TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2020 (2) TMI 1702
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....nies Act, 1956. It is a non-banking financial company engaged in the business of financial and advisory services. The defendants are entities which form part of SKIL Group of Companies and/or represent the SKIL Group. The plaintiff had exposure to SKIL Group of Companies. Various financial facilities were extended by the plaintiff to SKIL Group of Companies. These suits arise out those financial transactions. Hence, these summonses for judgments are being determined by a common order as common questions of facts and law arise for consideration, in all the suits. 3. Since the Summons for Judgment No. 30 of 2019 in Commercial Summary Suit No. 779 of 2019 was heard extensively as a lead case, the facts in the said are considered in detail. The facts in the rest of the suits are thereafter noted in brief. SJ 30 of 2019 in Comm. Summ. Suit No. 779 of 2019 4. This commercial division summary suit is instituted for recovery of a sum of Rs. 3,14,19,51,918/- along with further interest at the rate of 16% p.a. and additional interest at 2% p.a., penal interest at 2% p.a. and delayed payment interest at 2% p.a. 5. The material averments in the plaint can be summarised as under: ....
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...., 30th September, 2016 and 3rd November, 2016. 9. To discharge its obligation under the contract, defendant no. 1 had issued Electronic Clearing Systems Mandates (ECS Mandates) dated 30th December, 2015, 26th May, 2016 and 27th June, 2016 for various amounts. However, defendant no. 1 started committing default in performance of its obligation. 10. There were meetings and exchange of correspondence. Defendant no. 1 made offers of One Time Settlement (OTS). In the correspondence, defendant no. 1 acknowledged the liability to repay the loan amount along with accrued interest thereon, in clear and unequivocal terms. However, the loan amount remained outstanding. Plaintiff no. 1 thereupon addressed notices mentioning the events of default and called upon defendant no. 1 and 7 to repay the outstanding amount along with interest. The first notice was issued on 25th July, 2018. In the meanwhile, the ECS Mandates issued by defendant no. 1 were dishonoured on account of insufficiency of funds. In replies to the notices issued by the plaintiff, defendant no. 1, on the one hand, acknowledged the liability and, on the other hand, made an endeavour to raise untenable and frivolous grounds.....
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....executed on 26th October, 2016. The Letters of Guarantee were executed on 26th October, 2016. Defendant no. 4 pledged the shares of SKIL Infrastructure Limited by executing the Pledge Agreement dated 26th October, 2016. Defendant no. 2 pledged the shares of Reliance Naval and Engineering Limited by executing the Pledge Agreement dated 26th October, 2016. Defendant no. 1 has also drawn a Demand Promissory Note on 26th October, 2016. SJ 84 of 2019 in Comm. Summ. Suit No. 887 of 2019 14. This commercial division summary suit is instituted for recovery of a sum of Rs. 1,59,19,81,284/- along with interest. Defendant no. 1 Gujarat-Dwarka Portwest Limited, a SKIL Group entity, is the borrower. The loan of Rs. 120 Crore was offered in terms of sanction letter dated 22nd December, 2014. Upon acceptance of the terms and conditions therein by defendant no. 1, Loan Agreement came to be executed on 30th December, 2014. Defendant no. 2 is the corporate guarantor. Defendant no. 3 is the personal guarantor. Defendant no. 4, a partnership firm, has also guaranteed the repayment of due amount by defendant no. 1. Defendant nos. 2 and 4 executed the letters of guarantee on 30th December, 2014. D....
