TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2025 (1) TMI 783
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....gned orders/awards dated 13th February 2024 passed by the Presiding Officer of the Land Acquisition and Rehabilitation Authority, Nagpur ["the Reference Authority"] in two separate references preferred by some of the Respondents [the Original Claimants]. By the impugned orders/awards, the references filed by the Original Claimants [before the Reference Authority] under the provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 [for short the "2013 Act"] were partly allowed and the compensation payable to them was enhanced. 2. Since both the above appeals were not filed within the time stipulated under Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act, the above Interim Applications are filed seeking condonation of delay in filing the above two appeals. 3. As mentioned earlier, the impugned orders were passed on 13th February 2024. The application for a certified copy was filed on the same date and was made available also on the same day. Hence limitation to file the above appeals commenced from 14th February 2024. The provision for filing an appeal to the High Court from the order/award passed by the Reference Authority is pro....
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....id period. In a nutshell, this is the opposition of the Respondents to the above Interim Applications. 7. Considering that this is the argument canvassed on behalf of the concerned Respondents, we have heard the parties on this preliminary issue. If we hold that we have the power to condone the delay, we will then examine if sufficient cause is made out to condone the same. On the other hand, if we come to the conclusion that beyond the total period of 120 days [initial period of sixty days and a further period of sixty days], we have no power to condone the delay, then the cause shown for condoning the delay by the Appellant would be wholly irrelevant. 8. To counter the objection raised by the concerned Respondents regarding the power of this Court to condone the delay beyond the period of 120 days, Mr. Godbole, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Appellant, canvassed two basic submissions: (a) Since the 2013 Act is a general law, Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 would not apply. This argument is canvassed on the basis that Section 29(2) provides that where any special or local law prescribes a period of limitation different from the period prescri....
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.... Act and even the preamble of the 2013 Act makes it clear that it is a general law covering the entire subject of Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation, and Resettlement and is applicable throughout India. Since the 1894 Act has been held to be a general law, the re-enacted 2013 Act would also be a general law/enactment and not a special law or a local law as contemplated under Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. 11. To buttress this argument, Mr. Godbole submitted that in fact there is intrinsic evidence in the 2013 Act to show that the 2013 Act is a general law and not a special law or local law. In this regard, Mr. Godbole submitted that Section 105 of the 2013 Act read with the 4th Schedule thereof, clearly indicates what are the special enactments with reference to acquisition. Looking at all this material, Mr. Godbole therefore submitted that the 2013 Act being a general law, Section 29(2) would have no application, and the judgments relied upon by the Respondents either under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Electricity Act, 2003 or the Companies Act, 2013, would be wholly inapplicable in the present case. In other words, since the 2013 Act is a general law, ....
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....into, solution of and adjudication upon industrial disputes. It also provides the necessary machinery for enforcement of awards and settlements. From alpha to omega the ID Act has one special mission - the resolution of industrial disputes through specialised agencies according to specialised procedures and with special reference to the weaker categories of employees coming within the definition of workmen. Therefore, with reference to industrial disputes between employers and workmen, the ID Act is a special statute, and the LIC Act does not speak at all with specific reference to workmen. On the other hand, its powers relate to the general aspects of nationalisation, of management when private businesses are nationalised and a plurality of problems which, incidentally, involve transfer of service of existing employees of insurers. The workmen qua workmen and industrial disputes between workmen and the employer as such, are beyond the orbit of and have no specific or special place in the scheme of the LIC Act. And whenever there was a dispute between workmen and management the ID Act mechanism was resorted to. 53. What are we confronted with in the present case, so that I....
