TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2024 (1) TMI 1459
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....udgment and order, the High Court held that the Respondent Nos. 1 to 5 therein (Appellants herein and the State of Rajasthan) are bound to purchase a total of 906 MW electricity from the successful bidders. It, therefore, directed the writ Petitioner- MB Power (Respondent No. 1 herein) and Respondent No. 7 - PTC India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "PTC India") in the said writ petition (Respondent No. 2 in the present appeals) to supply 200 MW electricity to the Respondents therein (Appellants herein) within the limit of 906 MW. It also directed the writ Petitioner- MB Power and PTC India, Respondent No. 7 in the said writ petition, to file an appropriate application before the Respondent Nos. 1 to 5 in the said writ petition, within two weeks from the date of the order, complying with the necessary requisite conditions, including bank guarantee etc., as required in terms of the Request for Proposal (hereinafter referred to as "the RFP"). It further directed the Respondent Nos. 1 to 5 in the said writ petition, for issuance of Letter of Intent ("LoI" for short) in respect of bid filed through PTC India for supplying 200 MW power from the power generating station of the writ Peti....
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....itted a bid for 1041 MW, which it was to procure from five different generators. PTC India is a power-trading licensee company, which had procured the bid document after depositing a Bid Bond. 2.6 In the various meetings held between 17th April 2013 and 22nd April 2013, the BEC had placed the bids received in ascending order, from lowest to the highest tariff as follows: Rank Qualified Bidder Name Levelized Tariff (Rs/kWh) Capacity Offered Cumulative Capacity Offered Average Cumulative Tariff (Rs/ kWh) L-1 PTC - Maruti Clean Coal and Power Limited 4.517 195 195 4.517 L-2 PTC - DB Power Limited 4.811 311 506 4.698 L-3 LPL - Lanco Babandh Power Limited 4.943 100 606 4.738 L-4 PTC - Athena Chhattisgarh Power Ltd 5.143 200 806 4.839 L-5 SKS Power Generation (Chhattisgarh) Limited 5.300 100 906 4.890 L-6 LPL - Lanco Vidarbha Thermal Power Limited 5.490 100 1006 4.949 L-7 PTC - MB Power (Madhya Pradesh) Ltd. 5.517 200 1206 5.043 L-8 KSK Mahanadi Power Company Limited 5.572 475 1681 5.193 L-9 Jindal Power Limited 6.03....
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....f the Power Procurement Regulations, in its 4th meeting held on 29th January 2014, recommended that there was no requirement for long term procurement of 1000 MW (+/-10%) power under Case-I for which PPAs had been executed and tariff adoption petition had been filed before the State Commission. 2.14 In the meantime, the L-4 and L-5 bidders filed Writ Petitions being CWP No. 19437 of 2013 and CWP No. 18699 of 2013 respectively, before the High Court, seeking to strike down the negotiations process and the higher quantum awarded to L-1, L- 2 and L-3 bidders. 2.15 The High Court vide judgment dated 7th February 2014, refused to entertain the writ petitions and relegated the parties to the State Commission. The said order dated 7th February 2014 came to be challenged by the L-4 and L-5 bidders by way of writ appeals being DB Special Appeals (Writ) Nos. 538 of 2014 and 604 of 2014. The said appeals also came to be dismissed by the High Court vide judgment and order dated 18th April 2014. 2.16 Subsequently, in its 5th meeting held on 21st May 2014, the EAC recommended that as against the quantum of 1000 MW power, for which PPAs had been executed and tariff adoption petition had ....
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....ntum which was negotiated. 2.23 The order of the learned APTEL dated 2nd February 2018, was challenged by the present Appellants before this Court by way of Civil Appeal Nos. 3481-3482 of 2018, on the ground that the RFP quantum cannot be restored from 500 MW to 1000 MW. Subsequently, Civil Appeal Nos. 2502-2503 of 2018 also came to be filed by L-5 bidder- SKS Power Generation (Chhattisgarh) Limited (hereinafter referred to as "SKS Power"), on the ground that the State Commission could not have permitted the procurement of higher quantum by the L-2 and L-3 bidders. 2.24 Vide order dated 25th April 2018, the said Civil Appeals were disposed of by this Court, upholding the decision of the learned APTEL, setting aside the reduction of quantum of procurement from 1000 MW to 500 MW after the bidding process was over. However, this Court held that the decision of the learned APTEL on the quantum to be procured from individual bidders was liable to be reversed and that the quantum originally offered by the bidders in the bidding process has to be taken into consideration and increase in quantum by means of negotiation was not permissible. Insofar as L-4 and L-5 bidders are concerned....
