TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2023 (8) TMI 400
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....17 and again it was dishonoured on 06.02.2018 which was presented before the bank on assurance given by the petitioner. A legal demand notice under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was issued on 28.02.2018 by the petitioner, but he could not receive the postal acknowledgment and thereafter, he approached the postal department thereafter the same was received by him on 22.05.2018, whereas the complaint case was filed on 30.05.2018. 3. The learned trial Court vide order dated 01.08.2018 dismissed the complaint case on the ground that though the application under Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act has been moved, but the complainant could not disclose the fact as to when the application regarding postal acknowledgment was moved before the postal department. The complainant challenged the order passed by the learned Magistrate dated 01.08.2018 before the learned Sessions Court by filing revision and same was allowed vide order dated 03.12.2018 where the learned revisional Court held that the delay was bonafide and the complainant has explained the reason for such delay. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that though there is provision for condo....
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....1973 (the Code) for quashing the process issued by the learned Magistrate. That petition was rejected by the High Court. Hence, the accused approached this Court. This Court referred to its judgment in Haru Das Gupta v. State of West Bengal.[(1972) 1 SCC 639] wherein it was held that : "5. ....the rule is well established that where a particular time is given from a certain date within which an act is to be done, the day on that date is to be excluded ...... the effect of defining the period from such a day until such a day within which an act is to be done is to exclude the first day and to include the last day." 14. The counsel submitted that the word "within" has been held by this Court to mean "on or before". (Danial Latifi v. Union of India [(2001) 7 SCC 740]. Therefore, the complaint under Section 142(b) should be filed on or before or within, 30 days of the date on which the cause of action under Section 138(c) arises. The counsel submitted that there is no justification to exclude the 16th day of the 15-day period under Section 138(c) or the first day of the 30 days period under Section 142(b) as has been wrongly decided in Saketh. This would amount to exclusion of th....
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....teen days started at 11.45 a.m. on 2/12/1959 and expired at the same time on 17/12/1959. The accident occurred at 5.45 p.m. on 17/12/1959 and, therefore, it was not covered by the insurance policy. The Court of Appeal treated the expression "fifteen days from the commencement of the policy" as excluding the first date and the cover note was held to commence at midnight of that date. It was observed that the policy expired fifteen days from 2/12/1959 and these words on the ordinary rules of construction exclude the first date and begin at midnight on that day, therefore, the policy would cover the accident which had occurred at 5.45 p.m. on 17/12/1959." He would submit that the order passed by the learned revisional Court is liable to be set aside being contrary to the well settled principle of law as also to Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. 5. Learned counsel for the respondent would submit that the learned revisional Court has exercised the power given under Section 142 of Negotiable Instruments Act and its proviso. He placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Pawan Kumar Ralli Vs. Maninder Singh Narula, reported in (2014) 15 ....
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....ven otherwise, before quashing the criminal proceedings on the ground of limitation, the High Court could have decided whether sufficient cause was made out by the appellant under the proviso to Section 142(b) of the Act, and if satisfied, it could have condoned the delay. Alternatively, the High Court could have remanded the matter to the trial court to determine the issue. In support of his submissions, the learned amicus placed reliance on a judgment of this Court in Rakesh Kumar Jain v. State [(2000) 7 SCC 656], in which while considering the provisions of Section 473 CrPC and deciding the question whether on the ground of limitation, the accused is entitled to seek his discharge, this Court held: (SCC p. 661, para 10) "10. The mere fact that the complaint was filed 25 days after the expiry of the period of limitation, did not entitle the accused to seek his discharge under Section 245 CrPC because the complainant has, under law, a right to seek for extension of time under Section 473 CrPC. The complainant could satisfy the Magistrate on the facts and circumstances of the case that the delay was explainable which was occasioned on account of their bona fide belief to obtain t....