TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2009 (9) TMI 1076
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....one work site to another work site. The Tahsildar reported the matter to the first respondent, District Collector. The said respondent by Ext. P1 order, ordered to pay an amount of Rs. 20,000/- (Rupees Twenty Thousand only) for release of the vehicle. Feeling aggrieved by the said order, the Writ Petition is filed. According to the petitioner, his vehicle could be confiscated or he should be called upon to pay the value of the vehicle-in lieu of confiscation, only after a successful prosecution before the competent criminal court. In support of that submission, he mainly relies on the decision of this Court in Ahammed Kutty v. State of Kerala, (supra). When the respondents resisted the said prayer pointing out the decision of another learned Single Judge in Shoukathali v. Tahsildar, (supra), the Writ Petition, as mentioned earlier, was referred to the Division Bench. 2 . We heard the learned counsel, Sri. Babu S. Nair, and Sri. Jamsheed Hafiz, for the petitioners. We also heard the learned Advocate General, Sri. C. P. Sudhakara Prasad and the learned Government Pleader Sri. T. B. Hood, appearing for the State. The point that is vehemently canvassed by the learned counsel for the....
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....of any offence punishable under the Sand Act on a police report filed under S. 173(2) of the Cr.P.C. after investigation by police. S. 20 deals with penalty for the offence. Maximum period of imprisonment, apart from fine that can be imposed, is only two years. In Alavi's case we have considered the scope of S. 23 read with the Kerala Protection of River Banks and Regulation of Removal of Sand Rules (for short 'the Rules') and held that the Act and the Rules should be read together and harmoniously interpreted and Collector has got power to confiscate and sell the vehicle if the amount fixed by him is not paid to the River Management Fund within a reasonable time. Statutory rules framed in accordance with the Act also can be referred in interpreting the Statute so long as rules are not inconsistent with the Act. (See: Gujarat Pradesh Panchayat Parishad v. State of Gujarat ((2007) 7 SCC 718). For an effective understanding, we may extract S. 23 of the Act, Rr. 27 and 28 of the Rules: S. 23: Confiscation of vehicles:- Whoever transports sand without complying with the provisions of this Act shall be liable to be punished and the vehicle used for the transaction i....
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....Collector. 5 . The owner of the vehicle or the person from whom the vehicle was seized can file objection. 6 . The District Collector is bound to consider the objection filed within seven days of seizure. 7. In Alavi's case, we have also held that as part of principles of natural justice. District Collector should give an opportunity of hearing also to the person who has filed the objection. 8 . The District Collector is bound to take a decision. If the vehicle is not found involved in illegal transport of the same, he is bound to return the same. 9. If it is found that the vehicle was transporting sand illegally, he has to fix an amount equivalent to the prize to be paid to the River Management Fund. 10. The District Collector is bound to return the seized vehicle if the amount fixed by the Collector is paid by the owner (sic. owner or the person) in possession of the vehicle as the case may be. 11. If the amount fixed is not paid within a reasonable time, he can sell the vehicle in auction. 12. The amount realised from the auction shall be credited to the River Management Fund. 4 . A plain readin....
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....ow a Division Bench ruling binding on the single Bench for, he is bound in law to follow the Division Bench decision. The fact that the views of the learned Judge did not find acceptance at the hands of the Division Bench does not mean that whenever the identical question is raised before the learned Judge, the matter has to be again referred to a Division Bench till the views of the single Judge are endorsed by a Division or Full Bench. Brought up in the highest traditions of judicial discipline, this court cannot at any time swerve from the path of judicial decorum and propriety. We shall content ourselves by a quotation from the decision of the Supreme Court in Asstt. Collector, C.E., Chandran Nagar v. Dunlop India Ltd. (AIR 1980 SC 330) thus:- We desire to add and as was said in Cassef and Co. Ltd. v. Broome, 1972 AC 1027, we hope it will never be necessary for us to say so again that, 'in the hierarchical system of Courts' which exists in our country, 'it is necessary for each lower tier', including the High Court, 'to accept loyally the decisions of the higher tiers'. "It is inevitable in a hierarchical system of Courts that there are decision....
