AI Drafter 
TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1957 (2) TMI 96
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....r has attested the endorsements, as he was admittedly looking after her interests. The vakil for the plaintiff also signed the endorsements and consented to the dismissal of O. S. No. 151 of 1950. On the ground that the vakil had no authorisation to enter into any compromise and that her father was also not her authorised agent, this Govindammal filed a review application for setting aside the order of dismissal of the suit O. S. No. 151 of 1950 in the Chidambaram District Munsif's Court itself. That was not prosecuted and went by default. She subsequently filed an appeal in the District Court out of time. 4. The application for excusing delay was dismissed. Thereafter she has filed this suit to have the decree in O. S. No. 151 of 1950 set aside. The learned Subordinate Judge came to the conclusion that the suit for partially setting aside the compromise was devoid of merits and secondly, that in fact the vakil had power to enter into the compromise and that even if there is no express authority to enter into the compromise, under the inherent authority impliedly given to the vakil, he had the power to enter into the compromise on behalf of the party. Therefore, he dismissed....
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.... A vakil in India is both the Solicitor who acts and the counsel who pleads. Where the vakalat given to the vakil in a case empowered him to compromise the suit no second or special vakalat is necessary to empower him to compromise it. (3) Thenal Ammal v. Sokkammal, ILR (1918) Mad 233; AIR 1918 Mad 656 (C), (Seshagiri Aiyar and Kumaraswami Sastriar JJ.):-- A vakalat containing a provision authorising the vakil to present if necessary petitions for razinama for withdrawal and for referring to arbitration and to sign the razinama etc., petitions' does not give authority to the vakil to enter into a compromise without reference to his clients. At page 235 (of ILR Mad) : (at p. 657 of AIR): It is not the ordinary duty of an Advocate to negotiate terms, without reference to his client, with the opposite party. Such an action is calculated to place the practitioner in a false position. We do not think it is desirable that such a power should vest in him in the interest of the profession. From the point of view of the client, we think that it is not safe that he should be regarded by engaging a vakil to have given him authority to dispose of, ....
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....mbody that authority, which in the absence of a vakalatnama would be implied that the advocate concerned had the necessary authority to compromise. (6) Ramapaya v. Subbamma (1947) 2 MLJ 580 , (Gentle C. J. and Tyagarajan J. ): In a vakalatnama conferring in detail six separate distinct powers, the absence of a power or direction to compromise was not without significance. 582 (of Mad LJ) : (at p. 100 of AIR): He (the Advocate) had no express authority to effect a compromise, but solely to contest the suit. In those circumstances no implied authority arises or can be deemed to have been conferred upon him to make a compromise which was binding upon his client. (7) Nundo Lal Bose v. Nistarini Dassi, ILR 27 Cal 428 (G), 438: There cannot, I think, be any reasonable doubt at the present day that counsel possesses a general authority, an apparent authority, which must be taken to continue until notice be given to the other side by the client that it has been determined to settle and compromise the suit in which he is actually retained as counsel, and in the exercise of his discretion to do that which no considers best for the interest of his ....
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....sel, unless his authority to act for his client is revoked and such revocation is notified to the opposite side, has, by virtue of his retainer and without need of further authority, full power to compromise a case on behalf of his client. (12) Bholanath v. Pannalal, AIR 1947 All 382 (L), 383 : It is too late in the day.... to contend that a specific authority to compromise is necessary. (13) Jiwibai v. Ramkumar, AIR 1947 Nag 17, (FB) (M): 25 : The authority to compromise is implicit in the appointment unless it is expressly countermanded, and that, whether there is express authority conferred by the power or not. (14) Sarathakumari Dasi v. Amulyadhan, AIR 1923 P. C. 13 (N): It has been well established that a vakil appointed under a usual power of attorney is not endowed with power or Authority to compromise the suit he is thus retained to argue. (15) Sourendranath Mitra v. Tarubala Dasi (16) Sheonandan Prasad Singh v. Abdul Fateh Muhammad. Counsel in India have the same implied authority to compromise the action as have counsel in the English courts. (17) Supaji v. Nagorao Sakharam AIR 1954 Nag 250 (....