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....which a sum of Rs. 250 Crores is shown to have been advanced is unenforceable in law as the device adopted by the plaintiff of "ever-greening the loan" is prohibited by law and also defeats the provisions of law. The defendants contend that the Serious Fraud Investigation Office ('SFIO') is investigating into the affairs of the plaintiff. A report is submitted on 28th May, 2019 ('SFIO Report'). The SFIO Report adverts to wide-scale "ever greening of loans" by the plaintiff which is wrongful and prohibited by law. The loan transaction in question has also been a subject matter of investigation. The SFIO Report reveals that the instant loan was also advanced in flagrant violation of binding directions and is, thus, legally unenforceable. The SFIO Report, according to the defendants, itself warrants an unconditional leave to defend the suit. Entire amount disbursed by the plaintiff returned to the plaintiff on the day of disbursement or soon thereafter: (C) Banking upon the SFIO Report, the defendants contend that the disbursal of fresh loan was an eye-wash. The plaintiff had advanced the loan, in question, only with a view to close the old outstandin....
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....ontrary, invoked the pledged securities when their price plummeted and sold the shares in May-2017 and June 2018, which led to realization of diminished sum of Rs. 58,39,35,781/-. (E) The defendants also contend that the Loan Agreement and the underlying transaction are hit by the provisions of Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. The aforesaid defences raise genuine triable issues. The question of enforceability of the Loan Agreement, which was executed with the object of defeating the provisions of law, requires consideration. All these defences are rooted in facts: the determination of which hinges upon evidence. Moreover, SFIO Report, bolsters up the defences raised by the defendants. Hence, the defendants are entitled to an unconditional leave to defend. 19. I have heard Dr. Saraf, the learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff in all the suits, Mr. Seervai, the learned Senior Counsel for the defendants in Comm Summary Suit No. 779 of 2019 and Mr. Mehta, the learned Counsel for the defendants in other suits, at a considerable length. 20. In the backdrop of the defences raised on the part of the defendants, I deem fit in the fitness of things to first deal ....
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....ad fallen overdue, as non performing assets, in conformity with the directives of RBI, the plaintiff proposed to advance fresh lines of credit only for the purpose of showing repayment of the earlier loans sanctioned to group companies. The top officers of the plaintiff were fully aware that the said course of "ever-greening of loan" is statutorily proscribed. Yet, the plaintiff pursued the said fraudulent course with impunity, submitted Mr. Seervai. 25. Mr. Seervai invited the attention of the Court to the report submitted by SFIO in the matter of IL&FS limited and its subsidiaries, under Section 212(1)(c) of the Companies Act, 2013, to bolster up the aforesaid submissions. Special emphasis was laid on the following observations in the report: ABUSIVE FUNDING TO NON GROUP ENTITIES 1.13. . A number of these borrowers were not servicing their debt obligation timely. The top management of IFIN were aware of the potential problem accounts which were getting stressed in the succeeding months of the reports generated through the MIS of the company. Thereafter in order not to classify the loan/credit facility as a Non Performing Asset (NPA) as required under the RBI ....
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.... Lloyd group held 19%. As of May, 2010, IF&FS Group enhanced its exposure to SKIL group from Pipavav Shipyard Ltd. (now Reliance Naval and Engineering Limited) Rs. 159.40 Crore to Rs. 470.00 Crore. The increase in exposure for Rs. 295.00 Crore was towards part financing the acquisition of 19% stake held by Punj Lloyd Group in RNEL by SKIL Group. Since then, IFIN has extended multiple facilities to the Group, resulting in current terminal exposure of Rs. 670.00 Crore. IFIN servicing and exit was predicated on divestment of RNEL stake by SKIL Group to strategic buyer given the thrust in the defence business and RNEL being one of the key players with facilities in place. However, with delay in defence orders and no significant cash flow generation from existing operations, servicing under the IFIN facilities were delayed. Accordingly, IFIN had been invoking pledged RNEL shares towards appropriation of dues under the facility. Aggregate 5.36 Crore pledged equity shares of RNEL have been invoked in phases since Jan 14 till Sept 14 & Jan 16-June 18 & Rs. 192.30 Crore are appropriated towards SKIL Group dues. Of these invoked shares, IFIN has till date sold 1.62 Crore RNEL shares & balanc....
