2023 (9) TMI 1526
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
.... every man, whatever be his rank or condition, is subject to the ordinary law of the realm and amenable to the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals. Respect for law and its institutions is the only assurance that can hold a pluralist nation together. Any attempt to achieve solutions to controversies, however, ideologically and emotionally surcharged, not on the basis of law and through judicial institutions, but on the strength of numbers will subvert the fundamental values of our chosen political organisation. It will demolish public faith in the accepted constitutional institutions and weaken people's resolve to solve issues by peaceful means. It will destroy respect for the Rule of Law and the authority of courts and seek to place individual authority and strength of numbers above the wisdom of law." Mohd. Aslam v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 442. 1. Since the issues raised in all the captioned appeals are the same; the parties are also same and the challenge is also to the self-same judgment passed by the High Court of Gujarat those were taken up for hearing analogously and are being disposed of by this common judgment and order. 2. There are in all three app....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....od of two months and pay fine of Rs. 2,000/- (Rupees Two Thousand only) each and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of two (2) months. (iv) It is declared that following sale deeds executed by accused Nos. 3.1 to 3.4 through accused no. 4 as power of attorney holder in favour of purchaser as non est and it is hereby ordered to be cancelled, quashed and set aside and respondents are directed to restore the position which was prevailing prior to the execution of the aforesaid sale deeds which was prevailing at the time of the order dated 14.10.2015 passed in Special Civil Application No. 16266 of 2013. The said sale deeds are as follows: - LIST OF SALE DEEDS Sr. No. Sale Deed Date Plot Area Plot No. Consideration Name of the purchaser 1 9-11-15 118.48 79 103115/- Jagdish Chug 2 9-11-15 118.48 80 103115/- Rama Rani 3 19-2-16 118.48 119A 8500/- Prakash Kundu 4 19-2-16 118.48 199B 8500/- Prakash Kundu 5 19-2-16 118.48 200 8500/- Prakash Kundu 6 15-3-16 118.48 122B (56) 8500/- Mafatlal Kalidas HUF 7 15-3-16 118.48 ....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....tands disposed of accordingly. It goes without saying that the order was passed adinvitum/by consent of the learned advocates." (Emphasis supplied) 7. Thus, it appears that a statement was made by the learned counsel appearing for the contemnors before the High Court in the form of an undertaking and that too upon instructions of the clients that the subject matter i.e., the property would not be sold till the main petition i.e., the Special Civil Application No. 16266 of 2013 is finally disposed of. 8. On the strength of the aforesaid order one Letters Patent Appeal (LPA) filed by the respondents herein against an interim order also came to be disposed of vide order dated 21.10.2015, which reads thus: "Mr. Prabhav Mehta learned advocate for the applicants states that in view of the order dated 14 October, 2015 passed by learned single Judge in Civil Application No. 11412 of 2015 in SCA No. 16266 of 2013, wherein the statement is recorded that the property in question qua the subject matter of this entry shall not be sold until the main petition is heard and decided, he seeks permission to withdraw the proceedings. Permission is granted. Accordingly, the Civil App....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
.... 7 163 Mafatlal Kalidas HUF 122C (55) 118.48 8500/- 568704/- 15-3-16 8 164 Sudesh Dingra 27 152 8500/- 729600/ 17-5-17 9 165 Shilpi Ravi 27A 152 8500/- 729600/ 17-5-17 10 166 Roshan Lal 28 152 8500/- 729600/ 17-5-17 11 167 Sami Kumar 176 118.48 8500/- 568704/- 25-7-17 282730/- 6738432/- 2 Sale deeds done / added afterwards 12 518 Trilokram Mali Shop No. 7 19.26 49000/- 298530/- 30-10-18 13 555 Yogesh Kumar Patel 175 118.48 8500/- 568704/- 25-7-17 340230/- 7605666/- 12. The High Court, thereafter, in para 27 of its impugned judgment took notice of the affidavit dated 23.01.2019 filed by one of the contemnors. Para 27 reads thus: "27. In fact the 4th respondent in his affidavit dated 28.08.2005 filed in the present proceeding also admits this fact in paragraph 6 which is already extracted herein supra. In fact in the affidavit dated 23.01.2019 filed in the present contempt pr....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....given to this Court on 14.10.2015 which prevented the applicants herein to withdraw the said appeal and it is this solemn assurance given to the Court which per-forced them to withdraw the appeal by recording the statement made by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent Nos.3.1 to 3.4 and 4th respondent." (Emphasis supplied) 15. In para 33, the High Court took notice of the fact that the contemnors Nos. 3.1 to 3.4 had not disputed the execution of the power of attorney in favour of the 4th contemnor; they had not denied the execution of the sale deeds; they had not even denied having received the benefit under the sale deeds; and they had also not denied that the power of attorney was not cancelled. The High Court also took notice of the fact that the explanation offered by the contemnors that the sale deeds had to be executed as the sale transactions had already been completed, was an afterthought and lacking bona fide. 16. In para 35 of the impugned judgment, the High Court observed that the contemnors had not only violated the undertaking given to the court but had also taken undue advantage unto themselves, namely, the sale consideration having flo....