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....s within the implied authority of his counsel or advocate: ILR 1946 Nag 824 : (AIR 1947 Nag 17) (FB) (M); ILR 1947 All 706 : (AIR 1947 All 382) {L); 1888-20 Q.B.D. 141 (W); ILR 13 All 272 (K); Garrison v. Rodrigucs AIR 1924 Cal 651 . The authority of counsel or advocate may, however, be expressly limited by the client. If such limitation is communicated to the other side, the consent of counsel outside the limits of his authority is of no effect: Jivibai v. Ramkumar (M), (supra); ILR 1948 Mad 647 : (AIR 1949 Mad 98) (F), Strauss v. Francis, (1866) 1 Q.B. 379 (Y), per Blackburn J. at page 382. Difficult questions however arise if the limitation has not been communicated to the other side and counsel consents in spite of dissent or on terms different to those his client authorised : 1919-1-K. B. 474 (T). In some cases courts have refused to inquire if there is such a limitation : In re Hobler, 1844-8 Beav. 101 (Z); Mole v. Smith, 1820-1 Jack and W. 665 (Z-1) per Lord Eldon L. C. at page 673 and have refused to set aside a compromise entered into by counsel : 1866-1 Q.B. 379 (Y); Rumsey v. King, 1876-33 L.T. 728 (Z2). But the rule seems to be that the Court has power....
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....ocate by his acceptance of the cause of his client. The advocate is to conduct the cause of his client to the utmost of his skill & understanding. He must in the interest of his client, be in the position, hour by hour, almost minute by minute, to advance this argument, to withdraw that; he must make the final decision whether evidence is to be given or not on any question of fact; skill in advocacy is largely the result of discrimination. These powers in themselves almost amount to powers of compromise; one point is given up that another may prevail. But, in addition to these duties, there is from time to time thrown upon the advocate the responsible task of deciding whether in the course of a case he shall accept an offer made to him, or on his part shall make an offer on his client's behalf to receive or pay something less than the full claim or the full responsible liability. Often the decision must be made at once. If further evidence is called or the advocate has to address the court the occasion for settlement will vanish. In such circumstances, if the advocate has no authority unless he consults his client, valuable opportunities are lost to the client. ....
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....en authority may be silent on the matter. The scope of the written authority should therefore be enlarged at the same time reserving liberty to the client to countermand this portion of the authority without putting an end to the general engagement, or to give express instructions on the matter to his advocate which, if the advocate does not see fit to conform to, he will have to avoid by returning the brief. Halsbury's Laws of England, (Simonds Edn) Vol. 3, Section 72: The authority of counsel at the trial of an action extends, when it is not expressly limited, to the action and all matters incidental to it and to the conduct of the trial such as withdrawing the record or a juror, calling or not calling witnesses, consenting to a reference, or a state processus, or a verdict, undertaking not to appeal, or on the hearing of a motion for a new trial consenting to the reduction of damages. The consent of the client is not needed for a matter which is within the ordinary authority of counsel, and, if a compromise is entered into by counsel in the absence of the client, the client is bound. If an action is settled in court in the presence of the client, his con....
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....est interest of his client. On the other hand, there can be no question but that an attorney may be specially authorised to enter into a compromise which will be binding on the client, though it has been held that an attorney employed to bring suit for damages or to settle by compromise is not authorised to compromise without first consulting his client, especially after suit has been started. Some cases hold that the authority of an attorney to compromise is presumed until the contrary is shown: United States v. Beebe (Z16); at least it is not to be presumed that this was done, without lawful authority, and slight evidence in such a case may be sufficient to authorise the belief that he was clothed with all the power he assumed to exercise. It has been held that a compromise settlement made in good faith by counsel, when sanctioned by the court in a decree, is binding upon the client. Statutes relative to the authority of an attorney touching the conduct of his client's cause of action have generally been held to effect no departure from the general rule that an attorney has no implied authority to compromise his client's claim. The general rule has been ....