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2004 (7) TMI 706
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....s justice invariably adds complications to the already complicated issues involved in cases coming before them, and makes their duties more onerous by requiring them to adjust rights and equities arising from delay. 3. This introductory comment is occasioned by the fact that against the judgment of the learned single judge passed on 6.9.1988 the appeal was earlier heard by the Division Bench of the High Court on 22.3.1989 but it passed the judgment after a period of about five years on 24.1.1994. It dismissed the appeal and confirmed the decree of Specific Performance of the Contract granted by the single judge. 4. In appeal preferred by the defendants, this Court by order passed on 13.1.2000 [2000]1SCR254 remanded the appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court for a fresh decision only because of long gap of five years in hearing arguments and decision of appeal by the High Court. 5. After remand the Division Bench reheard the appeal and by the impugned judgment dated 24.4.2001 has allowed it. The decree granted by the learned single judge of partial relief of Specific Performance of Contract of Sale of life interest of the vendor in the suit properly has been set asi....
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....ce amount of Rupees 25,000/- to the purchaser. 8. There was a separate stipulation in the agreement that if after the sanction of the Court the vendor commits breach of the contract he shall return the advance money of Rupees 25,000/- and pay a sum of Rupees 15,000/- to the vendee by way of liquidated damages for failure to complete the sale. The agreement further provided that if after the sanction of the Court, vendee commits breach and does not complete the sale, he shall be liable to pay to the vendor a sum of Rupees 15,000/- by way of liquidated damages. 9. The relevant part of opening recitals and clauses 1,2,3,4,6,7,9 & 15 of the agreement dated 26.6.1977 Ex.P1 are reproduced hereunder as rights, and equities of the contesting parties are dependent on its proper construction, and understanding: AGREEMENT OF SALE "THIS AGREEMENT OF SALE executed at Madras this 26th day of June 1977 between G.D. NARENDRA KULLAMMA NAICKER, son of late M.Dorai Pandian alias Subba Naicker, Hindu, aged about 38 years and now residing at Plot No. 24, Second Stage, Panmanabha Nagar, Adyar, Madras-20, hereinafter referred to as the vendor of the one part and HPA INTERNATIONAL, a fir....
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....s Tax, Income-Tax, Wealth tax, penalties and interest, property tax, Urban Land Tax, compulsory deposits, etc., payable on the various assessments could not be paid and discharged as and where demanded for want of requisite net income from the estate to meet the same and on account of paucity of funds in the estate. WHEREAS there is now due towards the said Public debts and public liabilities a sum of nearly six lakhs, whereas consequent on the inability of the estate to pay the same, interest on the said public debts are accruing from day to day thereby increasing the liability of the estate enormously. Whereas in consequence of the inability and failure of the estate to meet the said public debts within the periods of the respective demands, penalties are also levied thereby further swelling the public Debt liabilities of the estate. WHEREAS the vendor apprehends that eventually the public debts and liabilities may swallow up the estate whereas the payment of all the said Public Debts and dues and public liabilities is a first charge on the entire state. WHEREAS the vendor also apprehends that in the circumstances the State and Public Authorities may ta....
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....ses bearing Municipal Door No. 36-C, Mount Road, Madras-2 inclusive of the life interest of the vendor and the interests of the remainder men and free from all encumbrances, charges of trusts whatsoever from the net sum of Rupees five and a half lakhs and subject to and upon all the terms and conditions mentioned below: 2. The sale is of the entire interests in the said property namely, the present interest of the vendor and the interest of the remainder men or reversionary after his death. 3. This agreement is subject to the passing of the vendor's title to the property and of the vendor's rights to sell the entire interest, present and future in the property by the Purchaser's advocate. 4. The vendor shall obtain at his own cost and expense the sanction of the High Court, Madras for the absolute sale as aforesaid of the entire interest in the property inclusive of the interest of the remainder men or reversioners after the life time of the vendor. 5. The purchaser has this day paid to the vendor a sum of Rs.25,000/- (rupees twenty five thousand only) by bank draft bearing No.CL/AA 779570 dated 24.6.1977 drawn on the State Bank of In....