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....vit filed against the reply filed by respondent No.3.3 and 3.4. It is also contended that sale consideration depicted in the Sale Deeds are farce and to overreach the order of the Court less consideration has been reflected as against the real value. To highlight this aspect in paragraph 6(c) the complainants have contended at the relevant point of time the Jantri value of the subject land was Rs.4,800/- per sq.mtr. and the consideration depicted in the Sale Deed is at Rs.8,500/-. It is also stated that consideration for the sale transaction for 118.80 sq. mtrs. of land and for the land sold to the extent of 152.00 sq. mtrs. are similar and hence the complainants contend that respondent No.4 maliciously sold the subject property at under value rate and has caused huge loss to the public exchequer. To highlight the fact that alleged possession certificate which has been relied upon to contend that sale transaction had already been completed way back in the year 2012 when compared to the Sale Deed dated 09.02.2016, it would clearly indicate that survey numbers depicted in both these documents are distinct and different. Hence, contending that the possession receipts executed in favou....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....s thus: "40. The accused have continued to commit further contempt. We say so for the reason that additional affidavit dated 06.04.2019 filed by complainant No. 1.1 enclosing the sale deed dated 30.10.2018 would clearly disclose that accused no. 4 on behalf of himself and also on behalf of accused no. 3.1 to 3.4 had sold shop bearing No. 7 admeasuring 19.2 sq. mtrs. in the land bearing Survey No. 63 which land was also agreed not to be sold by way of undertaking given to this Court on 14.10.2015. Additional affidavit dated 18.07.2019 has been filed by complainant No. 1.1 which discloses another portion of land admeasuring 118.48 in Survey No. 63 has been disposed of vide sale deed dated 25.07.2017. Respondent No. 4 who had been examined as a witness in Special Civil Suit No. 130 of 1995 in his deposition (Annexure B-2) has admitted that he was aware of the interim order in which breach is alleged. In fact he has also deposed that all the family members are well aware of the order dated 14.10.2015. His admission reads thus: "It is true that my Advocate. Mr. Shirishbhai Sanjanwala, under my instructions, gave oral undertaking that for Survey No. 63 and 65 of Majura ....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....filed. Had there been real remorse, they would have on notice of contempt being served, forthwith cancelled the power of attorney executed in favour of accused no. 4. However, they have not chosen to do so. On the other hand, they have allowed him to continue to perform duties as their agent and derived benefits out of it, which discloses there is no real contrition expressed by them which would satisfy the Courts' conscious." (Emphasis supplied) 21. The High Court thereafter, proceeded to consider whether the contempt proceedings were time barred. The High Court looked into Section 20 of the Act 1971 and took the view that the cause of action was recurring in nature and the wrong had continued. The proceedings initiated were not barred under Section 20 of the Act 1971. 22. In the last, the High Court recorded what had happened on the date when the contemnors remained present in the court to answer the charge framed against them. The High Court observed in para 61 as under: "As such, this Court by order dated 18.12.2018 directed the contemnors to be present personally and to answer as to why charge should not be framed against them. In reply to the same, an af....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....ance. The High Court went wrong in saying that the apology was tendered at a belated stage. (d) Section 12 of the Act 1971 stipulates the punishment for contempt of Court. The proviso to the said section states that 'accused may be discharged or punishment awarded may be remitted on apology being made to the satisfaction of the court'. Furthermore, the Explanation to the said proviso states that "an apology shall not be rejected merely on the ground that it is qualified or conditional if the accused makes it bona fide." (e) The High Court committed a serious error in not accepting the explanation offered by the appellants that the sale deeds had already been completed prior to the order dated 14.10.2015 and only formal registration of the sale deeds was left. (f) The High Court committed error in recording that the properties were sold even after the notice of contempt was issued to the appellants. 26. In support of aforesaid submissions, the learned Senior Counsel placed reliance on the following case law: (i) Rama Narang v. Ramesh Narang and Another, (2006) 11 SCC 114; (ii) Anil K. Surana and Another v. State Bank of Hyderabad, (200....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....issed as not maintainable only on this ground (c) The High Court clearly erred in holding that breach of the statement recorded in the order dated 14.10.2015 (assuming the same is considered as an undertaking contemplated under Section 2(b) of the Act 1971) was a wilful and deliberate breach, overlooking the following facts: (i) The Court has erred in disbelieving the explanation tendered by the Appellants regarding the necessity of the sales since the subject transfers had been concluded with full payment of consideration and handing over of possession vide the possession receipts much prior to 14.10.2015 and therefore, the transfers were not covered by the statement recorded on 14.10.2015. The High Court should have looked into the documents such as possession receipts, payment receipts and extracts of bank ledger statements, in respect of the subject sales produced before the High Court. The High Court erred in holding that no material had been placed to establish or demonstrate that the property had in fact been sold in the year 2012 itself. The High Court erred in holding in para 35 that an imaginary plea had been made by way of a defence that cash transactio....