TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2024 (7) TMI 811
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....(C) No. 431/2023 in C.A. No. 9597/2016, R.P.(C) No. 432/2023 in C.A. No. 11841/2016, CONMT.PET.(C) No. 735/2018 in C.A. No. 11857/2016, R.P.(C) No. 398/2023 in C.A. No. 8529/2016, R.P.(C) No. 399/2023 in C.A. No. 11857/2016, R.P.(C) No. 400/2023 in C.A. No. 8899/2016, R.P.(C) No. 401/2023 in C.A. No. 8527/2016, R.P.(C) No. 402/2023 in C.A. No. 8547/2016, R.P.(C) No. 403/2023 in C.A. No. 8952/2016, R.P.(C) No. 405/2023 in C.A. No. 8935/2016, R.P.(C) No. 406/2023 in C.A. No. 8954/2016, R.P.(C) No. 407/2023 in C.A. No. 9049/2016, R.P.(C) No. 408/2023 in C.A. No. 8559/2016, R.P.(C) No. 411/2023 in C.A. No. 9214/2016, R.P.(C) No. 413/2023 in C.A. No. 9595/2016, R.P.(C) No. 397/2023 in C.A. No. 8909/2016, R.P.(C) No. 417/2023 in C.A. No. 8921/2016, R.P.(C) No. 420/2023 in C.A. No. 8904/2016, R.P.(C) No. 421/2023 in C.A. No. 9719/2016, R.P.(C) No. 423/2023 in C.A. No. 8957/2016, R.P.(C) No. 424/2023 in C.A. No. 8922/2016, R.P.(C) No. 426/2023 in SLP(C) No. 17316/2016, R.P.....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....r. Tarun Mehra, Adv., Mr. Vikrant Kumar, Adv., Mr. Aditya Krishna, Adv., Mr. Anand Chichra, Adv., Mr. Deepak Yadav, Adv., M/s. Vedya Partners, AOR, Mr. Alok Gupta, AOR, Mr. Shyam Divan, Sr. Adv., Mr. D.K. Garg, Adv., Mr. Abhishek Garg, Adv., Mr. Dhananjay Garg, AOR, Mr. Ishaan Tiwari, Adv., Mr. Dinesh K. Garg, Adv., Mr. R.P. Bansal, Adv., Mr. Chanakya Gupta, Adv., Mr. Dinesh Kumar Garg, Adv., Ms. Anshula L. Bakhru, Adv., Mr. Davesh Bhatia, AOR, Mr. Neeraj Kumar Jain, Sr. Adv., Mr. T. N. Singh, AOR, Mr. Vikas Kumar Singh, Adv., Ms. Rajshree Singh, Adv., Ms. Diksha Rai, AOR, Mr. Arijit Dey, Adv., Ms. Atiga Singh, Adv., Ms. Apurva Sachdev, Adv., Ms. Akriti Chaubey, AOR, Mr. Mayank Kshirsagar, AOR, Ms. Smita Maan, AOR, Mr. Vishal Maan, Adv., Mr. Aditya Singh, Adv., Mr. Kartik Dabas, Adv., Mr. Jayant Singh, Adv., Mr. Sameer Jain, Adv., Mr. Abhinav Shrivastava, AOR, Mr. Shivang Rawat, Adv., Ms. Amrita Kumari, Adv., Mr. Atul Kumar, AOR, Ms. Sweety Singh, Adv., Ms. Archana Kumari, Adv., Mr. Rahul Pandey, Adv., Mr. Avs Kadyan, Adv., Mr. Arvind Kumar Sharma, AOR, Ms. Malvika Kapila, AOR, Mr. Ishaan Sharma, Adv., Ms. Tanwangi Shukla, Adv., Mr. Ashwani Kumar, AOR, Mr. Ashutosh Kaushik, Adv., M....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....PLANATION ................................. 36 J. OTHER PRECEDENTS ON REVIEW ............................................................ 41 K. ANALYSIS ....................................................................................................... 45 L. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................ 79 A. PREFACE 1. Day in and day out, as Judges of this Court, we are majorly addressed by learned counsel for the parties that the High Courts are either right or wrong; here, in view of a split verdict rendered by an Hon'ble Division Bench ("said Division Bench", hereafter) comprising two Hon'ble Judges of this Court, we have been addressed by the parties that our distinguished colleagues on the Bench have been right and wrong at the same time. To complete the task that has been entrusted to us, one of the opinions of the Hon'ble Judges comprising the said Division Bench has to be held incorrect unless, of course, harmonization of the....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....ch on 17th March, 2023 requiring the papers of the RPs to be placed before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice. Such order has been the immediate reason for His Lordship to constitute this larger Bench and refer the RPs to resolve which of the two views on maintainability of the RPs is the correct view; hence, all such RPs are now before this larger Bench. C. JUDICIAL TRAJECTORY 3. Before delving deep into the intricacies presented by the reference, it would be apposite to trace the judicial trajectory of proceedings in this Court on interpretation of section 24(2) of the 2013 Act that preceded the split verdict. 4. The 2013 Act was enforced with effect from 1st January, 2014. Soon thereafter, the interpretation of section 24(2) of the 2013 Act fell for consideration before this Court. A three-Judge Bench (cor. Hon'ble R.M. Lodha, Hon'ble Madan B. Lokur and Hon'ble Kurian Joseph, JJ.) in Pune Municipal Corporation v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki [(2014) 3 SCC 183] explained, in the light of section 31 of the 2013 Act what the expression "compensation has not been paid" occurring in section 24(2) meant. The verb "paid" in the same sub-section was also explained. Perhaps, since no....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....ation Limited [(2018) 3 SCC 585] while deferring a hearing as to whether the matter should at all be referred to a larger Bench directed that pending decision on the question of reference, the High Courts may not deal with any case relating to the interpretation of or concerning section 24 of the 2013 Act. 9. Two orders dated 22nd February, 2018 passed by different Benches of co-equal strength followed. While a Bench (cor. Hon'ble A.K. Goel and Hon'ble U.U. Lalit, JJ.) by an order passed in Indore Development Authority v. Shyam Verma [(2020) 15 SCC 342] directed the matters to be placed before an appropriate Bench the next day as per orders of the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India, a similar order was passed by a coordinate Bench (cor. Hon'ble Arun Mishra and Hon'ble Amitava Roy, JJ.) vide its order in State of Haryana v. Maharana Pratap Charitable Trust (Regd) [Civil Appeal No. 4835/2015]. 10. A five-Judge Constitution Bench (cor. Hon'ble Arun Mishra, Hon'ble Indira Banerjee, Hon'ble Vineet Saran, Hon'ble M.R. Shah and Hon'ble S. Ravindra Bhat, JJ.) was thereafter constituted. 11. Ultimately, vide the judgment in Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal [5-Judge, ....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