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....t suit. 12. On 16.1.1978, one of the reversioners viz., Saraswati Devi filed a written statement objecting to the grant of sanction for sale and prayed for dismissal of the suit. Another reversioner Prema Gangaiya adopted the written statement filed by other reversioner and objected to the sale. 13. As the sanction sought from the Court was opposed by the above-named reversioners, the vendor sent a lawyer's notice on 11.9.1979 to the vendee stating therein as under: "In view of the prolonged proceedings in obtaining sanction of Court, for sale of the above said property and the pressing demands from Tax Authorities, my client Mr. G.D. Narendra, hereby cancels the agreement of sale referred to above and the advance sum of Rs.25,000/- paid by your draft under the above said agreement is, therefore, refunded by his check bearing No.........dated 11.9.1979." 14. Soon after issuance of the above lawyer's notice, the vendor, on 12.9.1979, instructed his lawyer stating that the suit seeking sanction of the Court was not likely to be decided early and the chances of grant of sanction being remote, the suit be withdrawn. 15. It may be mentioned at this very stag....
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....cancelling the agreement, the vendee did not express desire to purchase life interest of the vendor without insisting on transfer of interest of the reversioners which was subject matter of the suit filed for seeking sanction of the Court. 19. On 29.12.1979, the vendor sold his life interest in the suit property for a sum of Rs.4.40 lacs by executing registered instrument in favour of respondents 1 to 5 (shortly referred to as the subsequent vendee ). What is apparent from the contents of the subsequent sale deed Ex.D1 dated 29.12.1979 executed in favour of the subsequent vendee is that large part of the sale consideration in different sums aggregating to Rs.2.68 lacs was paid directly by the subsequent vendee to various authorities to discharge public dues and taxes like Corporation Property Tax, Urban Land Tax and Income Tax arrears. 20. The subsequent vendee by separate release deeds dated 21.10.1980, 22.1.1980, 22.2.1980 and 29.4.1980 obtained surrender of rights individually from the reversioners by paying each of them a sum of Rs. 20,000/-. 21. After receiving the lawyer's notice and cancellation of the sale agreement, the vendee on 25.3.1981 got himself impleade....
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....by the vendee in which he alternatively claimed lesser relief of transfer of only life interest in the suit property of the Vendor, the learned single judge by common judgment dated 6.9.1988 dismissed Civil Suit No. 471/77 seeking sanction of the Court for sale as infructuous. The relevant part of order of the learned single judge dismissing Civil Suit for sanction as infructuous reads thus: "While so, by affidavit dated 25th November, 1986, Messrs. HPA International, swore in CS No. 423 of 1981, that in the event of this Court coming to the conclusion that Messrs. HPA International as 2nd plaintiff in CS No. 471 of 1977 is not entitled to maintain the suit as prayed for, HPA International is restricting their claim in CS No. 423 of 1981 for specific performance of the agreement Ex.P1 with reference to the life-estate of Narendra Kullamma Naicker alone and for a direction to the defendants in that suit to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff to the extent of the life-estate of Narendra Kullamma Naicker as provided under Section 12(3) of the Specific Relief Act for the consideration of Rs.5,50,000/- for which he had bargained for the whole interest in the suit p....
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.... to convey the whole of the interest of the suit property as contained in clause 4 of Ex.P1 agreement is not a bar for the plaintiff herein to enforce Ex.P1. since he has relinquished the benefit that accrues to him, which will not prejudice the 1st defendant. In view of the relinquishment of the right given to the plaintiff under clause 4 of Ex.P1, clause 6 of the agreement becomes otiose." 29. In granting decree of Specific performance of Conveyance of life interest of the Vendor, learned single judge further held thus: "Whereas, the agreement involved in this suit is capable of separation, one consisting of enforceable portion viz. the life interest of the first defendant and unenforceable portion viz. interest of remainder men and reversioners." 30. The learned single judge found that the equity was in favour of the vendee as the vendor has been found guilty of misrepresenting Bob Daswani and Fateh Chand Daswani as two persons when they were the same and the negotiations for subsequent sale were held in presence of one of the partners of the vendee. The learned single judge on this aspect in the judgment comments thus: "It is a pity that third defendant ....
