TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2024 (4) TMI 1211
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.... OIO No. CCE/BBSR-I/16-20/2011 dtd.31.01.2011 140,46,88,065/- 2. E/281/2011 OIO No. CCE/BBSR-I/21/2011 dtd.04.02.2011 15,46,214/- 3. E/704/2011 OIO No. CCE/BBSR-I/03/2011 dtd.28.04.2011 2,74,86,476/- 4. E/652/2012 OIO No. CCE/BBSRI/05/2012 dtd.15.05.2012 2,09,40,479/- 5. E/653/2012 (Dept. appeal) 2,69,50,581/-* (credit allowed) 2. All the appeals essentially concern availment of CENVAT Credit on inputs / capital goods. Cases wherein CENVAT Credit is denied, the appeals have been field by the appellant/company and where CENVAT Credit is allowed, cross-appeal has been filed by the Revenue. At the time of hearing of the stay petitions, the Tribunal was pleased to waive off the penalties levied on the appellant by way of the aforesaid Orders-in-Original in view of the fact and as contended that they had reversed the CENVAT Credit concerned in the said appeals. 2.1 The aforesaid facts are however mentioned only by way of reference for presenting a preliminary aspect of the issue. However, it be noted that subsequent to the filing of the appeals and the various applications filed from time to time seeking early hearing, etc., it has been informed by way of additional s....
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....ta Steel Limited Regd. Office: Bombay House, 24-Homi Mody Street, Fort, Mumbai, Maharashtra - 400 001" 3.3 The appellant-company underwent CIRP in terms of the Code which culminated into approval of the Resolution Plan submitted by M/s. Tata Steel Limited by the adjudicating authority of the NCLT, Principal Bench, New Delhi [ref. NCLT Order dated May 15, 2018] 4. In view of the aforesaid facts and settled case-laws on the subject, the present appeals undoubtedly get abated in terms of Rule 22 of the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1982 [The Rules], as no application for continuance of the said proceedings were tendered by the present owners. 4.1 The relevant clauses 8.2.1 and 8.2.2 of the Resolution Plan on record indicates the liquidation value for the operational creditors, which includes tax dues, as 'NIL' and clearly states that no amounts are to be paid to the operational creditors (refer to clause 8.2.1 and clause 8.2.2 of the Resolution Plan). Likewise, in terms of clauses 8.2.4, 8.2.6, 8.6.10, 8.6.11, 8.7.3 and 8.7.4 of the Resolution Plan read with Annexure-12 thereof, all sub-judice claims against the assessee also stand wipe....
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....aw as the said decisions were pronounced per incuriam. 8.1 The Ld. Senior Advocate further submitted that in view of their proposition that the aforesaid decisions were rendered per incuriam, the impugned issue would need a consideration by the Larger Bench of the Tribunal for the following reasons: - (a) Refund of pre-deposit sought by them is a 'security deposit' and cannot be construed as tax or duty and drew strength from the following case-laws in support: i. Commr. of Customs (Import) v. Finacord Chemicals (P) Ltd., (2015) 15 SCC 697 ii. Union of India v. Suvidhe Ltd., (2016) 11 SCC 808 iii. Nelco Limited v. Union of India, 2001 SCC OnLine Bom 1251 iv. Goldy Engg. Works v. CCE, (2023) 3 HCC (Del) 781 (b) While admitting that the appeals would no longer survive, the appellant contends that the amount deposited by way of pre-deposit is required to be returned to them as there is no authority in law for the Department to retain the said amount which was essentially in the nature of a security deposit. For this proposition, they placed reliance on the following decisions: i. Ruchi Soya Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, (2022) 6 SCC 343. ii. Voltas Ltd. v. UOI, 1....
