TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2017 (4) TMI 1639
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....ayalakshmi, Sri. Muniraju.M Sri. M. Lakshminarayan, Sri. M. Krishnappa, Smt. Narayanamma, Sri. Mallappa @ Mallana, Sri. M. Siddappa, Sri. M. Manjunath, Sri. N. Gopalappa, Sri. Chandrachari, Sri. S. Krishna Singh, Smt. K. Premalatha, Sri. Srinivasappa, Sri. Gangana Bovi, Sri. K. M. Doddappaiah, Sri. Narayanappa, Sri. Muniramaiah, Sri. Bodappa,` Sri. Narayanaswamy, Smt. Nanjamma, R. Venkatesh Sri. P. Venugopal, Chikka Hanumaiah, P. M. Siddappa, P. M. Diwakar Sankol, Sri. Chandrappa, Mr. Shivanna, Sri. Manju, Mr. Ajit Kumar D.R., Sri. H. Prabhanna, Sri. Krishnappa, Sri. Seebe Gowda, Sri. Hanumantharaya, Sri. Mahadevaiah, Sri. Gangadharaiah, Sri. Kenchaiah, Smt. Lakshmamma, Sri. G. K. Lakshmanna, Sri. Gaviyappa, Smt. Lakkamma, Sri. A. G. Basavarajaiah, Smt. Doddathayamma, Sri. Vasant A. Gowda, Sri. Siddaramaiah, Sri. Thimmaiah, Mr. H.S. Somashekar Versus The State of Karnataka, Represented by its Chief Secretary, Vidhana Soudha; The Principal Secretary, Commerce And Industrial Development Board, Bangalore Hon'ble Mr. Justice Anand Byrareddy For the Petitioner : Shri V. Lakshminarayana, Senior Advocate for Shri V. Javahar Babu, Advocate). For the respondents : Shri Aditya Sondh....
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....tion to that effect. Alternatively, it is sought that the petitioner be held entitled to compensation in accordance with the 2013 Act. W.P. 18861/2013: 5. The petitioner herein claims to be the owner of land measuring 2 acres 1 and 1/2 guntas of land in land bearing Survey No. 42/1 of Jakkasandra village. The land is said to have been converted for non-agricultural purposes as per an Order of the competent authority, dated 29.5.2012. He is also said to have obtained a sanction for the formation of a housing layout, from the Assistant Director, Town & Country Planning Authority, Kolar, as on 28.6.2012. He claims to have formed about 38 house sites and some of the sites are said to be the subject matter of agreements of sale with third parties. 6. The said land is also the subject matter of the very same acquisition proceedings referred to in the first of these cases. The petitioner has sought amendment of the petition to incorporate pleadings to claim the benefit of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. (Incorrectly mentioned as, "Section 25(2)") W.P. 18890/2013: 7. The petitioner herein claims to be the owner of lands bearing survey Nos. 7, 41, 73 and 106 of Jakkasandra vil....
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....li, Kolar district. The same was said to be the subject matter of acquisition proceedings under the KIAD Act. Pursuant to a preliminary notification dated 20.10.2012 and a final notification dated 4.1.2013, possession of the land is purportedly taken by the respondents on 11.1.2013. 17. It is claimed that in the matter of payment of compensation, in spite of an assurance that the same would be paid under the provisions of the 2013 Act, the respondents have failed to do so and hence the present petition claiming the benefit of the 2013 Act. W.P. 51805-807/2015: 18. There are 3 petitioners herein. They own lands in Adinarayana Hosahalli, Dodballapur taluk, Bangalore Rural District. The first petitioner is said to be the owner of land in Survey No. 64/1 measuring 1 acre and 8 guntas, the second petitioner is said to be the owner of land in survey No. 64/2 measuring 1 acre 12 guntas and the third petitioner is said to be the owner of land in survey No. 63 measuring 1 acre 16 guntas. 19. They are aggrieved by acquisition proceedings under the provisions of the KIAD Act, initiated vide preliminary notification dated 14.6.2013 and a final notification dated 12.2.2015. The peti....
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....er a sale deed dated 28.9.2005. The said land is said to have been converted for non-agricultural purposes, at the instance of the petitioners vide an order of conversion by the competent authority, dated 29.5.2006. 27. The said land, along with other lands of the village, was said to have been notified for acquisition vide notification dated 27.2.2007 issued under Section 28(1) of the KIAD Act, for purposes of establishment of the Rajiv Gandhi Medical University and allied institutions. A final notification under the said Act is said to have been issued on 18.6.2007. An award for a sum of Rs. 86 lakh as compensation was said to have been determined in respect of the land. 28. It is claimed that the said award amount has neither been paid to the petitioners nor has been deposited in the Civil Court as required in law. 29. Hence, the present petition claiming the benefit of the 2013 Act. W.P. 40473-474/2015: 30. The petitioner is said to be the owner of land bearing survey No. 8 of Bale Veeranna halli, Ramanagar taluk, measuring about 4 acres. The same was said to have been notified for acquisition vide notification dated 15.7.1997, under Section 28(4) of the KIAD Act....
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....s said to be the owner of land measuring 9 acres and 7 guntas of land bearing survey No. 71 of Archakarahalli, Ramanagar Taluk. The said land along with lands of the village was said to have been notified under the provisions of the KIAD Act, vide preliminary notification dated 1.3.2007 and final notification dated 18.6.2007. 39. It is stated that the petitioner had unsuccessfully challenged the acquisition proceedings before this court and a Special Leave Petition filed by the petitioner before the Apex Court against the dismissal of his appeal before this court is said to be pending and that the petitioner is also said to have the benefit of an interim order of stay of dispossession. 40. In the meantime, having noticed that adjacent land owners lands which were similarly notified for acquisition having been dropped from the acquisition proceedings on the summary instructions of the then Chief Minister of the State, he is said to have obtained similar instructions from the Minister for Medical Education. 41. However, it is stated that he has been served with a notice to receive the compensation determined in respect of the land in question. The petitioner claims that he h....
