TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2022 (2) TMI 1436
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....e view that the Award passed by the Lok Adalat can indeed form the foundation for exercising power Under Section 28A of the Act. 3. A notification came to be issued Under Section 4(1) of the Act on 21.03.1983 in respect of villages situated in Tehsil Dadri (Situation in District Ghaziabad) for planned industrial development contemplated by the Appellant. By the Award of the Land Acquisition Officer, which was passed on 28.11.1984, compensation was fixed for the lands belonging to the Respondents herein inter alia at the rate of Rs. 24,033 per bigha. The Respondents did not seek enhancement Under Section 18 of the Act. One Fateh Mohammed filed an application seeking reference against the Award dated 28.11.1984. The said reference was made over to a Lok Adalat. The reference is seen numbered as No. 6/02. The Lok Adalat passed an Award on 12.03.2016. We may set out the terms of the said award: Today, the matter has been placed before the Lok Adalat. Claimant Fateh Mohammed s/o. Ummed Khan with his learned Counsel Sri Jitendra Mathur and on behalf of Respondents the learned D.G.C. Civil are present in the court. The case file of this L.A.R. case has already been clubbed/con....
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....iling applications before Additional District Magistrate seeking shelter Under Section 28A of the Act. The Additional District Magistrate rejected the applications on the basis that the Award dated 12.03.2016 passed by the Lok Adalat was on the basis of the compromise. This led to the writ petitions being filed by the Respondents before the High Court. It is in the said writ petitions that the impugned judgments have been passed by the High Court finding that the Award of the Lok Adalat would be deemed to be decree of the Civil Court and, consequently, the Respondents would be entitled to invoke Section 28A of the Act. 5. We have heard Shri Anil Kaushik, learned Counsel for the Appellant. We have also heard Shri Dhruv Mehta and Shri V.K. Shukla, learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the Respondents. 6. Learned Counsel for the Appellant would point out that Section 28A is not available to be applied when there is no determination by the Court in terms of the Act. He referred us to the definition of the word 'Court' in the Act to contend that what Section 28A contemplates is an Award passed by such a Court. Lok Adalats, it is his contention are constituted Under Section 1....
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....the Lok Adalat. 9. Per contra, the learned Senior Counsel for the Respondents would point out, in the first place, that a perusal of the Award by Lok Adalat would show that it would be wholly unfair on the part of the Appellant to wriggle out of a rate which, in fact, was based on a decision of the High Court (apparently the decision in Mangu and others. It is further pointed out by Shri Dhruv Mehta, learned Senior Counsel, that full effect must be given to the legal fiction. The oft quoted admonition that the Courts must not allow their imagination to be boggled by the prospect of stretching a legal fiction to its logical culmination was invoked. In other words, it is the contention of Shri Dhruv Mehta that given the fact that an Award passed by the Lok Adalat is to be treated as a decree, it matters little that what led to the Award is not analogous to the procedure that is ordinarily contemplated in a reference Under Section 18 of the Act. The fiction must have full play. Thus, being a decree of a Civil Court, the Award of the Lok Adalat would provide firm foundation for similarly circumstanced persons to claim benefit of Section 28A. In this regard, he would point out that t....
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....eeding before a court. Section 2(aaa) defines 'Court': (aaa) 'Court' means a civil, criminal or revenue court and includes any tribunal or any other authority constituted under any law for the time being in force to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Section 2(d) defines Lok Adalat as meaning a Lok Adalat organized under Chapter VI. 12. Chapter VI contains Sections 19 to 22. Section 19(1) contemplates Lok Adalats being organised at such intervals and places and for exercising such jurisdiction and for such areas as is thought fit by the relevant bodies mentioned therein. Section 19(2) is significant as it provides for the composition of the Lok Adalat. It reads as follows: (2) Every Lok Adalat organised for an area shall consist of such number of: (a) Serving or retired judicial officers and (b) Other persons, of the area as may be specified by the State Authority or the District Authority or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee or the High Court Legal Services Committee, or as the case may be, the Taluk Legal Services Committee, organising such Lok Adalats. Sub-section (3) goes on t....
