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2024 (7) TMI 811
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.... 9597/2016, R.P.(C) No. 432/2023 in C.A. No. 11841/2016, CONMT.PET.(C) No. 735/2018 in C.A. No. 11857/2016, R.P.(C) No. 398/2023 in C.A. No. 8529/2016, R.P.(C) No. 399/2023 in C.A. No. 11857/2016, R.P.(C) No. 400/2023 in C.A. No. 8899/2016, R.P.(C) No. 401/2023 in C.A. No. 8527/2016, R.P.(C) No. 402/2023 in C.A. No. 8547/2016, R.P.(C) No. 403/2023 in C.A. No. 8952/2016, R.P.(C) No. 405/2023 in C.A. No. 8935/2016, R.P.(C) No. 406/2023 in C.A. No. 8954/2016, R.P.(C) No. 407/2023 in C.A. No. 9049/2016, R.P.(C) No. 408/2023 in C.A. No. 8559/2016, R.P.(C) No. 411/2023 in C.A. No. 9214/2016, R.P.(C) No. 413/2023 in C.A. No. 9595/2016, R.P.(C) No. 397/2023 in C.A. No. 8909/2016, R.P.(C) No. 417/2023 in C.A. No. 8921/2016, R.P.(C) No. 420/2023 in C.A. No. 8904/2016, R.P.(C) No. 421/2023 in C.A. No. 9719/2016, R.P.(C) No. 423/2023 in C.A. No. 8957/2016, R.P.(C) No. 424/2023 in C.A. No. 8922/2016, R.P.(C) No. 426/2023 in SLP(C) No. 17316/2016, R.P.(C) No. 430/2023 in C.A. No.....
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...., Adv., Mr. Aditya Krishna, Adv., Mr. Anand Chichra, Adv., Mr. Deepak Yadav, Adv., M/s. Vedya Partners, AOR, Mr. Alok Gupta, AOR, Mr. Shyam Divan, Sr. Adv., Mr. D.K. Garg, Adv., Mr. Abhishek Garg, Adv., Mr. Dhananjay Garg, AOR, Mr. Ishaan Tiwari, Adv., Mr. Dinesh K. Garg, Adv., Mr. R.P. Bansal, Adv., Mr. Chanakya Gupta, Adv., Mr. Dinesh Kumar Garg, Adv., Ms. Anshula L. Bakhru, Adv., Mr. Davesh Bhatia, AOR, Mr. Neeraj Kumar Jain, Sr. Adv., Mr. T. N. Singh, AOR, Mr. Vikas Kumar Singh, Adv., Ms. Rajshree Singh, Adv., Ms. Diksha Rai, AOR, Mr. Arijit Dey, Adv., Ms. Atiga Singh, Adv., Ms. Apurva Sachdev, Adv., Ms. Akriti Chaubey, AOR, Mr. Mayank Kshirsagar, AOR, Ms. Smita Maan, AOR, Mr. Vishal Maan, Adv., Mr. Aditya Singh, Adv., Mr. Kartik Dabas, Adv., Mr. Jayant Singh, Adv., Mr. Sameer Jain, Adv., Mr. Abhinav Shrivastava, AOR, Mr. Shivang Rawat, Adv., Ms. Amrita Kumari, Adv., Mr. Atul Kumar, AOR, Ms. Sweety Singh, Adv., Ms. Archana Kumari, Adv., Mr. Rahul Pandey, Adv., Mr. Avs Kadyan, Adv., Mr. Arvind Kumar Sharma, AOR, Ms. Malvika Kapila, AOR, Mr. Ishaan Sharma, Adv., Ms. Tanwangi Shukla, Adv., Mr. Ashwani Kumar, AOR, Mr. Ashutosh Kaushik, Adv., Ms. Manika Tripathy, AOR, Mr. Shyam Diva....
