhilasha Kumari For the Petitioner : Mr Vc Kotwal, Senior Advocate For Mr Br Gupta For The Respondents : Mr Kamal B. Trivedi, Advocate General With Ms Sangeeta Vishen, Assistant Government Pleader COMMON ORAL JUDGMENT (PER: MR.JUSTICE J.M.PANCHAL) In all these petitions, 87 in number, common questions of facts and law arise for determination of the Court with the only difference in type and nature of vehicles/machines. The question to be considered is as to whether such vehicle/machine is "motor vehicle" or "vehicle" within the meaning of Section 2(28) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and, therefore, liable to be taxed under the provisions of the Bombay Motor Vehicles Tax Act, 1958 or whether it is simply machine and/or equipment not cov....
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....hicle within the meaning of Section 2(28) of the M.V. Act and was liable to be taxed under the Tax Act. This apprehension was also entertained by the petitioner with reference to another equipment namely crawler mounted crane called TATA-320 bearing equipment Sr.No.T-3801 manufactured by TELCO in India. Therefore, the petitioner invoked jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution by filing Special Civil Application Nos.8117 of 2003 and 8118 of 2003 seeking appropriate writ or order to hold that the petitioner's crawler crane TATA-320 was neither a 'motor vehicle' nor 'vehicle' under Section 2(28) of the M.V. Act and was, therefore, not required to be registered before the R.T.O. Authority in the State of Gujarat. Those two petitions came up for hearing before the learned Single Judge of this Court on June 19, 2003 and after hearing the learned counsels for the parties, the Court disposed of the two petitions vide order dated June 19, 2003 by giving following directions: "7. In view of the aforesaid, I find that the following directions shall meet with the ends of justice: (i) If the vehicles of the petitioners are detai....
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....rane, in view of its characteristics, does not fall within the definition of 'motor vehicle' as defined in Section 2(28) of the M.V. Act nor within the definition of 'construction equipment vehicle' as defined in Rule 2(ca) of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 ("the Central Rules" for short) and, therefore, the Commissioner of Transport was not justified in holding that crawler-crane TATA-320 was a 'motor vehicle' under Section 2(28) of the M.V. Act and also liable to be taxed under the provisions of the Tax Act. What is claimed by the petitioner is that crawler-crane of the petitioner is neither rubber-tyred nor rubber-padded nor steel-drum wheel mounted nor self-propelled nor manufactured with 'on or of' or 'on and of' and, therefore, cannot be termed as 'construction equipment vehicle' within the meaning of Rule 2(ca) of the Central Rules. According to the petitioner, the equipment is purely off highway construction equipment designed and adopted for use in an enclosed premises, factory or mine other than the road network and as it is not equipment to travel on public road on its own power, it is not a 'motor vehicle' ....
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....ts should not be determined by the Court while exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is mentioned in the reply that refund of tax can always be claimed under Section 9(4)(b) of the Tax Act and as no advance declaration of non-use in Form 'NT', as required by Rule 5(1) of the Bombay Motor Vehicles Rules, 1959 ("the Rules of 1959" for short), was filed, the 'crawler crane' is liable to be taxed under Section 3(2) of the Tax Act. What is mentioned in the reply is that a vehicle running upon a fixed rail or a vehicle of special type adapted for use is 'vehicle' and crawler crane, heavy duty dumper, motor graders are motor vehicles adapted for use upon roads though they may also be used in factory. According to the deponent of the said affidavit, in exercise of powers under Section 41(4) of the M.V. Act, the Central Government has issued notification dated June, 19, 1992 wherein crane mounted vehicle at Item No.(ix) is included as a 'non-transport vehicle' and, therefore, the vehicle of the petitioner is liable to be taxed. What is averred in the reply is that looking to the definition of 'construction equipment vehicle', pur....