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....n in the present matter and placed reliance in support of their stance on the proposition of law as laid down in the case of Ultratech Nathdwara Cement Ltd. v. Commissioner of Cus., Jamnagar (Prev.) [FO No. A/11268/2022 dated 20.10.2011 in C/45/2012 - CESTAT, Ahmd.] . 9. The Ld. Authorized Representative Shri S.S. Chattopadhyay, assisted by the Ld. Authorized Representative Shri S. Mukhopadhyay, however, strongly contests passing of any direction from the Tribunal on the aspect of refund of pre-deposit and submits that it is the settled law under the given circumstances, that the appeal stands abated and the Tribunal would thus not be in a position to give any directions in the matter, having become functus officio. 10. We have heard the two sides and carefully considered the extensive pleadings and arguments made before us. 11. The only question required to be dwelt upon is the fate of the present appeals under the given circumstances and if the same abate, any further course of action / direction to be issued with regard to deposits made by the erstwhile appellants under Section 35F of the Central Excise Act, 1944 [The Act.]. 12. For ready appreciation of the legal aspects in....
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....e> <abatement of a writ>. 2. The suspension or defeat of a pending action for a reason unrelated to the merits of the claim <the defendant sought abatement of the suit because of misnomer>. See plea in abatement under PLEA. "Although the term 'abatement' is sometimes used loosely as a substitute for 'stay of proceedings, the two may be distinguished on several grounds. For example, when grounds for abatement of an action exist, the abatement of the action is a matter of right, but a stay is granted in the court's discretion. And in proper circumstances a court may stay a proceeding pending the outcome of another proceeding although a strict plea in abatement could not be sustained." 1 Am. Jur. 2d Abatement, Survival, and Revival § 3 (1994)." 3. The act of lessening or moderating; diminution in amount or degree <abatement of the debt. 4. The reduction of a legacy, general or specific, as a result of the estate's being insufficient to pay all debts and legacies <the abatement of legacies resulted from the estate's insolvency>. 5. Archaic. The act of thrusting oneself tortiously into real estate after the owner dies and before the legal heir enters ....
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....d in the resolution plan. (2) Where the Adjudicating Authority is satisfied that the resolution plan does not confirm to the requirements referred to in sub-section (1), it may, by an order, reject the resolution plan. (3) After the order of approval under sub-section (1),- (a) the moratorium order passed by the Adjudicating Authority under section 14 shall cease to have effect; and (b) the resolution professional shall forward all records relating to the conduct of the corporate insolvency resolution process and the resolution plan to the Board to be recorded on its database." the effect of this is its binding nature and the vacation of the moratorium order. In effect, it may not be incorrect to state that once the CIRP process is set out in terms of Sections 7 to 10 of the Code, all pending disputes are given a go-by and what occupies the centre stage is the moratorium declaration and its public announcement. 13.2 Further, the moment the Resolution Plan is approved in terms of Section 31 of the Code or a moratorium is issued in terms of Section 14 of the Code, the said provisions of the code become applicable statutorily. 13.3 Rule 22 of The Rules is very categorical t....
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....of a corporation whereas 'liquidation' can be construed as the process of ascertaining the liabilities and distribution of the assets particularly in bankruptcy or dissolution. In other words, liquidation is largely a process of winding up. 15. Justice R.P. Sethi's treatise, Supreme Court on Words & Phrases (1950-2021) (Third Edition) further refers to abatement, as under: - "Abate. "Abating" means an extinguishments of the very right of action itself. The right of prosecution is effectually wiped out. To "abate", as applied to an action, is to cease, terminate, or come to an end prematurely. P.K. Mitra v. State of W.B. AIR 1959 SC 144. (See also Chandu Naik v. Sitaram B. Naik. AIR 1978 SC 333: (1978) 1 SCC 210; Lakshmi Shankar Srivastava v. State. AIR 1979 SC 451: (1979) 1 SCC 229)." 15.1 It therefore naturally flows that, abatement is commonly understood as extinguishing the right of action itself. It further categorizes to state, that the right of prosecution is effectually wiped out and that would equally apply to an action to cease, terminate or come to an end prematurely. Moreover, the effect of the various clauses of the Resolution Plan as referred to in paragraph 4.1 (s....
