TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2024 (5) TMI 278
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....ner / Bank / Intervenor, has filed IA No. 199 / 2024 (under Rule 11 r/w. Rule 31 of NCLAT Rules, 2016) in Comp. App (AT) (CH) (INS) No. 13 / 2024, seeking to 'Implead' in main 'Appeal', as Proposed 2nd Respondent. 2. It is the plea of the Petitioner / Bank / Proposed 2nd Respondent, that the details of 'Working Capital Facilities', sanctioned to the '1st Respondent / Appellant', is mentioned as under: Amount Sanctioned: Term Loan Rs. 24,00,00,000/- SODM Rs. 6,00,00,000/- Bank Guarantee Rs. 1,00,00,000/- Total Rs.31,00,00,000/- Amount Disbursed: Term Loan Rs. 24,00,00,000/- SODM Rs. 6,00,00,000/- Bank Guarantee Rs. 1,00,00,000/- Total Rs.31,00,00,000/- 3. According to the Petitioner / Bank (Proposed 2nd Respondent in main 'Appeal'), the Working Capital Facilities, were sanctioned to the '1st Respondent / Appellant', through Letter dated 30.03.2011 (vide Ref. No. RPR/3018/ADV/2011), and that the '1st Respondent / Appellant', had accepted the terms and conditions of the 'Sanction Letter'. Petitioner / Bank's Submissions: 4. The Learned Counsel for the Petitioner / Bank / Proposed 2nd Respondent, submits that the '1st Re....
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....oner / Bank'. Therefore, the '2nd Respondent', cannot be permitted to enforce the 'Exclusive Security', which was furnished, by the '1st Respondent / Appellant', to the 'Petitioner / Bank'. 7. According to the Petitioner / Bank, the '1st Respondent / Appellant', has from documents confirmed the utilisation of the 'Term Loan Credit Facility' of Rs.24 Crores, for the purpose of 'Construction of Parking Complex' and 'Completion of 100 Rooms Hotel', in the premises of 'Chiraan Fort Club' and Rs.600 Lakhs, towards 'Working Capital', for the existing club and the proposed Hotel and Rs.1 Crore, towards the 'Bank Guarantee Limit', for guaranteeing to various Departments, as and when required. 8. The Learned Counsel for the Petitioner, points out that the 1st Respondent / Appellant, had duly created a 'Charge' on the 'Assets', before the 'Registrar of Companies, Andhra Pradesh, on 30.04.2011 and had also created a 'Mortgage', on the 'subject property'. 9. It is the version of the Petitioner / Bank (Proposed 2nd Respondent in main 'Appeal'), that the 'Company' in 'Liquidation' ('M/s. Sainath Estate Private Limited), had also availed 'Credit Facilities', and the 'Outstanding Loan Amo....
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....ested huge amounts for the constructions of the Building and that the 'Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation', had also approved the Construction Plan, through BPS Proceedings dated 22.10.2010 and further, that the 'Memorandum of Understanding', dated 26.07.2012, was entered into between the '1st Respondent / Appellant', and the 'Corporate Debtor', clearly proves that all the 'Buildings', on the 'Lease Land', were constructed by the 'Appellant', at its own costs, which was to be refunded by the Respondent, before handing over of the possession by the 1st Respondent, to the 'Corporate Debtor'. 16. The stand of the 1st Respondent / Appellant is that, there was no 'Termination Notice', at any stage, given to the 1st Respondent / Appellant, in terms of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Further, the 'Lease Deed', dated 30.09.2017, was not 'terminated' or 'determined', before asking the 'Appellant', to vacate the premises. 17. According to the 1st Respondent / Appellant, it is a separate and distinct 'Legal Entity', than the 'Corporate Debtor'. It is not disputed that the 'Loan', was taken, by the '1st Respondent / Appellant', from the 'Bank', towards the 'Constr....