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....as to be subjected to test and manufacturer, i.e. Bharat Earth Movers Limited, has got designed approved, which would indicate that its motor vehicle would fall within the meaning of Section 2(28) of the M.V. Act. In support of this claim, the deponent has relied upon a sale certificate in Form No.21 and road worthiness certificate in Form 22 issued by BEML. In the reply, it is further mentioned that the Government of India by letter dated November 5, 2002 has stated that construction equipment vehicles are 'motor vehicles' and, therefore, the letter dated March 27, 2003 relied upon by the petitioner for contending that crawler/chain mounted cranes do not fall under 'construction equipment vehicles' should not be given undue importance. The deponent has referred to dictionary meaning of 'crawler' and contended that the crawler is a self-moving vehicle, which is fit for use on road. Along with affidavit-in-reply, photographs are produced to show that crawler mechanism is adapted for use on road and fit for use on road. It is mentioned in the reply that before passing the order, the Commissioner of Transport, Gujarat State, had heard the petitioner and taken i....
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....failed to supply second sets in the petitions, which were initially listed for hearing before the learned Single Judge and, thereafter placed before the Division Bench. Therefore, the Division Bench by order dated October 27, 2004, dismissed all the petitions for non prosecution. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner and others approached the Supreme Court by way of filing Civil Appeal Nos.5961 of 2005 to 6042 of 2005 and the appeals were allowed by an order dated September 30, 2005 in the following terms: "Leave granted. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties at length, we are satisfied that there has been no satisfactory disposal of the matters in issue before the High Court and that has occasioned a failure of justice. In our opinion, the appellants, i.e., the petitioners in the High Court should have been allowed a reasonable opportunity for carrying out orders of the Court so as to make the matters ready for hearing bi-parte. For this reason alone and without expressing any opinion on the merits of the controversy at large before the High Court, the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside and the Special Civil Applications which were disposed o....
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....ed bank guarantee and as the orders have been carried out, deposit should not be encashed. 4. In almost identical situation in number of the cases, we have passed similar orders as passed above. For granting relief if earlier orders are to be observed, then, for modifying the relief earlier orders must also be observed. We find no reason to pass any different orders in favour of the present set of the petitions. If current taxes are not paid within four weeks, then, stay shall stand vacated automatically." 3.8 The record further shows that thereafter, in all thirty-eight applications, i.e. Civil Application Nos.11767 of 2005 to 11804 of 2005 were filed for extension of time to deposit the amount required to be deposited pursuant to order dated October 24, 2005 and after hearing the learned counsels for the parties, the Division Bench comprising Mr. Justice A.R. Dave and Ms. Justice R.M. Doshit passed following order on December 5, 2005: "Learned Advocate General has appeared for the Opponent in each application and has placed on record the details of amount payable by the applicant in respect of each vehicle. The said details have also been given to learned adv....
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.... 5. In reply to this preliminary objection, Mr. V.C. Kotwal, learned Senior Advocate from Mumbai appearing for the petitioner, contended that the fact that a revision lies in two petitions and appeal lies in rest of the petitions, does not oust the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the petitions because what is challenged in the petitions is jurisdiction of the State to levy tax on equipments, which are not 'motor vehicles' within the meaning of the M.V. Act, and the Rules framed thereunder. It was argued that against the appellate orders of the Commissioner of Transport, writ petitions along with other petitions were filed, which were dismissed by this Court as second set was not supplied in each petition, as a result of which, the petitioner had approached the Supreme Court for restoration of the petitions, but before the Supreme Court it was not contended on behalf of the respondents that the petitions should not be restored because of availability alternative remedy to the petitioner and, therefore, after remand of the petitions by the Supreme Court, such a plea should not be entertained by the Court. It was pleaded that levy of tax on the vehicles of the petitione....
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....its entry in the State for the period commencing from the date of its purchase is wholly unconstitutional, the prayers claimed in the petitions should be granted. It was argued that the collection of tax on the equipments of the petitioner, which are not suitable for use on roads, is beyond the legislative competence of the State in view of the provisions of Entry 57 List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and, therefore, the same should be struck down by the Court. It was asserted that the definition of 'construction equipment vehicle' in Rule 2(ca) of the Central Rules has no bearing on the interpretation of the provisions of the Tax Act, firstly because Section 2(28) of the M.V. Act, which defines 'motor vehicle' or 'vehicle', is not amended to include 'construction equipment vehicle'; and secondly because 'construction equipment vehicle' with caterpillar type of movement is neither contemplated in Entry 57 nor in the provisions of the Tax Act and, therefore, the petitions should be accepted. It was asserted that the words 'for use upon roads' employed in Section 2(28) of the M.V. Act defining the 'motor vehicle'....