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....1894 (c.47), 5.8). A winding-up may be ordered against a building society whose registry has been cancelled under s.6 of the Building Societies Act 1894 (c.47) (Re Grosvenor House Property Acquisition, etc. Society 71 L.J. Ch. 748). See further Re Ilfracombe Building Society 70 L.J. Ch. 72, cited FORMED. So, in a bank charter, though granted before the Companies Act 1862, "winding-up the affairs of the corporation" included a winding-up under the statutory powers for the time being in force, i.e. under the Companies Act, 1862, and the Acts amending the same (Re Oriental Bank 54 L.J. Ch. 481). "Winding-up of any partnership" (County Courts Act 1888 (c.43), s.67(7)). There might have been an action or application for the winding-up of a partnership notwithstanding that the alleged partnership was disputed by the defendants (R. v Judge Lailey, Ex p. Koffman [1932] 1 K.B. 568; affirmed ibid., 577). "In the course of winding-up" (Companies Act 1948 (c.38), s.276(1) (see now Companies Act 1985 (c.6), s.570)) is not confined to matters arising after a winding-up order has been made, but refers to all matters arising after the presentation of the petition (Re Dynamics Corp of America....
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....ds as:- "PART II INSOLVENCY RESOLUTION AND LIQUIDATION FOR CORPORATE PERSONS" 19. While the terms 'liquidation' and 'winding up' may not be defined under the Code, however, in view of what is stated supra, the natural meanings have to be assigned to the said terms, in the context so used in Rule 22 of The Rules and from the readings of the definition under Section 5(18) of the Code pertaining to "liquidator". What is clear therefrom is that the term 'liquidation' can safely be construed to be as is used in the context of 'insolvency' and that is why both Chapter II (Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process) and Chapter III (Liquidation Process) fall within Part II of the Code. 19.1 Simply put, 'winding up' involves ending of all business affairs and includes the closure of the corporate entity. 'Liquidation', on the other hand, as stated earlier, is largely concerned with the sale of assets of the corporate entity to pay up the creditors and then result in closure of the company. Section 271 of the Companies Act, 2013 lays down the circumstances that lead to winding up of a company. However, the "Insolvency Resolution Process", as the name itself suggests, is a mechanism pertain....
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....f any ex-parte ruling having been rendered in the matter. 20.1 Amongst others, the Ld. Senior Advocate referred to the decision in the case of State of Gujarat v. Essar Steel Ltd. (supra) for the proposition that the powers vested in the Tribunal under Rule 41 of the Rules were of a wide amplitude and by necessary implication, Tribunal is vested with all powers and duties incidental and necessary to make the exercise of those powers fully effective. However, in the said case, the relevant question was being examined in the context of stay petitions where ex-parte orders were under consideration before the Tribunal. Insofar as the case of Essar Steel Ltd. is concerned, it may be pointed out that it was categorically held therein that the petitioner had no legal authority to hold on to the amount of pre-deposit made in view of the respondent-company having succeeded the appeals whereby the Tribunal held that there was no liability to pay tax (ref. paragraph 21). The question thus arises is whether "abatement" can be considered as "succeeding the appeal" and the firm answer thereto is a resounding negative. Thus, we feel that no support can be derived by the appellant in support of t....
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....isdiction to vary the terms of such stay. R. v GM. Holdings Ltd., (1941) 3 All ER 417. An arbitrator or umpire who has made his award is functus officio, and cannot in common law alter it in any way whatsoever. See Mordue v Palmer 6 Ch App. 22. Brooke v Mitchell, 6 NC 349, The High Court has no power to issue a writ of certiorari for quashing the order of a Tribunal which has become extinct and the record of the proceedings, in which the impugned or- der was passed, was lodged outside the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court. But where the order of the Tribunal is absolutely null and void, it could be ignored and the authority who intended to enforce the order could be restrained by the High Court by appropriate direction from enforcing the said order if he were resident within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court. Punjab Sugar Mills v State of U.P., AIR 1960 All 444; E. Sefton And Co., Mirzapur v Textile Mill Mazdoor Union, AIR 1958 All 80. A question raised before the M.P. High Court in a reference under the Stamp Act, as to whether after registration of a document, the registering authority could hold an inquiry into the value of the property, and ask the execu....