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....bsp; 36 J. OTHER PRECEDENTS ON REVIEW ............................................................ 41 K. ANALYSIS ....................................................................................................... 45 L. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................ 79 A. PREFACE 1. Day in and day out, as Judges of this Court, we are majorly addressed by learned counsel for the parties that the High Courts are either right or wrong; here, in view of a split verdict rendered by an Hon'ble Division Bench ("said Division Bench", hereafter) comprising two Hon'ble Judges of this Court, we have been addressed by the parties that our distinguished colleagues on the Bench have been right and wrong at the same time. To complete the task that has been entrusted to us, one of the opinions of the Hon'ble Judges comprising the said Division Bench has to be held incorrect unless, of course, harmonization of the two opinions, in any manner, is possible. In the process of consider....
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....e the Hon'ble the Chief Justice. Such order has been the immediate reason for His Lordship to constitute this larger Bench and refer the RPs to resolve which of the two views on maintainability of the RPs is the correct view; hence, all such RPs are now before this larger Bench. C. JUDICIAL TRAJECTORY 3. Before delving deep into the intricacies presented by the reference, it would be apposite to trace the judicial trajectory of proceedings in this Court on interpretation of section 24(2) of the 2013 Act that preceded the split verdict. 4. The 2013 Act was enforced with effect from 1st January, 2014. Soon thereafter, the interpretation of section 24(2) of the 2013 Act fell for consideration before this Court. A three-Judge Bench (cor. Hon'ble R.M. Lodha, Hon'ble Madan B. Lokur and Hon'ble Kurian Joseph, JJ.) in Pune Municipal Corporation v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki [(2014) 3 SCC 183] explained, in the light of section 31 of the 2013 Act what the expression "compensation has not been paid" occurring in section 24(2) meant. The verb "paid" in the same sub-section was also explained. Perhaps, since no argument was advanced, the Bench did not have the occasion to consider whether....
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....larger Bench directed that pending decision on the question of reference, the High Courts may not deal with any case relating to the interpretation of or concerning section 24 of the 2013 Act. 9. Two orders dated 22nd February, 2018 passed by different Benches of co-equal strength followed. While a Bench (cor. Hon'ble A.K. Goel and Hon'ble U.U. Lalit, JJ.) by an order passed in Indore Development Authority v. Shyam Verma [(2020) 15 SCC 342] directed the matters to be placed before an appropriate Bench the next day as per orders of the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India, a similar order was passed by a coordinate Bench (cor. Hon'ble Arun Mishra and Hon'ble Amitava Roy, JJ.) vide its order in State of Haryana v. Maharana Pratap Charitable Trust (Regd) [Civil Appeal No. 4835/2015]. 10. A five-Judge Constitution Bench (cor. Hon'ble Arun Mishra, Hon'ble Indira Banerjee, Hon'ble Vineet Saran, Hon'ble M.R. Shah and Hon'ble S. Ravindra Bhat, JJ.) was thereafter constituted. 11. Ultimately, vide the judgment in Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] [(2020) 8 SCC 129], the controversy was finally put to rest. The conclusions in Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra....
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....h July, 2020 in Pune Municipal Corporation v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki [Recall Order] [2020 SCC OnLine SC 1471], a three-Judge Bench (cor. Hon'ble Arun Mishra, Hon'ble Vineet Saran and Hon'ble M.R. Shah, JJ.) allowed several applications, thereby recalling the judgment in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra). 14. What is, therefore, laid bare by these facts is that firstly, Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) was doubted in Shailendra [2-Judge] (supra), whereafter it was declared per incuriam in Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra), followed by its overruling in Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra) and ultimately recalled on 16th July, 2020 in Harakchand Misirimal Solanki [Recall Order] (supra). D. FACTS GIVING RISE TO THE REVIEW PETITIONS 15. Immediately after Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) was decided, several writ petitions came to be instituted not only in the High Court but also in different high courts across the country seeking similar declaration, viz. owing to the requisite conditions mentioned in Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act being met, land acquisition proceedings initiated under the 1894 Act stood lapsed. These RPs arise out of writ proceedings on the file of the High Co....