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....in survey No. 40/1 and 0.5 1/2 guntas of land in survey No. 58/1 of Nelahal village, Tumkur Taluk and District. 53. The tenth petitioner, Lakshmanna claims to be the owner in possession of lands in Sy. No. 40/1 measuring 1acre 35 guntas and Sy. No. 58/1 measuring 0.5 1/2 guntas situated in Nelahal village of Tumkur Taluk and District. 54. Gaviyappa, petitioner No. 11, claims to be the owner in possession of land bearing Sy. No. 40/1 measuring 1 acre 35 guntas and Sy. No. 58/1 measuring 0.5 1/2 guntas situated in Nelahal village of Tumkur Taluk and District. 55. Lakkamma, petitioner No. 12 also claims to be the owner in possession of lands comprising in survey No. 40/1 measuring 1 acre 35 guntas and survey No. 58/1 measuring 0.5 1/2 guntas situated in Nelahal village, Tumkur Taluk and District. 56. Basavarajaiah, petitioner No. 13 claims to be the owner in possession of lands bearing Sy. No. 106/P measuring 3 acres 9 guntas and survey No. 9/2B measuring 0.5 guntas of Chikkasheebi village, Tumkur Taluk and District. 57. Doddathayamma, petitioner No. 14 claims to be the owner in possession of 2 acres 26 guntas in survey No. 26/2A situated in Nelahal village of Tumkur Ta....
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....hrough National Manufacturing Policy-2011, which is also adopted by the State Government vide its Government Order dated 27.2.2015. 66. The Government of India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP) has declared a National Manufacturing Policy dated 4.11.2011. The Policy is based on the principle of industrial growth in partnership with the States. The Central Government would create the enabling policy frame work, provide incentives for infrastructure development on a public private partnership (PPP) basis through appropriate financing instruments, and State Governments would be encouraged to adopt the instrumentalities provided in the policy. The policy further states, while the NIMZ is an important instrumentality, the proposals contained in the policy apply to manufacturing industry throughout the Country, including wherever industry is able to organize itself into clusters and adopt a model of self-regulation as enunciated. 67. The preface to NMP states that "This policy document has been prepared after extensive stakeholder consultation and inputs from the industry, State Governments and experts in the field of manufactu....
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....sary social infrastructure; skill development facilities, etc. The minimum area of land required for establishing NIMZ is 5000 hectares (12500 acres) as per the NIMZ guidelines." 73. It is contended that unfortunately, the State Government which identified 2322 acres of Government land, was to identify 9729 acres, so as to provide for the minimum area of 12500 acres, did not bother to adhere to the guiding principles to identify waste lands, infertile and dry land not suitable for cultivation. Though the policy states that the use of agricultural land should be to the minimum, the State Government and its agencies identified only wet lands and garden lands consisting of coconut and arecanut gardens and other wet lands. 74. The guiding principles require an environmental impact study to be conducted in respect of a prospective NIMZ, in consultation with the Ministry of Environment and Forest. The State Government, after identifying the lands in question to the extent of 7915 acres, chose to issue the Government Order on 27.02.2015 adopting NIMZ and immediately followed by declarations under the State Act declaring an industrial area and also issuing acquisition notifications w....
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....nment has any power to acquire lands for establishment of Industrial Area, Industrial Estate and Industrial Infrastructural facilities, under any State Acts in force, in view of the parliamentary legislation providing for acquisition of lands for industrialization and development of essential infrastructural facilities. Section 2 of the 2013 Act which provides for the application of the Act to the whole of India, is applicable for acquisition of lands for infrastructure projects, which includes projects for industrial corridor or mining activities, NIMZ, as designated in the NMP. 80. The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Hereinafter referred to as the '1894 Act', for brevity), which was in force till the 2013 Act, came into force, did not specifically provide for acquisition of lands for Industrial Infrastructural Projects including NIMZ, as designated in the NMP. The 1894 Act provides for acquisition of lands only for public purposes or for a company. 'Public Purpose', is defined by Section 3(f) of the Act and only for such public purpose, could the lands be acquired under the 1894 Act. The public purpose defined in Section 3(f) did not include acquisition of land for....
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....se power only under the Central Act and follow the provisions of the Central Act and cannot resort to exercising power under the State Act, which has become redundant and invalid in view of the parliamentary legislation. 87. The provisions of the KIAD Act are repugnant to the Central Act or is otherwise inoperative and the State Government is not competent to exercise power under the State Act anymore, for the purpose of establishing and acquiring land for industrial areas, including NIMZ, which is under NMP. Thus, it may be necessary to compare the provisions of both the laws to find out whether the State Act is repugnant to the Central Act or has otherwise become inoperative and invalid in view of the provisions of the Central Act. 88. By virtue of the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the KIAD Act, it is mandatory that the State Government issue a notification published in the Official Gazette specifying the area to which Chapter VII shall apply and the date from which the said Chapter VII shall come into force in such area. 89. Under the Scheme of the Act, first, it is necessary and mandatory for the State Government to issue notification specifying the are....
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....of establishment of industrial areas is covered under the Central Act, the provisions of the State Act are redundant and such provisions are directly in conflict with the provisions of the Central Act and as such they are repugnant and inoperative, as contemplated under Article 245 and Article 246 of the Constitution of India. 95. The Central Act is traced to item 42 in List III - Concurrent List of Seventh Schedule which provides for acquisition and requisitioning of property. Hence in the matter of acquisition of property namely, the lands, is covered under the said provision, the Central Act prevails over the State Act, as contemplated under Article 246(2) and Article 246(4) read with the proviso to Article 254(2) of the Constitution. 96. A Constitution Bench of five Judges of the Supreme Court has declared the law in the matter of Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills Private Limited vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1980(4) SCC 136. The Bench has referred to Paragraph 17, the different entries in List I, II and III of the Seventh Schedule, that stood before the Constitution Seventh Amendment Act, 1956, and has held (paragraph 18) that in so far as substitution of a comprehensive entry in....
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....onstitution. The Constitution (7th Amendment) Act, 1956 deleted schedule 7 List I Entry 33, List II Entry 36 and reworded List III Entry 42 relating to "Acquisition and requisition of property". 101. Thus, in view of the law laid down by the 11 Judges Bench and followed by subsequent Constitution Benches of the Supreme Court mentioned in the above decisions, any argument that the State Act can incidentally provide for acquisition of lands for industrial purposes by a law traceable to Entry 24 in List II (State List), is untenable. 102. A contention that state is competent to make law under item 24 in List II, which provides for Industries subject to the provisions of entries 7 & 52 of List-I, is untenable, in as much as the provision providing for Industries does not empower the State to make law providing for acquisition of property for establishment of Industries. The acquisition of property being in the Concurrent List, it is open for both the State Government and the Central Government to make laws through the respective legislatures. Once the Parliament makes a law providing for acquisition of lands for industries and the Central Act being a self contained Code by itself....
