TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1989 (2) TMI 112
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....nder Order XX-B regarding appeals under section 130E of the Customs Act, 1962, and section 35L of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. It appears that an application for condonation of delay came before a learned single judge and in the circumstances mentioned in the Review Petition No. 557 of 1987, the application was dismissed by the learned single judge. That order was passed by the learned single judge under Order VI, rule 2(14) of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966. The application had been filed for condonation of delay along with the statutory appeal against the judgment/order of the Customs, Excises and Gold Control Appellate Tribunal. The Revenue, being the Collector of Central Excise, Madras, in this case, filed a review petition on the ground that the application for condonation of delay made in the statutory appeals arising out of final orders of the Tribunal under several Acts should be heard by a Bench of at least two judges. The matter was posted before this Bench for consideration as to whether the learned single judge had jurisdiction to dismiss such application for condonation of delay or not. In order to decide this question, it is necessary to have a conspectus o....
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....rs of the court in relation to the matters enumerated thereunder would be exercised by the Registrar. Order VI, Rule 2, provides that the powers of the court in relation to certain matters may be exercised by single judge sitting in chambers. Thereafter, 28 such matters are enumerated. Rule 2(14) of Order VI provides as follows: "Applications for enlargement or abridgement of time except where the time is fixed by the court and except applications for condonation of delay in filing special leave petitions." Reading the rule simply, it appears to us that it means all applications for the enlargement or abridgement of time would be cognizable by the learned single judge in chambers except those applications time for which has been fixed by the court in terms of Order VII and also applications for condonation of delay in filing special leave petitions. This appears to us to be the logical and literal meaning of the said rule. A question, however, has been posed : is this an application for condonation of delay or an application for enlargement or abridgement of time ? This question, it appears to us, is concluded by the decision of this court in CIT v. R. H. Pandit, Managing Trustee....
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....ay, according to this court, fixed by the rules. The significant feature of the Rules was that applications for condonation of delay in filing special leave petitions were excepted from the business of a chamber judge. The natural presumption was that, but for the exception, the rule would have to include also applications for condonation of delay in filing special leave petitions. Any application for condonation of delay in filing a petition of appeal was, therefore, included in applications for enlargement or abridgement of time. This court noted that the practice of the chamber judge hearing applications for condonation of delay in filing petitions of appeal within the time appointed by the rules of this court had been followed ever since 1966. Cursus curiae est lex curiae. The practice of this court is the law of the court. See Broom's Legal Maxims at p. 82. Where a practice had existed, it was convenient to adhere to it because it was the practice. It was noted that the power of each court over its own process is unlimited ; it is power incident to all courts. Reliance was placed on the observations in Cocker v. Tempest [1841] 7 M & W 502 ; 151 ER 864. Therefore, this court he....
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....single judge to decide certain matters which speak of applications for enlargement or abridgement of time except where the time is fixed by the court and except, inter alia, applications for condonation of delay in filing special leave petitions. On a proper reading, it appears to us that the exception made only in favour of the time fixed by the court means court functioning judicially in terms of Order VII, rule 1, as well as time fixed by the rules of the court. All other applications for enlargement or abridgement of time could be heard by the learned single judge. As is clear, Order VI demarcates the power of the Registrar and the learned single judge and Order VII demarcates the constitution of the Division Courts, powers of a single judge and the vacation judge. This is arranging the business of the court. This is within the power of the court. Two decisions were referred to us by the learned Additional Solicitor-General. Our attention was drawn to the observations in the Division Bench judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Promotho Nath Roy v. W. A. Lee, AIR 1921 Cal 415. There, the court was concerned with the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, section 109. The court....
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....uestion whether a learned single judge can dismiss an application for condonation of delay in a statutory appeal. After all, the court functions by its arrangement under the Rules. Order VI mentions the chamber business and the business to be transacted by the Registrar and single judge sitting in chambers. The powers of the court, that is to say, the whole court and the powers of the Division Bench normally, except those mentioned in Order VI, will be as enjoined by rule 1 of Order VII, that is to say, a Bench consisting of not less than two judges. In that view of the clear provisions of the rule, we are of the opinion that the said decision of the Calcutta High Court upon which reliance has been placed does not, in any manner, detract from the decision of this court in, CIT v. R. H. Pandit, AIR 1974 SC 2269. Our attention was also drawn to a decision of this court in Mela Ram and Sons v. CIT [1956] 29 ITR 607; [1956] SCR 166. There, the appellant firm had filed appeals against orders assessing it to income-tax and super tax for the two years 1945-46 and 1946-47 beyond the time prescribed by section 30(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. The appeals were numbered and notices w....
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.... 37 ITR 11 ; [1960] 1 SCR 249 and Petlad Co. Ltd.'s case [1963] 48 ITR 92 (SC) ; [1963] Suppl. 1 SCR 871, should be reconsidered and revised by us, we ought to be clear as to the approach which should be adopted in such cases. Mr. Palkhivala has not disputed the fact that in a proper case, this court has inherent jurisdiction to reconsider and revise its earlier decisions, and so, the abstract question as to whether such a power vests in this court or not need not detain us. In exercising this inherent power, however, this court would naturally like to impose certain reasonable limitations and would be reluctant to entertain pleas for the reconsideration and revision of its earlier decisions, unless it is satisfied that there are compelling and substantial reasons to do so It is general judicial experience that in matters of law involving questions of construing statutory or constitutional provisions, two views are often reasonably possible and when judicial approach has to make a choice between the two reasonably possible views, the process of decision-making is often very difficult and delicate. When this court hears appeals against decisions of the High Courts and is required to....
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....t to lay down any principles which should govern the approach of the court in dealing with the question of reviewing and revising its earlier decisions. It would always depend upon several relevant considerations : What is the nature of the infirmity or error on which a plea for a review and revision of the earlier view is based ? On the earlier occasion, did some patent aspects of the question remain unnoticed, or was the attention of the court not drawn to any relevant and material statutory provision, or was any previous decision of this court bearing on the point not noticed ? Is the court hearing such plea fairly unanimous that there is such an error in the earlier view ? What would be the impact of the error on the general administration of law or on public good ? Has the earlier decision been followed on subsequent occasions either by this court or by the High Courts ? And, would the reversal of the earlier decision lead to public inconvenience, hardship or mischief ? These and other relevant considerations must be carefully borne in mind whenever this court is called upon to exercise its jurisdiction to review and revise its earlier decisions." This view was again reiterat....