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....issa & Ors., 1992 Supp. (3) SCC 133; (3) Shantilal Khushaldas & Brothers Private Limited vs. Licensing Officer & Director of Transport, Goa, & Ors., 1995 (2) Goa L.T. 134; (4) Raj Construction vs. Intelligence Officer, 2005 (2) K.L.T. 436. 7. Mr. Kamal B. Trivedi, learned Advocate General, with Ms. Sangeeta Vishen, learned Assistant Government Pleader for the respondents, explained the scheme of the Tax Act of 1958 by referring to Section 2(10) of the said Act as well as Rule 2(h) of the Rules of 1959 and contended that one needs to make a cumulative reading of the provisions of (1) The Bombay Motor Vehicles Tax Act, 1958; (2) The Bombay Motor Vehicles Tax Rules 1959; (3) The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and (4) The Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, which would suggest that whenever the words 'motor vehicle' occur in the State Act and the Rules, meaning thereof should be gathered from the aforesaid Central Act and the Central Rules. It was argued that if any vehicle is covered within the meaning of term 'construction equipment vehicle' as defined in Rule 2(ca) of the Central Rules, the same would be considered to be 'motor vehicle' for the purpose of taxation under....
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.... respondents, the tax sought to be recovered is tax on motor vehicles for the likely use thereof on the roads, which is compensatory in character since the same is being used for providing roads and other infrastructural facilities and, therefore, the action of the respondents in collecting tax on vehicles of the petitioners cannot be regarded as without jurisdiction. While referring to communication dated March 27, 2003 of the Central Government relied upon by the petitioner, it was argued that the same cannot be relied upon so as to contend that the vehicle in question is not a motor vehicle under the M.V. Act for the purpose of the Taxation Acts because the very signatory to the above referred to communication had, in fact, opined other way round in its earlier communication dated November 5, 2002 addressed to the State Government. It was contended that communication dated March 27, 2003 cannot and should not be considered to be contemporanea expositio for the purpose of interpreting the definition of the term 'motor vehicle', in view of the settled legal position emerging from catena of decisions of the Supreme Court. It was asserted by the learned Advocate General that....
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....e ground that these machines were in fact the vehicles for which the registration was necessary and the taxes were required to be paid by the petitioner. The judgment further shows that the machines/vehicles in question in different petitions were as under: SCA No. Type or Nature of the machine/ vehicle 9976/99 Motor Grader - 2 9826/99 Wheel Loader - 1 10417/99 Vibratory Roller - 1 419/2000 Paver - 1 2034/2000 Motor Graders - 3 Wheel Loader - 1 Vibratory - 1 Vibratory Roller - 1 Excavator-cum-Loader - 1 619/2000 Motor Grader - 1 342/2000 Crane - 1 801/2000 Crane - 1 524/2000 Motor Graders - 2 Vibratory Rollers - 2 7491/99 Motor Grader - 1 7536/99 Crane - 1 8.1 The Court examined the question as to whether the motor grader, vibratory roller, wheel loader, paver, excavator-cum-loader, crane, etc. should be treated as 'motor vehicle' or 'vehicle' in the context of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, the Bombay Motor Vehicles Tax Act, 1958 and the Gujarat Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 or not. The Court noticed that so far as the mobile cranes were con....
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.... learned Single Judge that the cranes in question in the cases were not mobile cranes nor permanently fitted on the vehicles, but the cranes, which were transported on other heavy long bedded motor carriers at different work sites and in some cases, they were motor graders, wheel loaders, vibratory rollers, paver and excavator-cum-loader and, therefore, not 'motor vehicle' or 'vehicle' within the meaning of Section 2 (28) of the M.V. Act. The learned Single Judge noticed the definition of the words 'motor vehicle' or 'vehicle' as occurring in Section 2(28) of the M.V. Act and also noticed the argument advanced by the petitioner that these machines were not adapted for use on road and were only the equipments for the purpose of carrying out projects of construction of buildings, roads, dams, highways, and bridges over rivers and only for that purpose they were being carried from one place to another place and that too not on their own wheels as such, but after mounting them on some other registered vehicles which are long bedded. After examining the scheme of the Acts and the Rules and arguments, the learned Judge held as under in paragraphs 6 to 10: ....
