TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2024 (12) TMI 1265
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....s founded on several grounds, however, the learned counsel for the petitioner has confined the present petition to challenging the initiation of the reassessment proceedings as being barred by limitation. 3. A plain reading of the impugned notice dated 23.08.2024 issued under Section 148A (b) of the Act, indicates that the assessing officer (AO') had information regarding fictitious purchase transaction amounting to Rs. 9,83,65,488/- reflected during financial year (FY) 2013-14. Apparently, the said information was revealed by one Mr. Rajesh Rathi during the search conducted in the premises of KALA Rathi RSW Steel Pvt. Ltd (hereafter the searched person) on 10.10.2021. It is material to note that there is no allegation or suggestion in the impugned notice dated 23.08.2024, which suggests that any asset was found representing the petitioner's income that had allegedly escaped assessment. 4. The petitioner responded to the impugned notice dated 23.08.2024 contesting the allegations. Additionally, the petitioner also contended that the issuance of the said notice was issued beyond the period of limitation. 5. The AO was not persuaded with the petitioner's response dated 31.08....
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....t consideration bearing in mind the timeframes which stood specified in sections 149, 153A and 153C as they stood prior to the commencement of Finance Act, 2021. 9. Thus, an action of reassessment which comes to be initiated in relation to a search undertaken on or after 01 April 2021 would have to meet the foundational tests as specified in the First Proviso to Section 149 (1). A reassessment action would thus have to not only satisfy the time frames constructed in terms of Section 149, but in a relevant case and which is concerned with a search, also those which would be applicable by virtue of the provisions of Section 153A and 153C. 10. Undisputedly, and if the validity of the reassessment were to be tested on the anvil of Section 153C, the petitioner would be entitled to succeed for the following reasons. It is an undisputed fact that the proceedings under Section 148 commenced on the basis of the impugned notice dated 30 March 2023. This date would be of seminal importance since the period of six AYs or the "relevant assessment year" would have to be reckoned from the date when action was initiated to reopen the assessment pertaining to the AY 2013-2014. ....
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....ch constitutes the basis for an assessment under section 153A. F. While the identification and computation of the six AYs' hinges upon the phrase 'immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year' of search, the ten year period would have to be reckoned from the 31st day of March of the AY relevant to the year of search. This, since undisputedly, Explanation 1 to section 153A requires us to reckon it 'from the end of the assessment year'. This distinction would have to necessarily be acknowledged in the light of the statute having consciously adopted the phraseology 'immediately preceding' when it be in relation to the six year period and employing the expression 'from the end of the assessment year' while speaking of the ten year block." 12. Viewed in that light, it is manifest that the AY 2013-2014 would fall beyond the block period of ten years. It becomes pertinent to note that the First Proviso to Section 149 (1) compels us to test the validity of initiation of action for reassessment commenced pursuant to a search, based upon it being found that the proceedings would have sustained bearing in mind the timelines prescribed in Sections 1....
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....urisdictional AO, that does not convince us to revert to section 153A and hold that the block period is liable to be computed from the date of search. That, in our considered opinion, would amount to rewriting section 153C which would clearly be impermissible. [emphasis added] 10. The learned counsel for the Revenue had also contended that the date of placing the material on the insight portal ought to be considered the date of search for the purposes of computing limitation under Section 153C of the Act. However, prima facie, the same is contrary to the decision in Dinesh Jindal v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Circle 20, Delhi & Others: (supra). It is to be noted that in said case, this court had reasoned that in case of a search after 31.03.2021, there would be no actual handover of material to the jurisdictional Assessing Officer and therefore it would not be permissible to revert to Section 153A of the Act for the purposes of computing the period of limitation from the date of the search. Prima facie, this reasoning would also hold good in case of assuming the date of placing information on insight portal as the date of search for the purposes of the prov....