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....truction of the said Superstructures'. 22. The Learned Counsel for the 2nd Respondent / Liquidator, brings to the Notice of this 'Tribunal' that the alleged 100 year old 'Rental Deed', purportedly executed by and between the '1st Respondent Company', and the 'Corporate Debtor', on 14.12.1995 (being an 'Unregistered Document'), is absolutely 'devoid of', any 'legal binding effect'. 23. Continuing further, it is the submission of the Learned Counsel for the 2nd Respondent / Liquidator, if the 100 years old 'Rental Deed', was in fact, in vogue, for the 'subject Property', then, why an 'Unregistered Memorandum of Understanding', as it was executed on 30.09.2017, which had expired due to an efflux of time on 30.09.2022. 24. The clear cut stand of the 2nd Respondent / Liquidator is that the Petitioner / Bank, might have given 'Loans', in pursuance of the 'Superstructures', or for whatever purposes it may be, but, it does not qualify the Petitioner, to get itself 'Impleaded', in the instant 'Appeal', which deals squarely, with the 'issue of eviction' of the 1st Respondent / Appellant, owing to its 'illegal possession of the Land of the 'Corporate Debtor', despite, the fact that t....
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....ith the 'Liquidator', as a 'Financial Creditor' of the 'Corporate Debtor', unerringly points out that the 'Petitioner / Bank', does not have a 'Exclusive Charge', over the 'Superstructures', built upon the 'Land' of the 'Corporate Debtor'. 31. It cannot be brushed aside that the 'Asset', subject to such 'Security Interest', Viz. the 'subject matter' of the present 'Lis', was already relinquished by the 'Petitioner / Bank', in to the 'Liquidation Estate' of the 'Corporate Debtor', by their own admission. 32. One cannot remain in oblivion that the Petitioner / Bank is a member of the 'Corporate Debtor's Stakeholders Committee'. Just because the Petitioner / Bank, had given 'Loans', in pursuance of the 'Superstructures', it will not qualify the 'Bank', to get itself 'impleaded', in the main Comp. App (AT) (CH) (INS) No. 13 / 2024, in the considered opinion of this 'Tribunal'. 33. It is to be remembered that IA No. 265 / 2023 in CP (IB) No. 651 / 7 / HDB / 2018, was filed before the 'Adjudicating Authority' / 'Tribunal', 'on behalf of' and with the 'consent and consideration' of the 'Members of the Stakeholders Committee' (including the 'Petitioner / Bank'), and no steps, were....
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....o. 13 / 2024, with the 'available material on records', can be disposed of. Viewed in that perspective and looking at from any angle, the instant IA No. 199 / 2024 in Comp. App (AT) (CH) (INS) No. 13 / 2024, is devoid of any merits and it fails. Disposition: In fine, IA No. 199 / 2024 in Comp. App (AT) (CH) (INS) No. 13 / 2024 (filed by the Petitioner / Bank / Proposed Second Respondent) is dismissed. No costs. [AND] M/s. BHAGYANAGAR HOTELS PRIVATE LIMITED Versus MR. KRISHNA MOHAN GOLLAMUDI (LIQUIDATOR OF SAINATH ESTATES PVT. LTD.) For the Appellant : Mr. E. Om Prakash, Senior Advocate For Mr. Puneet Yadav, Advocate For the Respondent : Mr. Avinash Desai, Senior Advocate For Mr. Amir Bavani, Advocate for Caveator JUDGMENT ( Hybrid Mode ) Justice M. Venugopal , Member ( Judicial ) : Comp. App ( AT ) ( CH ) ( INS ) No. 13 / 2024 : Preface : The Appellant / Director of M/s. Bhagyanagar Hotels Private Limited (Respondent), has preferred the instant Comp. App (AT) (CH) (INS.) No. 13 of 2024, before this 'Tribunal', in respect of the 'Order', dated 04.12.2023 made in IA (IBC) No. 265 / 2023 in CP (IB) No. 651 / 7 / HDB / 2018 (under Section 60(5) read ....
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.... of possession, the tenant is not entitled to possession of the secured asset for more than the period prescribed under Section 107 of the T.P. Act." "The lower Courts are correct in ordering delivery of possession to the respondent no. 1 bank as the tenancy stands determined" 7.13 We are therefore of the view that the ruling in Vishal N. Kalsaria, is helpful to the applicant rather than to the respondent. 7.14 Therefore, in the light of our discussion, we allow the application and the Respondent is directed to vacate and handover the vacant physical possession of premises bearing house no. 1-8-322 to 335, near American Consulate, Begumpet, Secunderabad, admeasuring 15092 sq. yards which is described in the petition, on or before 29.01.2024 and in default the petitioner is at liberty to approach this tribunal for necessary further directions. 7.15 It is further ordered that arrears of the rent payable till the date of handing over of physical possession shall also be paid by the Respondent to the Applicant/Liquidator. 7.16 The Liquidator upon taking delivery of the scheduled mentioned property shall proceed further in accordance with the....