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....ous grounds urged in this appeal, it is necessary to briefly indicate the basis on which the Division Bench on re-hearing of the appeal - reversed the judgment of the learned Single Judge. 34. Construing the relevant clauses of the contract the Division Bench held that clause (6), which placed an obligation on the vendor to approach the court for sanction of sale of interest of reversioners, was incorporated not with a view to safeguard interest of the vendee alone but it was a term meant for benefit of both the parties. The Division Bench in paragraph 31 held thus: "The sanction referred to in the agreement is a sanction which was clearly meant for the benefit of both the parties to the agreement. The plaintiff was interested only in the purchase of entire interests' in the property, had made the agreement subject to such interest being lawfully conveyed and accepted liability for payment of liquidated damages if it failed to obtain the sale deed after the sanction was obtained. Plaintiff not having contracted with the reversioners to buy their interest, could not have secured the 'entire interest' in the property without an order of this Court directing co....
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....ersionary interest. What perished was the whole of the contract and not only a part. What was contemplated by the parties to the agreement was the sale of 'entire interest' in the property provided sanction was given, and in the event of sanction not being given the agreement stood cancelled as a whole leaving each of the parties to arrange their affairs as they thought fit wholly unhampered by anything contained in the agreement. The agreement contemplated the sale of all interests in the property if sanction was forthcoming, and no sale of any part of the property in case sanction was not given. The bargain was for all or nothing. It was not open to the court to make a new contract for the parties after the contract in its entirety had perished." 38. The Division Bench negatived the claim seeking conveyance of life interest in the property of the Vendor, also on the ground of delay and equity by observing thus: "Plaintiff cannot be allowed to claim performance in part several years later. Had the plaintiff been earnest about relinquishing its claim for reversionary interest, it could have obtained Narendra's life interest in 1977 itself, and at any time up....
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....ing sanction of the court, the contract was formally terminated by lawyer's notice dated 11.9.1979 sent by him. It is submitted that actions such as of sending notice of terminating the contract, thereafter instructing his lawyer to withdraw the suit for sanction followed by the negotiations which were proved to have been held to sell the suit property to the subsequent vendee, were clearly mala fide attempts on the part of the vendor to resile from the contract for getting higher price for the property. It is pointed out that an attempt was made to mislead the Court by creating confusion that Bob Daswani and Bhagwandas Daswani were two different persons and the subsequent vendee had no knowledge of the prior agreement entered with the plaintiff- vendee. This deception sought to be practised on the opposite party and the court was exposed during trial and the learned single judge has imposed penalty on the subsequent vendee for the misconduct of misleading the court. It is submitted that the subsequent vendee having purchased the property with knowledge of the prior agreement holds the property in trust for the benefit of the prior vendee and is obliged in law to make over the ....
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....formance of the contract of full rights of the property i.e. life interest of the vendor and spes successionis of the reversioners. To give effect to the right of the vendee to specific performance - the vendor, reversioners and subsequent vendee can be compelled in law to convey full title of the property to the plaintiff. 43. The alternative argument advanced on behalf of the plaintiff- vendor is that although the petitioner is, in law, entitled to conveyance of full title in the property by the vendor, the reversioners and the subsequent vendee, he has restricted his claim to the lesser relief of seeking conveyance only of life interest in the property of the vendor. Such relief can be granted under section 12(3) of the Specific Relief Act as the vendee is willing to pay full agreed consideration for lesser relief of conveyance of life interest in the property. Reliance is placed on Lala Durga Prasad v. Lala Deep Chand [1954]1SCR360 ; Jhumma Masjid v. Kodimaniandra Devaiah AIR1962SC847 ; Soni Lalji Jetha v. Sonkalidas Devchand [1967]1SCR873 ; and Narandas Karsondas v. S.A. Kamtam [1977]2SCR341 . 44. It is argued that the Division Bench of the Madras High Court was wrong in....