.... the narrative, it is to be noted that the ball did not stop rolling with Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra). By an order dated 16th July, 2020 in Pune Municipal Corporation v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki [Recall Order] [2020 SCC OnLine SC 1471], a three-Judge Bench (cor. Hon'ble Arun Mishra, Hon'ble Vineet Saran and Hon'ble M.R. Shah, JJ.) allowed several applications, thereby recalling the judgment in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra). 14. What is, therefore, laid bare by these facts is that firstly, Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) was doubted in Shailendra [2-Judge] (supra), whereafter it was declared per incuriam in Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra), followed by its overruling in Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra) and ultimately recalled on 16th July, 2020 in Harakchand Misirimal Solanki [Recall Order] (supra). D. FACTS GIVING RISE TO THE REVIEW PETITIONS 15. Immediately after Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) was decided, several writ petitions came to be instituted not only in the High Court but also in different high courts across the country seeking similar declaration, viz. owing to the requisite conditions mentioned in Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act being met, ....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....s 365 and 366 of Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra) and paragraph 217 of Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra). They also relied on Board of Control for Cricket in India v. Netaji Cricket Club [2005 4 SCC 741] in support of the contention that a party for sufficient reason could urge the court to exercise its review jurisdiction. On behalf of the respondent landowners, various decisions were cited to contend that the Explanation to Rule 1 of Order XLVII, CPC would not permit a review of the judgments/orders under review. 20. The presiding Judge allowed the review/recall petitions. Noting the specific overruling of Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) and all the decisions which were rendered following it by Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra), and referring to paragraph 217 of the decision in Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra), the Hon'ble Judge felt that "some meaning" had to be given to such observations. The contention of the respondents that the case falls under Rule 1 of Order XLVII, CPC and the subsequent overruling of Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) cannot be a ground to review the earlier judgments and orders was rejected by reasoning that "here is a peculiar case where the earlier d....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....1922 PC 112] and Haridas Das v. Usha Rani Banik [(2006) 4 SCC 78] wherein this Court had held that the grounds for review laid down by Rule 1 of Order XLVII, CPC do not include within their ambit, the rehearing of a dispute solely on the ground that the judgment on which the decision in the dispute had been relied upon, was overruled. Netaji Cricket Club (supra) was distinguished by observing that "exercise of review jurisdiction in that case, based on a subsequent event was confined to purely the facts of the said case involving a controversy between rival Cricket Associations" and hence could not be applied as a general ratio. F. SUBMISSIONS 23. It is as a consequence of the split-verdict that the RPs were heard by the present three-Judge Bench to decide the point of maintainability of the RPs and to settle the ancillary issues raised in K.L. Rathi Steels Limited (supra). 24. Though it may not be absolutely necessary to note the elaborate submissions advanced from the Bar by learned senior counsel/counsel for the parties since such submissions have been captured in the minutest detail in the split-verdict, for the sake of completeness, we shall briefly refer to the same.....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
.... on an overruled judgment, were upheld. 27. Mr. Sen, learned senior counsel, also appearing on behalf of the Delhi Development Authority, apart from adopting the submissions of Ms. Bhati and Mr. Vasdev, asserted the maintainability of the RPs by submitting as follows: a) Maintainability of the RPs ought not to be decided by a blanket order as the RPs have been filed not on the solitary ground of overruling of Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) but in terms of the 'liberty' granted by this Court in Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra), which has the force of law under Article 141 of the Constitution. In arguendo, Article 137 comes to the rescue of the review petitioners granting them the liberty to file a review. b) Public interest must be given precedence over private interest in case of a conflict. The present lands are required for implementing residential schemes for low-income groups and significant construction had already been carried out in other acquired portions. c) The jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution ought to be invoked to ensure substantial justice considering the threat to public good involved in the matter. 28. Urging t....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