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....has not obstructed the cause of justice in any manner whatsoever. As held by this Court in Murray & Co. v. Ashok Kr. Newatia & Another, (2000) 2 SCC 367 (paras 19 to 22), the language of Section 13 makes it clear that it is not enough there should be some technical contempt of court, but it must be shown that the act of contempt would otherwise substantially interfere with the due course of justice which has been equated with "due administration of justice". (f) The High Court erred in imposing a sentence of imprisonment for civil contempt without assigning any reasons as to why such an exception had to be made more particularly overlooking the following: (i) A close scrutiny of Section 12(3) indicates that the legislature intended that in case of civil contempt a sentence of fine alone should be imposed except where the Court considers that the ends of justice make it necessary to pass a sentence of imprisonment also. Before passing an extreme sentence, the Court ought to assign special reasons after proper application of mind. There is absolutely no justification or reason set out in the judgment supporting a bare conclusion that imprisonment is justified in the....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....Court is harsh. The plot owners are bona fide purchasers of the plots for consideration without notice. The sale in favour of the plot owners have been set aside without any notice to them or hearing them. The High Court could have balanced the equities rather than setting aside the sale deeds already executed bona fide by the Appellant. This Court in T. Ravi and Another v. B. Chinna Narasimha and Others reported in (2017) 7 SCC 342, has held that the transfer of the suit property pendente lite is not void ab initio and the purchaser of any such property take the bargain, subject to the rights of the Plaintiff in the pending suit. The Court further held that the same principle would apply to a case involving a breach of an injunction issued by a competent court, and such breach would not render the transfer by way of an absolute sale void or ineffective. 29. In support of the aforesaid submissions, the learned Senior Counsel placed reliance on the following case law: (i) Sevakram Prabhudas v. H.S. Patel and Others, 2000 (1) vol. 41 GLR 715; (ii) Mrityunjoy Das and Another v. Sayed Hasibur Rahaman and Others, (2001) 3 SCC 739; and (iii) Supreme Court Ba....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....f the contempt proceedings of the High Court. (e) The appellants have not produced any authenticated documents in support of their case of having put the buyers in possession in the year of 2012 (income tax return, bank statement etc.). The cash receipt which they have produced is issued by S. K. Industries Service Society and not by the present appellants and also all of those documents are unauthenticated, forged and fabricated. The High Court has duly taken notice of this fact in its impugned order (para 35 at page 38). As per law, the sale is deemed to have been completed on the date when the sale deed is registered, which in the instant case are admittedly after the undertaking given by Sr. Advocate in the SCA No. 16266 of 2013 as recorded in the order dated 14.10.2015 of the High Court. (f) The apology given by the appellants is a farce. Apology from the appellants did not come at the first instance. If they were really sorry, they should have cancelled the sale deeds executed during the pendency of the contempt proceedings, which they have not done. It is only in the present proceedings that they have tried to show that they attempted to cancel the sale dee....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....ot to have declared the sale transactions as void. It was also argued that the appellants have further transferred the properties and that would make them vulnerable to further civil and criminal proceedings by such subsequent purchasers. 37. In such circumstances referred to above, Mr. Divan, the learned Senior Counsel prayed that this Court may tilt the equities and protect the bona fide purchasers of the property for value without notice. 38. The aforesaid submission canvassed by Mr. Shyam Divan, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents suggests that the appellants (purchasers) have further transferred the properties and as on date they have no further interest in the subject properties. ANALYSIS 39. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having gone through the materials on record, the only question that falls for our consideration is whether the High Court committed any error in passing the impugned judgment and order? PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE EXERCISE OF CONTEMPT JURISDICTION 40. The object of the discipline enforced by the court in case of contempt of court is not to vindicate the dignity of the court or the person of the Ju....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
.... norm and trying to breach the law/assuming law on to himself. It intends to secure confidence of the people in the administration of justice by disciplining those erring in disobeying the orders of the Court/undertaking given to court. 46. This Court in a plethora of cases has explained the true purport of exercise of powers under the 1971 Act. In Mrityunjoy Das (supra), it held that: "13. Before however, proceeding with the matter any further, be it noted that exercise of powers under the Contempt of Courts Act shall have to be rather cautious and use of it rather sparingly after addressing itself to the true effect of the contemptuous conduct. The court must otherwise come to a conclusion that the conduct complained of tantamounts to obstruction of justice which if allowed, would even permeate in our society (vide Murray & Co. v. Ashok Kr. Newatia [(2000) 2 SCC 367 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 473]). This is a special jurisdiction conferred on to the law courts to punish an offender for his contemptuous conduct or obstruction to the majesty of law. It is in this context that the observations of this Court in Murray case [(2000) 2 SCC 367 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 473] in which one of us ....