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.... motor vehicles and according to Rule 176, nothing contained in these Rules shall apply to road rollers, graders and other vehicles designed and used solely for the construction, repair and cleansings of roads or for the construction and maintenance of dams etc. Both these Rules, i.e. Rules 60 and 176 provide for exemption of road rollers, graders, etc. Thus, crane mounted vehicle and dumper/excavator are non-transport vehicles and it is to be seen as to whether these two entries made in this Table under S.O. dated 19th June 1992 really form any basis so as to treat the crane mounted vehicle or the dumper/excavator as a motor vehicle. The question of crane mounted vehicle stands decided by the order of the Division Bench and as per this S.O. dated 19th June 1992, the dumper/ excavator has been included as a transport vehicle. This Table shows that the Motor Graders, Wheel Loaders, Vibratory Rollers, Paver etc. are neither transport vehicles nor non-transport vehicles. Even the crane other than the crane mounted vehicle has not been included either as a transport vehicle or as a non-transport vehicle. Learned AGP has submitted that the exemption under Rules 60 and 176 of the Gujarat....
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.... four wheels and is used for the purpose of digging and shifting sand etc. so as to place it in the trucks. It is used for preparatory work for constructing the roads. 8. Section 13 of the Bombay Motor Vehicles Tax Act, 1958 provides for exemption of all motor vehicles designed and used solely for agricultural operations on farms or farm lands and the same are exempted from the payment of tax. Section 13(2) further provides that the State Government may, subject to the provisions of any rules made in that behalf, by notification in the Official Gazette, exempt either totally or partially any class of motor vehicles other than those falling under sub-section (1), or any motor vehicles belonging to any class of persons, from the payment of the tax. It is not the case of the petitioners that any of these machines/vehicles are used solely for agricultural operations or that any of these machines/vehicles are otherwise exempted under Section 13(2) of the Bombay Motor Vehicles Tax Act, 1958. 9. During the course of dictation of the order, learned AGP Mr. Shukla referred to a notification dated 4th April 2000 issued by the Home Department of the Govt. of Gujarat in exerc....
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....hicle. Even if the driving of the same on the road is incidental and for a short duration at a slow speed not exceeding 50 kms per hour and what has been excluded or not included is the equipments which are purely off highway construction equipment designed and adopted for use in any enclosed premises, factory or mines, other than road work, not equipped to travel on public roads on their own power. Thus, as per this amendment, it is very clear and admits of no further argument or controversy that all or any of the vehicles in question are non-transport vehicles and there is no provision for their exemption from the tax because none of these vehicles fall in any of the exclusions as provided in the Act, i.e. Clause (ca) which is definition of the 'construction equipment vehicle'. It is apparent from the description and use of the vehicles as aforesaid that they are all construction equipment vehicles, i.e. non-transport vehicles and such construction equipment vehicles also fall within the definition of the motor vehicles or vehicles as such and hence, are liable to pay the tax. 10. On behalf of the petitioners, it has been pointed out by Mr. Kapadia that this noti....
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....e matters indicated that a correct statement was made by the learned Advocate General. The learned Advocate General was further requested to inform the Court whether the fact that those petitions were filed and rejected by the learned Single Judge on merits, was mentioned in any of these 87 petitions and after verification of the record, the learned Advocate General stated at the Bar that there is neither mention of filing of those petitions in any of these 87 petitions nor reference is made to the judgment of the learned Single Judge delivered in those petitions. The learned Advocate General also informed the Court that the judgment delivered by the learned Single Judge in those petitions has attained finality inasmuch as the said judgment was neither challenged by M/s.Larsen & Toubro Limited by way of filing Letters Patent Appeal nor subjected to challenge before any other higher forum. This Court noticed that there was a serious lapse on the part of the petitioners in not mentioning the filing of the earlier petitions as well as decision rendered thereon by the learned Single Judge of this Court and, therefore, wanted to know from Mr.V.C.Kotwal, learned Senior Advocate for the p....
