2022 (8) TMI 1427
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....under section 143(3) read with section 147 of the Act was complete by order dated 29/12/2008 determining the income of the assessee at Rs. 10,48,16,318/-. Subsequently a notice under section 148 of the Act was issued on 27/03/2012 and order under section 143(3) of the Act was passed on 08/03/2013 disallowing a sum of Rs. 22,18,70,175/-. 3. Assessee, being aggrieved by such an order dated 08/03/2013 preferred an appeal before the Ld. CIT(A) and the Ld. CIT(A) by order dated 14/08/2013 held that the disallowance of interest was incorrect and therefore, while partly allowing the appeal directed the learned Assessing Officer to calculate the interest paid till 03/12/2001 and allow the same because till such date the assessee had a valid banking license, and interest for the period thereafter has to be disallowed under section 40(a)(ia) of the Act . 4. Aggrieved by the order dated 14/08/2013, assessee preferred this appeal before us with a delay of 1529 days. In the appeal assessee challenged the action of the Ld. CIT(A) in remanding the matter to the file of the learned Assessing Officer to verify as to whether any interest was provided after cancellation of the banking license, in s....
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....that because in the order dated 17/2/2014 the tax was stated to be nil, the assessee was under the mistaken impression that nothing need be done but it is only on receiving the letter dated 18/3/2017, the assessee started making enquiries and addressed a letter to the learned Assessing Officer as to how the demand had arisen, since no such thing was to be found in the order dated 17/2/2014. According to the Ld. AR the letter dated 15/3/2017 said to have been received by the assessee on 14/7/2017 was not to be found in the records of the assessee and therefore, by appearing before the learned Assessing Officer on 7/11/2017 the assessee came to know about the letter dated 15/3/2017 and the learned Assessing Officer passing the order dated 14/3/2014 which resulted in demand. He placed reliance on the decisions reported in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition vs. MST. Katiji & others (1987) 167 ITR 471 (SC) and Surya General Traders vs. CTO 1997 (4) ALD 439 for the principle that ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late and that when substantial Justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deser....
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....le. And after hearing the assessee by order dated 29/12/2008 an order under section 143(3) read with section 147 of the Act was passed by disallowing the NPA provision and also the contingent provision. Assessee challenged the same before the Ld. CIT(A) unsuccessfully and therefore carried the matter to the Tribunal, which allowed the appeal crashing the reopening, and therefore the Revenue is in appeal before the Hon'ble High Court. 9. Subsequently, a notice under section 148 of the Act was issued on 27/3/2012 to the official liquidator proposing to disallow interest on deposits under section 40(a)(ia) of the Act, order under section 143(3) read with section 147 of the Act was passed on 8/3/2013 disallowing a sum of Rs. 22,18,70,175/-. Assessee's appeal before the Ld. CIT(A) against the order dated 8/3/2013 was allowed in part by the Ld. CIT(A) by order dated 14/8/2013 holding that the entire interest cannot be disallowed as the assessee was having RBI license till 4/12/2014, and therefore, on this premise, the Ld. CIT(A) directed the learned Assessing Officer to disallow interest paid post 4/12/2004. This order is under appeal before us now. 10. Subsequently, learned Assessing ....
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....ted to be nil in the consequential order dated 17/2/2014, it has nothing to do with the impugned order passed directing the learned Assessing Officer to disallow the interest paid subsequent to 4/12/2014. The disallowance in the impugned order is very clear and loud. Merely because a subsequent point of time the learned Assessing Officer passed an order dated 14/2/2014, it does not mean that the assessee has a good case. 13. It is pertinent to note that by the date of this consequential order dated 14/2/2014 itself the due date for filing the appeal was lapsed, because the impugned order dated 14/8/2013 was served on the assessee on 5/9/2013 and the due date for filing the appeal was by 4/11/2013. Even if we believe that the orders dated 14/2/2014 and 17/2/2014 received by the assessee on 14/3/2014 were capable of misleading the assessee, still the assessee cannot harp on that point because the impugned order was clear in its import that the interest for a period subsequent to 4/12/2004 was clearly directed to be disallowed by the Ld. CIT(A) on 14/8/2013 to challenge which, the appeal time was only available till 5/9/2013. Assessee cannot have the benefit of any confusion that is ....
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....the principle stated in Balwant Singh (dead) v. Jagdish Singh and others[15] would be quite fruitful. In the said case the Court referred to the pronouncements in Union of India v. Ram Charan[16], P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala[17] and Katari Suryanarayana v. Koppisetti Subba Rao[18] and stated thus:- "25. We may state that even if the term "sufficient cause" has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the party concerned. The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of "reasonableness" as it is understood in its general connotation. 26. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of a party to arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right has accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay i....
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....on given in the application for condonation of delay was absolutely fanciful. 15. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are: There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non- pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. The terms "sufficient cause" should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact- situation. Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so ....