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....(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution of India as well as Section 63 of the Electricity Act, 2003; (b) Issue appropriate Writ or order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the Respondent Nos. 1-4 to immediately issue a Letter of Intent in favour of the Petitioner, sign the power Purchase Agreement with the Petitioner as per its bid tariff, take steps for adoption of tariff of the Petitioner and immediately commence supply of power; (c) Pass such further order(s) as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the instant case in the interest of justice. 2.33 In the appeals filed by the present Appellants, i.e., Civil Appeal Nos. 1937 of 2020 and 2721 of 2020, Respondent No. 1- MB Power filed an application for impleadment, on the ground that the issue of role of the State Commission in adoption of tariff being decided by this Court in the said appeals would have an impact on the writ petition filed by it before the High Court. 2.34 Vide order dated 19th April 2021, this Court directed the said application for impleadment to be considered at the stage of hearing of the said appeals. 2.35 By the impugned judgment ....
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..... Vide order dated 10th October 2023, this Court had been informed that pursuant to the aforesaid order dated 26th September 2023, bids had been opened and the lowest bid was at Rs. 5.30 per unit. As a result, this Court had clarified that the pendency of the present appeal would not come in the way of the Appellant in finalizing the tender and executing power purchase agreement with the successful bidders and the Appellant would be at liberty to do so in order to overcome the difficulty of power shortage. 7. The order of the learned APTEL dated 1st June 2023 basically relies on the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, bench at Jaipur, passed in D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 14815 of 2020, which is a subject matter of challenge in Civil Appeal Nos. 6503 of 2022 and 6502 of 2022. As such, the result of Civil Appeal No. 4612 of 2023 would depend upon the outcome of Civil Appeal Nos. 6503 of 2022 and 6502 of 2022. SUBMISSIONS OF THE APPELLANTS 8. We have heard Shri P. Chidambaram, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Appellants, and Dr. A.M. Singhvi and Shri C.S. Vaidyanathan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Respondents. ....
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....I was issued to the Respondent No. 1-MB Power, it could not be construed as a "successful bidder". 13. Shri Chidambaram submits that the theory of "filling the bucket", as put forth by the Respondent No. 1-MB Power, has no basis either in the RFP or in the Bidding Guidelines. It is further submitted that the said theory is a dangerous proposition inasmuch as, it is expected that the procurer would be obliged to accept the bids of lower ranked financial bids, irrespective of the exorbitant tariff quoted by them. Shri Chidambaram has given an illustration to that effect that, if in a bid to procure 1000 MW, 2 bidders can be put forward as stalking horses who would bid lower tariffs and are ranked as L-1 and L-2. Thereafter, L-3 onwards can quote exorbitant tariffs which are not aligned to market prices. He submits that this specious theory of "filling the bucket", which would oblige the procurer to go to the last bidder, irrespective of their tariffs being completely exorbitant, is very dangerous. It is submitted that, in any case, Clause 3.5.12 of the RFP enables the procurer to reject any bid where the quoted tariff is not aligned to market prices. 14. Shri Chidambaram furthe....
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....al Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) and Ors. 2023:INSC:398, wherein this Court has emphasized the need for balancing the interest of the consumers with that of the generators. 19. Shri Chidambaram further submits that in view of clauses 2.15.1 and 3.5.12 of the RFP and Clause 5.15 of the Bidding Guidelines, the Appellants had the power to reject all price bids if the rates quoted are not aligned to the prevailing market prices. 20. Shri Chidambaram lastly submitted that the bidders have no vested right to contract. Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be used to award a contract in favour of the bidder. In this respect, he refers to the following judgments of this Court: i. Tata Cellular v. Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 651 : 1994 INSC 283 (para 94) ii. Rajasthan Housing Board and Anr. v. G.S. Investments and Anr. (2007) 1 SCC 477 (para 8, 9 and 11) iii. Laxmikant and Ors. v. Satyawan and Ors. (1996) 4 SCC 208 : 1996 INSC 409 21. Shri Chidambaram, therefore, submits that the impugned judgment and order is not sustainable and is liable to be set aside. SUBMISSIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS 22. Dr. A.M. Singhvi, learned Senior Couns....