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.... Section 3(z)(a) of the Act. Thus the acquisition of lands for industrial purposes is covered under the Central Act, which is the dominant legislation made by the Parliament by virtue of powers under the Proviso to Article 254(2) of the Constitution. 108. Industrial areas cannot be established without lands, either Government lands or the lands owned by citizens. The right to property is traceable to Article 300A of the Constitution. Chapter VII of the Act which provides for acquisition and disposal of land cannot be termed as incidental to establishing Industrial areas. Acquisition of property, as laid down by the Supreme Court can be traced to Entry 42 of List III only and as such the State Act which does not satisfy the law laid down by the Supreme Court relating to acquisition of property, is in conflict with the Central Act and as such, repugnant to the Central Act made by the Parliament under Article 254(2). 109. Thus the 'doctrine of severability' is applicable and provisions of Chapter VII read with Section 1(3) of the Act which bring the provisions of Chapter VII to force from the date that may be specified by the State Government, are liable to be declared a....
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.... the hands of the land owners. In other words, there is statutory divesting and re-vesting of the property in the hands of the land owners. This is the effect of "lapsing" as set out in Section 24(2) of 2013 Act. 119. In respect of acquisition made under the Karnataka Urban Development Authorities Act, 1987 and the Bengaluru Development Authority Act, 1976 (Section 36(2)), this Court in the case of Chikkatayamma, has held that Section 36 of the said Acts have to be constructed as legislation by reference. 120. Where a statute is cited by reference in another statute, any repeal or amendment of statute that is cited by reference is automatically carried over into referring statute. 121. Section 36 of the Karnataka Urban Development Authorities Act, 1987 and the Bangalore Development Authorities Act, 1976 are in all material particulars similar to Section 30 of the KIAD Act. The only difference between Section 30 of the KIAD Act and Section 36 of the aforesaid Acts is that while all the provisions of 1894 Act are applicable in the former Acts, under the KIAD Act, the only provisions relating to certain specified subjects as stated above have been incorporated. There is no re....
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.... the 1894 Act. 125. Section 23 of the 2013 Act relates to enquiry and award by the Collector which is squarely within the purview of Section 30 of the KIAD Act. 126. Section 25 is also pertaining to making of an award. 127. Section 24 deals with the effect of not making an award. Therefore, to say that Section 24 alone is inapplicable and not covered within the scope of Section 30 the KIAD Act, is an artificial construction which requires to be negatived. The scheme under Chapter IV of 2013 Act does not permit of excluding section 24 from the subject of "enquiry and award" and "Payment of compensation". 128. The distinction made between the acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the acquisition under the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966, giving the benefits in respect of the acquisitions under the former and not giving benefits to acquisitions under the latter will amount to unfair discrimination and violating the mandate of Articles 14 of the Constitution of India. Attention is drawn to Nagpur Improvement Trust vs Vithal Rao, 1973(1) SCC 500 Paras28, 29, 30 and 31. 129. The position is further fortified by the fact that under Section 3(....
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....as dilated upon Section 24 of the 2013 Act, and indicated that Section 24 incorporates the limits of legislative tolerance. The court was not considering the situation like the present one where Section 30 of the KIAD Act, which made applicable the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by reference to the acquisition made under the provisions of the KIAD Act. The Judgment of the Supreme Court of India in the case of Delhi Development Authority's case is clearly distinguishable. 134. The Judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of Hanuman Rao Gudadhe vs State of Maharashtra and others, 2015 (6) Mh.L.J. 127, raised a question as to whether Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, is applicable to acquisition made under the MRTP Act. The Court examined the acquisition under the MRTP Act, in the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Girnar's case and came to the conclusion that, primarily the purpose of the MRTP Act was to regulate planning and provisions relating to acquisition were only incidental and therefore the reference under Section 126 and 127 of the MRTP Act to the 1894 Act, was a legislation by incorporation and not a legislation by reference. 135. Un....
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....013 Act advances the contention of the petitioners to the effect that the provisions of 2013 Act have to be read in conjunction with the provisions of the KIAD Act. 137. The distinction between vesting provisions contained in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966, as pointed out by the Supreme Court of India in Para 34 of Naghbhushan's case are not germane in as much as at whatever point, the vesting may take place, there is a divesting under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act by providing for lapsing of the acquisition proceedings if the conditions specified under Section 24(2) are satisfied. 5. SUBMISSIONS BY SHRI V.V. GUNJAL 138. Shri V.V. Gunjal, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners in WP 59461-462/2014 and WP 23940-44/2015, contends as follows:-The provisions contained in Chapter VII of the State Act, viz., Sections 20 to 30 of the KIAD Act, are inconsistent and repugnant to the provisions of the 2013 Act, as both the Acts are traceable to Entry 42 in List III, Concurrent List of Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India. 139. The Central Act would prevail over the State Act and that in case of repugnanc....
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....te". Thus, it is noticeable that throughout Article 254, the emphasis is on law-making by the respective legislatures. 145. The entire above discussion on Articles 245, 246, 251 is only to indicate that the word "made" has to be read in the context of the law-making process and, if so read, it is clear that to test repugnancy, one has to go by the making of law and not by its commencement. 146. In T. Barai v. Henry Ah Hoe, (1983) 1 SCC 177, the Supreme Court has laid down the following principles on repugnancy: 147. There is no doubt or difficulty as to the law applicable. Article 254 of the Constitution makes provision, firstly, as to what would happen in the case of conflict between a Central and State law with regard to the subjects enumerated in the Concurrent List, and secondly, for resolving such conflict. Article 254(1) enunciates the normal rule that in the event of a conflict between a Union and a State law in the concurrent field, the former prevails over the latter. Clause (1) lays down that, if a State law relating to a concurrent subject is "repugnant" to a Union law relating to that subject, then, whether the Union law is prior or later in time, the Union law....
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.... constitutional bench of the Supreme Court in M. Karunanidhi vs. Union of India and another, (1979) 3 SCC 431, while examining as to whether the Tamil Nadu Public Men (Criminal Misconduct) Act, 1973, was repugnant to the Indian Penal Code, 1860, held as follows: "Where a law passed by the State Legislature while being substantially within the scope of the entries in the State List entrenches upon any of the Entries in the Central List, the constitutionality of the law may be upheld by invoking the doctrine of pith and substance if on an analysis of the provisions of the Act it appears that by and large, the law falls within the four corners of the State List an entrenchment, if any, is purely incidental or inconsequential." 151. That the aforesaid position was reiterated by the Supreme Court in Vijay Kumar Sharma and others vs. State of Karnataka and others, (1990) 2 SCC 562. While following the ratio in M. Karunanidhi's case (supra), it was held as follows: "10. Though for some time there was difference of judicial opinion as to in what situation Article 254 applies, decisions of this Court by overruling the contrary opinion have now concluded the position....