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....e extreme sentence of imprisonment, it must give special reasons after a proper application of its mind that a sentence of imprisonment alone is called for in a particular situation. Thus, the sentence of imprisonment is an exception while sentence of fine is the rule." Xxx xxx xxx 34. The object of punishment being both curative and corrective, these coercions are meant to assist an individual complainant to enforce his remedy and there is also an element of public policy for punishing civil contempt, since the administration of justice would be undermined if the order of any court of law is to be disregarded with impunity. Under some circumstances, compliance of the order may be secured without resort to coercion, through the contempt power. For example, disobedience of an order to pay a sum of money may be effectively countered by attaching the earnings of the contemner. In the same manner, committing the person of the defaulter to prison for failure to comply with an order of specific performance of conveyance of property, may be met also by the court directing that the conveyance be completed by an appointed person. Disobedience of an undertaking may in the l....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....sessing the material on record and attendant circumstances. PIVOTAL ISSUES 49. We would like to address ourselves broadly on four questions: (i) Whether the wilful breach of an assurance in the form of an undertaking given by a counsel/ advocate on behalf of his client to the court would amount to "civil contempt" as defined under Section 2(b) of the Act 1971? (ii) There exists a distinction between an undertaking given to a party to the lis and the undertaking given to a court. The undertaking given to a court attracts the provisions of the Act 1971 whereas an undertaking given to a party to the lis by way of an agreement of settlement or otherwise would not attract the provisions of the said Act. Whether in the present case an undertaking could be said to have been given to the court? (iii) Whether the contempt court has the power to declare any contemptuous transaction non est or void? In other words, although the transfer of the suit property pendente lite is not void ab initio yet when the court is looking into such transfers in contempt proceedings, whether the court can declare such transactions to be void in order to maintain the majesty of ....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court ...". Where the contempt consists in failure to comply with or carry out an order of a court made in favour of a party, it is a civil contempt. The person or persons in whose favour such order or direction has been made can move the court for initiating proceeding for contempt against the alleged contemner, with a view to enforce the right flowing from the order or direction in question. But such a proceeding is not like an execution proceeding under Code of Civil Procedure. The party in whose favour an order has been passed, is entitled to the benefit of such order. The court while considering the issue as to whether the alleged contemner should be punished for not having complied with and carried out the direction of the court, has to take into consideration all facts and circumstances of a particular case. That is why the framers of the Act while defining civil contempt, have said that it must be wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court. Before a contemner is punished for non-compliance of the direction of a court, the court must not only be satisfied a....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....gligent actions. The act has to be done with a "bad purpose or without justifiable excuse or stubbornly, obstinately or perversely". Wilful act is to be distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently. It does not include any act done negligently or involuntarily. The deliberate conduct of a person means that he knows what he is doing and intends to do the same. Therefore, there has to be a calculated action with evil motive on his part. Even if there is a disobedience of an order, but such disobedience is the result of some compelling circumstances under which it was not possible for the contemnor to comply with the order, the contemnor cannot be punished. "Committal or sequestration will not be ordered unless contempt involves a degree of default or misconduct." (Vide S. Sundaram Pillai v. V.R. Pattabiraman [S. Sundaram Pillai v. V.R. Pattabiraman, (1985) 1 SCC 591], Rakapalli Raja Ram Gopala Rao v. Naragani Govinda Sehararao [Rakapalli Raja Ram Gopala Rao v. Naragani Govinda Sehararao, (1989) 4 SCC 255 : AIR 1989 SC 2185], Niaz Mohammad v. State of Haryana [Niaz Mohammad v. State of Haryana, (1994) 6 SCC 332 : AIR 1995 SC 308], Chordia Autom....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....cific intent to fail to do something the law requires to be done, that is to say with bad purpose either to disobey or to disregard the law. It signifies a deliberate action done with evil intent or with a bad motive or purpose. THE TERM "UNDERTAKE" 57. Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition defines "undertaking" in the following words: "A promise, engagement, or stipulation. An engagement by one of the parties to a contract to the other, as distinguished from the mutual engagement of the parties to each other. It does not necessarily imply a consideration. In a somewhat special sense, a promise given in the course of legal proceedings by a party or his counsel, generally as a condition to obtaining some concession from the court or the opposite party. A promise or security in any form." 58. In M. v. Home Office and Another reported in (1992) Q.B. 270 : (1992) 2 WLR 73 : (1992) 4 All ER 97, the expression "undertaking" has been dealt with in the following manner: "If a party, or solicitors or counsel on his behalf, so act as to convey to the court the firm conviction that an undertaking is being given, that party will be bound and it will be no answer ....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....but merely states that he undertakes on behalf of his client, and that undertaking is always understood to be an undertaking to the Court which could be enforced by committal proceedings...." (Emphasis supplied) 60. The contrary view was taken by Harris, C.J., of the Calcutta High Court in Nisha Kanto Roy Chowdhuri v. Smt. Saroj Bashini Goho reported in AIR 1948 Cal 294. It was expressed that if the court had considered that the expression "undertaking" had come to acquire a technical meaning and if he had considered that aspect of the case, he would not have come to the conclusion that the only way to construe the expression 'undertaking' was to give it its plain natural meaning. Three judgments of the Calcutta High Court, all delivered by Single Judges, undoubtedly, were noticed which have taken the view that an "undertaking" means an "undertaking to the court." Another Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Chhaya Debi v. Lahoriram Prashar, (1962-63) 67 CWN 819 considered the aforesaid two cases and construing the decree in that case held that the undertaking given by the opposite party was an undertaking given to court and the opposite party always understoo....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....efinitions of the terms and lays down firmer bases for exercise of the court's jurisdiction in contempt. Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 defines civil contempt as meaning "wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court". (emphasis supplied) Analysed, the definition provides for two categories of cases, namely, (1) wilful disobedience to a process of court, and (2) wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court. As far as the first category is concerned, the word "any" further indicates the wide nature of the power. No distinction is statutorily drawn between an order passed after an adjudication and an order passed by consent. This first category is separate from the second and cannot be treated as forming part of or taking colour from the second category. The legislative intention clearly was to distinguish between the two and create distinct classes of contumacious behaviour. Interestingly, the courts in England have held that the breach of a consent decree of specific performance by refusal to execute the agreement is punishable by way of proceedings in con....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....d just. 64. The Delhi High Court decision in Suman Chadha (supra) referred to above, was challenged before this Court. The decision of this Court is reported in Suman Chadha v. Central Bank of India reported in AIR 2021 SC 3709, wherein this Court made important observations in paras 25 and 26 respectively. Paras 25 and 26 read thus: "25. It is true that an undertaking given by a party should be seen in the context in which it was made and (i) the benefits that accrued to the undertaking party; and (ii) the detriment/injury suffered by the counter party. It is also true that normally the question whether a party is guilty of contempt is to be seen in the specific context of the disobedience and the wilful nature of the same and not on the basis of the conduct subsequent thereto. While it is open to the court to see whether the subsequent conduct of the alleged contemnor would tantamount to an aggravation of the contempt already committed, the very determination of an act of contempt cannot simply be based upon the subsequent conduct. 26. But the subsequent conduct of the party may throw light upon one important aspect namely whether it was just the inability of....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....tenant was guilty of the contempt of Court. On March 13, 1980 when the judgment was pronounced the counsel for the tenant made a request to Court for grant of time to vacate shop No. 6. She was granted time of two months. She undertook to deliver vacant possession of shop No. 6 to the landlord on or before the expiry of two months from that day. It was held:- "...This cannot be said to be an arrangement by way of agreement between the parties for vacating shop No. 6. It is an undertaking to the Court. An undertaking is a promise, given to the Court by a party to a proceeding, to do or not to do particular thing, which is enforceable as an injunction because when the Court accepts an undertaking given by a party, its order amounts in substance to an injunction. An undertaking given to the court by a person or a Corporation in pending proceedings on the faith of which the court sanctions a particular course of action or inaction, has the same force as an injunction made by the Court and breach of the undertaking is misconduct amounting to contempt. An 'undertaking given to the Court' should be distinguished from a consent order, or what is known as an order passed on a compr....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....s Civil Application stands disposed of accordingly. It goes without saying that the order was passed adinvitum/by consent of the learned advocates." (Emphasis supplied) 71. Having regard to the principles of law as aforestated, it will be too much for this Court to say that the statement made by the learned Senior Counsel before the High Court was just an assurance given to a party to the lis and was not an undertaking given to the court so as to entail the consequences of "civil contempt". 