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....ppellant, to 'Corporate Debtor'. 9. The Learned Counsel for the Appellant, submits that the 'Appellant', is a 'separate and distinct Legal Entity', than the 'Corporate Debtor', and further that, a 'Company', has a 'distinct entity', and is independent, of its 'Members' or people, controlling it. 10. To put it differently, a 'Company', is considered as a 'Single Juristic Person', distinct from its 'Members', who 'constitute', the 'Company. As a matter of fact, the 'Separate Legal Entity Status', enables a 'Company', to own 'Property', and to deal with it, the way it likes, and as such, the 'Appellant', has right over the 'Assets', and 'Superstructures', constructed over the 'Land' of the 'Corporate Debtor'. 11. The Learned Counsel for the Appellant, comes out with a 'plea', that the Respondent has several times in the 'Reply', had stated that the 'Appellant', took 'Loan', for the 'Construction' and the 'Property', was kept as 'Mortgage', for availing the 'Loan / Borrowing', and further that, the 'Corporate Debtor', stood as a 'Guarantor', for the 'Loan', taken by the 'Company'. Also that, just because, the 'Corporate Debtor', has acted as a 'Guarantor', it does not mean tha....
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...."), which was the owner of the land; and (c) the Respondent and where, after initiation of CIRP against the Respondent, MHADA issued a notice for the Termination of the 'Joint Development Agreement' and return of the land and this 'Appellate Tribunal', refused to treat the 'Property', as the 'Asset' of the Respondent, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, reversed the said decision, by holding that Section 14(1)(d) stood attracted in the facts and circumstances of the said case and that even a reference to Section 18 & 25, may not be necessary. Appellant's Citations: 17. The Learned Counsel for the Appellant, cites the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, in 'Embassy Property Developments Private Ltd. v. State of Karnataka & Ors.', in support of his plea that the 'Adjudicating Authority' / 'Tribunal', has no Jurisdiction to Order such eviction, reported in (2020) 13 SCC at Page Nos. 308 & 309, wherein, at Paragraphs 15 to 45 and 51 & 52, it is observed as under: " ...... the decision of the Government to refuse the benefit of deemed extension of Lease, is in the public law domain and hence the correctness of the decision can be called in to question only in a superio....
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....." 19. Apart from the above, it is further observed and held in the aforesaid decision that where before a Mortgage is created in respect of an Immovable Property and the Borrower, had already 'Leased out', the same, in 'favour of a Lessee', either as the 'Owner' or as a 'Person', 'competent' or 'authorised to transfer', the 'Immovable Property', in accordance with Section 7 of the Transfer of Property Act, if such a Lease is made, by virtue of Section 8 of the Transfer of Property Act, the Lessee will have the right to enjoy the Leased Property in accordance with terms and conditions of 'Lease', irrespective of whether a subsequent Mortgagee, has knowledge of such a 'Lease' or not. 20. Proceeding further, the Learned Counsel for the Appellant, refers to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, in 'Jhanvi Rajpal Automotive Private Ltd. v. R.P. of Rajpal Abhikaran Private Ltd. & Anr.', reported in (2023), SCC OnLine SC 1535 at Page 71, wherein, it is observed as under: "We do not find any ground to interfere in the order impugned dated 05.01.2023 passed by the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal. The appeal is accordingly dismissed keeping the question ....
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....f National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, Chennai there shall be an 'Order of Stay', in regard to the implementation of the 'Impugned Order' dated 24.2.2021 in IA No. 168 / 2020 in CP(IB) 173 / 9 / HDB / 2018 and TCP(IB) No.22/9/AMR/2019 on the file of 'Adjudicating Authority' (National Company Law Tribunal, Amaravati Bench)." 23. The Learned Counsel for the Appellant, points out the 'Judgment' of this 'Tribunal' dated 20.02.2020, in 'K.L. Jute Products Private Ltd. v. Tirupti Jute Industries Ltd.', reported in (2020) SCC OnLine, NCLAT, 426, wherein, at Paragraph Nos. 66 - 70, it observed as under: 66. "Insofar as, the eviction of 2nd Respondent is concerned, the Adjudicating Authority is not empowered to pass an order of eviction and it is for an 'Aggrieved party' to move the appropriate forum for redressal of its grievances in accordance with Law. In short, the Committee of Creditors had approved the Resolution Plan in utter disregard regard to the ingredient of Section 30(2)(e) of the I&B Code and as hence the same was rejected by the Adjudicating Authority. Moreover, the Adjudicating Authority had appointed a 'Liquidator' other than the 'Existin....