..... We are of the opinion that on the rival contentions, the following questions arise for answers on the facts of these RPs: a) Can the review petitioners, on the basis of the pleadings in the RPs, be considered persons aggrieved? b) Whether the last sentence of paragraph 217 of Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra) grants 'liberty' to any party to seek a review of Pune Municipal Corporation (supra)? c) If the answer to (b) is in the affirmative, did such 'liberty' survive after the decision in Manoharlal [5- Judge, lapse] (supra)? d) Can the RPs be held to be maintainable, giving due regard to the Explanation in Rule 1 of Order XLVII, CPC vis-à-vis Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra)? e) If the answer to (d) is in the negative, do the RPs still deserve to be entertained on the other grounds urged therein? f) Are the miscellaneous applications maintainable? 32. While answering the aforesaid questions, we feel obliged and, hence, intend to address certain ancillary issues too. H. LAW ON REVIEW JURISDICTION 33. The law regulating exercise of review jurisdiction by the Supreme Court is so well-settled that any detailed discus....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....ew and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment of the Court which passed the decree or made the order. 35. Read in conjunction with section 114 of the CPC, Order XLVII Rule 1 thereof has three broad components which need to be satisfied to set the ball for a review in motion - (i) 'who', means the person applying must demonstrate that he is a person aggrieved; (ii) 'when', means the circumstances a review could be sought; and (iii) 'why', means the grounds on which a review of the order/decree ought to be made. Finally, comes the 'what', meaning thereby the order the Court may make if it thinks fit. Not much attention is generally required to be paid to components (i) and (ii), because of the overarching difficulties posed by component (iii). However, in deciding this reference, component (i) would also have a signif....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
.... Order XVLII does not end with the circumstances as section 114, CPC, the substantive provision, does. Review power under section 114 read with Order XLVII, CPC is available to be exercised, subject to fulfilment of the above conditions, on setting up by the review petitioner any of the following grounds: (i) discovery of new and important matter or evidence; or (ii) mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; or (iii) any other sufficient reason. 40. Insofar as (i) (supra) is concerned, the review petitioner has to show that such evidence (a) was actually available on the date the court made the order/decree, (b) with reasonable care and diligence, it could not be brought by him before the court at the time of the order/decree, (c) it was relevant and material for a decision, and (d) by reason of its absence, a miscarriage of justice has been caused in the sense that had it been produced and considered by the court, the ultimate decision would have been otherwise. 41. Regarding (ii) (supra), the review petitioner has to satisfy the court that the mistake or error committed by it is self-evident and such mistake or error can be pointed out ....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....ad been taken in the decision sought to be reviewed, was a good ground for review. Upon consideration of these decisions, the Law Commission had recommended as follows: "Recommendation It is felt that the position should be settled on this point. If the law is altered by judicial pronouncement of a higher court, the party affected should not, in our opinion, have a right to get the judgment reviewed. An amendment adopting the Kerala view will create a serious practical problem. It will keep alive the possibility of review indefinitely. Under the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for an application for review has been prescribed, but the delay can, 'for sufficient cause', be condoned by the Court under that Act. Where an application for review is made on the ground of a later binding authority, the party applying for review will usually be able to plead 'sufficient cause', because it is only when the superior court has made a pronouncement that he will have a ground for review; and he can, therefore, argue with considerable force that there was 'sufficient cause' for his not making the application earlier. Recommendation We, therefore, reco....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....petition for two obvious reasons - firstly, this was not pointed out to the Bench which decided the civil appeal; and secondly, by the time the impugned order was passed the three-Judge Bench judgment had not been upset and even in future if the Constitution Bench takes a contrary view it would be a subsequent event which cannot be a ground for review as is clear from the explanation to Order 47 Rule 1(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure ***". (emphasis supplied) The principle, thus, laid down is that a decision being upset in the future would be a subsequent event which could not be a ground to seek review. 