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....cket in India v. Netaji Cricket Club [2005 4 SCC 741] in support of the contention that a party for sufficient reason could urge the court to exercise its review jurisdiction. On behalf of the respondent landowners, various decisions were cited to contend that the Explanation to Rule 1 of Order XLVII, CPC would not permit a review of the judgments/orders under review. 20. The presiding Judge allowed the review/recall petitions. Noting the specific overruling of Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) and all the decisions which were rendered following it by Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra), and referring to paragraph 217 of the decision in Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra), the Hon'ble Judge felt that "some meaning" had to be given to such observations. The contention of the respondents that the case falls under Rule 1 of Order XLVII, CPC and the subsequent overruling of Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) cannot be a ground to review the earlier judgments and orders was rejected by reasoning that "here is a peculiar case where the earlier decision in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra), upon which reliance has been placed earlier, was itself doubted in the subsequent decision in the case ....
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....II, CPC do not include within their ambit, the rehearing of a dispute solely on the ground that the judgment on which the decision in the dispute had been relied upon, was overruled. Netaji Cricket Club (supra) was distinguished by observing that "exercise of review jurisdiction in that case, based on a subsequent event was confined to purely the facts of the said case involving a controversy between rival Cricket Associations" and hence could not be applied as a general ratio. F. SUBMISSIONS 23. It is as a consequence of the split-verdict that the RPs were heard by the present three-Judge Bench to decide the point of maintainability of the RPs and to settle the ancillary issues raised in K.L. Rathi Steels Limited (supra). 24. Though it may not be absolutely necessary to note the elaborate submissions advanced from the Bar by learned senior counsel/counsel for the parties since such submissions have been captured in the minutest detail in the split-verdict, for the sake of completeness, we shall briefly refer to the same. 25. Ms. Bhati, learned Additional Solicitor General, appearing on behalf of the review petitioners (the Govt. of NCT, Delhi), with all the passion at her comm....
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.... Mr. Vasdev, asserted the maintainability of the RPs by submitting as follows: a) Maintainability of the RPs ought not to be decided by a blanket order as the RPs have been filed not on the solitary ground of overruling of Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) but in terms of the 'liberty' granted by this Court in Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra), which has the force of law under Article 141 of the Constitution. In arguendo, Article 137 comes to the rescue of the review petitioners granting them the liberty to file a review. b) Public interest must be given precedence over private interest in case of a conflict. The present lands are required for implementing residential schemes for low-income groups and significant construction had already been carried out in other acquired portions. c) The jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution ought to be invoked to ensure substantial justice considering the threat to public good involved in the matter. 28. Urging that the RPs are maintainable and deserve a hearing on merits, Mr. Sen urged that the RPs be held maintainable and heard on its own merits. 29. The landowner respondents, represented by Mr. Divan, Mr. Giri, Mr. Chib and Mr....
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.... paragraph 217 of Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra) grants 'liberty' to any party to seek a review of Pune Municipal Corporation (supra)? c) If the answer to (b) is in the affirmative, did such 'liberty' survive after the decision in Manoharlal [5- Judge, lapse] (supra)? d) Can the RPs be held to be maintainable, giving due regard to the Explanation in Rule 1 of Order XLVII, CPC vis-à-vis Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra)? e) If the answer to (d) is in the negative, do the RPs still deserve to be entertained on the other grounds urged therein? f) Are the miscellaneous applications maintainable? 32. While answering the aforesaid questions, we feel obliged and, hence, intend to address certain ancillary issues too. H. LAW ON REVIEW JURISDICTION 33. The law regulating exercise of review jurisdiction by the Supreme Court is so well-settled that any detailed discussion would, in the first place, seem to be unnecessary. However, we cannot overlook the vociferous arguments on behalf of both the review petitioners and the respondents that the Hon'ble Judges of the said Division Bench have erred in their respective appreciation of the law relating to exercise of review jurisd....