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....e ingredients of Section 240A of the Code it is to be pointed out that a Financial Creditor or an Operational Creditor of MSME may take it to Insolvency Proceedings before an 'Adjudicating Authority'. But the fact of the matter is that the MSME may not be pushed into liquidation thereby affecting the employees and workers of MSME and therefore, Section 240A (2) of the Code specifies that the Central Government may, in public interest by notification direct that any of the provisions of the IBC shall not apply to Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises or apply to them with such modifications as may be mentioned. The learned Adjudicating Authority in the impugned order had not entered into the aspect of whether 8th and 9th Respondent are related to 1st Respondent/ Corporate Debtor or otherwise or whether the ingredient of section 29A of the Code applies or not because of the fact the said authority thought it fit that these aspects are irrelevant and while rejecting the plan ordered the liquidation of the 1st Respondent. The Adjudicating Authority in the impugned order, had also disposed of the Applications filed by the respective parties to the proceedings. 68. In rega....
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....iged to file a suit for eviction of the Appellant under MP Accommodation Control Act, 1961 even though lease in favour of the Appellant has expired shall be unduly prolonging the insolvency process which is a time bound process. When the Corporate Debtor has the ownership rights over the premises which premises can be taken in control by IRP/RP, we are of the view that for eviction of the Appellant especially in event when lease in favour of the Appellant has come to an end, filing a suit is not contemplated in the statutory scheme contained in IBC. 21. Thus, the contention of the Appellant that RP has to file a suit for eviction of the Appellant under the MP Accommodation Control Act, 1961 cannot be accepted. We thus, in view of the foregoing discussions are of the considered opinion that Adjudicating Authority has rightly allowed the Application filed by the RP directing the Appellant to vacate from the premises so that Resolution Plan which has been approved can be implemented. We thus do not find any merit in the Appeal, the Appeal is dismissed." 25. The Learned Counsel for the Respondent, adverts to Section 35 and 36 of the I & B Code, 2016, which 'empowers' and 'b....
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.... designed for a different purpose: to ensure that the NCLT alone has jurisdiction when it comes to applications and proceedings by or against a corporate debtor covered by the Code, making it clear that no other forum has jurisdiction to entertain or dispose of such applications or proceedings". Therefore, considering the text of Section 60(5)(c) and the interpretation of similar provisions in other insolvency related statutes, NCLT has jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes, which arise solely from or which relate to the insolvency of the Corporate Debtor. However, in doing do, we issue a note of caution to the NCLT and NCLAT to ensure that they do not usurp the legitimate jurisdiction of other courts, tribunals and fora when the dispute is one which does not arise solely from or relate to the insolvency of the Corporate Debtor. The nexus with the insolvency of the Corporate Debtor must exist." 29. The Learned Counsel for the Respondent, proceeds to point out that an alleged 'Unregistered Memorandum of Understanding', dated 26.07.2012, was entered into, between the 'Appellant' and the 'Corporate Debtor'. As a matter of fact, the said 'Memorandum of Understanding', was entered with....
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....btor, illegally stating to the 'Bank' ('Lender') that the Property, belongs to the 'Appellant'. 38. The Learned Counsel for the Respondent, refers to the extract of the 'Financial Statement' of the 'Appellant' (Notes forming integral part of the Balance Sheet and Profit and Loss Account as at 31.03.2019, vide Vol. - II of the Appellant's Appeal Paper Book at Page 316, which reads as under: "Term Loan from the Bank Viz. Syndicate Bank is secured by a pari passu first charge on immoveable properties (land and Building) of the Company situated at (1) H.N.1-8-322 to 1-8-329, 1-8-331 to 1-8-335, Devadi Iqbaluddolula, Begumpet, Secunderabad, and (2) land situated at Plot A/16, Nacharam Industrial Development Area, Nacharam Village, Ranga Reddy District, admeasuring 12099.32 Sq. Yards." 39. The Learned Counsel for the Respondent, contends that since the 'Appellant', had miserably failed to 'honour', its 'Financial Obligations', towards the 'Financial Creditor', culminating the 'Canara Bank', to prefer a Section 7 Petition (under I & B Code, 2016), in CP (IB) 08 / 2024, before the 'Adjudicating Authority' / 'Tribunal', against the 'Appellant'. 40. On behalf of the Respond....