51. In Nand Kishore Ahirwar v. Haridas Parsedia [(2001) 9 SCC 325] , a Bench of three Hon'ble Judges, while dismissing the review petitions before it, made pertinent observations reaching out to the very core of the said Explanation. This Court observed that simply because there has been a Constitution Bench decision, passed in the aftermath of the judgment impugned, would be no ground for a review of the said judgment. It also went on to observe that a reference to a Constitution Bench would stand on a still weaker footing (emphasis supplied). 52. The question ari....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....o show that such matter or evidence was not within its knowledge and even after the exercise of due diligence, the same could not be produced before the court/tribunal earlier." (emphasis supplied) 53. This Court, in Subramanian Swamy v. State of Tamil Nadu [(2014) 5 SCC 75] , has read the Explanation as follows: "52. *** The Explanation to Order XLVII, Rule 1 of Code of Civil Procedure 1908 provides that if the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the court is based, is reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior court in any other case, it shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment. Thus, even an erroneous decision cannot be a ground for the court to undertake review, as the first and foremost requirement of entertaining a review petition is that the order, review of which is sought, suffers from any error apparent on the face of the order and in absence of any such error, finality attached to the judgment/order cannot be disturbed." 54. The final one is a decision of the Constitution Bench in Beghar Foundation v. K.S. Puttaswamy [(2021) 3 SCC 1] . The majority was of the following view: "2. The prese....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....he words 'any other sufficient reason' in Order 47 of the Code would mean a reason sufficient on grounds analogous to those specified immediately previously in that order. The grounds for review are the discovery of new matters or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or the review is asked for on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record. In Rajah Kotagiri Venkata Subbamma Rao v. Rajah Vellanki Venkatrama Rao Lord Davey at p. 205 of the Report said that 'the section does not authorise the review of a decree which was right when it was made on the ground of the happening of some subsequent event'." (emphasis supplied) 59. What was laid down in Netaji Cricket Club (supra), upon reading Order XLVII, CPC, can be better understood in the words of the Hon'ble Judge authoring the judgment. The relevant passages are quoted hereunder: "88. *** Section 114 of the Code empowers a court to review its order if the conditions precedent laid down therein are satisfied. The substantive provision of law does not prescribe any lim....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....s accepted the meaning of the ground "for any other sufficient reason" as explained in Chhajju Ram (supra), Moran Mar Basselios Catholics (supra) and Kamlesh Verma (supra). K. ANALYSIS 63. Before answering question (a), we take up questions (b), (c) and (d) first with (b) and (c) together for answers. 64. It was with more than sufficient intensity, force, vehemence and seriousness that learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the review petitioners argued, based on their understanding of paragraph 217 of Shailendra [3- Judge] (supra) that, irrespective of anything else, the same did grant them 'liberty' to apply for review, that availing such 'liberty' granted by this Court the RPs were filed, and that this Bench being of co-equal strength, instead of taking a different view, ought to read the last sentence of paragraph 217 in the manner they (learned senior counsel) understood it, and to accept the same for holding the RPs maintainable. 65. For reasons more than one, the decision in Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra) cannot come to the rescue of the review petitioners. 66. The first reason is that the submission of a 'liberty' being granted by Shailendra [3-Judge] (s....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....functioning of a co-ordinate bench of the same court, much less sit in judgment as an appellate court over its decision (emphasis supplied). While allowing the appeal, it was further observed that the State not having filed any appeal against the order of Varma, J. granting bail to the appellant, the same had become final so far as the high court was concerned and that in the absence of any allegation of misuse of the concession of bail by the appellant, Gupta, J. had no authority to upset the earlier order of Varma, J (emphasis supplied). In conclusion, it was also observed as follows: "2. *** That which could not be done directly could also not be done indirectly. Otherwise a party aggrieved by an order passed by one bench of the High Court would be tempted to attempt to get the matter reopened before another bench, and there would not be any end to such attempts. Besides, it was not consistent with the judicial discipline which must be maintained by courts both in the interest of administration of justice by assuring the binding nature of an order which becomes final, and the faith of the people in the judiciary ***." 69. We do believe that what was said of a high co....