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.... (4) Every Lok Adalat shall, while determining any reference before it under this Act, act with utmost expedition to arrive at a compromise or settlement between the parties and shall be guided by the principles of justice, equity, fair play and other legal principles. (5) Where no award is made by the Lok Adalat on the ground that no compromise or settlement could be arrived at between the parties, the record of the case shall be returned by it to the court, from which the reference has been received Under Sub-section (1) for disposal in accordance with law. (6) Where no award is made by the Lok Adalat on the ground that no compromise or settlement could be arrived at between the parties, in a matter referred to in Sub-section (2), that Lok Adalat shall advice the parties to seek remedy in a court. (7) Where the record of the case is returned Under Sub-section (5) to the court, such court shall proceed to deal such reference Under Sub-section (1). 4. Section 21 provides for the final decision by the Lok Adalat and it reads as follows: Section 21. Award of Lok Adalat (1) Every award of the Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be a d....
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....late to any offence, to decide the dispute. SCHEME OF THE ACT 17. The Act provides for acquisition of land and for compensation to be provided thereunder. The proceedings are commenced by a notification Under Section 4. Compensation is determined with reference to the date of the said notification. After the procedures are undergone, an Award is passed. While Section 18 provides for a right with a person dissatisfied with the amount inter alia awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer to seek enhancement, Section 28A contemplates situations where a person has not availed of the right Under Section 18 but any other person has utilized the provisions of Section 18 and obtained an enhancement. Other conditions obtaining in Section 28A being present, a person who has not filed application Under Section 18 inter alia is entitled to claim redetermination of the compensation. Section 28A may be noticed: 28A. Re-determination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the award of the Court.-(1) where in an award under this part, the court allows to the applicant any amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the collector Under Section 11, the persons int....
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...., another Learned Single Judge of the very same Court in the decision reported in Chanabasappa and Anr. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer ILR 2011 KAR 4276 took the view that to apply Section 28A(3) of the Act, there must be an Award Under Section 28A(2). He further took the view that the existence of an Award passed by a Court under Part III of the Act was a condition precedent to apply Under Section 28A. The award passed by the Lok Adalat was found to be by consent. In the decision reported in Namdev v. State of Maharashtra, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court on 03.11.2014 only notes that the Award passed by the Lok Adalat has a force of decree and an application Under Section 28A can be founded on such an Award. It is further stated that this view has been confirmed by the High Court in number of matters. 20. A learned Single Judge of the Kerala High Court in the decision reported in Thankamma Mathew v. State of Kerala and Anr. (2017) 2 KLT 1023 did consider the provisions of the 1987 Act in greater detail. The learned Single Judge was guided by the scope and effect of the deeming provision Under Section 21 of the 1987 Act. He referred to the judgment of this Court r....
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....ok Adalat or for which such Lok Adalat is organised, but such court having passed it under Part III of the LA Act, so as to have consequences for third parties. There is nothing to suggest that if the award is in a compensation dispute in a land acquisition matter, any third party should thereby be entitled to apply for re-determination of its compensation Under Section 28A of the LA Act. As a matter of principle, it is not possible to say that that eventuality (i.e. entitlement of a third party to apply for re-determination of its own compensation after passing of the award by the Lok Adalat) inevitably follows as a corollary or consequence from such award. xxx xxx xxx 20. If this consequence, namely, the award of Lok Adalat having to be treated as an award of the reference court under Part III, does not follow as an inevitable sequitur, to come to such consequence the legal fiction contained in Section 21 of the LSA Act will have to be actually extended to import two other fictions, namely, that the award of Lok Adalat should be deemed (i) "a decree of the court which has referred the matter to the Lok Adalat", and (ii) "a decree passed under Part III of the Land Acqu....
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.... an agreement. It is further found that the Civil Court cannot vary the terms of the Award or extend the time agreed to between the parties to an Award. 25. Having set out the provisions and referred to the judgments, we may consider the respective arguments that are raised before the Court. FINDINGS 26. The object of the 1987 Act inter alia as can be noticed from the preamble to the Act, also is the organisation of Lok Adalats. It is clear beyond the shadow of any doubt that the jurisdiction of the Lok Adalat Under Section 20 is to facilitate a settlement of disputes between the parties in a case. It has no adjudicatory role. It cannot decide a lis. All that it can do is to bring about a genuine compromise or settlement. Sub-section (4) of Section 20 is important insofar as the law giver has set out the guiding principles for a Lok Adalat. The principles are justice, equality, fair play and other legal principles. The significance of this provision looms large when the Court bears in mind the scheme of Section 28A of the Act. 27. The scheme of Section 28A of the Act is unmistakably clear from its very opening words. What Section 28A contemplates is a redetermination of....
