TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2008 (1) TMI 382
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....earch conducted on 23/24th November, 1995 at Amravati and 24th November, 1995 at Akola, raw materials for manufacturing mandrax tablets, machineries, mandrax tablets and cash of lakhs of rupees was recovered. Two charge sheets were filed against 10 accused persons. Accused Nos. 1 to 6 were convicted and the rest were acquitted. In appeals the High Court confirmed the conviction as well as acquittal. It is not disputed that no further appeal was filed before the Apex Court and the decision of the High Court became final. 3. On the basis of confessional statements of accused No. 8 Kantilal and accused No. 9 Kasam, the accused was arrested on 24-5-2001. Complaint was filed against him on 18th August, 2001. He was released on bail by the order of this Court on 8th September, 2001 reported in 2002 ALL MR (Cri) 72 (Sureshkumar Moolchand Seth @ Jain v. Director of Revenue Intelligence). 4. On 7-11-2001 the accused moved an application for discharge under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C. The said application was resisted by the complainant by reply dated 19-12-2001. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, the trial Court allowed the application and discharged the accused under S....
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....e of Ss. 227 and 288 of the Code and the limitations imposed upon the court at the initial stage of framing the charge, this Court in State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh, AIR 1977 SC 2018 : (1977Q Cr.L.J. 1606 held (Para 4):- "Reading the two provisions together in juxta-position, as they have got to be, it would be clear that at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. It is not obligatory for the Judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at this stage of deciding the matter under S. 227 or S. 228 of the Code. At that stage the Court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong susp....
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....d guilty or otherwise is not exactly to be applied at the stage of framing the charge. Even on the basis of a strong suspicion founded on materials before it, the court can form a presumptive opinion regarding the existence of factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged and in that event be justified in framing the charges against the accused in respect of the commission of the offence alleged to have been committed by them. Relying upon its earlier judgments in Ramesh Singh (AIR 1977 SC 2018: 1977 Cri.L.J. 1606) and Anil Kuinar Bhunja's (AIR 1980 SC 52: 1979 Cri.L.J. 1390) cases (supra) this Court again in Satish Mehra v. Delhi Administration (1996) 9 SCC 766 reiterated: "Considerations which should weigh with the Sessions Court at this stage have been well designed by Parliament through S. 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short 'the Code') which reads thus:- "227. Discharge - If upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge th....
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....nt under Section 10 of the Indian Evidence Act as they form prima facie material against the accused to show that the accused was involved in the conspiracy of manufacturing mandrax tablets. Shri Loney submitted that this aspect has not been considered by the learned trial Judge while passing the order of discharge. This was also not considered by the learned Judge of this Court while releasing the accused on bail (2002 ALL MR (Cri.) 72). In this respect Shri Loney relied on the observations made in State of Maharashtra v. Damu - (2000) 6 Supreme Court Cases 269 which are as under:- "43..... Section 10 of the Evidence Act renders anything said, done, or written by any one of the conspirators in reference to their common intention as a relevant fact, not only as against each of the conspirators but for proving the existence of the conspiracy itself. Further the said fact can be used for showing that a particular person was a party to the conspiracy. The only condition for application of the rule in Section 10 is that there must be "reasonable ground to believe that two or more persons have conspired together to commit an offence". 44. The basic principle which underlies Sectio....
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....tained in the confessional statement. The court is required to examine whether the confessional statement was voluntary; in other words, whether it was not obtained by threat, duress or promise. If the court is satisfied from the evidence that it was voluntary, then it is required to examine whether the statement is true. If the court on examination of the evidence finds that the retracted confession is true, that part of the inculpatory portion could he relied upon to base the conviction. However, prudence and practice require that court would seek assurance getting corroboration from other evidence adduced by the prosecution." 10. While dispelling the submissions made by Shri Loney, Shri Manohar submitted that Section 10 was not pressed into service by Shri Loney who represented the complainant when the High Court decided the application for bail by the accused. Even otherwise the complainant would not be able to take aid of Section 10 of the Evidence Act because the alleged confessional statements were made only after the arrest of accused no.8 and accused no.9 and such post arrest statements would not fall within the ambit of Section 10 of the Evidence Act. In this respect S....
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....eral rule, while permitting the statement made by one conspirator to be admissible as against another conspirator restricts it to the statement made during the period when the agency subsisted. Once it is shown that a person became snapped out of the conspiracy, any statement made subsequent thereto cannot be used as against the other conspirators under Section 10. 114. Whether a particular accused had ceased to be a conspirator or not, at any point of time, is a matter which can be decided on the facts of that particular case. Normally a conspirator's connection with the conspiracy would get snapped after he is nabbed by the police and kept in their custody because he would thereby ceased to be the agent of the other conspirators. Of course we are not unmindful of rare cases in which a conspirator would continue no confabulate with the other conspirators and persists with the conspiracy even after his arrest. That is precisely the reason why we said that it may not be possible to lay down a proposition of law that one conspirator's connection with the conspiracy would necessarily be cut off with this arrest." (iii) In Mohd. Khalid v. State of W.B. - (2002) 7 Supreme Court Ca....