TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2024 (10) TMI 972
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....fore the learned Trial Court for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (NI Act). It was asserted that the complainant is the proprietor of M/S Raju and Company Cloth Merchant, Main Bazar, Hamirpur, District Hamirpur, H.P. The accused used to purchase the cloth material from the complainant for his cloth shop located at Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P. by making the payment to the complainant through cheques. The accused purchased the cloth from the complainant in 2007 and issued a cheque of Rs.1,20,000/-drawn on H.P.State Co-Operative Bank Ltd, Bum, District Bilaspur, H.P. The complainant presented the cheque on 09.05.2007, 31.08.2007 and 29.09.2007 for payment butit was returned unpaid with the endorsements of "Exceeded arrangement and Insufficient funds". Memos dated 09.05.2005, 31.08.2007 and 29.09.2007 were issued. The complainant issued a notice to the accused on 04.10.2007 through a registered post acknowledgement due. The registered letter was returned with the remarks that the accused had left the address. No money was paid to the complainant. Hence, the complaint was filed against the accused for taking action as per ....
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....hbaz Khan, Latest HLJ 2009 (HP) 735. Hence, the appeal was allowed and the accused was acquitted. 8. Being aggrieved from the judgment passed by the learned First Appellate Court, the complainant has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Appellate Court erred in acquitting the accused. The judgment is not based on the material on record. The evidence was appreciated in a perfunctory and cursory manner. The statement of the complainant, corroborated by the documentary evidence, was ignored. The learned First Appellate Court had wrongly relied upon the first notice issued by the complainant. The complainant had not relied upon this notice, and the finding recorded by the learned First Appellate Court is not sustainable. Hence, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned First Appellate Court be set aside. 9. I have heard Mr P.K.Verma, learned counsel representing the petitioner/complainant and Mr. Rohit Thakur, learned counsel representing the respondent/accused. 10. Mr. P.K. Verma, learned vice counsel for the petitioner/complainant, submitted that the learned First Appellate Court erred in holding that the cheque ca....
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....not, the third consideration is whether the view taken by the trial court is a fairly possible view. A decision of acquittal is not meant to be reversed on a mere difference of opinion. What is required is an illegality or perversity. 27. It may be noted that the possibility of two views in a criminal case is not an extraordinary phenomenon. The "two-views theory" has been judicially recognised by the courts, and it comes into play when the appreciation of evidence results in two equally plausible views. However, the controversy is to be resolved in favour of the accused. For, the very existence of an equally plausible view in favour of the innocence of the accused is in itself a reasonable doubt in the case of the prosecution. Moreover, it reinforces the presumption of innocence. Therefore, when two views are possible, following the one in favour of the innocence of the accused is the safest course of action. Furthermore, it is also settled that if the view of the trial court, in a case of acquittal, is a plausible view, it is not open for the High Court to convict the accused by reappreciating the evidence. If such a course is permissible, it would make it practically im....
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....36 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 586] and Anwar Ali v. State of H.P. [Anwar Ali v. State of H.P., (2020) 10 SCC 166 : (2021) 1 SCC (Cri) 395] ). 7.2. With an order of acquittal by the trial court, the normal presumption of innocence in a criminal matter gets reinforced (see Atley v. State of U.P. [Atley v. State of U.P., 1955 SCC OnLine SC 51: AIR 1955 SC 807]). 7.3. If two views are possible from the evidence on record, the appellate court must be extremely slow in interfering with the appeal against acquittal (see Sambasivan v. State of Kerala [Sambasivan v. State of Kerala, (1998) 5 SCC 412: 1998 SCC (Cri) 1320])." 14. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 15. The learned First Appellate Court acquitted the accused solely on the ground that the repeated presentation of the cheque and issuance of notice are not permissible. This finding of the learned First Appellate Court cannot be accepted. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in MSR Leathers (supra) that there is nothing in the N.I.Act to prevent the repeated presentation of the cheque or issuance of successive notices. It was observed: ....
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....(2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 138, wherein it was observed at page 203: "7. Having regard to the object of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, a prosecution based on a second or successive default in payment of the cheque amount is not impermissible simply because no statutory notice had been issued after the first default and no proceeding for prosecution had been initiated. As held by this Court in MSR Leathers v. S. Palaniappan [MSR Leathers v. S. Palaniappan, (2013) 1 SCC 177 : (2013) 1 SCC (Civ) 424 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 458], there is no real or qualitative difference between a case where default is committed and prosecution immediately launched and another where the prosecution is deferred till the cheque presented again gets dishonoured for the second time or successive times." 18. Therefore, the learned First Appellate Court erred in acquitting the accused on the ground that the cheque was presented repeatedly and the notices were issued twice. Hence, the judgment passed by the learned First Appellate Court is not sustainable. 19. Since, the learned First Appellate Court has not touched the other grounds challenging the judgment and or....