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.... than the 1st year tariff of the said bidder itself. 27. Dr. Singhvi submits that M/s. Deloitte is a common consultant insofar as the Appellants and the Uttar Pradesh Power Corporation Limited ("UPPCL" for short). He submits that, in fact, BEC of UPPCL, in March 2013, accepted tariff up to Rs. 5.849 per unit i.e., a tariff much higher than that of Respondent No. 1-MB Power. It is submitted that the bidding period in the present case as well as in the case of UPPCL is the same. It is submitted that, however, in 2018, the Rajasthan BEC mischievously and selectively considered tariff only up to 2012 and compared bids of Andhra Pradesh and Kerala, which were, in fact, discovered in 2015 and 2014 respectively. It is submitted that similarly, in the State of Tamil Nadu, for the same period, the equivalent levelized tariff was determined by M/s. Deloitte at Rs. 5.75 per unit for 25 years and the same was accepted. It is, therefore, submitted that, considering the aforesaid, the levelized tariff of the Respondent No. 1-MB Power for 25 years at Rs. 5.517 per unit is indisputably market aligned even as on 2012-2013. 28. Dr. Singhvi, relied on the following charts to show that the level....
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....not followed or the bids are not market aligned, then the Appellants would be entitled to reject all bids and not individually and selectively some bids. He submits that if the interpretation as placed by the Appellants is to be accepted, it will vest an arbitrary power with the procurer of energy to arbitrarily reject the bid of any of the bidders. It is submitted that such an unfettered and unchecked discretion cannot be permitted to be exercised by the Appellants/distribution companies ("DISCOMS"). 33. Dr. Singhvi submits that insofar as the aspect with regard to "consumer's interest" is concerned, the learned APTEL has squarely covered the same. It has been held by the learned APTEL that the consumers' interest is a broad term and among others, involves reliable, quality and un-interrupted power on long term basis besides being competitive. 34. The learned Senior Counsel submits that the State of Rajasthan needed 1000 MW of power when it invited the bids in question. He submits that the DISCOMS have even fairly admitted that they are still in need of power and as such, filed an Interlocutory Application being I.A. No. 150366 of 2023 in Civil Appeal No. 4612 of 202....
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....Year Quoted Tariff Levelized Tariff for 25 years PPA Duration Adani Mumbai- 2022 5.98 8.78 2.1 years Uttarakhand-2023 5.41 7.93 1.5 years Noida Power - 2022 5.15 7.46 3 years Mundra SEZ- 2023 5.00 6.69 15 years Haryana - 2022 5.70 to 5.75 8.36 3 years J & K - 2023 6.05 8.22 5 years Haryana - 2023 6.05 8.22 5 years NDMC - 2023 6.05 8.22 5 years Madhya Pradesh-2023 6.05 8.22 5 years Haryana - 2023 5.79 8.49 5 years Gujarat - 2023 5.18 to 5.69 6.81 15 years Uttarakhand-2023 7.97 11.72 3.5 years Noida Power - 2023 6.30 9.18 3 years" 37. Dr. Singhvi, therefore, submits that, if the directions as issued by the High Court are maintained, it will be in the interests of the consumers, who will be getting the electricity at lesser prices than what has recently been emerged as a levelized price in the bidding process. He submits that this is specifically so when indisputably even according to the Appellants they are in dire need of power. Dr. Singhvi, therefore, prays for dismissal of the present appeals. 38. Shri C.S. Vaidyana....