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....discharged his duty, or whose office or authority is at an end." As per Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 1986, 5th edn., Vol. 2, p. No. 1064: "Where a Judge has made an order for a stay of execution which has been passed and entered, he is functus officio and neither he nor any other Judge of equal jurisdiction has jurisdiction to vary the terms of such stay. (Re: V.G.M. Holdings Limited, (1941) 3 All E.R. 417)" M.C. Bachappa v Nagarath-namma, 2018 (2) KCCR 1017: 2018 (2) Kar LJ 150 (Karn). "24. The learned Counsel for the Revenue contended that the normal principle of law is that once a judgment is pronounced or an order is made, a Court, Tribunal or Adjudicating Authority be- comes functus officio (ceases to have control over the matter). Such judgment or order is "final" and cannot be altered, changed, varied or modified. It was also submitted that the Income Tax Tribunal is a Tribunal constituted under the Act. It is not a "Court" having plenary powers, but a statutory Tribunal functioning under the Act of 1961. It, therefore, cannot act out- side or dehors the Act nor can exercise powers not expressly and specifically conferred by law. It is well-settled that the power ....
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....such pronouncement by open Court dictation, the Judge can make corrections before signing and dating the judgment. Therefore, a Judge becomes functus officio when he pronounces, signs and dates the judgment (subject to Section 152 and power of review). The position is different with reference to quasi-judicial authorities. While some quasi-judicial Tribunals fix a day for pronouncement and pronounce their orders on the day fixed, many quasi-judicial authorities do not pronounce their orders. Some publish or notify their orders. Some prepare and sign the orders and communicate the same to the party concerned. A quasi- judicial authority will become functus officio only when its order is pronounced, or published/notified or communicated (put in the course of transmission) to the party concerned. When an order is made in an office noting in a file but is not pronounced, published or communicated, nothing prevents the Authority from correcting it or altering it for valid reasons. But once the order is pronounced or published or notified or communicated, the Authority will become functus officio. The order dated 18-1-1995 made on an office note, was neither pronounced, nor published/not....
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....us, it implies the cessation of the authority to act upon having discharged a duty, statutory function or the like. As pointed out in the aforesaid commentary, no sooner an award is made and filed in court, the powers of arbitration come to an end i.e., the authority pronouncing the order become functus officio. Thus, accordingly, the process of judicial analysis and issuance of order (loosely worded as 'to arbitrate') is off the shelf once the Resolution Plan is approved in terms of Section 31 of the Code. 22. The aforesaid definitions, analyses and rulings, expressions as conveyed and explained by way of various examples concerning criminal processes, arbitration award, order of probate or such other orders made, including that for execution of a stay, or any other legal pronouncement by a judicial authority once it is finally dealt with, only lead to the inevitable conclusion of the authority being debarred from acting upon in the matter. 23. It may therefore be concluded that in such scenarios, exercise of any powers not expressly conferred by law ceases to exist. The judicial authority is divested acting de hors the powers not expressly vested. There is therefore no doubt th....