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.... As far as the appellate order is concerned, the only averment made by the petitioner in the memorandum of Special Civil Application No.15815 of 2003 is to be found in Ground 5(K), which is as under: "(K) The respondent No.2 has misread and misconstrued the various decisions of the Apex Court and the Gujarat High Court cited in his impugned order in the context of the petitioner's equipment, which can neither be classified as a "motor vehicle" or "construction equipment vehicle". As such the said decisions do not at all apply to the present case." Thus, there is no manner of doubt that Mr. K.D. Mehta, who had filed the earlier petitions was aware about the fact that earlier the petitions claiming the same relief, as are claimed in the instant petitions, were filed and rejected by the learned Single Judge of this Court. It is relevant to notice that in paragraph 7 of the petition, the petitioner has made the following statement on oath: "7. The petitioner declares that except as stated in the body of this petition it has not preferred any other proceeding in respect of the subject matter of this petition before any Court, including this Hon'ble High Cour....
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....facts, and the applicant must state fully and fairly the facts and the penalty by which the Court enforces that obligation is that if it finds out that the facts have not been fully and fairly stated to it, the court will not examine the merits of the case. As a general rule, suppression of a material fact by a litigant disqualifies such a litigant from obtaining any relief. This rule has been evolved out of the need of the Courts to deter a litigant from abusing the process of the Court by deceiving it. The applicant, who does not come with candid facts, cannot hold a writ of the Court with soiled hands. Suppression or concealment of material facts is not an advocacy. it is a jugglery, which has no place in equitable and prerogative jurisdiction. If the applicant does not disclose all the material facts fairly and truly, but states them in a distorted manner with a view to mislead or deceive the Court, the Court has inherent power in order to protect itself and to prevent an abuse of its power to discharge the rule nisi and should refuse to proceed with further examination of the case on merits. If the Court does not reject the petition on that ground, the Court would be failing i....
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....facts in this case at some length and passed a detailed order because we are deeply grieved to come across such conduct on the part of an association, which claims to represent high placed officers of a premier bank of this country. One expects such officers to fight their battles fairly and squarely and not to stoop low to gain, what can only be, temporary victories by keeping away material facts from the court. It is common knowledge that, of late, statements are being made in petitions and affidavits recklessly and without proper verification not to speak of dishonest and deliberate misstatements. We, therefore, take this opportunity to record our strong and emphatic disapproval of the conduct of the petitioners in this case and hope that this will be a lesson to the present petitioner as well as to other litigants and that at least in future people will act more truthfully and with a greater sense of responsibility". 11.3 Again, in Vijay J. Gadhavi vs. State of Gujarat, 1988 (2) G.L.R. 902, the petitioner was serving as English Section Writer in the Court of Civil Judge (J.D.), Visavadar. He filed petition under Article 226 of the Constitution alleging that his services had ....
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....39;populist stance'). I do not purpose to initiate action for the contempt of Court. But if I do not reject the petition on the ground of material suppression of facts, I would be failing in my duty. 8. It is really not a matter of pleasure to reject a petition and tell the litigant that he is not entitled to be heard on merits. But some times certain occasions do arise when one is called upon to perform unpleasant duties. Hence with much anguish and reluctance I am constrained to hold that the petition is liable to be rejected on the short ground of suppression of material facts. In the case of N.D. Patel & Company vs. Manubhai Karsanbhai Parmar and Anr., 25(1) GLR 386, a Division Bench of this High Court (consisting of R.C. Mankad, J. and myself) had taken the same view. Therein the petitioner had suppressed certain material facts. The Court held that important fact and material facts was deliberately suppressed from the Court. The Division Bench did not interfere with the award passed by the Labour Court on the ground of suppression of material facts alone. Thus, on the basis of first principles as well as in view of the principles laid down by this High Court in th....
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....pplication No.817 of 2005 are also produced, which make it evident that ultimately by judgments dated March 24, 2005, the matters were remanded to the respondent, who was directed to take appropriate decision on the question, whether the equipment in question was a 'motor vehicle' or a 'construction equipment vehicle'. The affidavit would further show that the judgments of the learned Single Judge were subjected to challenge in Letters Patent Appeal Nos.495 to 497 of 2005 and the Division Bench comprising G.S. Singhvi, J. (as he then was) and Anant S. Dave, J. by judgment dated April 8, 2005 rejected the same with costs by inter alia making following observations: "We are further of the view that the learned Single Judge did not commit any error by observing that as and when the question arises whether the equipment in question is a "motor vehicle" or a "construction equipment vehicle", the appropriate authority will decide the same by considering the evidence which may be produced by the parties and if the appellant feels aggrieved by the order of the competent authority, then it will be at liberty to challenge the same by filing appeal etc. The appellant ....