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....g to Section 36(1)(a), we find that it empowers the Reserve Bank to "caution or prohibit" the banking companies from entering into any particular type of transaction or generally to give advice to the said banking companies. This provision not only enables the Reserve Bank to assume an advisory role but it also gives it the power to prohibit a banking company against entering into any particular transaction/s or class of transactions. The use of the words, "caution or prohibit" in Section 36(1)(a) clearly implies that when the Reserve bank of India prohibits the banking companies from entering into any particular transaction then such a direction which is issued would be binding on the banks and has to be complied with. While the Reserve Bank of India has the power under Section 36(1)(a) of the Act to give advice or to caution the banking companies which may not be binding on the banking companies, but when the Reserve Bank prohibits the banking companies against their entering into any particular transaction or class of transactions, the said prohibition has to be regarded as being binding. The power to prohibit, given by Section 36, will be meaningless if it was not meant to be b....
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....the aforesaid submission, Dr. Saraf placed a strong reliance upon the judgment of the Australian High Court in the case of Yango Pastoral Co. Pty Ltd. v. First Chicago Australia Ltd. (1978) 21 ALR 585 In the case of Yango Pastoral (supra) the submission before the High Court of Australia was that the mortgage was rendered illegal and void by the provisions of Section 8 of the Banking Act, 1959 as the loan was advanced by a corporate entity without having an authority to carry on the banking business. The learned Judges, by separate judgments, unanimously concluded that the absence of a valid licence as granted by Section 8 of the Act does not vitiate the contract made by a body corporate in the course of carrying on a banking business in breach of the section, and the contracts of mortgage and guarantee were neither void nor unenforceable. 35. Aforesaid judgment in the case of Yango Pastoral (supra) was referred with approval by the Supreme Court in the case of B.O.I. Finance (supra), to hold that the non-compliance of directions issued by the Reserve Bank of India will not result in invalidation of the agreement executed in breach thereof. The observations in paragraphs 32 to 3....
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....A.C. at pp. 586; Amicable Society Vs. Bolland (1830) 4 Bligh (N.S.) 194 at P. 211. However, in the present case Parliament has provided a penalty which is a measure of the deterrent which it intends to operate in respect of non-compliance with Section 8. In this case it is not for the court to hold that further consequences should flow, consequences which in financial terms could well far exceed the prescribed penalty and could even conceivably lead the plaintiff to insolvency with resultant loss to innocent lenders or with resultant loss to innocent lenders or investors. In saying this I am mindful that there could be a case where the facts disclose that the plaintiff stands to gain by enforcement of rights gained through an illegal activity far more than the prescribed penalty. This circumstance might provide a sufficient foundation for attributing a different intention to the legislature. It may be that the true basis of the principle is that the court will refuse to enforce a transaction with a fraudulent or immoral purpose: Bereford Vs. Royal Insurance Co. Ltd. (1937) 2 K.B. 197 at p. 220. On this basis the common law principle of ex turpi causa can be given and opera....
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....by itself, would not invalidate the contracts though the infringement of the said directions may lead to action being taken under Section 46 of the Act." (emphasis supplied) 36. Reliance was also placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Canara Bank and others vs. Standard Chartered Bank (2002) 10 Supreme Court Cases 697. In the said case also, a defence was sought to be advanced that the transaction therein was contrary to the circulars of the Reserve Bank and opposed to public policy. The Supreme court after referring to its earlier judgment in the case of B.O.I. Finance (supra) observed that the instructions issued by the Reserve Bank of India were meant to be complied with only by the banking companies and could not be regarded as binding on the other parties. There was no evidence raised or sought to be raised in the said case which could possibly have led the Court to the conclusion that the transaction was opposed to public policy. 37. The exposition of the aforesaid legal position indicates that non-observance of the directives or the circulars of the Reserve Bank of India by the banking companies, though they are statutorily enjoined to obse....