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.... referred to paragraph 102 of the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Ghanashyam Mishra & Sons Pvt. Ltd. v. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Company [(2021) 9 SCC 657 (S.C.)] wherein, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: "102. In the result, we answer the questions framed by us as under: (i) That once a resolution plan is duly approved by the Adjudicating Authority under sub section (1) of Section 31, the claims as provided in the resolution plan shall stand frozen and will be binding on the Corporate Debtor and its employees, members, creditors, including the Central Government, any State Government or any local authority, guarantors and other stakeholders. On the date of approval of resolution plan by the Adjudicating Authority, all such claims, which are not a part of resolution plan, shall stand extinguished and no person will be entitled to initiate or continue any proceedings in respect to a claim, which is not part of the resolution plan; (i) 2019 amendment to Section 31 of the I&B Code is clarificatory and declaratory in nature and therefore will be effective from the date on which I&B Code has come into effect; (iii) Consequently all the dues includin....
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....hrough such a resolution plan." (Emphasis supplied) 26.5 On the specific question of claim of refund of pre-deposit by the appellant, the Tribunal in the said case, after taking due note of the Hon'ble Apex Court's pronouncements in the case of Ruchi Soya Industries Ltd. v. Union of India [2022 (380) E.L.T. 8 (S.C.)], clearly noted that this Tribunal had been rendered functus officio in the matter. The relevant part of the Tribunal's decision is reproduced verbatim hereunder: "4.7 Applicant has claimed refund of pre-deposit as per judgement of Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Ruchi Soya [2022 (380) ELT 8 (SC)] holding as follows: "14. Admittedly, the claim in respect of the demand which is the subject matter of the present proceedings was not lodged by the respondent No. 2 after public announcements were issued under Sections 13 and 15 of the IBC. As such, on the date on which the Resolution Plan was approved by the Learned NCLT, all claims stood frozen, and no claim, which is not a part of the Resolution Plan, would survive. 15. In that view of the matter, the appeals deserve to be allowed only on this ground. It is held that the claim of the respondent, which is not p....
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....cant has abated and CESTAT has become functus officio in the matters relating to this appeal. 8.1. In view of the order passed by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Tribunal vide Final Order No. A/86026-86036/2022 dated 19.07.2022 and on the basis of the judgement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ghanashyam Mishra (supra) and upon taking note of the fact that the NCLT has approved the resolution plan in the insolvency proceedings in regard to the corporate debtor of the appellant-assessee company, we are of the view that the appeals before this Tribunal are abated." 27.2 It be noted that even in this case, no orders were passed by the Tribunal on the subject question of refund of pre-deposit, taking due note of relevant case laws and the settled position in law. 28. V3 Engineers Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Tax, Bengaluru North West [Excise Appeal No. 3610 of 2012 and Excise Miscellaneous Application No. 20465 of 2021 & ors. - Final Order Nos. 21318-21324/2023 dated 30.11.2023 - CESTAT, Bangalore] 28.1 In the instant case too, the NCLT had vide its Order dated 21.09.2020 in terms of the powers vested under Section 31(1) of the Code, approved the Resolution Plan. It was i....
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....hich analysed the position with regard to Rule 22 of The Rules, the Tribunal observed that the said Rule would be applicable the moment the successor-in-interest with sufficient rights is appointed by the NCLT to make an application for continuation of the proceedings. The relevant extract from the said decision in Alok Industries Ltd. case is quoted hereunder: "4.4. .... Learned advocate has labored to explain why this rule should not be made applicable in his case. However, in view of the fact as stated in the para 4.2 and 4.3 above we are of the view that moment the successor interest with sufficient rights to be represented is appointed by the NCLT this rule will become applicable and it is for the successor interest to make an application for continuance of the proceedings. In the present case no such application has been filed by the successor interest for the continuance of the proceedings and hence the appeal stands abated by the operation of this rule. 4.5. Resolution plan specifically has ... ............................. 4.6. There is no dispute to the binding nature of the resolution plan as approved by the NCLT. It has been settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court....