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....the rules and procedures of Madras High Court framed for its original side. That suit for sanction which was of summary nature happened to be clubbed with the suit for specific performance. The two suits were jointly tried. A common judgment was passed dismissing the sanction suit as infructuous and partly decreeing the suit for specific performance. An appeal was filed against the common judgment. Therefore, non-filing of appeal against the dismissal of sanction suit as infructuous does not operate as res judicata and is no ground to refuse specific performance of the grant of decree of specific performance of contract for transfer of life interest for which no sanction of the court was needed. Reliance is placed on S.P. Chengalvarya Naidu v. Jagannath AIR1994SC853 and Sheoparsan v. Ramnandan AIR 1916 PC 78 . 48. Rest of the contentions advanced at the Bar on behalf of the plaintiff- vendee, in our opinion, are not required to be separately dealt with because of the view we propose to take and the conclusion reached by us which shall be elaborated hereinafter. 49. Learned senior counsel Shri Soli J. Sorabjee appearing for the subsequent vendee rested his argument on his main....
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....iram Pardesi v. Janardhan Govind Nerlekar and Anr. AIR1938Bom134 . 53. The claim for conveyance of life interest is also opposed on the ground that the option exercised under section 12(3) of the Specific Relief Act was not unconditional and without reservations. There was no surrender of claim to the interest of the reversioners. Such a conditional claim for lesser relief was rightly rejected by the Division Bench of the High Court. Reliance is placed on T.V. Kochuvareed and Anr. v. P. Mariappa Gounder and Ors. ; Bolla Narayan Murthy v. Cannamaneedi Madhavayya and Anr. (1947) 2 MLJ 366 ; and Surjith Kaur v. Naurata Singh and Anr. AIR2000SC2927 . 54. The additional ground urged to oppose claim for lesser relief of the conveyance of life interest is that such option under section 12(3) of the Specific Relief Act was not exercised at the first available opportunity when a formal legal notice was given by the vendor to terminate the contract anticipating remote possibility of grant of sanction. It is submitted that the option for lesser relief was claimed when the joint trial had already commenced in the suits and all the pleadings of the parties had been completed. It was not a....
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.... than the prevailing market price. The subsequent vendee has purchased separately the life interest of the vendor which alone he could convey and obtained separate surrender-deeds from the reversioners by paying each of them price of their interest. In the agreement Ex.P-1 entered with the vendee, as also in the sale-deed obtained by subsequent vendee, there is clear mention of the fact of pressure on the property for recovery of taxes and public dues. In the sale-deed obtained by the subsequent vendee, there is recital that taxes and public dues were directly paid by the subsequent vendee to the public authorities. The contents of the agreement of sale Ex. P-1 and the sale-deed Ex. D-1 are evidence of the fact that early disposal of the property was the pressing necessity to ward off coercive recovery from the property. 57. The additional argument advanced in opposing the claim for lesser relief of conveyance of life interest is that the clause requiring the sanction of the court for transfer of the reversioners' interest was a term of contract for the benefit of both the vendor and the vendee. The court's sanction would have protected the vendor from claims and possibl....
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....endor that he tried to wriggle out of the sale agreement Ex. P- 1, only to obtain higher price of his property by selling it to the subsequent vendee, is not borne out from the evidence on record. The contents of the sale-deed Ex. D-1 dated 29.12.1979 executed in favour of the subsequent vendee clearly show that a substantial portion of agreed consideration of Rs. 4,40,000/- was paid directly by cheques towards the property tax [Rs.50,383.98] to Corporation of Madras, Urban Land Tax to Tehsildar [Rs. 36,860.70] and income tax [Rs.1,10,000/-] to Income-Tax Officer. The above payments made by the subsequent vendee to public authorities justify the stand of the vendor that there were pressing demands of public authorities on the property and the sale of the property, well before the impending initiation of coercive recovery by public authorities, was an urgent necessity. 59. The main contention advanced against the vendor is that the contract term clause (4) imposed a liability on him to seek sanction of the court for transfer of full title in the property. During pendency of suit for sanction, actions on the part of the vendor such as terminating the contract by sending a lawyer&#....
