2024 (1) TMI 1459
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.... 1 to 5 therein (Appellants herein and the State of Rajasthan) are bound to purchase a total of 906 MW electricity from the successful bidders. It, therefore, directed the writ Petitioner- MB Power (Respondent No. 1 herein) and Respondent No. 7 - PTC India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "PTC India") in the said writ petition (Respondent No. 2 in the present appeals) to supply 200 MW electricity to the Respondents therein (Appellants herein) within the limit of 906 MW. It also directed the writ Petitioner- MB Power and PTC India, Respondent No. 7 in the said writ petition, to file an appropriate application before the Respondent Nos. 1 to 5 in the said writ petition, within two weeks from the date of the order, complying with the necessary requisite conditions, including bank guarantee etc., as required in terms of the Request for Proposal (hereinafter referred to as "the RFP"). It further directed the Respondent Nos. 1 to 5 in the said writ petition, for issuance of Letter of Intent ("LoI" for short) in respect of bid filed through PTC India for supplying 200 MW power from the power generating station of the writ Petitioner i.e. MB Power at levelized tariff of Rs. 5.517/Kwh, bein....
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....rs. PTC India is a power-trading licensee company, which had procured the bid document after depositing a Bid Bond. 2.6 In the various meetings held between 17th April 2013 and 22nd April 2013, the BEC had placed the bids received in ascending order, from lowest to the highest tariff as follows: Rank Qualified Bidder Name Levelized Tariff (Rs/kWh) Capacity Offered Cumulative Capacity Offered Average Cumulative Tariff (Rs/ kWh) L-1 PTC - Maruti Clean Coal and Power Limited 4.517 195 195 4.517 L-2 PTC - DB Power Limited 4.811 311 506 4.698 L-3 LPL - Lanco Babandh Power Limited 4.943 100 606 4.738 L-4 PTC - Athena Chhattisgarh Power Ltd 5.143 200 806 4.839 L-5 SKS Power Generation (Chhattisgarh) Limited 5.300 100 906 4.890 L-6 LPL - Lanco Vidarbha Thermal Power Limited 5.490 100 1006 4.949 L-7 PTC - MB Power (Madhya Pradesh) Ltd. 5.517 200 1206 5.043 L-8 KSK Mahanadi Power Company Limited 5.572 475 1681 5.193 L-9 Jindal Power Limited 6.038 300 1981 5.321 L-10 LPL - Lanco Amarkantak Power Ltd 7.110 100 2081 5.407 2.7 In the 216th Meeting of the Board of Directors of RVPN, it was decided to take an opinion from the BEC ....
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....4 In the meantime, the L-4 and L-5 bidders filed Writ Petitions being CWP No. 19437 of 2013 and CWP No. 18699 of 2013 respectively, before the High Court, seeking to strike down the negotiations process and the higher quantum awarded to L-1, L- 2 and L-3 bidders. 2.15 The High Court vide judgment dated 7th February 2014, refused to entertain the writ petitions and relegated the parties to the State Commission. The said order dated 7th February 2014 came to be challenged by the L-4 and L-5 bidders by way of writ appeals being DB Special Appeals (Writ) Nos. 538 of 2014 and 604 of 2014. The said appeals also came to be dismissed by the High Court vide judgment and order dated 18th April 2014. 2.16 Subsequently, in its 5th meeting held on 21st May 2014, the EAC recommended that as against the quantum of 1000 MW power, for which PPAs had been executed and tariff adoption petition had been filed, a demand of 600 MW power ought to be considered, on account of availability of power from various sources and to meet future contingencies. 2.17 The Government of Rajasthan, therefore, vide its letter dated 25th July 2014, issued to the RVPN, approved the purchase of a quantum of 500 MW power....