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....Lok Adalat. If no compromise or settlement is or could be arrived at, no order can be passed by the Lok Adalat. Therefore, question of merger of Lok Adalats order does not arise. 28. An argument was raised by Shri Dhruv Mehta, learned Senior Counsel for the Respondents, that the Lok Adalat insofar as it manifests the stand of the Appellant and it being consensual based on the consent of the NOIDA, NOIDA is estopped. In this regard, he drew our attention to the judgment of this Court in P.T. Thomas v. Thomas Job AIR 2005 SC 3575. 29. We see no merit in this argument. What has been laid down by this Court may be noticed in this regard in the aforesaid judgment: In Sailendra Narayan Bhanja Deo v. The State of Orissa AIR 1956 SUPREME COURT 346, (CONSTITUTION BENCH) held as follows: A judgment by consent or default is as effective an estoppel between the parties as a judgment whereby the court exercises its mind on a contested case. (1895) 1 Ch. 37 & 1929 AC 482, Rel. on; In-'In re South American and Mexican Co., Ex. Parte Bank of England', (1895) 1 Ch 37(C), it has been held that a judgment by consent or default is as effective an estoppel betwe....
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.... questions which pointedly arose was whether the dismissal of an application filed beyond time Under Section 18 of the Act would entitle a person to invoke Section 28A: 9. Before we embark upon an inquiry as to what would be the correct interpretation of Section 28-A, we think it appropriate to bear in mind certain basic principles of interpretation of a statute. The Rule stated by Tindal, C.J. in Sussex Peerage case [(1844) 11 Cl & Fin 85 : 8 ER 1034] still holds the field. The aforesaid Rule is to the effect: (ER p. 1057) If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves alone do, in such case, best declare the intention of the lawgiver. It is a cardinal principle of construction of a statute that when the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, then the court must give effect to the words used in the statute and it would not be open to the courts to adopt a hypothetical construction on the ground that such construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. In Kirkness v. John Huds....
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.... questions referred to us by the Bench of two learned Judges. It is no doubt true that the object of Section 28-A of the Act was to confer a right of making a reference, (sic on one) who might have not made a reference earlier Under Section 18 and, therefore, ordinarily when a person makes a reference Under Section 18 but that was dismissed on the ground of delay, he would not get the right of Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act when some other person makes a reference and the reference is answered. But Parliament having enacted Section 28-A, as a beneficial provision, it would cause great injustice if a literal interpretation is given to the expression "had not made an application to the Collector Under Section 18" in Section 28-A of the Act. The aforesaid expression would mean that if the landowner has made an application for reference Under Section 18 and that reference is entertained and answered. In other words, it may not be permissible for a landowner to make a reference and get it answered and then subsequently make another application when some other person gets the reference answered and obtains a higher amount. In fact in Pradeep Kumari case [ (1995) 2 SCC 736] the ....
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....of the Lok Adalat, in this manner of reasoning, is to be conflated to the adjudication contemplated Under Section 28A of the Act. 33. In K.N. Govindan Kutty Menon v. C.D. Shaji (2012) 2 SCC 51, this Court was concerned with the question as to whether Under Section 21 of the 1987 Act, when a case is referred to the Lok Adalat in a criminal case Under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and the matter is settled and an award is passed, whether it could be treated as a Decree of a Civil Court and, thus, executable. The Court held: 23. A statutory support as evidenced in the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act would not only reduce the burden of arrears of work in regular courts, but would also take justice to the doorsteps of the poor and the needy and make justice quicker and less expensive. In the case on hand, the courts below erred in holding that only if the matter was one which was referred by a civil court it could be a decree and if the matter was referred by a criminal court it will only be an order of the criminal court and not a decree Under Section 21 of the Act. The Act does not make out any such distinction between the reference made by a ci....
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.... is not the same as holding that the Court will not look to the object of the Act and, in particular, the fiction in question. In this regard, we notice the judgment of this Court in State of Karnataka v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors. (2017) 3 SCC 362: 75. In this context, we may usefully refer to the Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 14th Edn. by G.P. Singh. The learned author has expressed thus: In interpreting a provision creating a legal fiction, the court is to ascertain for what purpose the fiction is created [State of Travancore-Cochin v. Shanmugha Vilas Cashewnut Factory AIR 1953 SC 333; State of Bombay v. Pandurang Vinayak AIR 1953 SC 244 : 1953 Cri. LJ 1094], and after ascertaining this, the Court is to assume all those facts and consequences which are incidental or inevitable corollaries to the giving effect to the fiction. [East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council, 1952 AC 109 : (1951) 2 All ER 587 (HL); CIT v. S. Teja Singh AIR 1959 SC 352] But in so construing the fiction it is not to be extended beyond the purpose for which it is created [Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar AIR 1955 SC 661; CIT v. Amarchand N. Shroff AIR 1....