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.... solely with desire to obtain higher price of the property. 61. As we have mentioned above, only life interest was sold to the subsequent vendee for higher price. Out of the agreed sale consideration, major portion of money was directly paid by the subsequent vendee to satisfy dues and taxes of public authorities. The notice served for terminating the contract, anticipating remote prospect of grant of sanction by the Court within a reasonable period and after waiting for two years from date of the contract, cannot be termed to be a breach to justify grant of any specific relief to the vendee. 62. In this respect, it is also relevant to state that although by lawyer's notice, the vendor terminated the contract and instructed his lawyer to withdraw the suit for sanction, but in fact, the suit was not withdrawn. The vendee got himself impleaded initially as defendant to the suit and then sought his transposition as co-plaintiff. That part of the action of the vendee cannot be castigated as self-defeating because he was naturally interested in prosecuting the suit for sanction diligently to obtain conveyance of full rights in the property. However, the further act on the part....
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....ould not convey more than his own interest. It was open to the vendee to obtain conveyance of interest of the reversioners by obtaining release deeds from them by paying them consideration for surrender of their interest, as was done by the subsequent vendee. Another course open to him was to enter into separate agreement with the reversioners or insist on the reversioners joining the sale agreement. It seems the vendee entered into a speculative deal for obtaining full interest in the property depending upon the sanction to be granted by the court. It seems to be in contemplation of the parties that if the reversioners objected, the court might refuse sanction. They could as well foresee that despite the reversioners' objection, the court might grant sanction. The transfer of full interest in the property was, therefore, dependent on sanction of the court. To meet this contingency, there were specific terms such as clauses (4) and (6) incorporated in the contract whereby it was clearly agreed that the vendor shall obtain sanction of the court at his own expense and costs and if the sanction was not accorded by the court, the agreement would stand cancelled and the advance mone....
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....id to relieve the pressure on the property and obtained market price of the property. After obtaining possession of the property pursuant to the sale deed, the subsequent vendee has raised construction and inducted tenants. Accepting the legal stand based on sections 90, 91 & 92 of the Indian Trusts Act that the subsequent vendee, being a purchaser with knowledge of prior agreement, is holding the property as a trustee for the benefit of the prior vendee, the vendor, who changed his position by effecting subsequent sale cannot be compelled to convey his life interest when such lesser relief was not claimed at the earliest opportunity and the terms of the contract did not contemplate transfer of life interest alone. 68. On duly appreciating of the evidence on record, construing specific terms of the contract and considering the conduct of the parties, we have arrived at the conclusion that the recession of the contract, due to non-grant of sanction by the court within two years after execution of the contract and filing of the suit for sanction, was not an act of breach of contract on the part of the vendor to justify grant of relief of specific performance of the contract to the....
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....stained by him through the default of the defendant." [Emphasis added] 72. The power to grant partial relief, from the very language of the Section 12(3) is discretionary with the Court to be exercised keeping in view the facts and circumstances of each case and the rights and interests of the parties involved. 73. What is most important to be taken note of is that the reversioners were not parties to the sale agreement Ex.P1. In the sanction suit they filed written statement opposing the proposed sale as adversely affecting their spes successionis. 74. The Court dismissed the sanction suit rightly or wrongly but the matter having not been carried further in appeal, the subject of grant or refusal of sanction is no longer open to consideration in this appeal preferred only against the decision of the Division Bench in appeal refusing decree of Specific Performance of Sale of life interest. 75. The reversioners have surrendered their interest by accepting consideration separately and executed separate release deeds in favour of the subsequent vendee. Even though the subsequent vendee has acquired property with knowledge of sale agreement Ex.P1 existing with the prior ....