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....the Constitution. The aforesaid submission is supported by the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the KIAD Act which reads as follows:- "It is considered necessary to make provision for the orderly establishment and development of Industries in suitable areas in the State. To achieve this object, it is proposed to specify suitable areas for Industrial Development and establish a Board to develop such areas and make available lands therein for establishment of Industries. Hence this Bill." 156. The preamble to the KIAD Act reiterates the objective of the legislation- "An Act to make special provisions for securing the establishment of industrial areas in the State of Karnataka and generally to promote the establishment and orderly development of industries therein, and for that purpose to establish an Industrial Areas Development Board and for purposes connected with the matters aforesaid. WHEREAS it is expedient to make special provisions for securing the establishment of industrial areas in the State of Karnataka and generally to promote the establishment and the orderly development of industries in such industrial areas, and for that purpose to esta....
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....ition of land falls under Entry 42 of the Concurrent List. In order to achieve growth of industries it is necessary not only to acquire land but also to implement the purposes of the Act. The Corporation is therefore established for carrying out the purposes of the Act. The pith and substance of the Act is establishment, growth and organization of industries, acquisition of land in that behalf and carrying out the purposes of the Act by setting up the Corporation as one of the limbs or agencies of the Government. The powers and functions of the Corporation show in no uncertain terms that these are all in aid of the principal and predominant purpose of establishment, growth and establishment of industries. The Corporation is established for that purpose. When the Government is satisfied that the Corporation has substantially achieved the purpose for which the Corporation is established, the Corporation will be dissolved because the raison d'etre is gone. We, therefore, hold that the Act is a valid piece of legislation." 159. That in Offshore Holdings Private Limited vs. Bangalore Development Authority and others, (2011) 3 SCC 139, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court hel....
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....mtanu Co-operative Housing Society Limited and another vs. State of Maharashtra and others) and (2011) 3 SCC 1 (supra) in this regard. The MRTP Act deals with planning and development, the acquisition of land being incidental for achieving the object of the Act, whereas the Land Acquisition Act and the RFCTLARR Act are enacted with an object of acquiring the land for public purposes and companies, for determination of the compensation and for the rehabilitation and resettlement of the affected. Both the Laws i.e. the MRTP Act and the RFCTLARR Act are wholly dissimilar, they operate in different fields and have different objects. ... After considering the scheme of the two enactments, even if a fractional overlapping is accepted between the two Statutes i.e., the MRTP Act and the RFCTLARR Act, the same is saved by the doctrine of 'incidental overlapping', specially when the Centre and the State have enacted the Laws i.e. the RFCTLARR Act and the MRTP Act respectively, within the legislative competence and both the Acts can coexist and operate with compatibility." 163. As such, the KIAD Act and the 2013 Act differ greatly. While the 2013 Act is a general ....
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....n 28(2) to the owner or occupier, whichever the case may be, within a period of 30 days. The State Government is then required to hear the objections raised by the owners or occupiers and pass appropriate orders under Section 28(3). The final notification of acquisition of land is issued under Section 28(4) after which the land vests absolutely in the State Government, free from all encumbrances under Section 28(5) of the Act. Section 29 of the Act provides for compensation to be paid to the owner of the lands either by way of an agreement or by way of reference to the Deputy Commissioner. Section 30 of the Act states that the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 shall mutatis mutandis apply in respect of the enquiry and award by the Deputy Commissioner, the reference to Court, the apportionment of compensation and the payment of compensation, in respect of lands acquired under Chapter VII. Section 31 empowers the State Government to delegate any of its powers under Chapter VII to any of its officers by rules made in this behalf. The most significant provision in Chapter VII of the KIAD Act is Section 27. 166. A joint reading of Section 27 and Section 1(3) of the KIAD Ac....
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....ents remaining in force, with respect to acquisition of land or various purposes. 170. Section 2 of the Act is a definition and an enabling provision, having wide and inclusive meaning. The same cannot in anyway limit or restrict the powers of the State Legislatures and the interpretation of the State legislations. Indeed in the federal structure the powers of the State are independently provided for in terms of Lists II and III contained in Schedule VII to the Constitution of India read with Article 245 and 246 thereof. 171. As stated supra, the land sought to be acquired by the Stated Government under Section 28 of the KIAD Act vests absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances upon issuance of the final notification under Section 28(4). It is contended that such vesting is contemplated under Section 28(5) of the KIAD Act has far reaching legal implications that are vitally different from the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the 2013 Act. 172. Section 28(5) of the Act states as follows- "28. Acquisition of land - ... (5) On the publication in the official Gazette of the declaration under sub-section (4), the land sha....
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.... land in the State Government, provisions of lapse of land acquisition proceedings will not apply. 176. The Supreme Court in V. Chandrashekaran's case held as follows: "25. It is a settled legal proposition, that once the land is vested in the State, free from all encumbrances, it cannot be divested and proceedings under the Act would not lapse, even if an award is not made within the statutorily stipulated period." 177. It is contended that Section 30 of the KIAD Act is a legislation by incorporation. 178. Sections 28 and 29 of the KIAD Act substantially deal with the powers and consequences of acquisition of land. 179. The said provisions together are a complete code in the matter of initiating acquisition, taking possession and such other matters. It is only in respect of four aspects that the 1894 Act, is made applicable to the KIAD Act, as per Section 30 thereof. 180. It is contended that a conjoint reading of Section 30 of the KIAD Act and the corresponding incorporated provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 will disclose that it is only specific parts in the latter Act which have been incorporated into the former. Such incorporation can be e....
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.... a legal fiction, the Court is to ascertain for what purpose the fiction is created, and after ascertaining this, the Court is to assume all those facts and consequences which are incidental or inevitable corollaries to giving effect to the fiction. But in so construing the fiction it is not to be extended beyond the purpose for which it is created, or beyond the language of the Section by which it is created. A legal fiction in terms enacted for the purpose of one Act is normally restricted to that Act and cannot be extended to cover another Act...." 185. It is contended that Section 24 of the 2013 Act applies only to acquisition proceedings initiated under the 1894 Act. The Supreme Court in Delhi Development Authority v. Sukhbir Singh & Others., (Civil Appeal No. 5811 of 2015, decided on 09.09.2016), affirmed the judgment in Pune Municipal Corporation's case and held as follows- "13. To Section 24(1)(b) an important exception is carved out by Section 24(2). The necessary ingredients of Section 24(2) are as follows: (a) Section 24(2) begins with a non-obstante clause keeping sub-section (1) out of harm's way; (b) For it to apply, land acquisit....