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....pealed by Section 79(c) of the Electricity Supply Act. We are clearly of the view that the provisions of the Standing Orders Act must prevail over Section 79(c) of the Electricity Supply Act, in regard to matters to which the Standing Orders Act applies." I respectfully agree and apply the reasoning and the conclusion to the nearidentical situation before me and hold that the ID Act relates specially and specifically to industrial disputes between workmen and employers and the LIC Act, like the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, is a general statute which is silent on workmen's disputes, even though it may be a special legislation regulating the take over of private insurance business. ************ 57. What is special or general is wholly a creature of the subject and context and may vary with situation, circumstances and angle of vision. Law is no abstraction but realises itself in the living setting of actualities. Which is a special provision and which general, depends on the specific problem, the topic for decision, not the broad rubric nor any rule of thumb. The peaceful coexistence of both legislations is best achieved, if that be feasible, by allo....
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....eneral rules, yet, it may contain special provisions relating to limitation, in specified cases, different from the general law of limitation. Such a law would be a special law for the purpose of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. In the view that we take, we are supported by a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kaushalya Rani Vs. Gopal Singh [1963 SCC OnLine SC 41 : AIR 1964 SC 260]. In this decision, the only question for the determination of the Hon'ble Supreme Court was whether the provisions of Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 applied to an application for special leave to appeal, from an order of acquittal, under sub-section (3) of Section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898. In this context, the Hon'ble Supreme Court discussed as to what would be a "special law" as contemplated under Section 29(2) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. Whilst on this subject, the Hon'ble Supreme Court came to the conclusion that though the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 is a general law regulating the procedure for trial of criminal cases generally, if it does lay down any bar of time in respect of special cases, in special circumstances, like those con....
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.... a general law regulating the procedure in criminal trials generally, but it may contain provisions specifying a bar of time for particular class of cases which are of a special character. For example, a Land Revenue Code may be a general law regulating the relationship between the revenue-payer and the revenue-receiver or the rent-payer and the rent-receiver. It is a general law in the sense that it lays down the general rule governing such relationship, but it may contain special provisions relating to bar of time, in specified cases different from the general law of limitation. Such a law will be a "special law" with reference to the law generally governing the subject-matter of that kind of relationship. A "special law", therefore, means a law enacted for special cases, in special circumstances, in contradistinction to the general rules of the law laid down, as applicable generally to all cases with which the general law deals. In that sense, the Code is a general law regulating the procedure for the trial of criminal cases, generally; but if it lays down any bar of time in respect of special cases in special circumstances like those contemplated by Section 417(3) and (4), read....
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.... within its purview but for this provision. And for the purposes of determining any period of limitation prescribed by any special law, it has made the provisions of the Limitation Act, referred in clause (a) of sub-section (2) of Section 29 applicable to such cases to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law, and clause (b) of that sub-section expressly lays it down that the remaining provisions of the Limitation Act shall not apply to cases governed by any special or local law. In our opinion, therefore, the provisions of the Code supplemented by the provisions of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, make it clear that Section 5 of the Limitation Act would not apply to an application for special leave to appeal under Section 417(3) of the Code." (emphasis supplied). 14. We find that this decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court clearly answers the argument canvassed by Mr. Godbole. Though one may be able to say that the 2013 Act is a general law in relation to the subject of acquisition of land for public purposes, Section 74 which prescribes a different period of limitation for filing appeals from what is set out in the Schedule to the ....
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....t is a general law for every conceivable purpose, and consequently, Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 would have no application at all, is misconceived and rejected. ASSUMING THAT THE 2013 ACT, AND MORE PARTICULARLY SECTION 74 THEREOF, IS A SPECIAL LAW, EVEN THEN SECTION 5 WOULD BE APPLICABLE AS THE SAME HAS NOT BEEN EXPRESSLY EXCLUDED BY THE LANGUAGE OF SECTION 74 OF THE 2013 ACT. 17. The next argument canvassed by Mr. Godbole was that assuming that the 2013 Act, and more particularly Section 74 thereof, is a special law, even then, Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would be applicable as the same has not been expressly excluded by the language of Section 74. In this regard, Mr. Godbole submitted that there is a marked difference in Section 29 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 and that of the Limitation Act, 1963. Mr. Godbole submitted that under the provisions of Section 29(2) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, where any special or local law prescribed for any period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the First Schedule of the said Act, then, only the provisions contained in Sections 4, 9 to 18, and 22 applied, in so far as, and to the exten....
