TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2025 (8) TMI 552
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.... 2017 by M/s. I-Tech Plast India Pvt. Ltd., (for short-'appellant') against the Advance Ruling No. GUJ/GAAR/R/2024/04 dated 3.2.2024. 3. Briefly, the appellant who is engaged in the manufacture and supply of toys made up of plastic and/or rubber or both, approached the GAAR [Gujarat Authority for Advance Ruling] seeking a ruling on the below mentioned questions viz "[a] What is the appropriate classification & rate of GST applicable on supply of plastic toys under CGST & SGST? [b] Can the applicant claim ITC in relation to CGST-IGST separately in debit notes issued by the supplier in the current financial year i.e. 2020-21, towards the transactions for the period 2018-19" 4. GAAR, post admittance & personal hearing, pronounced its ruling vide Advance Ruling No. GUJ/GAAR/R/10/2021 dated 20.1.2021 wherein it was held as under: Answer to [a]: The classification of the product 'Plastic toys' manufactured and supplied by the applicant M/s. I-tech Plast India Pvt. Ltd., Survey No.108-109, Bhavnagar-Rajkot Highway, Shampara, Bhavnagar (as per the First Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act, 1975(51 of 1975) as well as the corresponding rate of GST (as per Not....
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....rst question before the GAAR is precisely the same i.e. the classification and rate of toys under CGST and SGST; d) that [a] the proceedings were pending against the applicant and [b] that these facts were not disclosed to the GAAR. 8. Aggrieved, the appellant is before the GAAAR [Gujarat Appellate Authority for Advance Ruling], raising the following averments, a) that the appellant had time and again requested for reply/response of DGGSTI, Pune or other authority, which was never supplied; that in this connection they would like to rely on the case of Kanwar Natwar Singh Manu/SC/795/2010; b) that DGGSTI in the incident report uses the word 'investigation' & 'primary scrutiny' and not 'proceedings; c) that the present case, is an investigation which has not culminated into proceedings; d) that merely because the appellant decided to pay the differential tax of 6%, it does not mean that the proceedings were pending; e) that the GAAR has avoided/missed para 13 of their communication dated 14.10.2020, wherein the appellant has clearly conveyed that it is in the process to analyse the correct classification; f) that SGST....
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.... ruling which clearly signifies that there was no intention of fraud, suppression or misrepresentation; r) that investigation undertaken by DGGSTI at best can be said to be falling under the category of 'possibility of a question arising consideration & by no means of imagination, it can fall under the category of question pending consideration; s) that the appellant feels that the action of DGGI was not required to be disclosed before the GAAR & therefore it should be treated as a Bonafide belief & matter of legal interpretation; t) that DGGI Pune has no jurisdiction to conduct inquiry. 9. Personal hearing in the matter was held on 25.6.2025, wherein Shri Tushar Hemani, Sr Advocate along with Shri Nishant Shukla, Advocate appeared on behalf of the appellant. Shri Tushar Hemani, Sr Advocate, took the authority through the appeal papers and reiterated the submissions made in the appeal. During the course of the personal hearing, they submitted the following documents viz a) Synopsis containing dates and events and the copies of the case laws, and ruling relied upon by the appellant; b) A compilation consisting of the following judgemen....
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.... been mentioned supra, for brevity, we do not wish to repeat it. The only issue before the authority as far as the present appeal is concerned is whether the GAAR vide its impugned finding was correct in holding that the ruling dated 20.1.2021 was void on the grounds that it was obtained by suppression of material facts & mis representation of facts. 13. For ease of reference we would like to reproduce sections 98 and 104, of the CGST Act, 2017, viz [relevant extracts] Section 98. Procedure on receipt of application.- (1) On receipt of an application, the Authority shall cause a copy thereof to be forwarded to the concerned officer and, if necessary, call upon him to furnish the relevant records: Provided that where any records have been called for by the Authority in any case, such records shall, as soon as possible, be returned to the said concerned officer. (2) The Authority may, after examining the application and the records called for and after hearing the applicant or his authorised representative and the concerned officer or his authorised representative, by order, either admit or reject the application: Provided that the Auth....