72. It is true that every undertaking given by a party to a litigation may not be an undertaking to the court; there is a difference between an undertaking given to the other party and an undertaking given to the court. The breach of an undertaking given to the other party may not constitute the contempt of court. However, whether a particular undertaking is an undertaking to the court or to the opposite party must depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and the language used. In the case on hand, it is not the case of the appellants that they had negotiated a settlement with the other side outside the court and reported the same to the High Court and the High Court proceed....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....PTUOUS TRANSACTIONS VOID? 79. We now proceed to answer the third question formulated by us as regards the power of the contempt court to declare any contemptuous transaction non est or void. 80. A Three-Judge Bench of this Court in the case of State Bank of India and Others v. Dr. Vijay Mallya reported in 2022 SCC Online SC 826, in clear terms said that apart from punishing the contemnor for his contumacious conduct, the majesty of law may demand that appropriate directions be issued by the Court so that any advantage secured as a result of such contumacious conduct is completely nullified. The approach may require the Court to issue directions either for reversal of the transactions in question by declaring said transactions to be void or passing appropriate directions to the concerned authorities to see that the contumacious conduct on the part of the contemnor does not continue to enure to the advantage of the contemnor or anyone claiming under him. 81. It would be pertinent, in this context, to refer to the decision of the Chancery Division in Clarke and others v. Chadburn and others reported in (1985) 1 All ER 211, wherein it was held that an act done in wilful disobe....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....is executed in breach of an injunction issued by a competent court, we do not see any reason why the breach of any such injunction should render the transfer whether by way of an absolute sale or otherwise ineffective. The party committing the breach may doubtless incur the liability to be punished for the breach committed by it but the sale by itself may remain valid as between the parties to the transaction subject only to any directions which the competent court may issue in the suit against the vendor." (Emphasis supplied) 84. Thomson Press (supra) referred to above has been relied upon in T. Ravi (supra) for the proposition that the effect of Section 52 of the Act 1882 is not to render transfers effected during the pendency of a suit by a party to the suit void; the transfer remains valid subject, of course, to the result of the suit. The pendente lite purchaser would be entitled to or suffer the same legal rights and obligations of his vendor as may be eventually determined by the Court. 85. This Court in Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper Construction Co. (P) Ltd. and Another reported in (1996) 4 SCC 622, held that the legal consequences of what has been done in....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....ilable in such a case, but it is bound to exercise it to undo the wrong in the interest of justice. That was a case where a meeting was held contrary to an order of injunction. The Court refused to recognise that the holding of the meeting is a legal one. It put back the parties in the same position as they stood immediately prior to the service of the interim order. 20. In Sujit Pal [AIR 1986 Cal 220 : (1986) 90 CWN 342] a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court has taken the same view. There, the defendant forcibly dispossessed the plaintiff in violation of the order of injunction and took possession of the property. The Court directed the restoration of possession to the plaintiff with the aid of police. The Court observed that no technicality can prevent the court from doing justice in exercise of its inherent powers. It held that the object of Rule 2-A of Order 39 will be fulfilled only where such mandatory direction is given for restoration of possession to the aggrieved party. This was necessary, it observed, to prevent the abuse of process of law. 21. There is no doubt that this salutary rule has to be applied and given effect to by this Court, if necess....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....not.-The consideration or object of an agreement is lawful, unless- it is forbidden by law; or is of such a nature that, if permitted, it would defeat the provisions of any law; or is fraudulent; or involves or implies injury to the person or property of another; or the court regards it as immoral, or opposed to public policy." In each of these cases, the consideration or object of an agreement is unlawful and every agreement executed with such an object or consideration which is unlawful is void. Since the sale deed was executed in favour of Respondent 1 in the teeth of the order of injunction passed by the trial court, the same appears to be unlawful." (Emphasis supplied) 88. Thus, although Section 52 of the Act 1882 does not render a transfer pendente lite void yet the court while exercising contempt jurisdiction may be justified to pass directions either for reversal of the transactions in question by declaring the said transactions to be void or proceed to pass appropriate directions to the concerned authorities to ensure that the contumacious conduct on the part of the contemnor does not continue to enure to the advantage of the conte....