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....2018 also came to be filed by L-5 bidder- SKS Power Generation (Chhattisgarh) Limited (hereinafter referred to as "SKS Power"), on the ground that the State Commission could not have permitted the procurement of higher quantum by the L-2 and L-3 bidders. 2.24 Vide order dated 25th April 2018, the said Civil Appeals were disposed of by this Court, upholding the decision of the learned APTEL, setting aside the reduction of quantum of procurement from 1000 MW to 500 MW after the bidding process was over. However, this Court held that the decision of the learned APTEL on the quantum to be procured from individual bidders was liable to be reversed and that the quantum originally offered by the bidders in the bidding process has to be taken into consideration and increase in quantum by means of negotiation was not permissible. Insofar as L-4 and L-5 bidders are concerned, since the tariff quoted was not considered at any stage by either the procurer, or by RVPN or by the State Commission, this Court directed the State Commission to go into the issue of approval for adoption of tariff with regard to L-4 and L-5 bidders. 2.25 Subsequent to the judgment and order dated 25th April 2018, pa....
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....ariff, take steps for adoption of tariff of the Petitioner and immediately commence supply of power; (c) Pass such further order(s) as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the instant case in the interest of justice. 2.33 In the appeals filed by the present Appellants, i.e., Civil Appeal Nos. 1937 of 2020 and 2721 of 2020, Respondent No. 1- MB Power filed an application for impleadment, on the ground that the issue of role of the State Commission in adoption of tariff being decided by this Court in the said appeals would have an impact on the writ petition filed by it before the High Court. 2.34 Vide order dated 19th April 2021, this Court directed the said application for impleadment to be considered at the stage of hearing of the said appeals. 2.35 By the impugned judgment and order, the said writ petition filed by MB Power has been allowed by the High Court in terms of the aforesaid directions. 2.36 Hence the present appeals. CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4612 OF 2023 3. This appeal filed by Rajasthan Urja Vikas Nigam Limited (hereinafter referred to as "RUVNL") challenges the order dated 1st June 2023, passed by the learned APTEL, whereby ....
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....successful bidders and the Appellant would be at liberty to do so in order to overcome the difficulty of power shortage. 7. The order of the learned APTEL dated 1st June 2023 basically relies on the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, bench at Jaipur, passed in D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 14815 of 2020, which is a subject matter of challenge in Civil Appeal Nos. 6503 of 2022 and 6502 of 2022. As such, the result of Civil Appeal No. 4612 of 2023 would depend upon the outcome of Civil Appeal Nos. 6503 of 2022 and 6502 of 2022. SUBMISSIONS OF THE APPELLANTS 8. We have heard Shri P. Chidambaram, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Appellants, and Dr. A.M. Singhvi and Shri C.S. Vaidyanathan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Respondents. 9. Shri Chidambaram, at the outset, submits that the writ petition, filed by the Respondent No. 1-MB Power, was not maintainable before the High Court in its original jurisdiction Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is submitted that, if the Respondent No. 1-MB Power had any grievance, it could have either approached the State Commission or the learned APTEL. 10. He submits that ....
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....obliged to accept the bids of lower ranked financial bids, irrespective of the exorbitant tariff quoted by them. Shri Chidambaram has given an illustration to that effect that, if in a bid to procure 1000 MW, 2 bidders can be put forward as stalking horses who would bid lower tariffs and are ranked as L-1 and L-2. Thereafter, L-3 onwards can quote exorbitant tariffs which are not aligned to market prices. He submits that this specious theory of "filling the bucket", which would oblige the procurer to go to the last bidder, irrespective of their tariffs being completely exorbitant, is very dangerous. It is submitted that, in any case, Clause 3.5.12 of the RFP enables the procurer to reject any bid where the quoted tariff is not aligned to market prices. 14. Shri Chidambaram further submits that the directions issued by this Court vide order dated 25th April 2018, were specifically restricted to L-1 to L-5 bidders, which were litigating. It is submitted that the contention of the Respondent No. 1-MB Power that the order of this Court dated 25th April 2018 was an order in rem is erroneous. 15. Relying on the judgment of this Court in the case of R. Viswanathan and Ors. v. Rukn-ul-Mu....
