TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2025 (7) TMI 838
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....l under the definition of 'victim' in terms of Section 2(wa) read with the proviso to Section 372 of the CrPC or whether Section 378 of the CrPC would prevail in the facts and circumstances of the present case. FACTUAL SETTING: 4. The Appellant, Asian Paints Limited, a public limited company, has been engaged in the business of manufacturing paint and paint products for approximately the last 73 years. Its Head Office is located in Mumbai, Maharashtra. In the face of counterfeit products being made and sold in the market in its name and style, the Appellant had given a Power of Attorney (hereinafter referred to as the 'PoA') to one Mr. Ajay Singh, Proprietor, M/s Solution (an IPR consultancy firm) through its authorized representatives, who were tasked with monitoring, tracking down and investigating unauthorised and illegal practices employed in respect of the Appellant's Intellectual Property Rights (hereinafter referred to as 'IPR') comprising, inter alia, trademarks and copyrights owned/used by the Appellant. Cases of trademark infringement, passing off etcetera were to be detected, and Mr. Ajay Singh was also asked to undertake survey, investigate and act against any per....
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....eized them and arrested Rambabu. 8. The complainant gave the Police two buckets filled with genuine Asian paint, one bucket of 10 litres of Tractor Emulsion Paint and one bucket of Ace Exterior emulsion Paint for the purpose of matching the counterfeit paint with the genuine. 9. On 06.02.2016, the police filed First Information Report No.30/2016 (hereinafter referred to as the 'FIR') under Sections 420/120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as the 'IPC') and under Sections 63/65 of the Copyright Act against Respondent No.1. 10. The investigation commenced, and the Investigating Officer submitted the Final Report under Section 173 of the CrPC on 23.04.2016 for offences under Sections 120B and 420 of the IPC and Sections 63 and 65 of the Copyright Act against Respondent No.1. 11. The State Forensic Science Laboratory submitted its Report No.fsl/jpr/qd/109/16 on 28.07.2016, stating that the seized counterfeit material(s) did not tally with the original in size, spacing and design of characters. 12. The learned Additional Senior Civil Judge and Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate No.13, Bassi, Jaipur, Metropolitan City (hereinafter referred to ....
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.... persons' by virtue of Section 11 of the IPC. As such, the Appellant would fall within the contours of the term 'victim'. 19. To further substantiate the Appellant's claim, the learned counsel pointed out that the underlying FIR which was lodged, giving rise to the instant Appeal, was primarily registered under Sections 63/65 of the Copyright Act, on account of infringement of the Appellant's copyright by the Respondent No.1. It was urged that this was sufficient to prove that it was the Appellant who suffered 'loss or injury' as mentioned in Section 2(wa) of the CrPC. The loss/injury was in the nature of reputational and financial losses on account of the commission of the afore-mentioned offence(s) by Respondent No.1. 20. Learned counsel vehemently argued that impleadment of the complainant/victim in an appeal filed by the accused under Section 374 of the CrPC is not a sine qua non for the complainant/victim to file an Appeal under the proviso to Section 372 of the CrPC in the High Court. 21. Learned counsel placed reliance on the ratio laid down in Jagjeet Singh v Ashish Mishra alias Monu, (2022) 9 SCC 321, wherein this Court held : '23. A "victim" within t....
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.... Court to which an appeal ordinarily lies against the order of conviction of such Court' used in the proviso to Section 372 of the CrPC. It was submitted that Section 374 of the CrPC does not provide for filing an appeal against an order passed in appeal by the First Appellate Court. 26. The learned counsel also submitted that Respondent No.2/State of Rajasthan has neither preferred an appeal nor a revision against the judgment of acquittal dated 16.02.2022 passed by the First Appellate Court. 27. Learned counsel further argued that the complaint dated 06.02.2016 was made by Mr. Pankaj Kumar Singh, an investigator employed by M/s Solution, who was neither an employee nor an authorised agent of the Appellant and therefore, he cannot be said to have acted as an agent of the Appellant apropos the Appellant being covered under Section 2(wa) of the CrPC. As such, the Appellant has/had no locus or authority to initiate any proceedings challenging the correctness of Judgment dated 16.02.2022 passed by the First Appellate Court. 28. Learned counsel advanced that the Appellant's application seeking impleadment in Criminal Appeal No.1657/2019 was practically rejected by the First Ap....
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....hich a sentence of imprisonment for more than seven years has been passed against him or against any other person convicted at the same trial, may appeal to the High Court. (3) Save as otherwise provided in sub-section (2), any person,- (a) convicted on a trial held by a Metropolitan Magistrate or Assistant Sessions Judge or Magistrate of the first class, or of the second class, or (b) sentenced under Section 325, or (c) in respect of whom an order has been made or a sentence has been passed under Section 360 by any Magistrate, may appeal to the Court of Session. (4) When an appeal has been filed against a sentence passed under Section 376, Section 376-A, Section 376-AB, Section 376-B, Section 376-C, Section 376-D, Section 376- DA, Section 376-DB or Section 376-E of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), the appeal shall be disposed of within a period of six months from the date of filing of such appeal. xxx 378. Appeal in case of acquittal.- (1) Save as otherwise provided in sub-section (2), and subject to the provisions of sub-sections (3) and (5),- (a) the District Magistrate may, in any case,....