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....dings commenced under the KIAD Act. 7. SUBMISSIONS OF SHRI ASHOK HARNAHALLI AND SHRI SHASHIKIRAN SHETTY, SENIOR ADVOCATES 189. Shri Ashok Harnahalli, Senior Advocate along with Shri Shashi Kiran Shetty, Senior Advocate appearing for Shri. B.B. Patil appearing for KIADB would contend as follows: 190. It is contended that the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board is a statutory body established under the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 with an object of promoting the establishment and orderly development of industries in industrial areas. In terms of Section 3(1) of the KIAD Act, the State Government declares lands as industrial lands. In terms of Section 1(3) of the KIAD Act, a notification is issued invoking the provisions of Chapter VII of the KIAD Act. 191. It is relevant herein to note that in terms of Section 1(3) of the KIAD Act, this Act except Chapter VII shall come into force at once. Chapter VII shall come into force in such area and from such date as the State Government, from time to time, by notification, specify in this behalf. Chapter VII of the KIAD Act starts from Section 27 which again provides that the provisions of Chapter VII ....
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....7. ii) Rajiv Sarin and another vs. State of Uttarakhand and others, AIR 2011 SC 3081 at paras 28, 30 and 35. iii) K.T. Plantation Private Limited and another vs. State of Karnataka, AIR 2011 SC 3430, at Paras 65, 66 and 67. 199. It is contended that a pre-requisite to applying Section 24 of the 2013 Act is to ascertain whether the acquisitions under the KIAD Act, are acquisitions under the KIAD Act or the 1894 Act. In case the said acquisitions are under the 1894 Act, Section 24 is applicable and in case the acquisitions are under the KIAD Act, the 2013 Act and Section 24 therein have no application whatsoever to the acquisitions. The issue is dealt under the next head. Without prejudice to the submission that the acquisitions are under the KIAD Act, the application of Section 24 of the 2013 Act is as under: 200. Section 24 of the 2013 Act, deals with the acquisition proceedings that are under process as on 01.01.2013, that is coming into force of the 2013 Act and the repealing of the 1894 Act. The said section deals with firstly, acquisitions wherein an award is not made; secondly acquisitions wherein an award is made; thirdly and finally, cases wherein an ....
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....ject generally adopts the law on the subject as of the time the law invoked. This will include all the amendments and modification of the law subsequent to the time the reference statute was enacted." 206. There is a distinction between a mere reference to or a citation of one statute in another and an incorporation which in effect means the bodily lifting of the provisions of one enactment and making it part of another. In case of a reference or a citation of one enactment by another without incorporation, the effect of a repeal of the one "reference to" is that set out in section 8(1) of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Whereas in case of incorporation, it is as held in the case of Clarke V. Bradlaugh (1881) 8 QBD 63 as under: "Where a statute is incorporated, by reference, into a second statute the repeal of the first statute by a third does not affect the second." 207. In Hanumanrao Morbaji Gudadhe and others, vs. State of Maharashtra and others, 2015 (6) Mh.L.J. 127 at para 10 provides as under: "Although the provisions of the RFCTLARR Act would not per se apply to the MRTP Act specially when the MRTP Act is not yet amended and continues to make a referen....
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....s. 213. It is an admitted fact that though KIAD Act came into effect in 1966, the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was also being followed by the State Government for the purpose of passing of an award and payment of compensation. Therefore, applicability of the provisions of the 1894 Act in relation to the award and reference is not disputed. 214. It is contended that the Board has also conceded that with effect from 01.01.2014, the new Act would be made applicable. Thus, the pending proceedings as on 01.01.2014 are deemed to have continued under the 2013 Act including the provisions of Section 24(2) of the Act. 215. It is contended that the legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process, as held by the Apex Court in Padma Sundara Rao (dead) and others vs. State of Tamil Nadu and others, 2002 (3) SCC 533. Therefore, lapsing of acquisition proceedings either under Section 24(2) or under Section 25 of the Act cannot be disputed. 216. When the amended provisions of the earlier statute are necessarily to be read into the later enactment becomes necessary as non-incorporation thereof would render the subsequent Act wholly unworkable and ineffectua....
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....cal possession is not taken or payment of compensation is not made despite an award. Therefore, the acquisition proceedings which are pending on 01.01.2014, Section 24(2) would be applicable to the award proceedings despite the acquisition initiated under the KIAD Act. 223. In view of Section 30 of the KIAD Act read with the word 'initiated' envisage award proceedings pending as on 01.01.2014. The word "proceedings" include original proceedings, appellate proceedings and proceedings upto the Apex Court including proceedings in execution also. Reliance is placed on Garikapati Veeraya vs. N. Subbiah Choudhry and others, AIR 1957 SC 540; P.L. Kantha Rao and others vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & others, and P.L. Kantha Rao and others vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1995 SC 807 in this respect. 224. The word 'proceedings' includes execution proceedings including a decree passed by a Court wherein a Court which has been substituted by a new Court, by amendment and the decree passed earlier can be executed by a new Court. Reliance is placed on Babu Lal vs. M/s. Hazari Lal Kishori Lal and others, (1982) 1 SCC 525, in this regard. 225. Insofar as the contention by t....
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....i) When notification under section 6 was issued (iii) When notice to pass an award was issued under section 9 and 10 (iv) After the award is passed under Section 11-A (v) When possession is taken or after the possession is taken (vi) When de-notification of other owners under the same notification similar treatment is not extended to an owner in terms of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, petition can be filed. 230. It is contended that the remedy provided under Section 24(2) of Act No. 30/2013 which is a beneficial piece of legislation to achieve noble social objects and the said provision is in favour of the land owners. 231. The Supreme Court in Tukaram Kana Joshi & others vs. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation and others, (2013) 1 SCC 353 para 17 has held as follows:- "Depriving the appellants of their immovable properties was a clear violation of Article 21 of the Constitution. In a welfare State, statutory authorities are bound, not only to pay adequate compensation, but there is also a legal obligation upon them to rehabilitate such persons. The uprooted persons to become vagabonds or to indulge in anti-nat....