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.... (380) ELT 8 (SC).] holding as follows: "14. Admittedly, the claim in respect of the demand which is the subject matter of the present proceedings was not lodged by the respondent No. 2 after public announcements were issued under Sections 13 and 15 of the IBC. As such, on the date on which the Resolution Plan was approved by the Learned NCLT, all claims stood frozen, and no claim, which is not a part of the Resolution Plan, would survive. 15. In that view of the matter, the appeals deserve to be allowed only on this ground. It is held that the claim of the respondent, which is not part of the Resolution Plan, does not survive. The amount deposited by the appellant at the time of admission of the appeals along with interest accrued thereon is directed to be refunded to the appellant." 4.8. However, from the date of approval of the resolution plan by the NCLT, the appeal filed by the applicant has abated and CESTAT has become functus officio in the matters relating to this appeal. Further it is also settled that the impugned orders in the appeals have got merged in the order of the NCLT approving the Resolution Plan. The decision of the Hon'ble Bombay High Court referred t....
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.... Bench in the case of M/s Jet Airways (India) Limited which was disposed of vide its order dated 12.05.2023 in Appeal Nos. ST/86949, 87287/2015 and it was ordered that the appeals stand abated once the Resolution Plan has been approved by NCLT and the CESTAT has become functus officio in the matters relating to this appeal. It is pertinent to reproduce the relevant findings of the coordinate benches on the issue which are reproduced herein below:- "4. We also find that the matter is no more res integra, as the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 8129 of 2019, in the case of Ghanashyam Mishra and Sons Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Company Ltd. & Ors. vide judgement dated 13.04.2021, had decided the settled position of law, as under.- "2. The short but important questions, that arise for consideration in this batch of matters, are as under:- (i) As to whether any creditor including the Central Government, State Government or any local authority is bound by the Resolution plan once it is approved by an adjudicating authority under sub- section (1) of Section 31 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (herein after referred to as 'I&B Code')? ....
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....ted below: ...... 6. Appellant-assessee has also claimed that the refund of pre-deposit to be paid to them at the time of filing the captioned appeal. In this regard, we find that the matter has already been decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ruchi Soya [2022 (380) ELT 8 (SC)]. The relevant paras of the judgement is extracted as follows: "14. Admittedly, the claim in respect of the demand which is the subject matter of the present proceedings was not lodged by the respondent No. 2 after public announcements were issued under Sections 13 and 15 of the IBC. As such, on the date on which the Resolution Plan was approved by the Learned NCLT, all claims stood frozen, and no claim, which is not a part of the Resolution Plan, would survive. 15. In that view of the matter, the appeals deserve to be allowed only on this ground. It is held that the claim of the respondent, which is not part of the Resolution Plan, does not survive. The amount deposited by the appellant at the time of admission of the appeals along with interest accrued thereon is directed to be refunded to the appellant." 7. However from the date of approval of the resolution plan by the NCLT, ....
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....osit is no more than a security deposit and being so the Department could not have retained the same. 31.1 We feel the question whether pre-deposit is in the nature of a security deposit or otherwise, does not arise for consideration in the present matter in view of the fact that the Tribunal being a creature of the statute, is bound by the provisions of the statute and the undisputed fact of the appeals abating under the given circumstances renders the Tribunal as functus officio. 31.2 Moreover, it is not the question of the erstwhile appellant having successfully overcome the appeal filed and a decision granted in their favour. The appeal filed gets abated, consequentially resulting in as if there was no appeal filed in the matter by the appellants. 31.3 Thus, under the circumstances, when there is no authoritative judicial pronouncement about the legality of the issue raised for consideration in the appeals filed before the Tribunal and the Tribunal being bound by the wordings of the statute, we are convincingly of the opinion that the question of addressing this issue any further beyond the scope of the powers vested under Rule 22 of The Rules does not arise. 32. In support....