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....evailing market prices. 20. Shri Chidambaram lastly submitted that the bidders have no vested right to contract. Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be used to award a contract in favour of the bidder. In this respect, he refers to the following judgments of this Court: i. Tata Cellular v. Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 651 : 1994 INSC 283 (para 94) ii. Rajasthan Housing Board and Anr. v. G.S. Investments and Anr. (2007) 1 SCC 477 (para 8, 9 and 11) iii. Laxmikant and Ors. v. Satyawan and Ors. (1996) 4 SCC 208 : 1996 INSC 409 21. Shri Chidambaram, therefore, submits that the impugned judgment and order is not sustainable and is liable to be set aside. SUBMISSIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS 22. Dr. A.M. Singhvi, learned Senior Counsel, per contra, submits that unlike Section 62 read with Sections 61 and 64 of the Electricity Act, Under Section 63 of the Electricity Act, the appropriate Commission only "adopts" tariff and does not "determine" tariff. However, in cases Under Section 63 of the Electricity Act, the Central Commission is bound by the guidelines issued by the Central Government and it is required to exercise its regulatory functions, albeit Under Section 79(1)(....
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....is the same. It is submitted that, however, in 2018, the Rajasthan BEC mischievously and selectively considered tariff only up to 2012 and compared bids of Andhra Pradesh and Kerala, which were, in fact, discovered in 2015 and 2014 respectively. It is submitted that similarly, in the State of Tamil Nadu, for the same period, the equivalent levelized tariff was determined by M/s. Deloitte at Rs. 5.75 per unit for 25 years and the same was accepted. It is, therefore, submitted that, considering the aforesaid, the levelized tariff of the Respondent No. 1-MB Power for 25 years at Rs. 5.517 per unit is indisputably market aligned even as on 2012-2013. 28. Dr. Singhvi, relied on the following charts to show that the levelized tariff for 25 years, as quoted by the Respondent No. 1- MB Power, is very much market aligned. "Market Price as of 2012-13 - at the time of Rajasthan Bid Procurer State 1st Year Quoted Tariff Levelized Tariff for 25 years PPA Duration Rajasthan - L5 (i.e. SKS) 3.976 5.300 25 years Rajasthan - L7 (i.e. R1 - MB Power Bid) 4.137 5.517 25 years UP - 2013 Tariff approved by BEC (Deloitte as consultant) 4.36 5.849 25 years TN - Approved Tariff 4.117 ....
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.... aspect with regard to "consumer's interest" is concerned, the learned APTEL has squarely covered the same. It has been held by the learned APTEL that the consumers' interest is a broad term and among others, involves reliable, quality and un-interrupted power on long term basis besides being competitive. 34. The learned Senior Counsel submits that the State of Rajasthan needed 1000 MW of power when it invited the bids in question. He submits that the DISCOMS have even fairly admitted that they are still in need of power and as such, filed an Interlocutory Application being I.A. No. 150366 of 2023 in Civil Appeal No. 4612 of 2023 (for permission to file additional documents) seeking permission to procure power for medium term from the State Commission. It is, therefore, submitted that even in the larger public interest and consumer interest, the Appellants should procure the power from the Respondent No. 1- MB Power. Dr. Singhvi submits that the Appellants are bound to procure 906 MW of power in view of the orders passed by this Court on 25th of April 2018. He submits that the RFP provides for bucket filling. It is, therefore, submitted that the Appellants are required to ....
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....3 6.30 9.18 3 years" 37. Dr. Singhvi, therefore, submits that, if the directions as issued by the High Court are maintained, it will be in the interests of the consumers, who will be getting the electricity at lesser prices than what has recently been emerged as a levelized price in the bidding process. He submits that this is specifically so when indisputably even according to the Appellants they are in dire need of power. Dr. Singhvi, therefore, prays for dismissal of the present appeals. 38. Shri C.S. Vaidyanathan, learned Senior Counsel also addressed similar arguments and prayed for dismissal of the present appeals. CONSIDERATIONS 39. For considering the rival submissions, it will be necessary to refer to some of the provisions of the Electricity Act, which are as under: 63. Determination of tariff by bidding process. - Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 62, the Appropriate Commission shall adopt the tariff if such tariff has been determined through transparent process of bidding in accordance with the guidelines issued by the Central Government." xxx &nbs....
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....rawn or cancelled by the Procurer/ Authorized Representative at any time without assigning any reasons thereof. The Procurer/ Authorized Representative further reserves the right, at its complete discretion, to reject any or all of the Bids without assigning any reasons whatsoever and without incurring any liability on any account. xxx xxx xxx 3.5 STEP IV- Successful Bidder(s) Selection 3.5.1 Bids qualifying in Step III shall only be evaluated in this stage. 3.5.2 The Levelized Tariff calculated as per Clause 3.4.8 for all Financial Bids of Qualified Bidders shall be ranked from the lowest to the highest. 3.5.3 The Bidder with the lowest Levelized Tariff shall be declared as the Successful Bidder for the quantum of power (in MW) offered by such Bidder in its Financial Bid. 3.5.4 The selection process of the Successful Bidder as mentioned above in Clause 3.5.3 shall be repeated for all the remaining Finan....