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....ly when the compensation is paid and possession of the land is taken under that Act. Section 48 of the Central Act empowers the state to withdraw from acquisition of any land of which possession has not been taken, despite the facts that award may have been pronounced in terms of section 11 of the central Act. But once there is complete vesting of land in the state it amounts to transfer of title from owner to the state by fiction of law." 235. A similar provision fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in State of U.P. v/s. Hari Ram (2013) 4 SCC 280 (para 32). The provisions of Section 28 of the KIAD Act is analogous to Section 10 of the Urban Land Ceiling Act. The word 'vesting' has been interpreted in para 32 of the said judgment. The word 'vesting' includes right and interest over the property including de-jure possession, but not de-facto possession. 236. De-facto possession contemplates physical possession. Therefore, Section 24(2) of the KIAD Act applies in a case where actual physical possession continues with the owner even though de-jure possession vests with the Government. Therefore, Section 24(2) of the Act 30/2013 applies. 237. It is f....
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....tanu Co-operative Housing Society Limited and another vs. State of Maharashtra and others, 1970(3) SCC 323 para 21. 245. Acquisition of land for a private company is not for a public purpose. Acquisition can be permitted only under Chapter VI of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Reliance is placed on Devinder Singh and other vs. State of Punjab and others, AIR 2008 SC 261 para 41. It has been laid down as follows: "In the case of acquisition of land for a private company, existence of a public purpose being not a requisite criteria other statutory requirements call for a strict compliance being imperative in character." 246. Therefore, the acquisition of land under the KIAD Act is only for industrialization and development of industrial area that too by the State Government not by the Board. Thus, the Board is only an implementing authority and not acquiring authority, which is not an aggrieved person to contend Section 24(2) should not be made applicable to land owners. 247. When an acquisition provision has been enacted to conceive the interest of the owner as a socio-economic piece of legislation, the same has to be interpreted in favour of the land owners. There....
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....nant to the provisions of the 2013 Act. ii) Whether Section 24 of the 2013 Act is applicable to an acquisition initiated under the provisions of the KIAD Act. iii) Whether there could be a deemed divesting of the acquired land in terms of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, which provides for a lapsing of the acquisition proceedings if the conditions specified therein are satisfied, notwithstanding the deemed vesting of the land in terms of Section 28(5) of the KIAD Act. iv) Whether the decision of the Apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 353/2017, The Special Land Acquisition Officer, KIADB, Mysore v. Anasuya Bai, dated 25.1.2017, would entail dismissal of these petitions. (Incidentally, after these petitions were heard and reserved for Orders, the Apex Court having rendered the above decision it is necessary to address this issue). 9. DISCUSSION ON POINT No. (iv): Whether the decision of the Apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 353/2017 dated 25.1.2017 would render these petitions infructuous. 253. In the light of the above contentions and on consideration of the voluminous authorities cited at the bar, it is felt necessary to address the last point, as framed abo....
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....on. (c) that in the absence of a consent award, the Deputy Commissioner ought to have passed a regular award, within two years from the date of final notification, in terms of Section 11 A of the 1894 Act. (d) that the respondent had never appeared before the Advisory Committee and had not participated in any meetings and hence had never acceded to the consent award. 259. The petition was said to have been allowed by a learned Single judge of this court, in part, holding that the respondents were not parties to the consent award. However, the appellants were directed to proceed with the fixing of the market value as on the date of final notification. The plea of the respondents that the proceedings had lapsed, was negatived. 260. An appeal is said to have been preferred by the respondents against the said order, before a Division Bench of this court. During the pendency of the appeal, the 2013 Act came into force. The respondents sought amendment of their pleadings claiming that Section 24 of the 2013 Act was applicable to the said acquisition proceedings, and since no award was passed under Section 11 of the 1894 Act, the proceedings had lapsed. The appeal ....
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....ade applicable on account of non-payment of compensation within a period of five years." 262. The Apex Court in setting aside the judgment of the Division Bench of this court has referred to the decision in Nagabushna v. State of Karnataka, (2011) 3 SCC 408, wherein it was held that when once proceedings are initiated under the KIAD Act, Section 11A of the 1894 Act would not be applicable. This opinion was based on the following rationale expressed in Nagabushna: "22. Having said so, it also needs to be kept in mind that a large chunk of land was acquired by the appellants and a minuscule part thereof belonged to the respondents herein. Further, insofar as respondents are concerned, it even undertook the exercise of fixing the compensation for the acquired land, as per the provisions of the KIAD Act. Advisory Committee was constituted for this purpose. Notices were also sent to all concerned, including the respondents herein. It further transpired that the land owners (except the respondents) participated in the meeting and as per the minutes of the meeting dated 9th September, 2005, consent agreement was arrived at whereby compensation at the rate of Rs. 6,50,000/- per....
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....2) for determination of the amount of compensation. The learned Single Judge, by adopting this course of action, specifically rejected the contention of the respondents herein to quash the proceedings. 24. The Division Bench of the High Court by the impugned judgment, however, has quashed the acquisition proceedings itself holding that they have lapsed. For this purpose, the High Court has taken aid of Section 24 of the New LA Act in the following manner: "13. It is also noted that the acquisition proceedings including preliminary and final declaration have been passed under the provisions of the KIADB Act. But there is no provisions under the KIADB Act to pass an award and award has to be passed only under the provisions of the LA Act, 1894. If the award has to be passed under LA Act, whether the new act can be pressed into service to hold the acquisition proceedings are lapsed on account of non-passing of award within a period of 5 years u/s. 11. If the award is passed under LA Act, the enquiry has to be conducted by the Deputy Commissioner or Collector before passing the award. Section 11A contemplates if the award is not passed within 2 years from the date of ....
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....ct. 266. Insofar as the above question is concerned, the question of repugnancy can arise only when both the Legislatures are competent to legislate with respect to the same subject, viz., a subject included in the Concurrent List (List III). There is no provision for a Union law to be void by reason of its inconsistency with any State law. But a State law will be void by reason of its being inconsistent with a Union law, subject of course to clause (1) of Article 254 of the Constitution of India. 267. Article 254 is reproduced hereunder for ready reference. "254. Inconsistency between laws made by Parliament and laws made by the Legislatures of States (1) If any provision of a law made by the Legislature of a State is repugnant to any provision of a law made by Parliament which Parliament is competent to enact, or to any provision of an existing law with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List, then, subject to the provisions of clause (2), the law made by Parliament, whether passed before or after the law made by the Legislature of such State, or, as the case may be, the existing law, shall prevail and the law made by the Legislatur....
