TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1945 (1) TMI 26
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....laintiff seeks to recover the difference between the contract price of Rs. 77 per cwt. and the maximum price of Rs. 48 per cwt. fixed by the order of the Government of India. In the plaint, the allegation was that the defendant company suppressed the fact that such an order had been passed and was guilty of misrepresentation. That charge is now abandoned. The plaintiff firm also claimed that the defendant company could not charge more than Rupees 47 per cwt., i.e., Re. 1 less than the maximum price. That claim is also abandoned. The plaintiff now claims the difference between the contract price and the price fixed by Government and the claim is based on the following two grounds, viz.: (1) The contract having become void by reason of the new Government order, the defendant is bound to make compensation to the plaintiff or restore the advantage it has got under the contract. Sections 56 and 65, Contract Act, are relied upon for this branch of the argument. (2) The payment in excess having been made by mistake the defendant is bound to refund it. Section 72, Contract Act, is invoked in support of this contention. 2. The defendant company's defence is that delivery having been gi....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....e consignee in the railway receipt it cannot be said that the goods were put on the railway for transmission to the buyer. 5. There can be no doubt that there may be delivery to the buyer even though the seller retained right of disposal in the goods delivered; but the mere putting of goods on the railway wagons does not necessarily amount to delivery to the buyer. The section says that the goods must be delivered to the carrier for transmission to the buyer. The section further says that such delivery to the carrier would prima facie be deemed to be delivery to the buyer; the use of the words prima facie shows that even if there be delivery to the carrier for transmission to the buyer circumstances may exist which would prevent such delivery from amounting to delivery to the buyer. Here the consignee was not the buyer but the seller. The goods were, therefore, being transmitted to the seller and not to the buyer. It cannot be said that the railway had been directed to carry the goods to the buyer and that the seller merely retained some right of disposal. The railway was directed to deliver the goods to the defendant company and not to the plaintiff firm. In such a case delivery ....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....es not contain any such compelling provision; no statute has been shown to me under which the defendant could be so compelled, nor can such compulsion be supported on any principle of justice or equity. The contract, as it stood, could not be performed without infringing the law and it, therefore, became void on the date of the promulgation of the afore, (said order under the Defence of India Act. The next question is whether on this account the plaintiff would be entitled to recover the difference between the contract price and the price fixed by the order by invoking the aid of S. 65 which is in the following terms: When an agreement is discovered to be void, or when a contract becomes void, any person who has received any advantage under such agreement or contract is bound to restore it, or to make compensation for it, to the person from whom he received it. In my opinion, the answer must be in the negative. Section 65 deals with two matters: (a) an agreement which is discovered to be void and (b) a contract which becomes void. 8. The first matter is concerned with an agreement which never amounted to a contract because it was void ab initio, the fact of its being void being....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....f law must be irrevocable. Put thus it seems to me that this argument is not supported by logic. Section 72 uses the word "mistake" without any qualification. Is there any justification for engrafting a qualification which is not in the Statute ? The basic rule in construing a statute is to give the words of it their ordinary grammatical meaning. One must not depart easily from this rule. I am not unmindful of another principle of construction, viz., that one must always endeavour to give effect to every part of a statute and adopt, whenever possible, a construction which has this effect in preference to a construction which would render a part of the statute nugatory. Both these principles should be worked in harmony. Now if the word mistake in S. 72 is given its ordinary meaning, viz., a mistake of any kind - an unqualified mistake - does any conflict necessarily arise between that section and S. 21 ? I think not Section 21 speaks not of a payment made under a mistake of law but of "a contract caused by a mistake of law." Section 72 does not speak of a contract at all but merely of a payment made under a mistake. The section appears in Chap. V, which does not deal with contracts ....