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....er of Customs, Jamnagar (Preventive) [Customs Appeal No. 45 of 2012 - Final Order No. A/11268/2022 dated 20.10.2022 (CESTAT, Ahmedabad)] wherein the very question raised by the learned Sr. Counsel that Rule 22 of The Rules was applicable to a company only when it gets wound up was one of the issues under consideration. It was categorically asserted by the Tribunal that there is no provision under the Customs and Central Excise Act/Rules to give effect to NCLT proceedings. The Tribunal being a creature of the statute, in the absence of any explicit provision, it is handicapped to decide on the same. In fact, it is necessary to reproduce hereinbelow the finding and the manner in which the Tribunal dealt with the said question of law: "4.2 From the above facts, we find that as per the resolution plan approved by the NCLT and in the light of Hon'ble Supreme Court judgment in the case of Ghanashyam Mishra & Sons Pvt. Ltd.-2021 SCC Online SC 313, it prima facie appears that the adjudged dues cannot be recovered by the department however, this issue has to be decided by the department and not by this tribunal. For this reason, that firstly, there is no provision made in the Customs ....
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....the past obligation of the past period gets extinguished once the new management has taken over the Company as part of the Resolution Plan. 6. At the outset it is clarified that the contention of the Petitioner-Company that there is nothing in the said judgment which says that the past credit due to the company gets expunged; is misconceived. As a matter of fact, the liability of the earlier management may not be shifted to the current management but at the same time, the credit available to the earlier management will also not be available to the current management as the current management was not a taxpayer during the period of procurement of inputs or capital goods as availed in the TRAN-1 filed on 30.11.2022 Accordingly, we hold that on the one hand; the Respondent No. 2 has illegally and arbitrarily confirmed the demand of Rs.6,02,34,616/- u/s 74(9) of the Central Goods and Service Tax Act, 2017 and imposed interest and penalty, on the ground of irregular availment of transitional credit during the period 2017-18, which includes the transitional credit of Rs.5,10,21,204/- claimed by the Petitioner for the period prior to 17.04.2018 and balance amount of Rs.92,13,412/- has....
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....e case of Commissioner of Central Excise, Bangalore-III v. Dhiren Gandhi [2012 (281) E.L.T. 64 (Kar.)], held that the Hon'ble High Court was correct in its conclusion that while interpreting the provisions of the Central Excises and Salt Act, legal heirs who are not the persons chargeable to duty under the Act cannot be brought within the ambit of the Act by stretching its provisions. Viewed in the backdrop buttressed by the provisions of Rule 22 of The Rules, the issue in the present case is somewhat akin to the given circumstances, but instead of the legal heir it is now the new operators, who in turn are operating the erstwhile company (original appellant/BSL), in accordance with the Resolution Process as laid out in law. Moreover, what is good for the goose has to be good for the gander as well. 35.2 The Hon'ble Apex Court in the said judgement noted and reiterated the legal position by citing the case of in Partington v. A.G. [(1869) LR 4 HL 100 at 122, Lord Cairns], as under: "If the person sought to be taxed comes within the letter of the law he must be taxed, however great the hardship may appear to the judicial mind to be. On the other hand, if the Crown seeking to reco....
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....ppeal No. 450 of 2011 - Final Order No. 76433/2023 dated 22.08.2023 - CESTAT, Kolkata] (iii) SPS Metal Cast & Alloys Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Bolpur [Excise Appeal No. 431 of 2010 & anor. - Final Order Nos. 76241-76242/2023 dated 31.07.2023 - CESTAT, Kolkata] (iv) Patanjali Foods Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs [Customs Appeal No. 2657 of 2012 - Final Order No. 21268/2023 dated 17.11.2023 - CESTAT, Bangalore] In this case, the Tribunal inter alia observed as under: "12. Needless to mention, as observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and High Courts in a catena of cases that the Tribunal is a creature of the statute; it cannot travel beyond the express powers vested under the Statute or Rules framed under the statute while deciding a statutory Appeal filed before it against the Orders of the prescribed statutory authorities mentioned under the statute. The corollary, any order passed by the Tribunal beyond the vested powers under the statute would be non-est in law. 13. In the circumstances, we are in complete agreement with the view consistently expressed by this Tribunal in a series of cases referred as above that the appeal abates once the IRP is appoi....