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....s follows: 1. Promote competitive procurement of electricity by distribution licensees; 2. Facilitate transparency and fairness in procurement processes; 3. Facilitate reduction of information asymmetries for various bidders; 4. Protect consumer interests by facilitating competitive conditions in procurement of electricity; 5. Enhance standardization and reduce ambiguity and hence time for materialization of projects; 6. Provide flexibility to suppliers on internal operations while ensuring certainty on availability of power and tariffs for buyers. 41. It will also be relevant to refer to certain clauses of the RFP, which are as under: 2.15 Right to withdraw the RFP and to reject any Bid. 2.15.1 This RFP may be withdrawn or cancelled by the Procurer/ Authorized Representative at any time without assigning any reasons thereof. The Procurer/ Authorized Representative further reserves the right, at its complete discretion, to reject any or all of the Bids without assigning any reasons whatsoever and without incurring any liability on any account. xxx &nbs....
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....e Successful Bidder with the lowest Levelized Tariff amongst the remaining Bids. Any increase/decrease in the Requisitioned Capacity exceeding ten percent (10%) of the quantum in Clause 1.3.1. can be made only with the approval of the Appropriate Commission. 3.5.8 The Letter(s) of Intent shall be issued to all such Successful Bidder(s) selected as per the provisions of this Clause 3.5. 3.5.9 There shall be no negotiation on the Quoted Tariff between the Authorized Representative/ Procurer and the Bidder(s) during the process of evaluation. 3.5.10 Each Successful Bidder shall unconditionally accept the LOI, and record on one (1) copy of the LOI, "Accepted Unconditionally", under the signature of the authorized signatory of the Successful Bidder and return such copy to the Procurer/ Authorized Representative within seven (7) days of issue of LOI. 3.5.11 If the Successful Bidder, to whom the Letter of Intent has been issued does not fulfill any of the conditions specified in Clauses 2.2.8 and 2.2.9, the Procurer/Authorized Representative reserves the right to annul the award of the Letter of Intent of such Successful Bidder. Further, in such a case,....
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....rected to pass consequential order in accordance with the law keeping in view our observations made above as well as the judgments of this Tribunal rendered earlier on the aspects of the scope of Section 63 of the Act as expeditiously as possible, preferably, within 2 months from today. No order as to costs. 46. After the learned APTEL passed the aforesaid order, M/s. D.B. Power Ltd. (L-2 bidder) filed an Interlocutory Application before the State Commission, praying for passing forthwith consequential orders in terms of the judgment of the learned APTEL. It also sought a direction to DISCOMS to start procuring power from it to the extent of 410 MW as per the PPA dated 1st November 2013. 47. When the matter was heard by the State Commission on 8th March 2018, it was noticed that appeals against the order of the learned APTEL were pending before this Court. 48. This Court disposed of the said appeals vide judgment and order dated 25th April 2018, and issued the following directions: We are in agreement with the earlier conclusion of the APTEL. We are of the view that the direction of reduction of capacity from 1000 mw to 500 mw by the State Commission was correctly....
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....y, RVPN filed a Miscellaneous Application before this Court. This Court vide order dated 19th November 2018, passed the following order: Having heard learned Counsels for both the parties, we only clarify that the Rajasthan Electricity Regulatory Commission [the State Commission) is to decide the tariff under- Section 63 of the Electricity Act, 2003 having regard to the law laid down both statutorily and by this Court. The State Commission to finalise the aforesaid prices within a period of eight weeks from today. The MAs are disposed of accordingly. 55. A review application was also filed on behalf of the SKS Power. The said review application was disposed of by this Court vide order dated 21st January 2019, with the following directions: ------. We find that as per the Standard Bidding Guidelines the PPA is first to be signed after which the question of adoption of tariff has to be taken up. With this clarification of the 20.09.2018 order, we dispose of the review and the M.A. The State Commission which has reserved its judgment on 16.01.2019 will hear the parties within a period of two weeks from today and will pass orders....