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....matter that to the contempt proceedings Somani Builders was not a party. It cannot gain an advantage in derogation of the rights of the parties, who were litigating originally. If the right of sub-tenancy is recognised, how is status quo as of September 15, 1988 maintained? Hence, the grant of sublease is contrary to the order of status quo. Any act done in the teeth of the order of status quo is clearly illegal. All actions including the grant of sublease are clearly illegal." (Emphasis supplied) 92. The Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court while referring to Satyabrata Biswas (supra) referred to above In Re: Mafatlal Industries Ltd. Cross-Objection in O.J. Appeal No. 16 of 1994 in Company Petition No. 22 of 1994 decided on 12.07.1996, observed as under: "71. It is of the essence of the rule of law that everyone within the society is governed by the rule of law and should consider himself bound by and obey the rule of law. It is fundamental to the system of polity that India has adopted and which is embodied in the Constitution that the courts of the land are vested with the powers of interpreting the law and of applying it to the facts of the cases which are pr....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....enating or otherwise transferring the suit property, has the right to be impleaded as a party. The trial court accepted the application filed by the transferees and the order of the trial court was confirmed by the lower appellate court and the High Court. While allowing the appeal against the order of the High Court, this Court observed: "4. ... In defiance of the restraint order, the alienation/assignment was made. If we were to let it go as such, it would defeat the ends of justice and the prevalent public policy. When the Court intends a particular state of affairs to exist while it is in seisin of a lis, that state of affairs is not only required to be maintained, but it is presumed to exist till the Court orders otherwise. The Court, in these circumstances has the duty, as also the right, to treat the alienation/assignment as having not taken place at all for its purposes. Once that is so, Pritam Singh and his assignees, respondents herein, cannot claim to be impleaded as parties on the basis of assignment. Therefore, the assignees-respondents could not have been impleaded by the trial Court as parties to the suit, in disobedience of its orders." (Emphasis supplie....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....way affecting the rights of the appellant except with the order or authority of the court. Admittedly, the authority or order of the court had not been obtained for alienation of those properties. Therefore, the alienation obviously would be hit by the doctrine of lis pendens by operation of Section 52. Under these circumstances, the respondents cannot be considered to be either necessary or proper parties to the suit. (Emphasis supplied) 95. This Court in Bibi Zubaida Khatoon v. Nabi Hassan Saheb and Another reported in (2004) 1 SCC 191, was called upon to consider whether the High Court's order, which had declined to interfere with the order passed by the trial court dismissing the applications filed by the appellant for impleadment as party to the cross suits of which one was filed for redemption of mortgage and the other was filed for specific performance of the agreement for sale, was correct. While dismissing the appeal, this Court referred to the judgments in Sarvinder Singh (supra) and Dhurandhar Prasad Singh v. Jai Prakash University and Others reported in (2001) 6 SCC 534, and observed that: "10. ... There is no absolute rule that the transferee pendent....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....he ground that it is qualified or conditional if the accused makes it bona fide. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, no court shall impose a sentence in excess of that specified in sub-section (1) for any contempt either in respect of itself or of a court subordinate to it. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, where a person is found guilty of a civil contempt, the court, if it considers that a fine will not meet the ends of justice and that a sentence of imprisonment is necessary shall, instead of sentencing him to simple imprisonment, direct that he be detained in a civil prison for such period not exceeding six months as it may think fit. (4) Where the person found guilty of contempt of court in respect of any undertaking given to a court is a company, every person who, at the time the contempt was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the contempt and the punishment may be enforced, with the leave of the court, by the detention in civil prison of each such per....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....ing to the court that they would not do so. By and large, from the averments in the various affidavits filed by the appellants over a period of time; referred to by the High Court in its judgment, the stance had been that the appellants should not have defied the order of the High Court and are extremely sorry in that regard. In such circumstances, the appellants pleaded before the High Court that their apology may be accepted and they may be discharged from the proceedings. 101. We may take judicial notice of the fact with all humility at our command that over a period of time, the courts have shown undue leniency and magnanimity towards the contemnors. This lenient attitude shown by the courts over a period of time has actually emboldened unscrupulous litigants to disobey or commit breach of the order passed by any court or any undertaking given to the court with impunity. 102. The litigants, proceeded for contempt of court have realised that they have a very potent weapon in their hands in the form of apology. Take for instance, the present case itself. What do the appellants want us to do? The appellants want this Court to accept their apology and set aside the order of p....