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....e Bench while deciding Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra) could have granted any 'liberty' to the review petitioners to apply for review, assuming that the words "open to be reviewed in appropriate cases" did mean 'liberty to apply'. 72. Prior to attempting an answer to that question, it would also be apposite to note what the dicta in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community v. State of Maharashtra [(2005) 2 SCC 673] is, as laid down by another Constitution Bench of this Court. The legal position summed up in paragraph 12 reads as follows: "12. Having carefully considered the submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel for the parties and having examined the law laid down by the Constitution Benches in the abovesaid decisions, we would like to sum up the legal position in the following terms: (1) The law laid down by this Court in a decision delivered by a Bench of larger strength is binding on any subsequent Bench of lesser or coequal strength. (2) A Bench of lesser quorum cannot disagree or dissent from the view of the law taken by a Bench of larger quorum. In case of doubt all that the Bench of lesser quorum can do is to invite the attention of the Ch....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....declared it per incuriam. But, the same logic applies to this Bench too. Respectfully following the binding dictum in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community (supra) and also having regard to our sense of judicial discipline and propriety, we restrain ourselves from declaring Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra) as per incuriam notwithstanding our firm conviction in this behalf. 75. However, nothing much turns on our restraint for there are weightier reasons to reject the contention of the review petitioners; and this, we say, to specifically answer question (c). 76. In paragraph 365 of Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra) itself, it has been held by the Constitution Bench that Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra) did not have the occasion to consider certain aspects for which that decision cannot prevail. Learned senior counsel for the respondents, based on such statement, contended that Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra) stands overruled. This submission has been disputed by learned senior counsel for the review petitioners. According to them, Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra) has not been expressly overruled; only because of aspects referred to in paragraph 365 and the discussion preceding, it cease....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....ough the remedy of appeal or review had not been pursued earlier and without the successful landowners being on record before the court. 79. The role of the Court, it is needless to observe, is to adjudicate; it cannot, in the absence of exercising its advisory jurisdiction under Article 143 of the Constitution, take upon itself the role of the advisor to any party to the proceedings, to wit, the land acquiring authorities. The maxim heavily relied on by the review petitioners, i.e., actus curiae neminem gravabit, in such a situation would kick in to prevent any harmful act being perpetrated. 80. There is another perspective which cannot be lost sight of. If the understanding of learned senior counsel for the review petitioners of the relevant sentence in paragraph 217 of Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra) is accepted, it would result in utter chaos and confusion in the justice delivery system apart from disturbing the principle of finality of judicial decisions. Should we read "open to be reviewed" as connoting a 'liberty' granted to apply for review, any number of review petitions could be filed based on such liberty for review of decisions between parties which have attained fin....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....lendra [3-Judge] (supra) are erroneous. 85. Questions (b) and (c) are answered accordingly, against the review petitioners. 86. Let us now move on to question (d) to answer it. 87. The decision in Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra), according to the respondents, did not afford a ground for maintainability of the RPs while the contrary is argued by the review petitioners. According to Ms. Bhati, an aggrieved party can seek a review "for any other sufficient reason" and overruling of Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) followed by recall thereof brings the claims of the review petitioners within the coverage of this particular ground. That apart, it has been urged that when miscarriage of justice occasioned due to an earlier flawed decision is brought to the notice of this Court and when public interest would be a casualty resulting from the operation of such earlier decision, it ought to be the Court's duty to pass appropriate orders to set things right. 88. It has been noted that prior to the Explanation being inserted in Rule 1 Order XLVII, with the sole exception of the Kerala High Court, there were decisions of the Privy Council dating back to the commencement of the....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....down by His Lordship. 