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....efined in S. 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act are substantially the same, in the State Act, than the one contained in the Central Acts. It is, therefore, manifest that the State Act does not contain any provision which is repugnant to the Central Act, but is a sort of complimentary Act which runs 'pari passu' the Central Acts mentioned above". In Vijay Kumar Sharma vs. State of Karnataka, AIR 1990 SC 2072, the Court summarized the law and laid down eleven ways in which repugnancy or inconsistency may arise. 1. There may be direct repugnancy between the two provisions; 2. Parliament may evince its intention to cover the whole field by laying down an exhaustive code in respect thereof displacing the state Act, provision or provisions in that Act. The Act of Parliament may be either earlier or subsequent to the State law. 3. The inconsistency may be demonstrated not necessarily by detailed comparison of the provisions of the two pieces of law, but by their very existence in the statutes; 4. Occupying the same field; operational incompatibility; irreconcilability or actual collision in their operation in the same territory....
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.... to declare the State law to be void or repealed by implication; 11. The assent of the President of India Under Art. 254(2) given to a State law/provision/provisions therein accord only operational validity though repugnant to the Central law; but by subsequent law made by the Parliament or amendment/modification, variation or repeal by an Act of Parliament renders the State law void. The previous assent given by the President does not blow life into a void law." 270. It is no doubt laid down in Shri Ramtanu Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. Case, supra, while examining the constitutional validity of the Maharashtra Industrial Development Act, 1962, which is said to be pari materia to the KIAD Act, that the pith and substance of the Act was establishment, growth and organisation of industries, acquisition of land in that behalf and carrying out the purposes of the Act by setting up the Corporation as one of the limbs or agencies of the Government. The powers and functions of the Corporation showed in no uncertain terms that the same were all in aid of the principal and predominant purpose of growth and establishment of industries. And that the Corporation was establishe....
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....sions of the KIAD Act. 273. To elaborate further on the above, the following statements from the Statement of Objects and Reasons to the 2013 Act may be noticed: "xxxxxxx 3. There have been multiple amendments to the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 not only by the Central Government but by the State Governments as well. Further, there has been heightened public concern on land acquisition, especially multi-cropped irrigated land and there is no central law to adequately deal with the issues of rehabilitation and resettlement of displaced persons. As land acquisition and rehabilitation and resettlement need to be seen as two sides of the same coin, a single integrated law to deal with the issues of land acquisition and rehabilitation and resettlement has become necessary. Hence the proposed legislation proposes to address concerns of farmers and those whose livelihoods are dependent on the land being acquired, while at the same time facilitating land acquisition for industrialization, infrastructure and urbanization projects in a timely and transparent manner. xxx 9. The National Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy, 2007 has been formulated on th....
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....ly; one time financial assistance of Rs. 50,000; twenty-five per cent additional rehabilitation and resettlement benefits for the families settled outside the district; free land for community and social gathering and continuation of reservation in the resettlement area, etc." 274. The preamble to the Act is relevant: "An Act to ensure, in consultation with institutions of local self government and Gram Sabhas established under the Constitution, a humane, participative, informed and transparent process for land acquisition for industrialisation, development of essential infrastructural facilities and urbanization with the least disturbance to the owners of the land and other affected families and provide just and fair compensation to the affected families whose land has been acquired or proposed to be acquired or are affected by such acquisition and make adequate provisions for such affected persons for their rehabilitation and resettlement and for ensuring that the cumulative outcome of compulsory acquisition should be that affected persons become partners in development leading to an improvement in their post acquisition social and economic status and for matters conn....
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....ublic hearing for social impact assessment, and the study being duly published. The appraisal of the Social Impact Assessment Report is further appraised by an expert group. Finally, the State Government makes a further appraisal of the Social Impact Assessment report. There is a complete bar on acquisition of irrigated multi-cropped land, except as a last resort and for certain projects such as railway lines and roads, as laid down in Chapter III. 277. Chapter IV contains elaborate provisions for determination and payment of compensation. 278. The deep concern for rehabilitation and resettlement of displaced land owners is demonstrated by Chapters V through VIII being dedicated to ensure the same. 279. Further according to the NMP, declared by the Government of India as on 4-11-2011, industrial growth is intended to be achieved by the Union government in partnership with the States. The 2013 Act provides for acquisition of land for infrastructure projects, which includes Industrial Corridors and NIMZ, as designated under the Policy. The NMP is adopted by the State Government vide Government Order dated 27-2-2015. The Policy further states, while the NIMZ is an important i....
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.... declared a primary public purpose under the 2013 Act, the KIAD Act which is silent in all respects as to the feasibility of acquisition of particular land for industrial purposes, the lot of the land owners and their plight and a host of other concerns which the 2013 Act provides for, the working of the KIAD Act should strictly conform to provisions of the 2013 Act prescribing checks and balances, preceding the acquisition of land and in the process of acquisition and thereafter, or perish. 283. Further, in view of the specific provision under the 2013 Act, namely, Section 103, which lays down that the provisions of the Central Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of, any other law for the time being in force, the State Government which is the appropriate government for carrying out the provisions of the Act, cannot exclusively exercise power under the KIAD Act, de hors the provisions of the 2013 Act. It is mandatory for the State Government to follow the provisions of the 2013 Act in addition to the provisions of the KIAD Act, if necessary. But in so far as the acquisition of lands for establishment of Industrial corridors, industrial areas or industrial clusters,....
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.... ahs to submit a report along with his recommendations on the objection to the appropriate Government for decisions. The report should deal with the matters mentioned in sub-Rule (2). 288. Chapter IV provides for declaration and award. Rule 10 provides for publication of declaration and acquisition has contemplated in section 19(1) of the Act. Rule 11 provides for land acquisition ward referred in Section 23. Rule 15 is very important hence it is extracted:- "15. Limits of extent of land under sub-section (3) of section 2. - The limits of extent of land referred to in Clause (a) of sub-section (3) of Section 2 shall be twenty hectares in urban areas and forty hectares in rural areas." 289. The State Government which is the appropriate Government under the Central Act has made rules known as "The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement (Karnataka) Rules, 2015 published vide Notification No. RD 152 AQB 2013, Bangalore dated 17.10.2015, for carrying out the provisions of the Act. 290. Chapter-II of the State Rules provide for social impact assessment, under Rules 3 to 15 which can be referred to. Rule-2 contemp....
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....295. It is not open for the State Government to acquire lands for the industrial areas under the State Act, especially for establishment of NIMZ, which is a concept under the NMP of the Government of India. Even otherwise, the entire field of establishment of industrial areas is covered under the Central Act, the provisions of the State Act are redundant and such provisions as are directly in conflict with the provisions of the Central Act are repugnant and inoperative, as contemplated under Articles 245 and 246 of the Constitution of India. 296. The State Government cannot any longer exercise power under Section 3 of the KIAD Act without conforming to the pre-requisites as prescribed under the 2013 Act, nor work the other provisions of the Act without also adhering to other mandatory provisions of the 2013 Act and the Rules thereunder. The Scheme under the KIAD Act as it prevails is inconsistent with the provisions of the 2013 Act in terms of Article 254(2) of the Constitution of India and is hence no longer valid as an independent enactment. 11. DISCUSSION ON POINT No. ii) Whether Section 24 of the 2013 Act is applicable to an acquisition initiated under the provisions of t....