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.... that it was the Appellant which had given Power-of-Attorney to M/s Solution through its Proprietor Ajay Singh for protecting its IPR by undertaking survey(s), investigating and acting against any person found to be engaged in violating/infringing the Appellant's IPR, including but not limited to, under the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and the Copyright Act. 32. In turn, M/s Solution appointed Mr. Pankaj Kumar Singh to carry out the task assigned by the Appellant. Thus, whatever action was taken either by Mr. Pankaj Kumar Singh or by M/s Solution related to the infringement of IPR with regard to the Appellant's products, was clearly for and on behalf of the Appellant. It was ultimately the interest of the Appellant which was sought to be served through the engagement of M/s Solution, which in turn, engaged Mr. Pankaj Kumar Singh as its Field Operative. In the present case, it is clear that the allegation directly relates to wrongdoings on the part of Respondent No.1 in displaying, keeping in his shop and being in possession of materials/products which are similar to those manufactured/sold/distributed by the Appellant which also bore its mark on the outside packaging i.e., the bucket i....
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....n in the Impugned Judgment that the impleadment application/petition was 'not allowed' by the First Appellate Court is erroneous and in effect, the learned Single Judge, without saying so, has impliedly conveyed that a negative order was passed on the plea for impleadment. This would be an incorrect appreciation of the true import of the order passed by the First Appellate Court dated 10.02.2022, which clearly states that the 'complainant' was heard on the appeal, though it has also been mentioned that it was in the background of the consent given. Indubitably, as noted in the Impugned Judgment itself in the very same sentence, 'but with the consent of respondent no.1 accused, present appellant was permitted to assist public prosecutor to advance arguments.' Albeit, nothing much turns on this. 36. Section 2(wa) of the CrPC defines 'victim' in plain and simple language as a 'person who has suffered any loss or injury caused by reason of the act or omission for which the accused person has been charged...'. It is clear that Section 2(wa) of the CrPC has thoughtfully accorded an expansive understanding to the term 'victim' and not a narrow or restricted meaning. 37. In the prese....
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....cases instituted upon private complaint, leave to appeal under Section 378(4) of Cr.P.C. is maintainable. Therefore, leave to appeal against order of acquittal in appeal is also not maintainable in the instant case.' 43. We are constrained to observe that the finding of the High Court that the Appellant could not have maintained the appeal before it would amount to completely negating the proviso to Section 372 of the CrPC. In our considered opinion, Section 372 of the CrPC is a self-contained and independent Section; in other words, it is a stand-alone Section. Section 372 of the CrPC is not regulated by other provisions of Chapter XXIX of the CrPC. The proviso to Section 372 of the CrPC operates independently of and shall not be read conjointly with any other provision in the CrPC, much less Section 378 of the CrPC. 44. At the cost of repetition, we have indicated above as to who would be covered as a 'victim' under Section 2(wa) of the CrPC. There is no doubt that the Appellant is the 'victim' herein. As explained in Jagjeet Singh (supra), it is not necessary for the 'victim' to also be the 'complainant' or the 'informant' in a given case. 45. Furthermore, another aspec....
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.... historical reason for this, beginning with the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in the 96th Plenary Session on 29-11-1985. The Declaration is sometimes referred to as the Magna Carta of the rights of victims. One of the significant declarations made was in relation to access to justice for the victim of an offence through the justice delivery mechanisms, both formal and informal. In the Declaration it was stated as follows : "4. Victims should be treated with compassion and respect for their dignity. They are entitled to access to the mechanisms of justice and to prompt redress, as provided for by national legislation, for the harm that they have suffered. 5. Judicial and administrative mechanisms should be established and strengthened where necessary to enable victims to obtain redress through formal or informal procedures that are expeditious, fair, inexpensive and accessible. Victims should be informed of their rights in seeking redress through such mechanisms. 6. The responsiveness of judicial and administrative processes to the needs of victims s....
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.... is not at all necessary to consider the effect of a victim being the complainant as far as the proviso to Section 372 CrPC is concerned.' ( emphasis supplied ) 49. The law on the issue has been enunciated by the 3-Judge Bench, by a majority of 2:1, in Mallikarjun Kodagali (supra), which squarely applies to the instant matter. The exposition on the term 'victim' by 3 learned Judges in Paragraph 23 of Jagjeet Singh (supra) has already been taken note of by us hereinabove, with which we respectfully concur. 50. We may also indicate that the view taken by us that the right of a victim to prefer an appeal as granted under the proviso to Section 372 of the CrPC, which was inserted vide Section 29 of Act V of 2009, with effect from 31.12.2009, is not restricted by any other provision of the CrPC. It serves the salutary purpose of safeguarding the rights of the victim. Upon detailed discussion, a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Mahabir v State of Haryana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 184 observed: '53. Therefore, by the aforesaid provision a right has been created in favour of the victim, which was not existing earlier in the Code, i.e., that a victim shall have a right t....