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....imes Newspaper Ltd. [(1974) AC 273 : (1973) 3 All ER 54 : (1973) 3 WLR 298 (HL)] Lord Diplock stated: (All ER p. 71f) "There is an element of public policy in punishing civil contempt, since the administration of justice would be undermined if the order of any court of law could be disregarded with impunity;...." xxx xxx xxx 74. In Hiren Bose, Re [AIR 1969 Cal 1 : 72 Cal WN 82] the High Court of Calcutta stated: (AIR p. 3, para 13) "13. ... It is also not a matter of course that a Judge can be expected to accept any apology. Apology cannot be a weapon of defence forged always to purge the guilty. It is intended to be evidence of real contrition, the manly consciousness of a wrong done, of an injury inflicted and the earnest desire to make such reparation as lies in the wrong-doer's power. Only then is it of any avail in a court of justice. But before it can have that effect, it should be tendered at the earliest possible stage, not the latest. Even if wisdom dawns only at a later stage, the apology should be tendered unreservedly and unconditionally, before the Judge has indicated the trend of his mind. Unless that is done, not only is the te....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....pt of Court. In our considered opinion, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, imposition of fine in lieu of imprisonment will not meet the ends of justice." (Emphasis supplied) 108. This Court in Priya Gupta and Another v. Additional Secretary, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare and Others reported in (2013) 11 SCC 404, held that: "7. Tendering an apology is not a satisfactory way of resolving contempt proceedings. An apology tendered at the very initial stage of the proceedings being bona fide and preferably unconditional would normally persuade the court to accept such apology, if this would not leave a serious scar on the dignity/authority of the court and interfere with the administration of justice under the orders of the Court. 8. "Bona fide" is an expression which has to be examined in the context of a given case. It cannot be understood in the abstract. The attendant circumstances, behaviour of the contemnor and the remorse or regret on his part are some of the relevant considerations which would weigh with the Court in deciding such an issue. Where, persistently, a person has attempted to overreach the process of Court and has ....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
.... court for the acceptance of the same. It is also an accepted principle that one who commits intentional violations must also be aware of the consequences of the same. One who tenders an unqualified apology would normally not render justification for the contemptuous conduct. In any case, tendering of an apology is a weapon of defence to purge the guilt of offence by the contemnor. It is not intended to operate as a universal panacea to frustrate the action in law, as the fundamental principle is that rule of law and dignity of the court must prevail. xxx xxx xxx 14. From the above principle, it is clear that consideration of an apology as contemplated under Explanation to Section 12(1) of the Act is not a panacea to avoid action in law universally. While considering the apology and its acceptance, the court inter alia considers: (a) the conduct of the contemnor prior and subsequent to the tendering of apology. If the conduct is contemptuous, prejudicial and has harmed the system and other innocent persons as a whole, it would be a factor which would weigh against the contemnors; and (b) the stage and time when such apology is tendered." (Emphasis supplie....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....e contempt because the judges were scandalized with a view to diverting the due course of justice, and that in signing this application the two advocates were guilty of contempt. That decision therefore stands." (Emphasis supplied) 111. Thus, apology is not just a word. The court should not accept the apology when it appears that saying sorry is nothing but a legal trick to wriggle out of responsibility. A true apology must be a deep ethical act of introspection, self-introspection, atonement and self-reform. In its absence, an apology can be termed as farce. 112. It is equally well-settled that apology tendered is not to be accepted as a matter of course and the court is not bound to accept the same. Although, the apology may be unconditional, unqualified and bona fide, yet, if the conduct is serious which has caused damage to the dignity of the institution the same need not to be accepted. 113. In the facts of the case, we are convinced that although the appellants might have tendered the apology before the High Court in the first instance, yet such apology does not deserve to be accepted and was rightly not accepted by the High Court. It was nothing but a gamble on t....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....ounsel / advocate on behalf of his client to the court; the wilful breach or disobedience of the same would amount to "civil contempt" as defined under Section 2(b) of the Act 1971. (ii) There exists a distinction between an undertaking given to a party to the lis and the undertaking given to a court. The undertaking given to a court attracts the provisions of the Act 1971 whereas an undertaking given to a party to the lis by way of an agreement of settlement or otherwise would not attract the provisions of the Act 1971. In the facts of the present case, we hold that the undertaking was given to the High Court and the breach or disobedience would definitely attract the provisions of the Act 1971. (iii) Although the transfer of the suit property pendente lite may not be termed as void ab initio yet when the court is looking into such transfers in contempt proceedings the court can definitely declare such transactions to be void in order to maintain the majesty of law. Apart from punishing the contemnor, for his contumacious conduct, the majesty of law may demand that appropriate directions be issued by the court so that any advantage secured as a result of such con....


TaxTMI
TaxTMI