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....ligation on the part of the vendor to transfer his life interest, if sanction for transfer of reversioners' interest was not granted, cannot be read in the contract by implication and recourse to Section 12(3) of the Specific Relief Act, therefore, is impermissible. 77. In our considered opinion, Section 12(3) of the Specific Relief Act can be invoked only where terms of contract permit segregation of rights and interest of parties in the property. The provision cannot be availed of when the terms of the contract specifically evince a intention contrary to segregating interest of the vendor having life interest and spes successionis of reversioners. Neither law nor equity is in favour of the vendee to grant Specific Performance of the Contract. 78. On these facts, in our opinion, the learned single judge of the High Court was in error in granting decree of specific performance of transfer of life interest of the vendor on a finding that the vendor had committed breach by rescinding contract during pendency of sanction suit. The Division Bench of the High Court, in our considered opinion, rightly reversed the decree and dismissed the suit. 79. We are fortified in our co....
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.... the contract became unenforceable. 82. The decision of the Calcutta High Court reported in ILR 152 Narain Pattro v. Aukhoy narain Manna and Ors.] also supports the respondents. When the sanction as contemplated was not obtained from the court, the contract even with variations could not be directed to be enforced. See the following observations of the Calcutta High Court :- "It is not necessary for us to express any opinion as to whether the suit was barred by clause (e) of section 21 or clause (b) of section 27 of the Specific Relief Act, for in our opinion the Judge was quite right in saying that the contract as it stood could not be enforced, and that section 26 had no application to the case. The contract such as it was, was not a complete contract at any time. It was contingent upon the permission of the court. The court's permission did not extend to the whole contract as set out in the shuttanamah. The defendants, therefore, could not be compelled to carry out the terms of the original agreement, nor could they have insisted upon the plaintiff's carrying out the terms sanctioned by the court. Section 26, upon which the vakeel for the appellant relies, se....
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....ferent contract between the parties not in contemplation by them when they entered into the contract in question, which is sought to be enforced. "Their Lordships think (1) that before a Court can exercise the power given by section 16 it must have before it some material tending to establish these propositions, and cannot apply the section on a mere surmise that, if opportunity were given for further enquiry, such material might be forthcoming and possibly might be found to be sufficient; and (2) that the words of the section wide as they are, do not authorise the Court to take action otherwise than judicially, and in particular do not permit it to make for the parties, or to enforce upon them a contract, which in substance they have not already made for themselves. ............. ............... Hence section 16, both because it must be something not covered by section 14 and because no court can act unjugdicially without either statutory warrant or consensual authority, must be limited and the expression "stands on a separate and independent footing" points to a limitation, which would exclude any new bargain, that cannot be said to be contained in the ....
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.... of the contract was purely a contingent contract, and if the future event provided for became impossible the contract fell through. Sections 14 and 15 of the Specific Relief Act appear to me to refer to cases where the inability to perform the whole contract was not contemplated by the contracting parties. Where, as here, the contracting parties knew of and contemplated the possibility of the whole contract being incapable of performance, for reasons beyond the control of either of the parties, the sections have no application. They apply to unforeseen contingencies, not to foreseen contingencies. The parties should have provided in the contract for such an eventuality, but failed to do so. [Emphasis added] 88. In the present case, the terms of the contract fully indicate that the parties did contemplate that if the sanction of the court was not granted for transfer of the interest of the reversioners, the contract could not be enforced. Clause (6) specifically provided that in case sanction by the court was not granted, the advance money of Rs. 25,000/- shall be refunded to the purchaser. It was known to the parties that the vendor had only life interest in the property and....