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....to be read into M.R.T.P. Act in view of the pronouncement of the Judgment by the Supreme Court of India in Nagpur Improvement Trust case in order to prevent the M.R.T.P. Act from the vice of discrimination. The judgment of the Bombay High Court is clearly distinguishable in as much as the KIAD Act is not an enactment for regulating the planning activity like the Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act, 1961. As the preamble of the KIAD Act suggests the Act is meant to secure the establishment of Industrial areas in the State of Karnataka. It is needless to state that for the purpose of establishing the industrial areas the enactment contemplates a substantial second part, namely, the power to acquire under Chapter - VII. The objects of under the KIAD Act, is two fold namely (1) establishing industrial area and (2) acquisition of land for the purpose of establishing industrial area. This is fortified by the requirement of declaration under Section 3(1) of the said Act. In structure and content the KIAD Act is different from the structure and content of M.R.T.P. Act and therefore the judgment of the Bombay High Court is clearly inapplicable to the facts of the instant case. In the co....
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....D Act meaning thereby that all the provisions of the 1894 Act, are applicable in respect of the aforesaid four subjects but with modification in relation to minor details. The minor details include specification of a Section or an Officer and the like. Section 24(1) and 24(2) of the 2013 Act on the face of it seem to suggest their applicability in respect of acquisition proceedings initiated under the 1894 Act. However, that is required to be understood in the context of Section 30 of the KIAD Act, as meaning acquisition under Section 28 of the KIAD Act. In other words the statement in Section 24(2) "initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894" to be read and understood as "initiated under the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 read with the Land Acquisition Act, 1894." This is a minor change which is the effect of the use of the phrase "Mutatis Mutandis" under Section 30 of the KIAD Act. It does not amount to rewriting the Section. 308. Sections 23, 24 and 25 of the 2013 Act relate to enquiry and making of an award. The same are analogous to Sections 11 and 12 of the 1894 Act. 309. Section 23 of 2013 Act relates to enquiry and award by the Collector which is....
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....Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act in terms of Section 30 of the KIAD Act, in the backdrop of the wholesale repeal of the 1894 Act and its replacement with the 2013 Act. 316. The construction which advances a harmonious gel between various statutes within the Constitutional mandate has to be preferred by the Court. The construction therefore which harmoniously brings together Section 24 of the 2013 Act and Section 30 of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 has to be preferred to a construction which brings Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act in conflict with Section 30 of the KIAD Act, 1966. 317. Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act is applicable to acquisition proceedings under the KIAD Act. 318. Incidentally, it is brought to the attention of this bench that a co-ordinate bench of this court has had occasion to address the question, whether the provisions of the 2013 Act are applicable to the lands sought to be acquired under the provisions of the KIAD Act and if found applicable, then whether Section 24(2) would come into play and to what effect? (W.P. 51377 & W.P. 52037-042/2014, M. Somashekar & others v. State of Karnataka & others, dated 15-12-2016) And it is held as f....
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....entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Act. 20. A careful perusal of Section 24(1) would show that if, as on the date the New Act came into force with effect from 1.1.2014 no Award under Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act has been made, then the provisions of the New Act relating to determination of compensation shall be applicable. But, where an Award has already been made, then the proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the Old Act as if the Old Act had not been repealed. This sub-section (1) of Section 24 has no application because it is stated in the Statement of objection filed by respondent No. 4 that Award was passed on 10.12.2008 and was approved by the Government on 16.11.2009. But, sub-section (2) of Section 24 states that where an Award has been made under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, five years or more, prior to the commencement of the New Land Acquisition Act but physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid, the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government if it so chooses, shall initiate the said proceedings afresh in ....
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....n Act. If such benefit is available to a person whose land has been acquired under the Land Acquisition Act and in whose favour though award had been passed under Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894, five years or more prior to the commencement of the New Land Acquisition Act but physical possession thereof had not been taken or compensation had not been paid, then denial of such benefit in favour of land owners whose lands had been acquired under the provisions of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 would be violative of his right under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, Section 24 of the new Act in essence deals with determination of compensation and payment thereof in respect of acquired lands prior to New Land Acquisition Act came into force. The effect of Sub-section 2 of Section 24 would be that cases where acquisition was initiated prior to new Land Acquisition Act came into force which had not been completed despite lapse of five years or more from the date of passing of Award by paying compensation or by taking physical possession of the land, the said proceedings cannot be continued under the Old Act because payment of compensatio....
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....100% solatium, (Section 30) allotment of alternative land, one time subsistence allowance, special provisions for SC/STs, etc., have introduced sea change in the matter of acquisition of land for public purpose. 27. Even a perusal of Sections 107 & 108 of the New Act makes it clear that the State Legislatures are free to enact any law to provide enhanced or additional benefits to the land losers regarding higher compensation or better rehabilitation. This, further makes it clear that while better benefits under the local laws can be extended to the land losers, if the local laws do not provide for atleast minimum benefits as stipulated in the New Land Acquisition Act, 2013, then enforcing such provisions would certainly incur the wrath of Article 14 of the Constitution, in so far as the land losers are concerned. 28. Hence, it has to be stated that if the amendment made to the Land Acquisition Act by enacting a new legislation is not imported into the KIAD Act, it would render the KIAD Act wholly unworkable offending Article 14 especially in the context of the provisions under Section 24(2) of the Act of which we are now concerned. Therefore, the fact that the KIA....
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....the service of the notice. (7) If any person refuses or fails to comply with an order made under sub-section (5), the State Government or any officer authorized by6 the State Government in this behalf may take possession of the land and may for that purpose use such force as may be necessary. (8) Where the land has been acquired for the Board, the State Government, after it has taken possession of the land, may transfer the land to the Board for the purpose for which the land has been acquired." 322. It is evident from a plain reading of the above that though the land vests absolutely in the State Government, free from all encumbrances on publication of the declaration in terms of sub-section (4), the State is required to complete the formality of taking over physical possession of the land. It is only thereafter that such possession could be transferred to the KIADB. The process is to be evidenced by acceptable documentation. 323. Sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the 2013 Act reads thus: "(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), whe....