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.... apply for a review of judgment of the Court which passed the decree or made the order. 35. Read in conjunction with section 114 of the CPC, Order XLVII Rule 1 thereof has three broad components which need to be satisfied to set the ball for a review in motion - (i) 'who', means the person applying must demonstrate that he is a person aggrieved; (ii) 'when', means the circumstances a review could be sought; and (iii) 'why', means the grounds on which a review of the order/decree ought to be made. Finally, comes the 'what', meaning thereby the order the Court may make if it thinks fit. Not much attention is generally required to be paid to components (i) and (ii), because of the overarching difficulties posed by component (iii). However, in deciding this reference, component (i) would also have a significant role apart from the Explanation inserted by way of an amendment of the CPC. 36. Let us now briefly attempt a deeper analysis of the provision. We are conscious that the provisions relating to review have been considered in a catena of decisions, but the special features of these RPs coupled with the fact that two Hon'ble Judges of this Court have delivered a split verdict make....
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....arent on the face of the record; or (iii) any other sufficient reason. 40. Insofar as (i) (supra) is concerned, the review petitioner has to show that such evidence (a) was actually available on the date the court made the order/decree, (b) with reasonable care and diligence, it could not be brought by him before the court at the time of the order/decree, (c) it was relevant and material for a decision, and (d) by reason of its absence, a miscarriage of justice has been caused in the sense that had it been produced and considered by the court, the ultimate decision would have been otherwise. 41. Regarding (ii) (supra), the review petitioner has to satisfy the court that the mistake or error committed by it is self-evident and such mistake or error can be pointed out without any long-drawn process of reasoning; and, if such mistake or error is not corrected and is permitted to stand, the same will lead to a failure of justice. There cannot be a fit-inall definition of "mistake or error apparent on the face of the record" and it has been considered prudent by the courts to determine whether any mistake or error does exist considering the facts of each individual case coming befor....
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.... Kerala view will create a serious practical problem. It will keep alive the possibility of review indefinitely. Under the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for an application for review has been prescribed, but the delay can, 'for sufficient cause', be condoned by the Court under that Act. Where an application for review is made on the ground of a later binding authority, the party applying for review will usually be able to plead 'sufficient cause', because it is only when the superior court has made a pronouncement that he will have a ground for review; and he can, therefore, argue with considerable force that there was 'sufficient cause' for his not making the application earlier. Recommendation We, therefore, recommend that the following Explanation should be added below Order 47/XLVII Rule 1[1]." 46. A comparative study of the terms of the Explanation recommended by the Law Commission and the Explanation, which ultimately had the approval of the Parliament and came to be inserted in Order XLVII are not in variance except alteration of some words. 47. It is of some worth to note that even prior to the decisions of the Oudh, Punjab and Gujarat High Courts consider....
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....le, thus, laid down is that a decision being upset in the future would be a subsequent event which could not be a ground to seek review. 51. In Nand Kishore Ahirwar v. Haridas Parsedia [(2001) 9 SCC 325] , a Bench of three Hon'ble Judges, while dismissing the review petitions before it, made pertinent observations reaching out to the very core of the said Explanation. This Court observed that simply because there has been a Constitution Bench decision, passed in the aftermath of the judgment impugned, would be no ground for a review of the said judgment. It also went on to observe that a reference to a Constitution Bench would stand on a still weaker footing (emphasis supplied). 52. The question arising for decision in State of West Bengal v. Kamal Sengupta [(2008) 8 SCC 612] was whether a tribunal established under section 4 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 can review its decision on the basis of a subsequent order/decision/judgment rendered by a coordinate or larger Bench or any superior court or on the basis of subsequent event/development. It was contended on behalf of the State that any subsequent decision on an identical or similar point by a coordinate or larger ....