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....or the persons for whom that Act was made, must be accepted. According to Mr. Godbole, if the proviso to Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act is interpreted in a restricted or narrow manner, it would be contrary to the beneficial intendment of the legislation and therefore such an interpretation ought to be avoided. 19. Mr. Godbole also relied upon Judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of (i) Superintendent Engineer/Dehar Power House Circle Bhakra Beas Management Board (PW) Slapper and another Vs. Excise and Taxation Officer, Sunder Nagar/Assessing Authority [(2020) 17 SCC 692]; (ii) Mangu Ram Vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi [1976 (1) SCC 392]; and (iii) Mohd. Abaad Ali and Another Vs. Directorate of Revenue Prosecution Intelligence [(2024) 7 SCC 91]; to submit that when one reads Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act along with its proviso, there is no express exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and therefore, we would certainly have the power to condone the delay by invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 20. We have heard Mr. Godbole as well as Mr. Daver on this issue. Before we proceed to examine this issue, it would be apposite to set out the prov....
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....s well. Section 5 reads thus: "5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases.-Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. Explanation.-The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section." 22. Section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1963 reads as under: "29. Savings.-(1) Nothing in this Act shall affect section 25 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872). (2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescr....
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....s for any suit, appeal or application, a period of limitation different from the Schedule of said Act, for the purposes of determining any period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application prescribed by such special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 shall apply, unless and to the extent they are expressly excluded by the language of such special or local law. In other words, Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply [unlike under Section 29(2)(b) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908], unless expressly excluded by the language of the concerned special or local law. 25. The question that remains is whether in the language used in Section 74 of the 2013 Act there is an express exclusion to the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. We, after perusing the provisions of Section 74, are clearly of the view that when the said section is read as a whole, the inescapable conclusion is that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 cannot be invoked for condoning the delay beyond the total period of 120 days as stipulated in Section 74(1) read with its proviso. If the legislature had in fact intended that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, ....
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....e order of the reference court without putting any fetter on the court's power to condone the delay. In contrast, when the 2013 Act was brought into force, the legislature, in its wisdom, deemed it appropriate to ensure that if the appellate remedy is to be availed of, it should be done in a time bound manner, after which, the aggrieved party loses its right of appeal. This is also another factor which leads to the inescapable conclusion that Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act read with its proviso, expressly excludes the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 27. We are unable to agree with Mr. Godbole that an express exclusion only means that Section 74 ought to expressly mention the exclusion of Section 5. An express exclusion would mean that the language of the statute clearly indicates that Section 5 has been excluded. The words used in the proviso to Section 74(1) "within a further period not exceeding sixty days" clearly therefore excludes the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. If we were to hold otherwise, as mentioned earlier, would render the said words otiose and would be against all principles of interpretation. 28. In the view that w....
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.... sufficiency of the cause for the delay beyond the period prescribed in the proviso to Section 34. 5. The issue will have to be resolved with reference to the language used in Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 and Section 34 of the 1996 Act. Section 29(2) provides that: "29. (2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only insofar as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law." 6. On an analysis of the section, it is clear that the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 will apply when: (i) there is a special or local law which prescribes a different period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application; and (ii) the special or local law does not expressly exclude those secti....
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....ntion is that sub-section (3) of Section 116-A of the Act not only provides a period of limitation for such an appeal, but also the circumstances under which the delay can be excused, indicating thereby that the general provisions of the Limitation Act are excluded. There are two answers to this argument. Firstly, Section 29(2)(a) of the Limitation Act speaks of express exclusion but there is no express exclusion in sub-section (3) of Section 116-A of the Act; secondly, the proviso from which an implied exclusion is sought to be drawn does not lead to any such necessary implication." 10. This decision recognises that it is not essential for the special or local law to, in terms, exclude the provisions of the Limitation Act. It is sufficient if on a consideration of the language of its provisions relating to limitation, the intention to exclude can be necessarily implied. As has been said in Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra [(1974) 2 SCC 133] : (SCC p. 146, para 17) "If on an examination of the relevant provisions it is clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid t....