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....e same had been dealt with in detail by the learned APTEL vide order dated 2nd February 2018 and also considered by this Court before passing the order dated 25th April, 2018. 61. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed by the learned APTEL vide order dated 3rd February 2020 and the order dated 26th February 2019 of the State Commission was set aside. The learned APTEL directed that the tariff of SKS Power, as offered in its bid, shall be adopted. The parties were directed to revive and implement the PPA dated 4th February 2019. This order dated 3rd February 2020, passed by the learned APTEL has been challenged by the DISCOMS and RVPN before this Court by way of Civil Appeal No. 1937 of 2020 and Civil Appeal No. 2721 of 2020 respectively. 62. The Respondent No. 1 in the present proceedings rests its claim on the aforesaid orders passed by this Court and the order dated 3rd February 2020, passed by the learned APTEL. 63. Basically, it is the contention of the Respondent No. 1-MB Power that after the orders were passed by this Court, RVPN and the DISCOMS were bound to procure electricity/power from the bidders going down the ladder until the entire 906 MW power was exhausted. It....
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....non obstante Clause covering only Section 62. Secondly, unlike Section 62 read with Sections 61 and 64, the appropriate Commission does not "determine" tariff but only "adopts" tariff already determined Under Section 63. Thirdly, such "adoption" is only if such tariff has been determined through a transparent process of bidding, and, fourthly, this transparent process of bidding must be in accordance with the guidelines issued by the Central Government. What has been argued before us is that Section 63 is a standalone provision and has to be construed on its own terms, and that, therefore, in the case of transparent bidding nothing can be looked at except the bid itself which must accord with guidelines issued by the Central Government. One thing is immediately clear, that the appropriate Commission does not act as a mere post office Under Section 63. It must adopt the tariff which has been determined through a transparent process of bidding, but this can only be done in accordance with the guidelines issued by the Central Government. Guidelines have been issued under this Section on 19-1-2005, which guidelines have been amended from time to time. Clause 4, in particular, deals wit....
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....elines and must exercise its regulatory functions, albeit Under Section 79(1)(b), only in accordance with those guidelines. As has been stated above, it is only in a situation where there are no guidelines framed at all or where the guidelines do not deal with a given situation that the Commission's general regulatory powers Under Section 79(1)(b) can then be used. [emphasis supplied] 67. It could thus be seen that it has been held by this Court that unlike Section 62 read with Sections 61 and 64, under the provisions of Section 63 of the Electricity Act, the appropriate Commission does not "determine" tariff but only "adopts" tariff already determined Under Section 63. It has further been held that, such "adoption" is only if such tariff has been determined through a transparent process of bidding, and that, this transparent process of bidding must be in accordance with the guidelines issued by the Central Government. It was sought to be contended before this Court in the said case that Section 63 is a standalone provision and has to be construed on its own terms, and that, therefore, in the case of transparent bidding nothing can be looked at except the bid itself which....
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....ing the price at which electricity shall be procured from the generating companies or licensees or from other sources through agreements for purchase of power for distribution and supply within the State. 71. It can thus be seen that Section 86(1)(b) of the Electricity Act gives ample power on the State Commission to regulate electricity purchase and procurement process of distribution licensees. It also empowers the State Commission to regulate the matters including the price at which electricity shall be procured from the generating companies, etc. 72. It will also be relevant to refer to the Bidding Guidelines notified by the Central Government vide Resolution dated 19th January 2005. The preamble of the Bidding Guidelines specifically states that, one of the objectives of the said Bidding Guidelines is to facilitate transparency and fairness in procurement processes and protection of consumer interests by facilitating competitive conditions in procurement of electricity. 73. Clause 5.15 of the Bidding Guidelines is an important clause. It provides that, the bidder who has quoted lowest levelized tariff as per evaluation procedure, shall be considered for the award. It ....
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....bove when the prices quoted are totally not aligned to market prices. 78. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the learned APTEL has grossly erred in holding that the State Commission has no power to go into the question, as to whether the prices quoted are market aligned or not and also not to take into consideration the aspect of consumers' interest. 79. When the Bidding Guidelines itself permit the BEC to reject all price bids if the rates quoted are not aligned to the prevailing market prices, there is no question of the State Commission being not in a position to go into the question, as to whether the rates quoted are market aligned or not, specifically, in the light of ample powers vested with the State Commission Under Section 86(1)(b) of the Electricity Act, which also includes the power to regulate the prices at which electricity shall be procured from the generating companies, etc. The finding of the learned APTEL, in our view, therefore, is totally erroneous. 80. In the case of SKS Power, the BEC, consisting of following 6 members, has considered the levelized tariff quoted by L-4 and L-5 bidders: (i) Shri R.K. Jain, Chief Engineer (NPP &....