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.... a superior court in any other case, it shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment. Thus, even an erroneous decision cannot be a ground for the court to undertake review, as the first and foremost requirement of entertaining a review petition is that the order, review of which is sought, suffers from any error apparent on the face of the order and in absence of any such error, finality attached to the judgment/order cannot be disturbed." 54. The final one is a decision of the Constitution Bench in Beghar Foundation v. K.S. Puttaswamy [(2021) 3 SCC 1] . The majority was of the following view: "2. The present review petitions have been filed against the final judgment and order dated 26-9-2018. We have perused the review petitions as well as the grounds in support thereof. In our opinion, no case for review of judgment and order dated 26-9-2018 is made out. We hasten to add that change in the law or subsequent decision/judgment of a coordinate or larger Bench by itself cannot be regarded as a ground for review. The review petitions are accordingly dismissed." J. OTHER PRECEDENTS ON REVIEW 55. Precedents on the aspect of review are legion and we do not wish to burden t....
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....port said that 'the section does not authorise the review of a decree which was right when it was made on the ground of the happening of some subsequent event'." (emphasis supplied) 59. What was laid down in Netaji Cricket Club (supra), upon reading Order XLVII, CPC, can be better understood in the words of the Hon'ble Judge authoring the judgment. The relevant passages are quoted hereunder: "88. *** Section 114 of the Code empowers a court to review its order if the conditions precedent laid down therein are satisfied. The substantive provision of law does not prescribe any limitation on the power of the court except those which are expressly provided in Section 114 of the Code in terms whereof it is empowered to make such order as it thinks fit. 89. Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code provides for filing an application for review. Such an application for review would be maintainable not only upon discovery of a new and important piece of evidence or when there exists an error apparent on the face of the record but also if the same is necessitated on account of some mistake or for any other sufficient reason. 90. Thus, a mistake on the part of the court which would include a mist....
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....w, that availing such 'liberty' granted by this Court the RPs were filed, and that this Bench being of co-equal strength, instead of taking a different view, ought to read the last sentence of paragraph 217 in the manner they (learned senior counsel) understood it, and to accept the same for holding the RPs maintainable. 65. For reasons more than one, the decision in Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra) cannot come to the rescue of the review petitioners. 66. The first reason is that the submission of a 'liberty' being granted by Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra) makes it abundantly clear that but for such 'liberty', the review petitioners would not have even thought of applying for review since the law on the point was no longer res integra. It is, therefore, an admission on their part that the judgments and orders under review, as on the dates they were delivered/made, were neither erroneous (which is a possible ground for appeal, if an appeal were allowed by law) nor suffering from any error apparent on the face of the record (a possible ground for review). Therefore, merely based on Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra), a subsequent event, the review jurisdiction of this Court which is a limited ....
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....o not be done indirectly. Otherwise a party aggrieved by an order passed by one bench of the High Court would be tempted to attempt to get the matter reopened before another bench, and there would not be any end to such attempts. Besides, it was not consistent with the judicial discipline which must be maintained by courts both in the interest of administration of justice by assuring the binding nature of an order which becomes final, and the faith of the people in the judiciary ***." 69. We do believe that what was said of a high court in this decision, would squarely apply to this Court. The Supreme Court of India, a revered institution, is one Court which operates through separate Benches owing to administrative exigency and practical expedience. These Benches are essential to efficiently manage the diverse and voluminous cases that come before the Court and to discharge the solemn judicial duty for which the Court exists. It would be an erroneous perception to regard this division as a cause for din within the Court. When faced with a peculiar circumstance as before us presently, one might just be compelled to ask whether one voice of this Court is louder than another? The ans....
