TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2023 (9) TMI 1675
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....on 28 (9) of the Customs Act, 1962 (hereinafter, referred to as 'the Act'). It is submitted that during the period in dispute, i.e. when the show cause notice dated 26.12.2014 was issued, provisions of Section 28 (9) read differently. In this connection, learned counsel has placed reliance on a recent decision rendered by the Hon'ble Division Bench of Delhi High Court, in the case of Swatch Group India Pvt. Ltd., Vs. Union of India and others, dated 16.08.2023, wherein, the said provision was interpreted as follows:- '' 33. The phrases ''as far as possible and ''as far as practicable'' appear in other statutes as well came up for consideration before the Apex Court in C.N.Paramasivam and another....
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....ords, ''where it is not possible to do so'' in our opinion, does not enable the Department to defer the determination of the notices for an indeterminate period of time. The legislature in its wisdom has provided a specific period for the authority to discharge its functions. The indifference of the concerned officer to complete the adjudication within the time period as mandated, cannot be condoned to be detriment of the assessee. Such indifference is not only detrimental to the interest of the taxpayer but also to the exchequer. '' 2.1 It is further submitted that identical provision came up for consideration before the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi, in the case of Sunder System Pvt. Vs. Union of India and other....
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.... counsel for the respondents would submit that the Show Cause Notice, dated 26.12.2014 was not adjudicated earlier as the issue was pending before the CESTAT against the Order-in- Appeal No.776 of 2015 dated 30.08.2015 in the appeal filed by the petitioner before CESTAT and the Department was awaiting for orders of the CESTAT. It is therefore submitted that the Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed and the petitioner should be asked to workout its remedy before the Appellate Commissioner, as was done by the petitioner on the earlier occasion in respect of Order-in-Original dated 12.05.2015. 4. I have considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner and the respondents. 5. The principle ground, on which, the im....
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...., any officer senior in rank to the proper officer may, having regard to the circumstances, under which, the proper officer was prevented from determining the amount of duty or interest under subsection (8), extend the period specified in clause (a) to a further period of six months and the period specified in clause (b) to a further period of one year; provided further that where the proper officer fails to determine within such extended period, such proceedings shall be deemed to have concluded as if no notice had been issued]. 5.1 The above amendment in the 2nd Column came into force only on 29.03.2018. Explanation 4 to Section 28 was also amended. In the year, 2018, Explanation 4 read different from Explanation 4, as it reads now. They....
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.... so''. Prima facie, it appears that the Department was not precluded from adjudicating the show cause notice beyond six months. 5.3 If it is the case of the Department that the pendency of the Appeal before CESTAT against the Order-in-Appeal dated 30.08.2015 was a reason for not passing orders earlier, it remains to be explained, as to why, the impugned order has been passed eventhough the petitioner's appeal is still pending adjudication before CESTAT. 5.4 This ought to have been explained properly in the impugned order. Admittedly, the impugned order passed by the third respondent is bereft of such reasons. Only in the counter affidavit filed in this Writ Petition, the respondents have stated that the delay was on account of....