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.... the evidence led. In this respect, the following observations of the Lord Reid in the House of Lords' decision (supra) are pertinent :- "I think that it would be open to the arbitrators to find that the respondents had committed a fundamental or repudiator breach. One way of looking at the matter would be to ask whether the party in breach has by his breach produced a situation fundamentally different from anything which the parties could as reasonable men have contemplated when the contract was made. Then one would have to ask not only what had already happened but also what was likely to happen in future. And there the fact that the breach was deliberate might be of great importance". 91. Applying the above test to the terms of the contract and the conduct of the parties under consideration before us, we do not find that the parties had agreed to wait for the whole period during which the suit for sanction was pending and till its finalisation including appeal proceedings, if any. Such a course was not in contemplation of the parties because the vendor had agreed that the vendee would directly discharge the tax liabilities from the total amount of sale considerat....
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.... not further undertake the road construction work and therefore, wrote to the plaintiff to treat agreement as cancelled. It is on these facts that this court held :- "that having regard to the nature and terms of the contract, the actual existence of war conditions at the time when it was entered into, the extent of the work involved in the scheme fixing no time limit in the agreement for the construction of the roads etc., and the fact that the order of requisition was in its very nature of a temporary character, the requisition did not affect the fundamental basis of the contract; nor did the performance of the contract become illegal by reason of the requisition, and the contract had not, therefore, become impossible within the meaning of section 56 of the Indian Contract Act." 95. Such is not the position in the present case. The vendor could not have waited indefinitely for the final result of the sanction suit as coercive proceedings for recovery of tax were likely to be initiated at any time. We have held above that reasonable period for obtaining sanction from the court has to be read as an implied condition of the contract in view of the urgent necessity of sal....
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....y Act. In the case before us, the reversioners were not parties to the agreement of sale. When in the suit for sanction to transfer their interest they were made parties and were noticed, they expressly objected to the proposed transfer. No principle of estoppel or provisions of section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act can, therefore, operate against them. So far as the subsequent vendee is concerned, in the course of suit, he was pushed to a position in which he could not take a stand that he had no knowledge of the prior agreement with the vendee but he has separately purchased life interest from the vendor and obtained separate release deeds, on payment of consideration, from the reversioners. The reversioners being not parties to the sale agreement Ex. P-1 entered into with the vendee, the latter could not enforce the contract Ex. P-1 against the former. 99. The decision in Dr. Jiwanlal and Ors. vs. Brij Mohan Mehra and Anr. [1973]2SCR230 is also distinguishable on the facts of that case. There clauses (5) & (6) of the agreement provided for execution of sale-deed within three months from the date the premises agreed to be sold were vacated by the Income-Tax Authorities . ....
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....ation by their act or omission to frustrate the contact, the contract cannot be directed to be specifically enforced. 102. On behalf of the vendee, support for his claim was sought from the following observations of Lord Atkinson :- "The application to contracts such as these of the principle that a man shall not be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong thus necessarily leaves to the blameless party an option whether he will or will not insist on the stipulation that the contract shall be void on the happening of the named event. To deprive him of that option would be but to effectuate the purpose of the blamable party. When this option is left to the blameless party it is said that the contract is voidance, but that is only another way of saying that the blamable party cannot have the contract made void himself, cannot force the other party to do so, and cannot deprive the latter of his right to do so. Of course the parties may expressly or impliedly stipulate that the contract shall be voidance at the option of any party to it. I am not dealing with such a case as that. It may well be that question whether the particular event upon the happening of which the co....
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....nterest of vendor and chance of succession of reversioners. The contract was one and indivisible for full interest. There is no stipulation in the contract that if sanction was not obtained, the vendor would transfer only his life interest for the same or lesser consideration. On the contrary, the contract stipulated that if the sanction was not granted, the contract shall stand cancelled and the advance money would be refunded to the purchaser. 106. Lastly, the stage has arrived for considering the question of adjustment of equities between the parties because of the change of positions by them in the course of a very long period of litigation. The decree for specific relief of conveyance of life interest, has been executed and registered sale deed through the court in favour of the vendee has also been issued. Possession of the property has been obtained by the vendee on execution of decree granted by the single judge of the High Court. The Division Bench of the High Court in adjusting the equities in paragraphs 62 to 68 of its judgment has taken note of the above relevant facts and subsequent events. 107. After execution of the decree and registered sale-deed the vendee pl....