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....the law laid down by the Constitution Benches in the abovesaid decisions, we would like to sum up the legal position in the following terms: (1) The law laid down by this Court in a decision delivered by a Bench of larger strength is binding on any subsequent Bench of lesser or coequal strength. (2) A Bench of lesser quorum cannot disagree or dissent from the view of the law taken by a Bench of larger quorum. In case of doubt all that the Bench of lesser quorum can do is to invite the attention of the Chief Justice and request for the matter being placed for hearing before a Bench of larger quorum than the Bench whose decision has come up for consideration. It will be open only for a Bench of coequal strength to express an opinion doubting the correctness of the view taken by the earlier Bench of coequal strength, whereupon the matter may be placed for hearing before a Bench consisting of a quorum larger than the one which pronounced the decision laying down the law the correctness of which is doubted. (3) The above rules are subject to two exceptions: (i) the abovesaid rules do not bind the discretion of the Chief Justice in whom vests the power of framing the roster and wh....
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....upra) did not have the occasion to consider certain aspects for which that decision cannot prevail. Learned senior counsel for the respondents, based on such statement, contended that Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra) stands overruled. This submission has been disputed by learned senior counsel for the review petitioners. According to them, Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra) has not been expressly overruled; only because of aspects referred to in paragraph 365 and the discussion preceding, it ceases to be a precedent. 77. We have not held Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra) to be per incuriam for the reason indicated above but the statement in paragraph 365 of Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra) has to be given some meaning. Although it is true that Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra) was not expressly overruled by Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra), what stands out as a direct impact of paragraph 365 thereof is that Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra), not having considered certain vital aspects and more particularly as to how the conjunction 'or' in sub-section (2) of section 24 of the 2013 Act has to be read as well as the proviso thereto, the very basis for Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra) to declare Pune Munic....
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.... for the review petitioners of the relevant sentence in paragraph 217 of Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra) is accepted, it would result in utter chaos and confusion in the justice delivery system apart from disturbing the principle of finality of judicial decisions. Should we read "open to be reviewed" as connoting a 'liberty' granted to apply for review, any number of review petitions could be filed based on such liberty for review of decisions between parties which have attained finality not only in this Court but also in the high courts. From the practical point of view, the results could be pernicious. A landowner, satisfied with a final decision of a court, could find himself requiring to contest a review petition filed on the basis of the 'liberty' granted by none other than the Supreme Court of India in proceedings where such landowner was not even noticed. We would be inclined to the thought that no court, much less the Supreme Court (because of its status as the apex court), should pass any judicial order affecting the right of a party who has not been put on notice. If such an order is passed, there cannot be a more egregious violation of principles of natural justice. 81. No....
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.... an earlier flawed decision is brought to the notice of this Court and when public interest would be a casualty resulting from the operation of such earlier decision, it ought to be the Court's duty to pass appropriate orders to set things right. 88. It has been noted that prior to the Explanation being inserted in Rule 1 Order XLVII, with the sole exception of the Kerala High Court, there were decisions of the Privy Council dating back to the commencement of the twentieth century and at least of five High Courts, starting from 1927, to the effect that a subsequent judgment of a higher court reversing the judgment relied on in the order under review would not afford a ground for review. There are also at least half a dozen precedents of this Court reiterating such position of law, albeit with the aid of the Explanation. 89. The relevant principles deducible from the precedents on the Explanation to Rule 1 that we have considered, for the purpose of deciding the present reference, are as follows: a) in case of discovery of a new or important matter or evidence, such matter or evidence has to be one which existed at the time when the decree or order under review was passed or mad....
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.... powers are powers which are resident in all courts, especially of superior jurisdiction. These powers spring not from legislation but from the nature and the constitution of the tribunals or courts themselves so as to enable them to maintain their dignity, secure obedience to its process and rules, protect its officers from indignity and wrong and to punish unseemly behaviour. This power is necessary for the orderly administration of the court's business." 94. A superior court, in exercise of its inherent power, is authorized to do such justice that the cause before it demands. Upon satisfaction being reached by a court that a mistake has been committed by it, which is gross and palpable, it is not the law that the mistake has to be corrected by exercising the power of review only. Such power can be exercised, only if the person aggrieved by the order or decree applies therefor. On its terms, section 114 of the CPC read with Order XLVII thereof does not conceive of a suo motu power of review being exercised by the court. The words "court on its own motion" are absent in the statutory provision. However, once the court is satisfied that a mistake committed by it needs to be rectif....