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.... has failed to make out any case, in seeking the relief of setting aside the 'Impugned Order', dated 04.12.2023 in IA (IBC) 265 / 2023 in CP(IB)/651/7/HDB/2018, passed by the 'Adjudicating Authority' / 'National Company Law Tribunal', Hyderabad Bench, and thereafter, the instant 'Appeal', is liable to be dismissed, by this 'Appellate Tribunal', in the 'interest of Justice' and 'good conscience'. Respondent's Decisions : 46. The Learned Counsel for the Respondent, refers to the Judgment dated 11.08.1995 of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, in R.V. Bhupal Prasad v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. (vide Civil Appeal Nos. 7701 - 7702 / 1995), reported in (1995), 5 SCC at Page 698 at Spl Pg.: 700, wherein, at Paragraph No.8, it is observed as under: 8. "A tenant at sufferance is one who comes into possession of land by lawful title, but who holds it by wrong after the termination of the term or expiry of the lease by efflux of time. The tenant at sufferance is, therefore, one who wrongfully continues in possession after the extinction of a lawful title. There is little difference between him and a trespasser. A tenancy at sufferance does not create the relationship of ....
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....eal with them. In the case of Sivjnanam Abraham & Anr v. Mathevan Pillai Bhoothalingam Pillai (supra), the Court was not directly concerned with the interpretation of Section 69 sub-section (2) of the Partnership Act. The question before the Court was whether on the determination of the lease erstwhile tenant was liable to restore the possession of the property to the plaintiff. Analysing the landlord's claim for recovery of possession on determination of tenancy, it was observed in para 7 that : "7. The landlord's claim for recovery of possession of the properties from a tenant on the determination of tenancy need not be based on any contract expressly entered into in that behalf. The right of the landlord to get and the liability of the tenant to surrender possession of the properties leased, on the determination of the tenancy, is inherent in the very relationship of landlord and tenant and will be implied by the law. This is known as the rule in Henderson v. Squire, (1869) 4 QB 170. "The duty of the tenant upon the determination of the tenancy ............... is simply to yield up peaceable and complete possession of the premises demised to him togethe....
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.... cannot be said to be in lawful possession within the meaning of Rule 6 of the Karnataka Cinemas (Regulation) Act (23 of 1964). It is of course true that while referring to Section 108(q) of the Property Act it has been observed that on the expiry of the lease period, the lessee was bound to put the lessor into possession of the property and that it would be an implied term of the contract. It imposes an obligation in law on the erstwhile tenant to restore possession to the landlord." 48. The Learned Counsel for the Respondent, seeks in aid, of the 'Judgment dated 11.09.2019' of the 'Hon'ble Supreme Court of India', in 'Bajarang Shyamsunder Agarwal v. Central Bank of India & Anr.' (vide Criminal Appeal No. 1371 / 2019 - Arising out of SLP (CRL.) No. 9590 / 2015), wherein, at Paragraph 21 & 25 (c), it is observed as under: 21. "Before concluding, the Court in Harshad Govardhan Case (supra), distinguished the implications of a registered and an unregistered instrument/oral agreement, in the following manner: 36. We may now consider the contention of the respondents that some of the appellants have not produced any document to prove that they are bona fide lessees....