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.....5.11 If the Successful Bidder, to whom the Letter of Intent has been issued does not fulfill any of the conditions specified in Clauses 2.2.8 and 2.2.9, the Procurer/Authorized Representative reserves the right to annul the award of the Letter of Intent of such Successful Bidder. Further, in such a case, the provisions of Clause 2.5 (b) shall apply. 3.5.12 The Procurer/Authorized Representative, in its own discretion, has the right to reject all Bids if the Quoted Tariff are not aligned to the prevailing market prices. 42. It will also be relevant to refer to Clause 5.15 of the Bidding Guidelines, which is as under: 5.15 The bidder who has quoted lowest levellised tariff as per evaluation procedure, shall be considered for the award. The evaluation committee shall have the right to reject all price bids if the rates quoted are not aligned to the prevailing market prices. [emphasis supplied] 43. Successful bidder has been defined in the RFP as under: Successful Bidder(s)" shall mean the Bidder(s) selected by the Procurer/ Authorized Representative, as applicable pursuant to this RFP for supply of power by itself or through the Project Company as per the terms of the RFP Do....
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....order dated 25th April 2018, and issued the following directions: We are in agreement with the earlier conclusion of the APTEL. We are of the view that the direction of reduction of capacity from 1000 mw to 500 mw by the State Commission was correctly set aside. Since L- 1 to L-5 were represented before this Court, we direct that they shall be entitled to supply of power in terms of the originally offered amount, mentioned above, in accordance with para 3.5 of the Request for Proposal. The power supply will now be reduced to a total of 906 mw. The State Commission may now go into the issue of approval for adoption of tariff with regard to L-4 and L-5. All Letters of Intent (LOIs) shall stand modified in terms of the above. All the appeals shall stand disposed of in terms of the above order. 49. Consequent to the orders passed by this Court, the State Commission vide its order dated 29th May 2018, directed RVPN/DISCOMS to file an appropriate application/petition in relation to L-3, L-4 and L-5 bidders. 50. RVPN accordingly filed an application on 27th August 2018 before the State Commission, submitting therein that the tariff of L-4 and L-5 bidders was very high and not aligned ....
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....se of the review and the M.A. The State Commission which has reserved its judgment on 16.01.2019 will hear the parties within a period of two weeks from today and will pass orders after taking into account the order that we have passed today. 56. In accordance with the directions issued by this Court, the State Commission considered the rival submissions of the parties and came to a conclusion that the tariff quoted by SKS Power was not market aligned. The State Commission also found that, adoption of such high rate would be against the consumer interest. The State Commission, therefore, vide order dated 26th February 2019, decided not to adopt the tariff quoted by L-4 and L-5 bidders. 57. The said order dated 26th February 2019 of the State Commission was challenged before the learned APTEL by SKS Power by way of Appeal No. 224 of 2019. The learned APTEL framed the following three issues in the said appeal: ISSUE No. 1: Whether the Respondent Commission could reject the tariff/bid of the Appellant, in terms of Section 63 of the Electricity Act, 2003 and the directions issued by the Hon'ble Supreme Court? ISSUE No. 2: Whether there was a sufficient proof to show that th....
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....N and the DISCOMS were bound to procure electricity/power from the bidders going down the ladder until the entire 906 MW power was exhausted. It is their contention that once it is certified that the bid evaluation process has been complied with as per the Bidding Guidelines issued by the Central Government, it is presumed that the process was transparent and it is not permissible for the State Commission to go into the question of market aligned tariff and also the consumer interest. It is their contention that without considering the question, as to whether the tariff was market aligned or not, the procurers were bound to accept supply from the bidders at the rates quoted by them. It is their submission that the power Under Section 63 of the Electricity Act restricted the scrutiny only to two aspects, viz., (1) whether the Bidding Guidelines framed by the Union of India Under Section 63 of the Electricity Act were followed; and (2) whether the bidding process was transparent or not. 64. The High Court in the impugned judgment, relying on the observations of the learned APTEL and the earlier orders of this Court has come to a conclusion that, applying the test of "filling the buc....