92. Concededly, the Constitutional courts have inherent powers and this Court is also vested by Article 142 of the Constitution with powers to pass such decree or make such order as is necessary to do complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it. 93. Insofar as inherent powers are concerned, it has been held by this Court in Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres [(1996) 5 SCC 550] that: "22. The judiciary in India also possesses inherent power, specially under Section 151 CPC, to recall its judgment or order if it is obtained by fraud on court. In the case of fraud on a party to the suit or proceedings, the court may direct the affected party to file a separate suit for setting aside the decree obtained by fraud. Inherent powers are powers which are resident in all courts, especially of superior jurisdiction. These powers spring not from legislation but from the nature and the constitution of the tribunals or courts themselves so as to enable them to maintain their dignity, secure obedience to its process and rules, protect its officers from indignity and wrong and to punish unseemly behaviour. This power is necessary for the orderly adminis....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
.... has been committed on court or to correct grave and palpable errors. 95. In any event, in the present case, we have not found exercise of inherent power under section 151, CPC or under Article 142 by the Hon'ble presiding Judge of the said Division Bench. 96. It was urged that a court may recall or review any order exercising its inherent power saved by section 151, CPC to meet the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. This argument, however, need not detain us for long in the light of the law, which stands well-settled by this Court. It is no longer res integra that inherent powers of the court under section 151, CPC cannot be invoked if there exists a remedy made available by the CPC itself. 97. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Padam Sen v. State of Uttar Pradesh [(1961) 1 SCR 884] laid down the law in the following words: "8. ...The inherent powers of the Court are in addition to the powers specifically conferred on the Court by the Code. They are complementary to those powers and therefore it must be held that the Court is free to exercise them for the purposes mentioned in Section 151 of the Code when the exercise of those powe....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....t the ground "any other sufficient reason" means "a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified immediately previously". 101. However, with utmost respect, we do not find any of those decisions, which have taken an expansive view, looking at such ground in the manner we propose to look, for recording our concurrence with the view in Chhajju Ram (supra) that has unhesitatingly been followed over the years. If indeed "any other sufficient reason" were to take within its embrace any situation not analogous to "discovery of new matter or evidence" and "on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record", we wonder why the legislature chose to keep "any other sufficient reason" immediately after the aforesaid two grounds. If "any other sufficient reason" were to be read independent of the said two grounds, we believe the long line in Rule 1 after clauses (a) to (c) need not have been drafted in the manner it presently reads. In lieu of referring to the said two grounds as grounds on which a review could be sought, the legislature could well have kept it openended as in section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 where it is provided, without any s....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....m being unnecessary, is seen to run contrary to the terms of Order XLVII, CPC as expounded in A.C. Estates (supra) (decision of a Bench of three Hon'ble Judges) and Raja Shatrunji (supra). To save Netaji Cricket Club (supra) and Jagmohan Singh (supra) from being declared as decisions rendered per incuriam, we prefer to hold, as the Hon'ble companion Judge on the said Division Bench did, that such decisions turned on the very special facts and circumstances of the cases and cannot guide us in the present endeavor. 103. Ms. Bhati put forth the dissent authored by Hon'ble Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J. (as the Chief Justice then was) in Beghar Foundation (supra) to argue that the Explanation could not be a bar to the maintainability of the RPs in the present case. However, when a view is expressed by a member-Judge of a Constitution Bench which turns out to be the minority view, judicial discipline demands that a Bench of lesser strength does not accept the minority view in preference to the majority view. In any event, on a closer reading of the dissent itself, more particularly paragraph 18, it is revealed that the RPs had already been filed and were pending on the date when reference ....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....o had dismissed the Civil Appeals and the Special Leave Petitions bearing in mind that the issue raised was no longer res integra in view of Pune Municipal Corporation (supra). If indeed the judgments and orders were right, could the review petitioners be categorized as aggrieved persons? 108. For the reason that the judgments and orders under review were right on the dates they were rendered, we do not consider the review petitioners as persons aggrieved who can maintain a review petition citing either Manoharlal [5- Judge, lapse] and Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra). We, however, hold that the review petitioners can yet be considered persons aggrieved for what we proceed to say and hold immediately hereafter. 