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.... by third parties, capable in its nature of assumption, by third parties and have 'some degree of permanence' or 'stability'. Insolvency Act , 1986 ( United Kingdom ) : 50. Section 436 of the Insolvency Act, 1986 (United Kingdom), defines "... Property includes, money, goods, things in action, land and every description of property wherever situated and also obligations and every description of interest, whether, present or future or contingent, arising out of or incidental to property". Assessment : 51. Before the 'Adjudicating Authority' / 'Tribunal', the 'Respondent' / 'Liquidator', of M/s. Sainath Estates Private Limited, had filed IA (IBC) No. 265 / 2023 in CP (IB) No. 651 / 7 / HDB / 2018 (under Section 60(5), r/w. Section 35 & 36 of the I & B Code, 2016, r/w. Regulation 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Liquidation Regulations), 2016, and R.11 of the NCLAT Rules, 2016), wherein, the following reliefs, were sought for: (a) Allow the instant application. (b) To direct the Respondent to handover the possession of property mentioned herein to liquidator. (c) To direct the Respondent to pay the arrears of rentals till the da....
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....k place and the 'Investment', was 'capitalised', and the 'Appellant / Company', had also filed the 'Audited Balance Sheet', for the year 2018-19 dated 06.06.2019. All these, clearly prove that the entire 'Superstructure' Viz. all the Buildings on the 'Lease Land', were constructed by the 'Appellant / Company', at its own costs, to be refunded by the Corporate Debtor, before handing over of the 'possession', by the Appellant / Respondent to the 'Corporate Debtor'. 57. It is represented on behalf of the Appellant / Company, that the IA (IBC) No. 265 / 2023 in CP (IB) No. 651 / 7 / HDB / 2018, filed by the Respondent / 'Liquidator', seeking directions from this 'Tribunal', to direct the Appellant / Respondent / Company, to handover 'possession of the Property', is 'not maintainable', because of the fact that the various 'official documents', (including that of 'State and Central Governments' and the VAT Registration, TAN Registration, etc., issued by various Govt. Authorities, Licence for 'Sale of IMFL', 'Trade Mark Certificate', 'Food Licence Certificate', 'Professional Tax Registration Certificate' & 'Service Tax Registration', and these documents, were filed prior to the 'Writte....
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....15092 Sq. Yards), near American Consulate, Begumpet, Secunderabad, was refused to be handed over by the Appellant / Respondent / Company, on or before 29.01.2024. 62. In the present case, Regulation 9 (c) of the Liquidation Regulations, clearly mandates, 'cooperation', from persons, in regard to, the conduct of the 'Liquidation', and if such a 'cooperation' / 'assistance', is not extended, the 'Liquidator', can prefer a 'Petition / Application', before the 'Adjudicating Authority' / 'Tribunal', as per Regulations, praying for necessary reliefs. Powers and Duties of Liquidator : 63. Section 35 of the I & B Code, 2016, is analogous to Sections 167, 168, 169 and 170 of the UK Insolvency Act, 1986. The ingredients of Section 167 (3) of the Insolvency Act, 1986 (United Kingdom), mentions, that the Powers showered by Section 167 are subject to the control of the 'Code' and any 'Creditor or Contributory', may 'apply', to the Court, in regard to any exercise or proposed exercise of those 'Powers'. 64. Not resting with the above, Section 168 (5) of the Insolvency Act, 1986 (UK), postulates that a 'Person Aggrieved', by an 'Act of Decision', of the Liquidator, may 'apply', to the....
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....iquidation Proceedings of the Corporate Debtor subsists, as opined by this 'Tribunal'. 72. As per Section 107 of the Transfer of Proper Act, 1882, if a 'tenant', based on an 'Unregistered Instrument' or an 'Oral Agreement', coupled with the 'delivery of possession', then, in 'Law', he is not entitled, to be in 'Possession' of a 'Secured Asset', for more than the specified period. 73. It cannot be ignored that in the present case, the 'Memorandum of Understanding', dated 26.07.2012, cannot survive beyond 26.06.2013, even if it is an 'Unregistered' one. Even the 'Registered Lease Deed', dated 30.09.2017, entered into between the 'Appellant' and the 'Corporate Debtor', had expired on 30.09.2022, without 'any renewal' / 'extension' or 'waiver', as the case may be. 74. It is well settled 'Proposition of Law' that when the Appellant's Lease Deed dated 30.09.2017, had lapsed on 30.09.2022, the Appellant is not in 'Lawful Possession' of the 'Corporate Debtor's land. Indeed, the Appellant / Company, had addressed 'a Letter dated 04.10.2021, to Dr. K. V. Srinivas (Resolution Professional) for M/s. Sainath Estates Private Ltd., pertaining to the 1st Lockdown and 2nd Lockdown, imposed....