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....s and not in respect of some of the bidders is concerned, in our view, the same is without substance. 85. We may in this respect refer to Section 13(2) of the General Clauses Act, which reads thus: 13. Gender and number.-In all Central Acts and Regulations, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,- (1) .....................; and (2) words in the singular shall include the plural, and vice versa. 86. Apart from that, the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Vivek Narayan Sharma and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. 2023:INSC:2 : (2023) 3 SCC 1 had an occasion to consider the question, as to whether the word "any" would include "all" and vice versa. The Constitution Bench of this Court observed thus: 113. It is strenuously urged by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioners that the word "any" used in Sub-section (2) of Section 26 of the RBI Act will have to be given a restricted meaning to mean "some". It is submitted that if Sub-section (2) of Section 26 of the RBI Act is not read in such manner, the very power available under the said Sub-section will have to be held to be invalid on the....
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....onversation or literature, there can be no doubt that they are not infrequently used to mean "every one" - not one, but all. Thus we say of any one can see that this is wrong, to mean "everyone can see that this is wrong". "Any one may enter" does not mean that "only one person may enter", but that all may enter. It is permissible and indeed profitable to turn in this connection to Oxford English Dictionary, at p. 378, of which, we find the meaning of "any" given thus: In affirmative sentences, it asserts, concerning a being or thing of the sort named, without limitation as to which, and thus collectively of every one of them'. One of the illustrations given is - "I challenge anyone to contradict my assertions". Certainly, this does not mean that one only is challenged; but that all are challenged. It is abundantly clear therefore that "any one" is not infrequently used to mean "every one". 31. But, argues Mr. Pathak, granting that this is so, it must be held that when the phrase "any one" is used with the preposition "of", followed by a word denoting a number of persons, it never means "every one". The extract from Oxford Dictionary, it is interesting to notice, speak....
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....em" were held to be the equivalent of "any one of them". 34. After giving the matter full and anxious consideration, we have come to the conclusion that the words "any one of the Directors" is ambiguous; in some contexts, it means "only one of the Directors, does not matter which one", but in other contexts, it is capable of meaning "every one of the Directors". Which of these two meanings was intended by the legislature in any particular statutory phrase has to be decided by the courts on a consideration of the context in which the words appear, and in particular, the scheme and object of the legislation. (emphasis supplied) 117. The Constitution Bench in Lala Karam Chand Thapar case [Chief Inspector of Mines v. Lala Karam Chand Thapar, (1962) 1 SCR 9 : AIR 1961 SC 838] found that the words "any one" have been commonly used to mean "every one" i.e. not one, but all. It found that the word "any", in affirmative sentences, asserts, concerning a being or thing of the sort named, without limitation. It held that it is abundantly clear that the words "any one" are not infrequently used to mean "every one". 118. It could be seen that the Constitution Bench ....
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....ry to express "every one". It will be unreasonable, in our opinion, to attach too much weight to this circumstance; and as for the reasons mentioned above, we think the phrase "any one of the Directors" is capable of meaning "every one of the Directors", the fact that in other statutes, different words were used to express a similar meaning is not of any significance. 38. We have, on all these considerations come to the conclusion that the words "any one of the Directors" has been used in Section 76 to mean "every one of the Directors", and that the contrary interpretation given by the High Court is not correct. (emphasis supplied) 120. It could thus be seen that though it was sought to be argued before the Court that since the Rule of strict interpretation of penal statutes in favour of the Accused has to be adopted and that the word "any" was suffixed by the word "one", it has to be given restricted meaning; the Court in Lala Karam Chand Thapar case [Chief Inspector of Mines v. Lala Karam Chand Thapar, (1962) 1 SCR 9 : AIR 1961 SC 838] came to the conclusion that the words "any one of the Directors" used in Section 76 of the Mines Act, 1952 would mean "every ....