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.... Padam Sen v. State of Uttar Pradesh [(1961) 1 SCR 884] laid down the law in the following words: "8. ...The inherent powers of the Court are in addition to the powers specifically conferred on the Court by the Code. They are complementary to those powers and therefore it must be held that the Court is free to exercise them for the purposes mentioned in Section 151 of the Code when the exercise of those powers is not in any way in conflict with what has been expressly provided in the Code or against the intentions of the Legislature. It is also well recognized that the inherent power is not to be exercised in a manner which will be contrary to or different from the procedure expressly provided in the Code." (emphasis supplied) 98. Another three-Judge Bench of this Court in My Palace Mutually Aided Co-operative Society v. B. Mahesh & Others [2022 SCC OnLine SC 1063] held thus: "27. In exercising powers under Section 151 of the CPC, it cannot be said that the civil courts can exercise substantive jurisdiction to unsettle already decided issues. A Court having jurisdiction over the relevant subject matter has the power to decide and may come either to a right or a wrong conclusi....
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.... be read independent of the said two grounds, we believe the long line in Rule 1 after clauses (a) to (c) need not have been drafted in the manner it presently reads. In lieu of referring to the said two grounds as grounds on which a review could be sought, the legislature could well have kept it openended as in section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 where it is provided, without any strings attached, that any appeal or any application may be admitted after the prescribed period of limitation if the appellant or applicant satisfies the court that he had "sufficient cause" for not preferring the appeal or the application earlier. If the intention of the legislature were to give an expanded meaning, Order XLVII Rule 1 would have read somewhat like this: any person considering himself aggrieved by a decree or order or decision of the nature indicated in clauses (a), (b) and (c) for any sufficient reason desires to obtain a review of the decree or order made against him, may apply for a review. But that is not what the provision says and means. Reading Order XLVII Rule 1 in juxtaposition to section 5 of the Limitation Act drives us to accept the view in Chhajju Ram (supra) as having int....
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....dge of a Constitution Bench which turns out to be the minority view, judicial discipline demands that a Bench of lesser strength does not accept the minority view in preference to the majority view. In any event, on a closer reading of the dissent itself, more particularly paragraph 18, it is revealed that the RPs had already been filed and were pending on the date when reference was made to a larger Bench for which His Lordship did not consider it necessary even to consider the Explanation. The issue before us, as held earlier, cannot be resolved without looking at the Explanation and, thus, the contention advanced by Ms. Bhati is rejected. 104. We, thus, hold that no review is available upon a change or reversal of a proposition of law by a superior court or by a larger Bench of this Court overruling its earlier exposition of law whereon the judgment/order under review was based. We also hold that notwithstanding the fact that Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) has since been wiped out of existence, the said decision being the law of the land when the Civil Appeals/Special Leave Petitions were finally decided, the subsequent overruling of such decision and even its recall, for t....
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....true that the RPs include under the caption 'GROUNDS' reference to points which, according to the review petitioners, are sufficient to review the judgments/orders under review, apart from reference to the so-called 'liberty' granted by this Court vide Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra). Mr. Sen thus argued that even if the RPs are held not to be maintainable based on Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra) and Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra), the same ought to be decided upon consideration of such other grounds; and, for such purpose, the larger Bench may remit the RPs for being considered by an appropriate Bench on such other grounds. Viewed in the light of such contention, the review petitioners are persons aggrieved and the RPs cannot be shut out on the ground that the same are not maintainable for reasons discussed above. However, this finding does not take the cause of the review petitioners any forward. 110. We have perused the 'GROUNDS' in each of the RPs opposed by Mr. Divan and Mr. Giri. All such grounds are factual in nature. In fact, the review petitioners have raised 'GROUNDS' without even averring what was pleaded in their counter affidavits filed before the High Court and what w....