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....en issued under this Section on 19-1-2005, which guidelines have been amended from time to time. Clause 4, in particular, deals with tariff and the appropriate Commission certainly has the jurisdiction to look into whether the tariff determined through the process of bidding accords with Clause 4. 20. It is important to note that the regulatory powers of the Central Commission, so far as tariff is concerned, are specifically mentioned in Section 79(1). This regulatory power is a general one, and it is very difficult to state that when the Commission adopts tariff Under Section 63, it functions dehors its general regulatory power Under Section 79(1)(b). For one thing, such Regulation takes place under the Central Government's guidelines. For another, in a situation where there are no guidelines or in a situation which is not covered by the guidelines, can it be said that the Commission's power to "regulate" tariff is completely done away with? According to us, this is not a correct way of reading the aforesaid statutory provisions. The first Rule of statutory interpretation is that the statute must be read as a whole. As a concomitant of that rule, it is also clear that al....
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.... own terms, and that, therefore, in the case of transparent bidding nothing can be looked at except the bid itself which must accord with guidelines issued by the Central Government. However, rejecting the said contention, this Court observed that the appropriate Commission does not act as a mere post office Under Section 63. It has been observed that, Clause 4, in particular, deals with tariff and the appropriate Commission certainly has the jurisdiction to look into whether the tariff determined through the process of bidding accords with Clause 4. 68. This Court in the said case, in paragraph 20, further observed that the entire Act shall be read as a whole. It has been held that, all the discordant notes struck by the various Sections must be harmonized. It has been held that, considering the fact that the non obstante Clause advisedly restricts itself to Section 62, there is no reason to put Section 79 out of the way altogether. It has been held that, either Under Section 62, or Under Section 63, the general regulatory power of the Commission Under Section 79(1)(b) is the source of the power to regulate, which includes the power to determine or adopt tariff. It has been held ....
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....r who has quoted lowest levelized tariff as per evaluation procedure, shall be considered for the award. It also provides that the evaluation committee shall have the right to reject all price bids if the rates quoted are not aligned to the prevailing market prices. 74. It is thus amply clear that the evaluation committee is empowered to consider, as to whether the rates quoted are aligned to the market price or not, and that the evaluation committee shall have the right to reject all the price bids if it finds that the rates quoted are not aligned to the prevailing market price. The orders which are relied upon by the learned APTEL, specifically the order dated 19th November 2018 of this Court, had specifically clarified that the State Commission was to decide the tariff Under Section 63 of the Electricity Act having regard to the law laid down both statutorily and by this Court. 75. In this background, the State Commission was justified in considering Clause 5.15 of the Bidding Guidelines, which specifically permits to reject all price bids if the rates quoted are not aligned to the prevailing market prices. 76. The contention that this Court has ordered that the bids quoted b....
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....lized tariff quoted by L-4 and L-5 bidders: (i) Shri R.K. Jain, Chief Engineer (NPP & RA), RVPN, Jaipur; (ii) Shri Manish Saxena, Chief Controller of Accounts, RVPN, Jaipur; (iii) Shri M.M. Ranwa, Chief Engineer, RUVNL, Jaipur; (iv) Shri K.L. Meena, Addl. Chief Engineer (Fuel), RVUN, Jaipur; (v) Shri S.K. Mathur, Chief Engineer (HQ), JVVNL, Jaipur; and (vi) Shri Tarun Agarwal, CA, Partner M/s. Shyamlal Agrawal & Co., Jaipur 81. It can be seen that the said Committee consisted of 4 technical members of the rank of Chief Engineer/Additional Chief Engineer. It consisted of the Chief Controller of Account, RVPN, Jaipur. It also consisted of a Chartered Accountant, who is an expert in financial matters. After due deliberations, the BEC consisting of experts found that the prices quoted by L-4 and L- 5 bidders were exorbitantly high and it would result in additional financial burden of more than Rs. 1715 crore on the consumers of the State as compared to the tariff of L-1 bidder. 82. The State Commission after considering the detailed analysis of the BEC had come to the considered conclusion that the prices offered by SKS Power (L-5 bidder) were not market aligned, and ther....
