TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2025 (3) TMI 1249
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....present purposes, we propose to examine the same only on the touchstone of our Judgment in Vos Technologies India (P) Ltd. v. Director General SCC OnLine Del 8756, the same having formed the vanguard of the attack on the SCNs. The learned counsel for the Petitioner would contend that: (a). The impugned order and the impugned SCNs were issued in gross violation of procedural fairness and the Principles of Natural Justice. (b). The SCNs were issued between the years 2013 to 2018 and despite filing of replies thereto, the final adjudication was not done for several years. (c). In respect of the SCN dated 07.09.2015, a personal hearing was also held as far back as 30.10.2015. This SCN dated 07.09.2015 contained the same issue as the other SCNs (except the first SCN i.e., the one dated 18.10.2013). (d). These SCNs which were kept pending for 6 to 10 years are prejudicial to the interest of the Petitioner. (e). As no order has been passed, in spite of duly filing replies and participation in the hearing, the Petitioner was under the impression that these proceedings have been dropped. However, out of the blue, without giving any hearing opportunity (as the notices issued in 202....
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....Rs. 21,01,50,386/- has been evaded by the Petitioner. 7. Vide Order-in-Original [OIO] dated 10.06.2015, the Principal Commissioner of Service Tax dropped proceedings in respect of the first SCN dated 18.10.2013. 8. Challenging this OIO, the department filed an appeal before the Customs Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal [CESTAT] which was decided vide Order dated 18.09.2018. The Tribunal set aside the OIO dated 10.06.2015 and remanded the matter back to the original Adjudicating Authority for the purpose of verifying the claim of the Petitioner and as to whether, on certain contracts, the Petitioner has paid full rate of service tax rather than the concessional rate of service tax under the composition Scheme. 9. In the interregnum, the Department issued four (4) other SCNs dated 21.05.2014, 07.09.2015, 13.10.2016 and 01.03.2018 for FYs 2012-13, 2013-14, 2014-15 and 2015-16 to 30.06.2017, respectively, demanding tax along with interest and penalties. 10. The SCN dated 21.05.2014 was a follow-up of the SCN dated 18.10.2013 and the infractions and provisions mentioned in that were applicable to this subsequent SCN. Besides this, in this SCN, it was also alleged that the Pe....
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....er dated 23.08.2024; and thus, it is apparent that the Respondent kept the impugned SCNs pending for periods between 6 to 10 years. The following table summarizes the timelines followed by the Respondent in adjudicating the impugned SCNs: Period SCN Adjudication Order Delay in adjudication 2008-2009 to 2011-12 18.10.2013 23.08.2024 10 years, 10 months, 5 days 2012-13 21.05.2014 23.08.2024 10 years, 3 months, 2 days 2013-14 07.09.2015 23.08.2024 8 years, 11 months, 16 days 2014-15 13.10.2016 23.08.2024 7 years, 10 months, 10 days 2015-16 to 30.06.2017 01.03.2018 23.08.2024 6 years, 5 months, 22 days 14. Section 73 of the Act empowers the taxing authorities to issue SCN(s) to the assessee, chargeable with service tax, which has not been levied or paid or short-levied or short-paid or erroneously refunded. After issuance of the SCN, Section 73(4B) of the Act casts a duty upon the authorities to determine the due amount of service tax within six months/ one year, where it is possible to do so, from the date of notice. The relevant portion of Section 73 states as follows: "73. Recovery of service tax not levied or paid or short-levied or short-paid or erroneou....
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....ication within a reasonable period of time and inordinately delaying the same for decades together would constitute a sufficient ground to annul those proceedings. They would contend that the principles of a 'reasonable period' which courts have propounded in connection with an adjudicatory function conferred upon an authority would apply and the impugned SCNs' and orders are liable to be quashed on this short score alone. ....... 18. This provision flows along lines similar to those appearing in the Customs Act and creates two separate streams dependent on whether the allegation be plainly of short-levy, non-levy or erroneous refund as contrasted with cases where that may have occurred by reason of fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement or suppression of facts. However, and of significance is sub-section (4-B), and which continues to employ the phrase "where it is possible to do so" as opposed to the amendments which came to be made in Section 28 of the Customs Act. ***** 20. We have chosen to extract those provisions for the sake of completeness and notwithstanding the petitioners asserting that by virtue of Section 174 (2) of the CGST Act, and which constitutes the 'Repea....
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....5. The position which thus emerges from the aforesaid discussion and a review of the legal precedents is that the respondents are bound and obliged in law to endeavour to conclude adjudication with due expedition. Matters which have the potential of casting financial liabilities or penal consequences cannot be kept pending for years and decades together. A statute enabling an authority to conclude proceedings within a stipulated period of time "where it is possible to do so" cannot be countenanced as a license to keep matters unresolved for years. The flexibility which the statute confers is not liable to be construed as sanctioning lethargy or indolence. Ultimately it is incumbent upon the authority to establish that it was genuinely hindered and impeded in resolving the dispute with reasonable speed and dispatch. A statutory authority when faced with such a challenge would be obligated to prove that it was either impracticable to proceed or it was constricted by factors beyond its control which prevented it from moving with reasonable expedition. This principle would apply equally to cases falling either under the Customs Act, the 1994 Act or the CGST Act. 86. When we revert to....