2024 (4) TMI 1287
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....eyond the period of limitation as prescribed under Section 34(3) of the A&C Act. Accordingly, the appellants had filed an application (IA No. 11689/2022) seeking condonation of delay in filing the above petition. 3. The learned Single Judge found that the Court did not have the power to condone the delay as it exceeded the period of thirty days and accordingly, dismissed the said application. Consequently, the appellants' petition for setting aside the impugned award also stood rejected. 4. It is the appellants' case that the period of thirty days after the expiry of the period of limitation-which was the outer limit of the delay that could be condoned by the Court-expired when this Court was closed for vacations, therefore, the said period stood extended to the date on which the Court reopened after vacations. The appellants claim, on the strength of Section 10 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (hereafter the General Clauses Act), that their petition was filed within a period that could be condoned by the Court, as it was filed immediately on reopening of the Court after summer vacations. 5. Thus, the only controversy that requires to be addressed is whether the delay of....
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....s, applications or other proceedings, which were to be filed on reopening day could also be instituted or preferred in the regular course from 27.06.2022 to 02.07.2022, however for the purposes of limitation, the Court re-opened on 04.07.2022 only. REASONS & CONCLUSION 12. As noticed at the outset, that the dispute involved in the present appeal is in a narrow compass. The principal question to be addressed is whether the delay of period beyond thirty days in filing an application under Section 34 of the A&C Act can be condoned by the Court if the last day of the said period falls on the day when the Court is closed and the application is filed immediately after the said date. 13. Mr. Nayar, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Sridevi Datla v. Union of India & Ors. (2021) 5 SCC 321 in support of his contention that Section 10 of the General Clauses Act would be applicable in respect of the period of delay of thirty days that could be condoned by a Court in terms of the proviso to Section 34(3) of the A&C Act. He submitted that the reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Assam Urban Water Supply & Sewerage Bo....
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....d of thirty days would not extend further even though the last day of such period fell on a date when the Court was closed. The relevant extract of the said decision is set out below: "11. The question, therefore, that falls for our determination is whether the appellants are entitled to extension of time under Section 4 of the 1963 Act in the above facts? 12. Section 4 of the 1963 Act reads as under: "4. Expiry of prescribed period when court is closed.-Where the prescribed period for any suit, appeal or application expires on a day when the court is closed, the suit, appeal or application may be instituted, preferred or made on the day when the court reopens. Explanation.-A court shall be deemed to be closed on any day within the meaning of this section if during any part of its normal working hours it remains closed on that day." The above section enables a party to institute a suit, prefer an appeal or make an application on the day the court reopens where the prescribed period for any suit, appeal or application expires on the day when the court is closed. 13. The crucial words in Section 4 of the 1963 Act are "prescribed period". What is the meaning of these words....
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....nt was prevented by sufficient cause from filing an appeal within the said period of thirty days, it could allow it to be filed within "a further period not exceeding sixty days". In the said case, the period of ninety days expired on 12.07.2020, which was a Sunday. The appellant filed the appeal on the next date, that is, on 13.07.2020. The Supreme Court held that the Limitation Act (including Section 4 of the Limitation Act) was inapplicable, however, the benefit of Section 10 of the General Clauses Act would be available. The relevant extract of the said decision is set out below: "Applicability of General Clauses Act 19. There can be no dispute that the period of limitation set out in a special law, which provides for remedies and appeals, has to be construed in its terms and without reference to the Limitation Act, if it contains specific provisions delineating the time or period within which applications or appeals can be preferred, and confines the consideration of applications for condoning the delay to a specific number of days. Undoubtedly, in such cases, the Limitation Act would be inapplicable. There are several previous judgments of this Court holding that where pe....
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....ies proprio vigore to all appeals filed under the NGT Act." 20. It is apparent from the above that the Supreme Court had proceeded on the basis that where a period of delay that can be condoned is prescribed and the same expires on a holiday, then the act should be considered done within the prescribed period if it is done on the next date. 21. It is relevant to refer to Section 10 of the General Clauses Act, which reads as under: "10. Computation of time.-(1) Where, by any [Central Act] or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, any act or proceeding is directed or allowed to be done or taken in any Court or office on a certain day or within a prescribed period, then, if the Court or office is closed on that day or the last day of the prescribed period, the act or proceeding shall be considered as done or taken in due time if it is done or taken on the next day afterwards on which the Court or office is open: Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to any act or proceeding to which the [Indian Limitation Act, 1877, applies. (2) This section applies also to all and Regulations made on or after the fourteenth day of January, 1887." 22. It is at once cl....
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.... that if the last date of such period, during which the applicant was allowed to file an application (albeit subject to satisfying the Court that he was prevented from filing the petition within the prescribed period) or a day when the Court was closed, by virtue of Section 10 of the General Clauses Act, the said act would be deemed to be done within the said period if it was done on the day when the Court reopened. 24. At this stage, it is also relevant to consider the import of paragraph 7 of the Notification dated 20.05.2022 issued by this Court expressly providing that the suits, appeals, applications or other proceedings could be filed in regular course between 27.06.2022 to 02.07.2022. The relevant extract of the said Notification dated 20.05.2022 is set out below: "7. Suits, Appeals, Applications or other proceedings, which are to be filed on the re-opening day, may also be instituted/preferred or made in regular course between 10.00 A.M. and 4.00 P.M. from Monday, the 27th June, 2022 to Saturday, the 2nd July, 2022 as per convenience of the parties though for the purpose of limitation the Court re-opens only on 04.07.2022." 25. It is clear from the plain language of the....
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.... 58. Therefore, in light of the application of the Limitation Act, 1963 to the proceedings under the Arbitration Act and when Section 10 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 specifically excludes the applicability of Section 10 to any act or proceeding to which Limitation Act, 1963 applies and in light of the definition of "period of limitation" as defined under Section 2(j) read with Section 4 of the Limitation Act and as observed and held by this Court in Assam Urban, benefit of exclusion of period during which the Court is closed shall be available when the application for setting aside award is filed within "prescribed period of limitation" and shall not be available in respect of period extendable by Court in exercise of its discretion. 59. Now, so far as the reliance placed upon the decision of this Court in Sridevi Datla v. Union of India relied upon on behalf of the appellant is concerned, at the outset it is required to be noted that in the said decision, this Court has not noticed the decision in Assam Urban and there is no discussion on distinction between "prescribed period" and the "discretionary condonable period". On the other hand, the binding decision of this Court ....