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....valid on the ground of excessive delegation. It is submitted that it cannot be construed that the legislature intended to bestow uncanalised, unguided and arbitrary power on the Central Government to demonetise the entire currency. It is, therefore, the submission of the Petitioners that in order to save the said Section from being declared void, the word "any" requires to be interpreted in a restricted manner to mean "some". 114. Per contra, it is submitted on behalf of the Respondents that the word "any" Under Sub-section (2) of Section 26 of the RBI Act, cannot be interpreted in a narrow manner and it will have to be construed to include "all". Precedents construing the word "any" 115. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Chief Inspector of Mines v. Lala Karam Chand Thapar [Chief Inspector of Mines v. Lala Karam Chand Thapar, (1962) 1 SCR 9 : AIR 1961 SC 838] was considering the question as to whether the phrase "any one of the Directors" as found in Section 76 of the Mines Act, 1952 could mean "only one of the Directors" or could it be construed to mean "every one of the Directors". In the said case, all the Directors of the Company were prosecuted for the offences punis....
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.... or thing of the sort named"; it is not unreasonable to say that, the word "of" followed by a word denoting a number of persons or things is just such "naming of a sort" as mentioned there. Suppose, the illustration "I challenge any one to contradict my assertions" was changed to "I challenge any one of my opponents to contradict my assertion". "Any one of my opponents" here would mean "all my opponents" - not one only of the opponents. 32. While the phrase "any one of them" or any similar phrase consisting of "any one", followed by "of" which is followed in its turn by words denoting a number of persons or things, does not appear to have fallen for judicial construction, in our courts or in England - the phrase "any of the present Directors" had to be interpreted in an old English case, Isle of Wight Railway Co. v. Tahourdin [Isle of Wight Railway Co. v. Tahourdin, (1883) LR 25 Ch D 320 (CA)]. A number of shareholders required the Directors to call a meeting of the company for two objects. One of the objects was mentioned as 'To remove, if deemed necessary or expedient any of the present Directors, and to elect Directors to fill any vacancy on the Board'. The Directors i....
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....and Thapar, (1962) 1 SCR 9 : AIR 1961 SC 838], after giving the matter full and anxious consideration, came to the conclusion that the words "any one of the Directors" was an ambiguous one. It held that in some contexts, it means "only one of the Directors, does not matter which one", but in other contexts, it is capable of meaning "every one of the Directors". It held that which of these two meanings was intended by the legislature in any particular statutory phrase has to be decided by the courts on consideration of the context in which the words appear, and in particular, the scheme and object of the legislation. 119. After examining the scheme of the Mines Act, 1952, the Constitution Bench of this Court further observed thus: (Lala Karam Chand Thapar case [Chief Inspector of Mines v. Lala Karam Chand Thapar, (1962) 1 SCR 9 : AIR 1961 SC 838] AIR pp. 848-49, paras 36-38) 36. But, argues Mr. Pathak, one must not forget the special Rule of interpretation for "penal statute" that if the language is ambiguous, the interpretation in favour of the Accused should ordinarily be adopted. If you interpret "any one" in the sense suggested by him, the legislation he suggests is void and....
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...."one", still the Court held that the words "any one" would mean "all" and not "one". It is to be noted that in the present case, the legislature has not employed the word "one" after the word "any". It is settled law that it has to be construed that every single word employed or not employed by the legislature has a purpose behind it. 121. On the very date on which the judgment in Chief Inspector of Mines v. Lala Karam Chand Thapar [Chief Inspector of Mines v. Lala Karam Chand Thapar, (1962) 1 SCR 9 : AIR 1961 SC 838] was pronounced, the same Constitution Bench also pronounced the judgment in Banwarilal Agarwalla [Banwarilal Agarwalla v. State of Bihar, (1962) 1 SCR 33 : AIR 1961 SC 849], wherein the Constitution Bench observed thus: (Banwarilal Agarwalla case [Banwarilal Agarwalla v. State of Bihar, (1962) 1 SCR 33 : AIR 1961 SC 849] AIR p. 850, para 3) 3. The first contention is based on an assumption that the word "any one" in Section 76 means only "one of the Directors, and only one of the shareholders". This question as regards the interpretation of the word "any one" in Section 76 was raised in Criminal Appeals Nos. 98 to 106 of 1959 (Chief Inspector of Mines [Chief Inspe....