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...., often than not, the boat sinks, under the weight of over indebtedness. 42. Undoubtedly, the plaintiff indulged in imprudent and risky financial business. As indicated in the report of SFIO, this might be with the full knowledge and understanding of the consequences. However, the non-observance of prudent lending norms does not imply that the very transaction is void. It is pertinent to note that the defence that the debt has become unenforceable because of the aforesaid practice of 'ever-greening of the loans' did not see the light of the day till the affidavit-in-reply came to be fled. None of the correspondence placed on record emanating from the defendants indicates that the defendants had ever resisted the extension of the facility. Thus, the mere fact that SFIO has carried investigation in the affairs of the plaintiff and found that the plaintiff indulged in the practice of ever-greening of the loans, may not justify an inference that the entire transaction is void. It is especially for the reason that the existence of liability of the SKIL group to the tune of about 700 Crore was acknowledged by the defendants. Thus, I am not persuaded to agree with the submissio....
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....pproximately 3.93 Crore of RNEL alone. Instead, the plaintiff sold the shares of RNEL at a much lower price of Rs. 27 per share (at about 45% of Rs. 63 per share), which was offered in the takeover deal. This conduct on the part of the plaintiff, according to the learned Senior Counsel for the defendants, surely raises a triable issue. 46. Dr. Saraf the learned Counsel for the plaintiff, in contrast, submitted that the aforesaid contention of the defendants is factually incorrect and legally unsound. There is no clinching material on record to indicate that at a particular time the defendants had made a request to invoke the pledged shares. In view of the provisions contained in Section 176 of the Indian Contract Act, the pledgee is not bound to take recourse to the securities. Nor the pledgee can be blamed for not invoking the securities at a particular point of time. In view of this well recognised position in law, the defence of not invoking the pledged shares by the plaintiff does not raise a triable issue, urged Dr. Saraf. 47. In order to led support to the aforesaid submission Dr. Saraf placed reliance on a judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of State....
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....on dated 11th May, 2016. On 21st June, 2016, also, the defendants requested the plaintiff to accept their request to sell the pledged shares to Reliance as it would have had reduced the loan exposure by approximately Rs. 250 Crore. Of course, the said communication refers to certain further commitments to be performed by the defendants. The communication dated 28th June, 2016 also underscore the urgency of decision on the sale of the pledged shares to reduce the liability of the defendants. The aforesaid contention finds support in the reply to the notice (issued by the plaintiff on 25th July, 2018) dated 16th August, 2018 by Chief Fiance Officer of SKIL Infrastructure Limited. It is, inter alia, mentioned therein that despite having given approval to the take over deal the plaintiff failed to sell approximately 39.3 Crore RNEL shares at Rs. 63 per share, aggregating to total consideration of approximately Rs. 248 Crore in mid January 2016 to Reliance Group. Instead, the shares were sold at a much lower price (Rs. 27/- per). This ground is agitated in the offer of one time settlement dated 20th September, 2018, as well. 51. The pledgee may not be under an obligation to track the....
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....dence. Thus, a defendant, who unquestionably owes the debt, cannot be permitted to derive an unfair advantage on the strength of a technical defence like insufficiency of stamp on the instrument under which the liability is incurred. Dr. Saraf further urged that such objections have been taken by the debtors in almost every other case and those objections have been consistently repelled, by the Courts. 55. To lend support to the aforesaid submission, Dr. Saraf, placed a strong reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Hindustan Steel Limited vs. Messrs Dilip Construction Company. (1969) 1 SCC 597 The said case arose out of an award under Indian Arbitration Act, 1940. The award was unstamped. In the context of the provisions contained in Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, the Supreme Court observed as under: "5. An instrument which is not duly stamped cannot be received in evidence by any person who has authority to receive evidence, and it cannot be acted upon by that person or by any public officer. Section 35 provides that the admissibility of an instrument once admitted in evidence shall not, except as provided in Section 61, be called in ques....