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....apart, the use of the term "deemed" has to be read in its context and further, the fullest logical purpose and import are to be understood. It is because in modern legislation, the term "deemed" has been used for manifold purposes. The object of the legislature has to be kept in mind. 37. In the light of the principles which have been laid down, we are inclined to take the following view. An Award passed by the Lok Adalat under 1987 Act is the culmination of a non-adjudicatory process. The parties are persuaded even by members of the Lok Adalat to arrive at mutually agreeable compromise. The Award sets out the terms. The provisions contained in Section 21 by which the Award is treated as if it were a decree is intended only to clothe the Award with enforceability. In view of the provisions of Section 21 by which it is to be treated as a decree which cannot be challenged, undoubtedly, by way of an appeal in view of the express provisions forbidding it, unless it is set aside in other appropriate proceedings, it becomes enforceable. The purport of the law giver is only to confer it with enforceability in like manner as if it were a decree. Thus, the legal fiction that the....
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....cree. 39. If a Revenue Court or a Tribunal which, undoubtedly, fall Under Section 2(aaa) of the 1987 Act were to refer a case to the Lok Adalat Under Section 20(1) and an award is passed it may become the order of the court/tribunal. In other words, if the matter were finally concluded on a regular basis, that is, without reference to the Lok Adalat, it would be an order which would be passed. 40. The argument, however, according to Shri Dhruv Mehta, learned Senior Counsel, appears to be that by virtue of this legislative device, the award of the Lok Adalat passed in these cases by the Reference Court Under Section 18 executing the Lok Adalat must be treated as an order passed by the Court Under Section 28A of the Act. We will answer this question after considering the requirement Under Section 28A now. 41. Section 28A, undoubtedly, has been introduced by parliament in the year 1984 to bring solace to those land owners or persons having interest in land to claim the just amount due to them even though they have omitted to file application Under Section 18 of the Act seeking enhancement. In fact, in Jose Antonio Cruz Dos R. Rodriguese and Anr. v. Land Acquisition Collector ....
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.... contemplates grounds or reasons and therefore, adjudication is contemplated and Section 26(2) of the Act is self-explanatory. 45. The next aspect is even more fatal to the case of the Respondents. Not only must it be an award passed as a result of the adjudication but it must be passed by 'the Court' allowing compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the collector. The word 'Court' has been defined in the Act as the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction unless the appropriate Government has appointed a Special Judicial Officer to perform judicial functions of the court under this Act. We have noticed the composition of a Lok Adalat in Section 19(2) of the '1987 Act'. The Court is not the same as a Lok Adalat. 46. The Award passed by the Lok Adalat in itself without anything more is to be treated by the deeming fiction to be a decree. It is not a case where a compromise is arrived at Under Order XXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, between the parties and the court is expected to look into the compromise and satisfy itself that it is lawful before it assumes efficacy by virtue of Section 21. Without anything more, the award passed....
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....f the 1987 Act by the Lok Adalat cannot be the basis for invoking Section 28A. 50. As far as the argument of the Respondents that the award dated 12.3.2016 can be treated as the order of the Court within the meaning of Section 18 of the Act read with Section 28A of the Act, we are of the view such an argument cannot be accepted. Unlike in the facts of the case decided by the Andhra Pradesh High Court reported in (supra) which has been distinguished by the Bombay High Court in Umadevi (supra) on the score that in the case from Andhra Pradesh, the Reference Court has passed an award based on a compromise arrived at between the parties before the Lok Adalat, in this case, the award dated 12.3.2016 is the award passed by the Lok Adalat. This is clear from the judgment of the High Court, the case of the parties before it and the terms of the award dated 12.3.2016. In other words, this is a case whereas as noted in the impugned judgment LAR 6 of 2006 (Fateh Mohammed v. State of U.P.) was referred to the Lok Adalat, that is the Additional District and Sessions Judge/FTC No. 2, Gautam Buddh Nagar, U.P. Thus, the proceedings dated 12.3.2016 which is relied on by the Respondents is indeed....