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....nd its business was being transacted, anything said during the course of that business was immune from proceedings in any court. 124. This Court, in LDA [LDA v. M.K. Gupta, (1994) 1 SCC 243], was considering Clause (o) of Section 2(1) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 which defines "service", wherein the word "any" again fell for consideration. This Court observed thus: (SCC p. 255, para 4) 4. ... The words "any" and "potential" are significant. Both are of wide amplitude. The word "any" dictionarily means "one or some or all". In Black's Law Dictionary it is explained thus, 'word "any" has a diversity of meaning and may be employed to indicate "all" or "every" as well as "some" or "one" and its meaning in a given statute depends upon the context and the subject- matter of the statute'. The use of the word "any" in the context it has been used in Clause (o) indicates that it has been used in wider sense extending from one to all. 125. This Court held in LDA case [LDA v. M.K. Gupta, (1994) 1 SCC 243] that the word "any" is of wide amplitude. It means "one or some or all". Referring to Black's Law Dictionary, the Court observed that the word "any" has a diver....
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.... may impose restrictions, like limitation or pre- deposit of penalty or it may limit the area of appeal to questions of law or sometime to substantial questions of law. Whenever such limitations are imposed, they are to be strictly followed. But in a case where there is no limitation on the nature of order or decision to be appealed against, as in this case, the right of appeal cannot be further curtailed by this Court on the basis of an interpretative exercise. 20. Under Section 35 of FEMA, the legislature has conferred a right of appeal to a person aggrieved from "any" "order" or "decision" of the Appellate Tribunal. Of course such appeal will have to be on a question of law. In this context the word "any" would mean "all". *** 26. In the instant case also when a right is conferred on a person aggrieved to file appeal from "any" order or decision of the Tribunal, there is no reason, in the absence of a contrary statutory intent, to give it a restricted meaning. Therefore, in our judgment in Section 35 of FEMA, any "order" or "decision" of the Appellate Tribunal would mean all decisions or orders of the Appellate Tribunal and all such decisions or orders are, subject to limit....
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....meaning and in Black's Law Dictionary it has been stated that this word may be employed to indicate "all" or "every", and its meaning will depend "upon the context and subject-matter of the statute". A reference to what has been stated in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, Vol. I, is revealing inasmuch as the import of the word "any" has been explained from pp. 145 to 153 of the 4th Edn., a perusal of which shows it has different connotations depending primarily on the subject-matter of the statute and the context of its use. A Bench of this Court in LDA v. M.K. Gupta [LDA v. M.K. Gupta, (1994) 1 SCC 243], gave a very wide meaning to this word finding place in Section 2(1)(o) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 defining "service". (See para 4) (emphasis supplied) 132. Shri Chidambaram rightly argued that the word "any" will have to be construed in its context, taking into consideration the scheme and the purpose of the enactment. There can be no quarrel with regard to the said proposition. Right from the judgment of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Chief Inspector of Mines v. Lala Karam Chand Thapar [Chief Inspector of Mines v. Lala Karam Chand Thapar, (1962) 1 SCR 9:....
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.... approach of interpretation is a pragmatic one, and not pedantic. An interpretation which advances the purpose of the Act and which ensures its smooth and harmonious working must be chosen and the other which leads to absurdity, or confusion, or friction, or contradiction and conflict between its various provisions, or undermines, or tends to defeat or destroy the basic scheme and purpose of the enactment must be eschewed. The primary and foremost task of the Court in interpreting a statute is to gather the intention of the legislature, actual or imputed. Having ascertained the intention, it is the duty of the Court to strive to so interpret the statute as to promote or advance the object and purpose of the enactment. For this purpose, where necessary, the Court may even depart from the Rule that plain words should be interpreted according to their plain meaning. There need be no meek and mute submission to the plainness of the language. To avoid patent injustice, anomaly or absurdity or to avoid invalidation of a law, the court would be justified in departing from the so-called golden Rule of construction so as to give effect to the object and purpose of the enactment. Ascertainme....