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....no hearing', we find that sometimes applications are filed for 'clarification', 'modification' or 'recall' etc. not because any such clarification, modification is indeed necessary but because the applicant in reality wants a review and also wants a hearing, thus avoiding listing of the same in chambers by way of circulation. Such applications, if they are in substance review applications, deserve to be rejected straight away inasmuch as the attempt is obviously to bypass Order XL Rule 3 relating to circulation of the application in chambers for consideration without oral hearing. By describing an application as one for 'clarification' or 'modification', - though it is really one of review - a party cannot be permitted to circumvent or bypass the circulation procedure and indirectly obtain a hearing in the open court. What cannot be done directly cannot be permitted to be done indirectly. [See in this connection a detailed order of the then Registrar of this Court in Sone Lal v. State of U.P. (1982) 2 SCC 398 deprecating a similar practice.]". 115. Similarly, and more recently, this Court in Supertech Ltd. v. Emerald Court Owner Resident Welfare Association and others [(2023) 10 S....
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....t were made in course of progress of other proceedings before us, which followed immediately after judgment on this set of RPs and miscellaneous applications was reserved. Such other proceedings arose out of appeals carried from orders of the High Court declaring land acquisition proceedings as lapsed based on the decision in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) as distinguished from RPs and miscellaneous applications of the nature under consideration. Since all such proceedings have more or less a common genesis and have followed similar trajectory, it would be eminently desirable to find a solution that benefits all. We may hasten to add here that the exercise of inherent powers conferred on this Court by Article 142, in such circumstances, is not just inevitable but also pivotal for disposal of the matters at hand, given their impact on public interest at large as well as to secure uniformity and consistency in our decisions; hence, we consider it expedient to pass such orders or directions for ensuring complete justice in the matters under consideration before us. Notwithstanding our discussion on the reference which was necessitated to answer the question of law on which there w....
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....o take necessary steps as per the procedure contemplated under section 21 onwards of Chapter-IV of 2013 Act, save and except where compliance of any provision has been expressly or impliedly dispensed with; f) The landowners may submit their objections within a period of four weeks from the date of pronouncement of this order. Such objections shall not question the legality of the acquisition process and shall be limited only to clauses (a) and (b) of section 15(1) of the 2013 Act; g) The Collector shall publish a public notice on his website and in one English and one vernacular newspapers, within two weeks of expiry of the period of four weeks granted under direction (f) above; h) The Collector shall, thereafter, pass an award as early as possible but not exceeding six months, regardless of the maximum period of twelve months contemplated under section 25 of the 2013 Act. The market value of the land shall be assessed as on 01st January, 2014 and the compensation shall be awarded along with all other monetary benefits in accordance with the provisions of the 2013 Act except the claim like rehabilitation etc.; i) The Collector shall consider all the parameters prescribed u....
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....W.P. (C) No. 6897/2014], which shall stand restored on the file of the High Court for this limited purpose on remand being ordered. The Chief Justice of the High Court is requested to constitute a dedicated bench to decide these writ petitions in the manner indicated hereafter. The nominated bench will accord an opportunity to the landowners/subsequent purchasers, the GNCTD, and the DDA to submit additional documents on affidavits whereupon such bench shall embark on an exercise to decide who between the landowner(s) and the subsequent purchaser(s) is the rightful claimant to receive compensation. The nominated bench will have the authority to obtain independent fact-finding enquiry reports, if deemed necessary. The inquiry could include determination as to whether after the Notification under section 4(1) of the 1894 Act, any transfer could have been effected and even if effected, whether such transfer is permitted by any law. Once compensation is determined, the relevant authority in the land acquisition department shall deposit the same with the reference court. The reference court shall then invest the deposited amount in a short-term interest-bearing fixed deposit account....