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....n Hindustan Steel Limited v. Messrs Dilip Construction (Company), Neolite Polymer Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. Standard Chartered Bank and Wolstenholme International Ltd. v. Twin Stars Industrial Corporation. 11. In my view, if the document is impounded and sent for adjudication, the technical defect alleged by the defendant has been taken care of. In view of the observations in these 3 judgments and in other judgments referred to in those judgments, the defendant cannot be given unconditional leave on such technicality." (emphasis supplied) 57. The aforesaid judgment was carried in appeal in the case of Kapil Puri vs. Rupinder Singh Arora. 2019(3) Mh.L.J. 155 A Division Bench of this Court, after adverting to the challenge posed on the basis of inadequate stamp-duty recorded that the approach of the learned Single Judge in impounding the document and sending it for adjudication instead of granting leave on the sole count of insufficiency of stamp-duty on the instrument in question, was in consonance with law and, thus, warranted no interference. Paragraph 12 of the judgment reads as under: "12. In regard to the contention that the appellant was coerced to ....
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....fter, pass a conditional order for grant of leave to defend the suit. The Division Bench observed in paragraph 24 as under: "24. We do not agree with Mr. Chinoy further. We must not forget that the Stamp Act envisages a duty on the instrument. The Stamp Act is concerned with the Instrument and not the transaction embodies or contained in it. The underlying transaction, therefore, does not enter into consideration while determining the proper stamp duty, adjudicating it and pass an order for ensuring payment of the same. Thus, the above mattes are not with which the Court is concerned and it can in appropriate cases such as the one before us proceed with the merits of the matter by ensuring that the proper stamp duty is adjudicated and paid. The learned single Judge has precisely ensured that. He has not allowed the appellants to rely on a technical plea and of the nature referred above. The course adopted by him, in the facts and circumstances of the case, cannot be faulted. We have found that in all the instruments based on which the suit has been laid and particularly those required by Order XXXVII there is 'an admission of' the liability. There is no denial on t....
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.... clause that is contained in the sub-contract in question is the subject matter of the present appeal. It is significant that an arbitration agreement may be in the form of an arbitration clause "in a contract". 28. Sections 2(a), 2(b), 2(g) and 2(h) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 ["Contract Act"] read as under: "2. Interpretation clause.-In this Act the following words and expressions are used in the following senses, unless a contrary intention appears from the context: (a) When one person signifies to another his willingness to do or to abstain from doing anything, with a view to obtaining the assent of that other to such act or abstinence, he is said to make a proposal; (b) When the person to whom the proposal is made signifies his assent thereto, the proposal is said to be accepted. A proposal, when accepted, becomes a promise; xxx xxx xxx (g) An agreement not enforceable by law is said to be void; (h) An agreement enforceable by law is a contract; xxx xxx xxx 29. When an arbitration clause is contained "in a contract", it is significant that the agreement only becomes a contract if it is enforc....
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....not adequately stamped? In the Negative. 65. In the case of Garware (supra), the Supreme Court adverted to the aforesaid Full Bench Judgment and held that question no. 2 (extracted above) having been answered contrary to the judgment of the Supreme Court, was incorrectly decided. 66. Dr. Saraf joined the issue by advancing a submission that the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case of Garware (supra) cannot be read de hors the issue which arose for consideration before the Supreme Court in the said case. Dr. Saraf made an earnest endeavour to demonstrate that the question posed before the Supreme Court was essentially, whether Section 11(6A) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 introduced by Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015, has removed the basis of the judgment in the case of SMS Tea (supra) wherein it was, inter alia, held that where an arbitration clause is contained in an unstamped agreement, the Judge hearing Section 11 application shall impound the agreement and ensure that stamp-duty and penalty are paid thereon before proceeding with the said application. It was submitted that endeavour of the defendants to draw support and....