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....nd themselves in an embarrassing position of having to choose between dissentient judgments of their own High Court. 79. In Lala Shri Bhagwan v. Ram Chand (AIR 1965 SC 1767), Gajendragadkar, C.J. observed: (AIR p. 1773, para 18) 18........It is hardly necessary to emphasis that considerations of judicial propriety and decorum require that if a learned Single Judge hearing a matter is inclined to take the view that the earlier decisions of the High Court, whether of a Division Bench or of a Single Judge, need to be reconsidered, he should not embark upon that enquiry sitting as a Single Judge, but should refer the matter to a Division Bench or, in a proper case, place the relevant papers before the Chief Justice to enable him to constitute a larger Bench to examine the question. That is the proper and traditional way to deal with such matters and it is founded on healthy principles of judicial decorum and propriety. It is to be regretted that the learned Single Judge departed from this traditional way in the present case and chose to examine the question himself. 80. In Union of India v. Raghubir Singh, (1989) 2 SCC 754, R. S. Pathk, C.J. while recognising....
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.... rather than to leave two conflicting judgments to operate, creating confusion. It is not proper to sacrifice certainty of law. Judicial decorum, no less than legal propriety forms the basis of judicial procedure and it must be respected at all costs. 83. In Pradip Chandra Parija v. Pramod Chandra Patnaik (2002) 1 SCC 1, the Constitution Bench noted that the two learned Judges denuded the correctness of an earlier Constitution Bench judgment in Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Mumbai Shramik Sangha (2001) 4 SCC 448, and reiterated the same despite the fact that the second Constitution Bench refused to reconsider the earlier verdict and observed: (Pradip Chandra Parija case, SCC pp. 3-4, paras 3 &. 5-6) 3 . We may point out, at the outset, than in Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Mumbai Shramik Sangha a Bench of five Judges considered a somewhat similar question. Two learned Judges in that case doubted the correctness of the scope attributed to a certain provision in an earlier Constitution Bench judgment and, accordingly, referred the matter before them directly to a Constitution Bench. The Constitution Bench that then heard the matter took the view that the d....
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....stified. 84. In State of Bihar v. Kalika Kuer, (2003) 5 SCC 448, the Court elaborately considered the principle of per incuriam and held that the earlier judgment by a larger Bench cannot be ignored by invoking the principle of per incurium and the only course open to the coordinate or smaller Bench is to make a request for reference to the larger Bench. 85. In State of Punjab v. Devans Modern Breweries Ltd., (2004) 11 SCC 26, the Court reiterated that if a coordinate Bench does not agree with the principles of law enunciated by another Bench, the matter has to be referred to a larger Bench. 86. In Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community v. State of Maharashtra the constitution Bench interpreted Article 141, referred to various earlier judgments including Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Mumbai Shramik Sangha and Pradip Chandra Parija v. Pramod Chandra Patnaik and held that the law laid down in a decision delivered by a Bench of larger strength is binding on any subsequent Bench of lesser or co-equal strength and it would be inappropriate if a Division Bench of two Judges starts overruling the decisions of Division Benches of three Judges. The Court furth....
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....interesting to note that in Coir Board v. Indira Devi P.S., (1998) 3 SCC 259, a two-Judge Bench doubted the correctness of the seven-Judge Bench judgment in Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa, (1978) 2 SCC 213, and directed the matter to be placed before Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India for constituting a larger Bench. However, a three-Judge Bench headed by Dr. A.S. Anand, C.J., refused to entertain the reference and observed that the two-Judge Bench is bound by the judgment of the larger Bench - Coir Board v. Indira Devai P.S. (2001) 1 SCC 224. 90 . We are distressed to note that despite several pronouncements on the subject, there is substantial increase in the number of cases involving violation of the basics of judicial discipline. The learned Single Judges and Benches of the High Courts refuse to follow and accept the verdict and law laid down by coordinate and even larger Benches by citing minor difference in the facts as the ground for doing so. Therefore, it has become necessary to reiterate that disrespect to the constitutional ethos and breach of discipline have great impact on the credibility of judicial institution and encourages ....