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..... Not only that, these Tribunals are tribunals consisting of experts having vast experience in the field of electricity. As such, we find that the High Court erred in directly entertaining the writ petition when the Respondent No. 1, i.e., the writ Petitioner before the High Court had an adequate alternate remedy of approaching the State Electricity Commission. 94. This Court in the case of Reliance Infrastructure Limited v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. 2019:INSC:63 : (2019) 3 SCC 352 has held that while exercising its power of judicial review, the Court can step in where a case of manifest unreasonableness or arbitrariness is made out. 95. In the present case, there is not even an allegation with regard to that effect. In such circumstances, recourse to a petition Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the availability of efficacious alternate remedy under a statute, which is a complete code in itself, in our view, was not justified. 96. No doubt that availability of an alternate remedy is not a complete bar in the exercise of the power of judicial review by the High Courts. But, recourse to such a remedy would be permissible only if extraordinary and exceptional ci....
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....urt, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. There is a plethora of case-law on this point but to cut down this circle of forensic whirlpool, we would rely on some old decisions of the evolutionary era of the constitutional law as they still hold the field. (emphasis supplied) 26. Following the dictum of this Court in Whirlpool [Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1], in Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. [Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 107], this Court noted that: (....
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....ropriate case though ordinarily, a writ petition should not be entertained when an efficacious alternate remedy is provided by law. 27.5. When a right is created by a statute, which itself prescribes the remedy or procedure for enforcing the right or liability, resort must be had to that particular statutory remedy before invoking the discretionary remedy Under Article 226 of the Constitution. This Rule of exhaustion of statutory remedies is a Rule of policy, convenience and discretion. 27.6. In cases where there are disputed questions of fact, the High Court may decide to decline jurisdiction in a writ petition. However, if the High Court is objectively of the view that the nature of the controversy requires the exercise of its writ jurisdiction, such a view would not readily be interfered with. 28. These principles have been consistently upheld by this Court in Chand Ratan v. Durga Prasad [Chand Ratan v. Durga Prasad, (2003) 5 SCC 399], Babubhai Muljibhai Patel v. Nandlal Khodidas Barot [Babubhai Muljibhai Patel v. Nandlal Khodidas Barot, (1974) 2 SCC 706] and Rajasthan SEB v. Union of India [Rajasthan SEB v. Union of India, (2008) 5 SCC 632] among other decisions. 98. Thi....
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.... commercial decision considerations which are paramount are commercial considerations. The State can choose its own method to arrive at a decision. It can fix its own terms of invitation to tender and that is not open to judicial scrutiny. It can enter into negotiations before finally deciding to accept one of the offers made to it. Price need not always be the sole criterion for awarding a contract. It is free to grant any relaxation, for bona fide reasons, if the tender conditions permit such a relaxation. It may not accept the offer even though it happens to be the highest or the lowest. But the State, its corporations, instrumentalities and agencies are bound to adhere to the norms, standards and procedures laid down by them and cannot depart from them arbitrarily. Though that decision is not amenable to judicial review, the court can examine the decision-making process and interfere if it is found vitiated by mala fides, unreasonableness and arbitrariness. The State, its corporations, instrumentalities and agencies have the public duty to be fair to all concerned. Even when some defect is found in the decision- making process the court must exercise its discretionary power Und....
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....itrariness, mala fides, irrationality, it will not be permissible for the Court to interfere with the same. 104. In the present case, the decision-making process, as adopted by the BEC was totally in conformity with the principles laid down by this Court from time to time. The BEC after considering the competitive rates offered in the bidding process in various States came to a conclusion that the rates quoted by SKS Power (L-5 bidder) were not market aligned. The said decision has been approved by the State Commission. Since the decision-making process adopted by the BEC, which has been approved by the State Commission, was in accordance with the law laid down by this Court, the same ought not to have been interfered with by the learned APTEL. 105. In any case, the High Court, by the impugned judgment and order, could not have issued a mandamus to the instrumentalities of the State to enter into a contract, which was totally harmful to the public interest. Inasmuch as, if the power/electricity is to be procured by the procurers at the rates quoted by the Respondent No. 1-MB Power, which is even higher than the rates quoted by the SKS Power (L-5 bidder), then the State would have....