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.... when the Supreme Court or the High Court considers an application under Section 11(4) to 11(6), and comes across an arbitration clause in an agreement or conveyance which is unstamped, it is enjoined by the provisions of the Indian Stamp Act to first impound the agreement or conveyance and see that stamp duty and penalty (if any) is paid before the agreement, as a whole, can be acted upon. It is important to remember that the Indian Stamp Act applies to the agreement or conveyance as a whole. Therefore, it is not possible to bifurcate the arbitration clause contained in such agreement or conveyance so as to give it an independent existence, as has been contended for by the respondent. The independent existence that could be given for certain limited purposes, on a harmonious reading of the Registration Act, 1908 and the 1996 Act has been referred to by Raveendran, J. in SMS Tea Estates (supra) when it comes to an unregistered agreement or conveyance. However, the Indian Stamp Act, containing no such provision as is contained in Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908, has been held by the said judgment to apply to the agreement or conveyance as a whole, which would include the ar....
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.... (i) Whether an arbitration agreement contained in an unregistered (but compulsorily registrable) instrument is valid and enforceable? (ii) Whether an arbitration agreement in an unregistered instrument which is not duly stamped, is valid and enforceable? (iii) Whether there is an arbitration agreement between the appellant and the respondent and whether an arbitrator should be appointed? 72. While answering question (ii), the Supreme Court in the context of the provisions contained in Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act expounded the legal position in paragraphs 19 and 20, which read as under: "19. Having regard to Section 35 of the Stamp Act, unless the stamp duty and penalty due in respect of the instrument is paid, the court cannot act upon the instrument, which means that it cannot act upon the arbitration agreement also which is part of the instrument. Section 35 of the Stamp Act is distinct and different from Section 49 of the Registration Act in regard to an unregistered document. Section 35 of the Stamp Act, does not contain a proviso like Section 49 of the registration Act enabling the instrument to be used to establish a collateral transact....
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....t the proper stage for determination of the question of insufficiency of stamp on a document containing an arbitration clause is consideration of the application under Section 11 of the Act. The Court dealing with such application was held to be enjoined to examine the aspect of instrument being duly stamped, and, if found to be deficient, the instrument be impounded and the procedure under Sections 35 and 38 of the Stamp Act, 1899, be thereafter followed. It was in terms held that even the arbitration clause in the said instrument cannot be acted upon by the Court, at that stage. 75. In the case of Garware (supra), the controversy arose as in the case of Coastal Marine Construction and Engineering Ltd. vs. Garware Wall Ropes Ltd. 2018(3) Mh.L.J. 22, this Court, in the context of the amendment to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, by the Amendment Act, 2015, especially the insertion of sub-section (6A) in Section 11 of the principal Act, which prescribed that the Court shall confine itself to examination of the existence of an agreement, held that the question of impounding of the instrument unstamped or insufficiently stamped need not be considered by the Judge who is ....
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.... that SMS Tea (supra) has not in any manner been touched by the amendment of Section 11(6-A). 80. In my considered view, and understanding of the aforesaid judgment, the principal question considered and determined by the Supreme Court is the continued applicability of the judgment in the case of SMS Tea (supra) that the question of an inadequate stamp-duty on an instrument containing an arbitration clause has to be determined by the Court at the hearing of an application under Section 11 of the Act, 1996 and the said aspect cannot be relegated to be determined by the Arbitral Tribunal, as was held by the learned Single Judge in the case of Coastal Marine (supra) and the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Gautam Landscapes (supra). 81. It is trite that a decision is an authority for what it decides and not what can logically be deducted therefrom. A profitable reference in this context can be made to the decision of the Constitution Bench in the case of Union of India vs. Chajju Ram (dead) By LRs. and others (2003) 5 SCC 568, wherein the Supreme Court in paragraph 23 has observed thus: "23. It is now well settled that a decision is an authority for what it decid....