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....ellate Tribunal beyond the total period of 120 days specified in Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003 read with its proviso. Any Interpretation of Section 125 which may attract the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 read with Section 29(2) thereof, would defeat the object of the legislation, namely, to provide a special limitation for filing an appeal against the decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal and the proviso to Section 125 would be rendered nugatory. The relevant portion of this decision reads thus: "25. Section 125 lays down that any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the Tribunal can file an appeal to this Court within 60 days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Tribunal. Proviso to Section 125 empowers this Court to entertain an appeal filed within a further period of 60 days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing appeal within the initial period of 60 days. This shows that the period of limitation prescribed for filing appeals under Sections 111(2) and 125 is substantially different from the period prescribed under the Limitation Act for filing suits, etc. The use of t....
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.... what we have to see is whether the scheme of the special law, that is in this case the Act, and the nature of the remedy provided therein are such that the legislature intended it to be a complete code by itself which alone should govern the several matters provided by it. If on an examination of the relevant provisions it is clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Act. In our view, even in a case where the special law does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it would nonetheless be open to the court to examine whether and to what extent the nature of those provisions or the nature of the subject-matter and scheme of the special law exclude their operation." (emphasis supplied) 30. In Singh Enterprises v. CCE [(2008) 3 SCC 70] the Court interpreted Section 35 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 which is pari materia to Section 125 of the Electricity Act and observed: (SCC p. 72, para 8) "8. The Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals) as also the tribunal being creatures of statu....
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....n the case of appeal to the Commissioner, it is silent about the number of days if there is sufficient cause in the case of an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal. Also an additional period of 90 days in the case of revision by the Central Government has been provided. However, in the case of an appeal to the High Court under Section 35-G and reference application to the High Court under Section 35-H, Parliament has provided only 180 days and no further period for filing an appeal and making reference to the High Court is mentioned in the Act. *** 32. As pointed out earlier, the language used in Sections 35, 35-B, 35-EE, 35-G and 35-H makes the position clear that an appeal and reference to the High Court should be made within 180 days only from the date of communication of the decision or order. In other words, the language used in other provisions makes the position clear that the legislature intended the appellate authority to entertain the appeal by condoning the delay only up to 30 days after expiry of 60 days which is the preliminary limitation period for preferring an appeal. In the absence of any clause condoning the delay by showing sufficient cause after th....
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....dge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. Vs. Gujrat Energy Transmission Corporation Ltd. And Others [(2017) 5 SCC 42]. In fact, in this case, the appeal was presented before the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 7th February 2008 and the office note recorded that the appeal was barred by 71 days. The appeal was listed before the Bench on 29th January 2010 on which date, the Supreme Court condoned the delay and admitted the appeal. When the matter was taken up for hearing, an objection was raised by the 1st Respondent that the Supreme Court could not have condoned the delay of 71 days in view of the language of Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003 and that the condonation of delay was done without notice to the 1st Respondent and deserves to be recalled. As a sequitur, the appeal be dismissed without adverting to the same on merits, was the contention. It is in these facts that the Supreme Court examined the provisions of Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003 and found immense force in the preliminary objection raised by the 1st Respondent, accepted the same, and dismissed the appeal. Since the said decision affirms the decision of the....
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....revented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within that period. ... *** 433. Limitation.-The provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963) shall, as far as may be, apply to proceedings or appeals before the Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal, as the case may be." 4. A cursory reading of Section 421(3) makes it clear that the proviso provides a period of limitation different from that provided in the Limitation Act, and also provides a further period not exceeding 45 days only if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within that period. Section 433 obviously cannot come to the aid of the appellant because the provisions of the Limitation Act only apply "as far as may be". In a case like the present, where there is a special provision contained in Section 421(3) proviso, Section 5 of the Limitation Act obviously cannot apply. 5. Another very important aspect of the case is that 45 days is the period of limitation, and a further period not exceeding 45 days is provided only if sufficient cause is made out for filing the appeal within the extended period. According to us, this is a p....