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....Act b. Already decided in any proceedings in the applicant's case under any of the provisions of the Act The onus therefore, is on the applicant to declare whether there are any proceedings pending/decided, against him under any provisions of the Act, in respect of the question on which a ruling is being sought. The applicant, in his application dated 30.11.2020, declared that there is no pending/decided proceedings against him. The term proceedings' is not defined under the Act. 16. Shri Tushar Hemani, Sr. Advocate, during the course of personal hearing, relying on sections 66, 98(2), 104 and 151, ibid, informed that the word scrutiny/inquiry, investigation, proceedings, have different connotations. He further stressed that there was no proceedings either pending or decided when the appellant preferred the application before GAAR and that this being the factual matrix, they were not legally bound to inform the sequence of events leading to payment of differential duty to the Authority. 17. In the interregnum, DGGSTI, Pune, has issued SCN No. DGGI/Int/Intl/76/2020-Gr.B-O/o-ADG-DGGI-ZU-Pune dated 28.6.2024, demanding IGST amount of Rs. 2.52 crores for the period 7/201....
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....ellant. This averment is not legally tenable, in view of the facts narrated above. Further, the averment that merely because the appellant decided to pay the differential tax of 6%, it does not mean that the proceedings were pending, fails because by discharging the differential duty, the purpose of the appellant was two fold [a] to avoid litigation and [b] closure of the proceedings under section 73, ibid. 22. The appellant has further stated vide their communication dated 14.10.2020, that they had conveyed to DGGSTI Pune that they are in the process to analyse the correct classification. The non-disclosure is to the GAAR and not to DGGSTI. The averment that since they had conveyed that they are in process of analyzing the classification to DGGSTI Pune, it tantamounts to disclosure before GAAR is not a plausible argument and does not absolve the appellant from not disclosing these facts to the GAAR. 23. The appellant has further stated that even the SGST, in their communication to GAAR had informed that proceedings could be said to have been initiated only when SCN is issued and the investigation by DGGI could not be equated with proceedings. The view does not appear to be c....
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....gned order, are that, pursuant to a letter from the DGGI, Pune vide their letter dated 15.9.2020, followed by other correspondences, M/s. I. Tech conveyed to the DGGI that they discharged their tax liabilities, along with due interest, for the year 2019-20 on 14.10.2020. They also conveyed vide their letter dated 14.10.2020 that, with effect from 1.10.2020, they had started to charge the tax rate of 18%, i.e., the rate contended by the DGGI to be the correct rate. All these facts, though directly related to the issue raised before the Advance Ruling Authority in the instant case, were never disclosed in their application dated 30.11.2020. Subsequently, on 18.12.2020, the applicant also discharged their tax liability with interest, for the period April, 2020 to September, 2020. This was much before the Advance Ruling authority passed it's ruling on 20.01.2021. All these facts, intricately related to the issue to be decided by the Advance Ruling Authority in the instant case, were required to be disclosed by the applicant. However, they manifestly failed to do so. Hence, we are of the considered opinion that they have failed to cross the bar of Section 104 of CGST Act, 2017, as they ....
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....s under section 62 or 63 or 67 or 73 or 74; that the provisional attachment order was passed before the proceedings were initiated under section 74. The present dispute is not relating to provisional attachment. The reliance therefore on this case is not tenable. 9 Smita and Sons Coal Pvt. Ltd. [2023] 147 taxmann.com 141 (Gujarat)] This case also relates to provisional attachment under section 83. The present dispute is not relating to provisional attachment. The reliance therefore on this case is not tenable. 10 Kaish Impex Pvt. Ltd. [2020] 114 taxmann.com 300 (Bombay)] This case also relates to provisional attachment under section 83. The present dispute is not relating to provisional attachment. The reliance therefore on this case is not tenable. 11 Rais Khan [2024] 160 taxmann.com 546 (Rajasthan)] The Hon'ble Court was dealing with the meaning of the words inquiry under section 70 and the word proceeding as appearing in section 6(2)(b), ibid. 12 Sage Publications Ltd. U.K. [2016] 73 taxmann.com 85 (Delhi)] The case pertains to Advance Ruling under the Income Tax Act wherein the Hon'ble Court held that issuance of notice under section 143(2....
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....o detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished judge." 12. In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. [1970 (2) All ER 294] Lord Reid said, "Lord Atkin's speech ......... is not to be treated as if it was a statute definition. It will require qualification in new circumstances." Megarry, J in (1971) 1 WLR 1062 observed: "One must not, of course, construe even a reserved judgment of Russell L.J. as if it were an Act of Parliament." And, in Herrington v. British Railways Board [1972 (2) WLR 537] Lord Morris said : "There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances made in the setting of the facts of a particular case." 13. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper. 14. The following words of Lord Denning in the matter of applying precedents have become locus classicus : "Each case depends on its own facts and ....