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....... in Parliament". The word "anything" is of the widest import and is equivalent to "everything". The only limitation arises from the words "in Parliament" which means during the sitting of Parliament and in the course of the business of Parliament. We are concerned only with speeches in Lok Sabha. Once it was proved that Parliament was sitting and its business was being transacted, anything said during the course of that business was immune from proceedings in any Court this immunity is not only complete but is as it should be. It is of the essence of parliamentary system of Government that people's representatives should be free to express themselves without fear of legal consequences. What they say is only subject to the discipline of the Rules of Parliament, the good sense of the members and the control of proceedings by the Speaker. The Courts have no say in the matter and should really have none. (emphasis supplied) 123. This Court held in Tej Kiran Jain case [Tej Kiran Jain v. N. Sanjiva Reddy, (1970) 2 SCC 272] that the word "anything" is of the widest import and is equivalent to "everything". The only limitation arises from the words "in Parliament" which ....
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....the context of the Income Tax Act for which the power of transfer has been conferred upon the authorities specified Under Section 127. (emphasis supplied) 127. The Court in K.P. Mohammed Salim [K.P. Mohammed Salim v. CIT, (2008) 11 SCC 573] again reiterated that the word "any" must be read in the context of the statute. The Court also applied the principles of purposive construction to the term "any" to mean "all". 128. In Raj Kumar Shivhare [Raj Kumar Shivhare v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2010) 4 SCC 772: (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 712], an argument was sought to be advanced that since Section 35 of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 uses the words "any decision or order", only appeals from final order could be filed. Rejecting the said contention, this Court observed thus: (SCC pp. 779-80, paras 19-20 & 26) 19. The word "any" in this context would mean "all". We are of this opinion in view of the fact that this Section confers a right of appeal on any person aggrieved. A right of appeal, it is well settled, is a creature of statute. It is never an inherent right, like that of filing a suit. A right of filing a suit, unless it is barred by statute, ....
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....dia v. A.B. Shah, (1996) 8 SCC 540: 1996 SCC (Cri) 688]. In the said case, the High Court was considering an appeal preferred by the Union of India wherein it had challenged the acquittal of the Accused by the learned Trial Court, which was confirmed in appeal by the High Court. The learned Trial Court and the High Court had held that the complaint filed was beyond limitation. This Court reversed the judgments of the learned Trial Court and the High Court. 131. This Court while interpreting the expression "at any time" observed thus: (A.B. Shah case [Union of India v. A.B. Shah, (1996) 8 SCC 540: 1996 SCC (Cri) 688], SCC p. 546, para 12) 12. If we look into Conditions 3 and 6 with the object and purpose of the Act in mind, it has to be held that these conditions are not only relatable to what was required at the commencement of depillaring process, but the unstowing for the required length must exist always. The expression "at any time" finding place in Condition 6 has to mean, in the context in which it has been used, "at any point of time", the effect of which is that the required length must be maintained all the time. The accomplishment of object of the Act, o....
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....ive policy for which the Electricity Act was enacted and read with Section 86(1)(b) of the Electricity Act, will have to be construed to be the one including "any". As such, the contention in that regard is to be rejected. 88. In any case, applying the principle of literal interpretation, the evaluation committee/BEC would be entitled to reject only such of the price bids if it finds that the rates quoted by the bidders are not aligned to the prevailing market prices. It does not stipulate rejection of all the bids in the bidding process. For example, if in a bidding process, which is in accordance with the Bidding Guidelines and is transparent, 5 bidders emerged. Out of the said bidders, the rates quoted by only 3 bidders are market aligned and the rates quoted by rest of the 2 bidders are not market aligned. In accordance with the Bidding Guidelines, the BEC would be entitled to recommend acceptance of the bids of the first 3 bidders and reject the bids of rest of the 2 bidders whose quoted rates/prices are not found to be market aligned. We, therefore, reject the contention in this behalf. 89. We further find that the Court, while interpreting a particular provision, will ....