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....t." 84. A useful reference, in this context, can be made to a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Indian Bank vs. Maharashtra State Cooperative Marketing Federation Ltd. (1998) 5 SCC 69, wherein the principle of harmonious construction was applied in the context of the provisions contained in Order XXXVII of the Code and Section 10 of the Code which warrant the stay of the trial of the subsequent suit in which the matter in issue is also directly and substantially in issue in a previously instituted suit. After considering the object of Section 10 of the Code and the object of the special scheme envisaged by Order XXXVII of the Code, it was, inter alia, held that considering the objects of both the provisions i.e. Section 10 and Order XXXVII wider interpretation of the word "trial" is not called for and the word "trial" in Section 10, in the context of summary suit, cannot be interpreted to mean the entire proceedings starting with institution of the suit by lodging a plaint. In a summary suit, the "trial" really begins after the Court or the Judge grants leave to contest the suit. Therefore, the Court or Judge dealing with the summary suit can proceed up to the stage o....
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....nstrument and directing the adjudication and payment of the requisite stamp-duty with penalty, if any. The compliance can be ensured by a direction that the decree shall not be drawn and executed till the deficit stamp-duty is adjudicated and paid. In none of the aforesaid contingencies, where the Court impounds the instrument, it can be said that the Court has acted upon the instrument without ensuring the compliance of the statutory requirement of payment of stamp-duty. 88. In contrast, if the consideration of the summons for judgment and the question of grant of leave to defend a summary suit is deferred till the question of stamp-duty is finally adjudicated by the authorities under the Act, the object with which the summary procedure is envisaged may not be advanced. 89. In the peculiar facts of the case, the aforesaid objection as to the insufficiency of the stamp-duty on the documents, in question, namely, the Loan Agreement and Guarantee Agreement and Pledge Agreement cannot be said to be of determinative significance as well. Apart from the said Loan, Guarantee and Pledge Agreements, there are other documents which fall within the ambit of the provisions contained in ....
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....est at the agreed rate at 16% p.a., with additional interest, penal interest, delayed payment interest at 2% p.a., each, de hors the circumstances in which the transactions were entered into? These are the questions, which warrant adjudication. The defence of alleged in-action on the part of the plaintiff in not invoking the shares at a specified time, despite agreeing to do so, resulting in loss to the defendants also raises an issue which requires consideration. 93. The aforesaid factors, however, are required to be appreciated in the backdrop of the fact that there are clear admissions of the debt to the extent of the principal amount, in the least. The defendants do not profess to plead that the loans were not advanced and disbursed. There are balance confirmation letters. Aliunde, there are admissions in writing in the form of OTS proposals acknowledging the aggregate liability to the tune of Rs. 700 Crore. 94. Thus, the proposition 17.6 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of IDBI Trusteeship Services Limited vs. Hubtown Limited (2017)1 Supreme Court Cases 568, which envisages that whether any part of the amount claimed by the plaintiff is admitted by the de....
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....eby impounded. Summons for Judgment 83 of 2019 in Comm Summary Suit No. 923 of 2019: (III) (i) Leave to defend the suit is granted to defendant nos. 1 to 4 subject to deposit of a sum of Rs. 43,00,00,000/- in the Court within eight weeks from today. (ii) In the event of deposit of the aforesaid amount, the defendant nos. 1 to 4 shall file the written statement, within four weeks of the deposit. (iii) If the defendants do not deposit the aforesaid amount within said period, the suit be listed for directions after 10 weeks. (iv) The plaintiff has tendered the original Loan Agreement dated 26th October, 2016, the letters of guarantee dated 26th October, 2016 and the Pledge Agreement dated 26th October, 2016. These documents are hereby impounded. Summons for Judgment 84 of 2019 in Comm Summary Suit No. 887 of 2019: (IV) (i) Leave to defend the suit is granted to defendant nos. 1 to 4 subject to deposit of a sum of Rs. 1,00,89,22,511/- in the Court within eight weeks from today. (ii) In the event of deposit of the aforesaid amount, the defendant nos. 1 to 4 shall file the written statement, within four weeks of the ....