109. Insofar as question (e) is concerned, which has been framed based on the arguments of Mr. Sen, it is true that the RPs include under the caption 'GROUNDS' reference to points which, according to the review petitioners, are sufficient to review the judgments/orders under review, apart from reference to the so-called 'liberty' granted by this Court vide Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra). Mr. Sen thus argued that even if the RPs are held not to be maintainable based on Shaile....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....intent behind introduction of Explanation 1 to Rule 1 of Order XLVII, CPC which, as noticed in paragraph 91 of this judgment, cannot be permitted by the Court. 114. In this regard, we find sufficient support in the decision in Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh Uban and others [(2000) 7 SCC 296], where this Court held: "17. We next come to applications described as applications for 'clarification', 'modification' or 'recall' of judgments or orders finally passed. We may point out that under the relevant Rule XL of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966 a review application has first to go before the learned Judges in circulation and it will be for the Court to consider whether the application is to be rejected without giving an oral hearing or whether notice is to be issued. [...] However, with a view to avoid this procedure of 'no hearing', we find that sometimes applications are filed for 'clarification', 'modification' or 'recall' etc. not because any such clarification, modification is indeed necessary but because the applicant in reality wants a review and also wants a hearing, thus avoiding listing of the same in chambers by way of circulation. Such applications, if they....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....guised version of a RP, it ought to be treated in similar manner a RP is treated. L. CONCLUSION 117. In the light of the foregoing discussion, the miscellaneous applications are not maintainable. 118. To sum up, our answers to all the questions [(b), (c), (d), (e) and (f)] are in the negative while (a) is partly negative and partly affirmative. 119. We respectfully concur with the opinion expressed by the Hon'ble companion Judge on the said Division Bench and record our inability to be ad idem with the Hon'ble presiding Judge. 120. The reference is answered accordingly. 121. Under the circumstances, dismissal of the RPs and miscellaneous applications would have been logical and we could have ended our judgment here by ordering so. However, there is something more of a balancing act that needs to be done having regard to the disclosures that were made in course of progress of other proceedings before us, which followed immediately after judgment on this set of RPs and miscellaneous applications was reserved. Such other proceedings arose out of appeals carried from orders of the High Court declaring land acquisition proceedings as lapsed based on the decision in Pun....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....ion process can be adhered to by the appellants and the GNCTD, which would also likely be beneficial to the expropriated landowners; d) Similarly, compliance with sections 13, 14, 16 to 20 of the 2013 Act can be dispensed with as the subjectlands are predominantly urban/semi-urban in nature and had earlier been acquired for public purposes of paramount importance. In order to simplify the compliance of direction at (a) above, it is further directed that every Notification issued under section 4(1) of the 1894 Act in this batch of cases, shall be treated as a Preliminary Notification within the meaning of section 11 of the 2013 Act, and shall be deemed to have been published as on 01st January, 2014; e) The Collector shall provide hearing of objections as per section 15 of the 2013 Act without insisting for any Social Impact Assessment Report and shall, thereafter, proceed to take necessary steps as per the procedure contemplated under section 21 onwards of Chapter-IV of 2013 Act, save and except where compliance of any provision has been expressly or impliedly dispensed with; f) The landowners may submit their objections within a period of four weeks from....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
.... 123. The cases falling under the second set are listed below: a) DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. TARUN KAPAHI [R.P.(C) No. 425/2023]; b) GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI v. NARENDER SHARMA [R.P.(C) No. 426/2023]; c) DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. M/S. RUNWEELL (INDIA) PVT. LTD. [R.P.(C) No. 428/2023]; d) DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MAHARAJ SINGH [R.P.(C) No. 429/2023]; and e) DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SURENDER SINGH [R.P.(C) No. 409/2023]. 124. As a fact-finding inquiry is necessary to ascertain the rightful claimant for receiving the compensation, which is to be determined as directed in paragraph 121 supra, we hereby set aside the orders of the High Court that were under challenge in the Civil Appeals out of which the aforementioned RPs have arisen. We revive the relevant writ petitions [W.P. (C) No. 5107/2015, W.P. (C) No. 5063/2014, W.P. (C) No. 4780/2014, W.P. (C) No. 1637/2015, W.P. (C) No. 6897/2014], which shall stand restored on the file of the High Court for this limited purpose on remand being ordered. The Chief Justice of the High Court is requested to constitute a dedicated b....