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....ject the bid of L-1 bidder, whose bid is found market aligned along with that of L-5 bidder, which is not market aligned, would lead to an anomalous situation. Could the consumer be deprived of the electricity to be procured from L-1 at a market aligned price only because some of the bidders have quoted much higher prices and are not market aligned. In our view, such an interpretation would result in defeating one of the main objects of the enactment, i.e., protection of the consumer. 92. It is needless to state that this Court, time and again, in various judgments including the one in the case of GMR Warora Energy Limited (supra) has recognised the requirement of balancing the consumers' interest with that of the interest of the generators. It will not be permissible to take a lopsided view only to protect the interest of the generators ignoring the consumers' interest and public interest. 93. We find that the High Court was not justified in entertaining the petition. The Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of PTC India Limited (supra) has held that the Electricity Act is an exhaustive code on all matters concerning electricity. Under the Electricity Act, al....
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....not do so when the aggrieved person has an effective alternate remedy available in law. However, certain exceptions to this "rule of alternate remedy" include where, the statutory authority has not acted in accordance with the provisions of the law or acted in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure; or has resorted to invoke provisions, which are repealed; or where an order has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. Applying this formulation, the High Court noted that the Appellant has an alternate remedy available under the GST Act and thus, the petition was not maintainable. 25. In this background, it becomes necessary for this Court, to dwell on the "rule of alternate remedy" and its judicial exposition. In Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks [Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1], a two-Judge Bench of this Court after reviewing the case law on this point, noted: (SCC pp. 9-10, paras 14-15) 14. The power to issue prerogative writs Under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provision of the Constitution. This power can be exercised ....
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....ithout jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. (See Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks [Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1].) The present case attracts applicability of the first two contingencies. Moreover, as noted, the Appellants' dealership, which is their bread and butter, came to be terminated for an irrelevant and non-existent cause. In such circumstances, we feel that the Appellants should have been allowed relief by the High Court itself instead of driving them to the need of initiating arbitration proceedings. (emphasis supplied) 27. The principles of law which emerge are that: 27.1. The power Under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue writs can be exercised not only for the enforcement of fundamental rights, but for any other purpose as well. 27.2. The High Court has the discretion not to entertain a writ petition. One of the restrictions placed on the power of the High Court is where an effective alternate remedy is available to the aggrieved person. 27.3. Exceptions to the Rule of alternate remedy arise where: (a) the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of a funda....
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.... However, the Respondent No. 1 did not take any steps from 6th January 2015 and in any case, from 25th April 2018 till 14th December 2020, on which date the petition came to be filed before the High Court. No doubt that the petition need not be dismissed solely on the ground of delay and laches. However, if Petitioner approaches the Court with delay, he has to satisfy the Court about the justification for delay in approaching the Court belatedly. In our considered view, the High Court ought not to have entertained the petition also on the ground of delay and laches. 101. In any case, we find that the High Court was not justified in issuing the mandamus in the nature which it has issued. This Court in the case of Air India Ltd. v. Cochin International Airport Ltd. and Ors. (2000) 2 SCC 617 : 2000 INSC 39 has observed thus: 7. The law relating to award of a contract by the State, its corporations and bodies acting as instrumentalities and agencies of the Government has been settled by the decision of this Court in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India [(1979) 3 SCC 489], Fertilizer Corpn. Kamgar Union (Regd.) v. Union of India [(1981) 1 SCC 568....
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.... own terms of invitation to tender and that is not open to judicial scrutiny. It has further been held that the State can enter into negotiations before finally deciding to accept one of the offers made to it. It has further been held that, price need not always be the sole criterion for awarding a contract. It has been held that the State may not accept the offer even though it happens to be the highest or the lowest. However, the State, its corporations, instrumentalities and agencies are bound to adhere to the norms, standards and procedures laid down by them and cannot depart from them arbitrarily. Though that decision is not amenable to judicial review, the court can examine the decision- making process and interfere if it is found vitiated by mala fides, unreasonableness and arbitrariness. It has further been held that even when some defect has been found in the decision- making process, the court must exercise its discretionary power Under Article 226 with great caution and should exercise it only in furtherance of public interest and not merely on the making out of a legal point. The court should always keep the larger public interest in mind in order to decide whether its ....