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....r or has an important bearing on the main point raised in the petition and is material to the relief claimed. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, this Court is of the firm opinion that filing of the earlier petitions and dismissal of the same by the learned Single Judge (Coram: M.R. Calla, J.) was a relevant fact, which goes to the root of the matter or has an important bearing on the main point raised in the petitions and is material to the reliefs claimed in the petitions. 15. The prerogative remedy is not a matter of course. While exercising power a writ Court would certainly bear in mind the conduct of the party who invokes the jurisdiction of the Court. If the applicant makes a false statement or suppresses material facts or attempts to mislead or deceive the Court, the Court would be justified in dismissing the action on that ground alone and should refuse to enter into the merits of the case. Thus, all the petitions are liable to be dismissed on the ground of suppression of material facts. 16. As is evident from the record of the case, the point in issue in the instant petitions is whether the type and nature of the vehicles/machines are motor vehicles/v....
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.... would be put to constant trouble, harassment and expenses. The doctrine of res judicata is based on the three principles namely; (1) no man should be vexed twice for the same cause; (2) it is in the interest of the State that there should be an end to a litigation; and, (3) a judicial decision must be accepted as correct. It is well-established that doctrine of res judicata codified in Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, is not exhaustive. This principle, no doubt, is embodied in relation to suits, but it is applied by court for achieving the finality in litigation. It has been settled since long that though Section 11 of the Code does not, in terms, apply to writ petitions, there is no good ground to preclude decisions in matters in controversy in writ proceedings under Article 32 or Article 226 of the Constitution from operating as res judicata in subsequent petitions or regular suits on the same matter in controversy between the same parties and thus to give limited effect to the principle of finality of decision after full contest. 16.2 As observed earlier, Special Civil Application No.9976 of 1999 and cognate matters were disposed of on merits after contest be....
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....d also on the ground that they are barred by general principles of res judicata as applicable to writ proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. 18. Further, this Court finds that interim order dated October 24, 2005 passed by the Division Bench comprising R.S. Garg & K.M. Mehta, JJ. in the instant petitions is not complied with at all in all the petitions, except Special Civil Application Nos.22663 of 2005 to 22666 of 2005 and Special Civil Application No.23749 of 2005, which would be an additional ground to dismiss those 82 petitions. Interim order dated October 24, 2005 passed by the Division Bench of this Court has been extracted in extenso earlier. A bare reading of the said order makes it very clear that the past recovery up to the date of filing of the writ petitions was to remain in abeyance and the petitioner was obliged to deposit the current taxes, if the vehicle was used or kept for use in the State in accordance with law till final disposal of the writ petitions. On true construction of interim order dated October 24, 2005, there is no manner of doubt that the current taxes from the date of filing of the writ petitions till their disposal were required to be....
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....g ad interim relief in terms of paragraph 14(B) on condition that the petitioner shall furnish to the Assistant Regional Transport Officer, Himatnagar, a Bank Guarantee in the sum of Rs.50,000=00, was passed on April 19, 2004. Interim relief claimed in terms of paragraph 14(B) was as under: "14(B) By way of interim relief, be pleased to order and direct the respondent authority, its servants, agents, representatives and assignees, not to intercept or detain the truck trailer carrying the petitioner's crawler mounted Pay-welder bearing Machine Serial No.75W3075 and Assets Code No.2265-002-4 in connection with execution of MOPL Project at Surat." The order dated April 19, 2004 passed by the Court requiring the petitioner to furnish to the Assistant Regional Transport Office of Himatnagar, Bank Guarantee in the sum of Rs.50,000=00 had nothing to do with the order dated October 24, 2005. Therefore, the claim advanced by the petitioner that furnishing of Bank Guarantee of Rs.50,000=00 is sufficient compliance of order dated October 24, 2005 cannot be upheld. There is no manner of doubt that interim order dated October 24, 2005 is not complied with by the petitioner in 82 pet....