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....0. The third judgment is Mangu Ram v. MCD [Mangu Ram v. MCD, (1976) 1 SCC 392 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 10] . In this judgment, Section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 provided for special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal. Section 417(4) required that the application for special leave should be made before the expiry period of 60 days from the date of the order of acquittal. Applying Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, this Court held that Section 5 of the Limitation would not be impliedly excluded in such case despite the mandatory and peremptory language contained in Section 417(4) CrPC. This Court held that all periods of limitation are cast in such mandatory and peremptory language and, therefore, Section 5 could not be said to be impliedly excluded. 11. This case again is wholly distinguishable. It applies only to a period of limitation which is given beyond which nothing further is stated as to whether delay may be condoned beyond such period. In the present case, Section 421(3) does not merely contain the initial period of 45 days, in which case the aforesaid judgment would have applied. Section 421(3) goes on to state that another period of 45 days, b....
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....what the Madhya Pradesh High Court was considering were the provisions of Section 74 of the 2013 Act. According to the Madhya Pradesh High Court, in the facts of that case, there was a delay of 28 days which the court condoned. The reason for condoning the delay can be found in paragraph 17 of this decision which states that the reasons assigned for obtaining the certified copies of the order and relaxation of the Corona pandemic, appeared bonafide and therefore condoned the delay. We are unable to see how this Judgment can be of any assistance to the Appellants in the present case. The delay was condoned on the basis of the factual situation before the Madhya Pradesh High Court. This Judgment does not lay down any proposition that even beyond maximum period of 120 days as stipulated in Section 74(1) read with its proviso, the Court has the power to condone the delay by invoking the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. In fact, Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 has not even been referred to in the aforesaid decision because the facts did not warrant the same, considering the exemption given by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on the issue of limitation due to the c....
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....in the case of Superintending Engineer/Dehar Power House Circle.... Vs. Excise and Taxation Officer, Sunder Nagar/Assessing Authority (supra). In this decision, the Hon'ble Supreme Court was considering a challenge to the impugned Judgment and order dated 19th November 2018 passed by the Himachal Pradesh High Court who refused to condone the delay in a Revision filed under Section 48 read with Section 64(5) of the Himachal Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2005 ("VAT Act, 2005"). The Himachal Pradesh High Court, whilst construing the provisions of Section 48, came to the conclusion that under the said provision, the Revision had to be filed before the High Court within 90 days and beyond the said period the High Court had no power to condone the delay. Whilst construing the provisions of Section 48 of the VAT Act, 2005, the Hon'ble Supreme Court overturned the decision of the Himachal Pradesh High Court by inter-alia holding that the language of Section 48 did not in any way exclude the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. When one reads the provisions of Section 48, it is clear that that the Revision has to be filed before the High Court within 90 days of the communica....
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....reme Court in fact opined that it was true that the language of sub-section (4) of Section 417 was mandatory and compulsive in that it provides in no uncertain terms that no application for grant of special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal shall be entertained by the High Court after the expiry of sixty days from the date of the order of acquittal. But that would be the language of every provision prescribing a period of limitation. It is because a bar against the entertainment of the application beyond the period of limitation prescribed by a special or local law, that it becomes necessary to invoke the aid of Section 5 in order that the application may be entertained despite such bar. The Hon'ble Supreme Court opined that a mere provision of a period of limitation in howsoever peremptory and imperative language is not sufficient to displace the applicability of Section 5. It was in these circumstances that the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that even beyond the period of sixty days, the High Court had the power to condone the delay by invoking the provisions of Section 5. We fail to see how this decision can be of any assistance to Mr Godbole. Section 417 only provides the ....