TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2023 (7) TMI 956
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....(OC) 1800/2022 in PAO No.09/2022 dated 01.08.2022 in ECIR Nos.CEZO-I/05/2019, CEZOI/ 37/2020 and CEZO-I/42/2020' shall hereinafter referred to as 'impugned order' for the sake of convenience and clarity. 3. To be noted, captioned WPs are in the admission Board and we are testing the captioned WPs for admission. To be noted, there were multiple listings of rescheduling, re-notification and adjournments earlier (all in the Admission Board). 4. In the light of the common order we propose to make, we deem it appropriate to not to delve into great details qua facts, to put it differently we do not propose to be detained by facts that are not imperative for disposal of the captioned WPs. 5. Short facts shorn of elaboration i.e., necessary facts that are essential and imperative for appreciating this common order are that an order of provisional attachment dated 01.08.2022 was made under Section 5(1) of PMLA by the second respondent and this provisional attachment pertains to multiple immovable properties; that this order of provisional attachment went to the 'first respondent' ('Adjudicating Authority' for the sake of convenience and clarity) in accordance ....
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....remedy rule are Dunlop India [Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Chandan Nagar, West Bengal Vs. Dunlop India Ltd. and others reported in (1985) 1 SCC 260], Satyawati Tandon [United Bank of India Vs. Satyawati Tondon and others reported in (2010) 8 SCC 110], K.C.Mathew [Authorized Officer, State Bank of Travancore Vs. Mathew K.C. reported in (2018) 3 SCC 85], Commercial Steel [The Assistant Commissioner of State Tax and Others Vs.M/s Commercial Steel Limited reported in 2021 SCC OnLine SC 884] and Greatship [State of Maharashtra and Others Vs.Greatship (India) Limited reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1262]. 9. Relevant paragraph in Dunlop India case is paragraph 3 and the same reads as follows: '3. ....... Article 226 is not meant to short-circuit or circumvent statutory procedures. It is only where statutory remedies are entirely ill-suited to meet the demands of extraordinary situations, as for instance where the very vires of the statute is in question or where private or public wrongs are so inextricably mixed up and the prevention of public injury and the vindication of public justice require it that recourse may be had to Article 226 of the Constitution. But then the ....
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.... the DRT Act and the SARFAESI Act and exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 for passing orders which have serious adverse impact on the right of banks and other financial institutions to recover their dues. We hope and trust that in future the High Courts will exercise their discretion in such matters with greater caution, care and circumspection.' 11. To be noted, in K.C. Mathew's case, the paragraph extracted and reproduced supra, Satyawati Tondon principle has been reiterated. 12. Relevant paragraphs in Commercial Steel are Paragraphs 11 and 12 and the same read as follows: '11 The respondent had a statutory remedy under section 107. Instead of availing of the remedy, the respondent instituted a petition under Article 226. The existence of an alternate remedy is not an absolute bar to the maintainability of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. But a writ petition can be entertained in exceptional circumstances where there is: (i) a breach of fundamental rights; (ii) a violation of the principles of natural justice; (iii) an excess of jurisdiction; or (iv) a challenge to the vires of the statute or delegated legislation. 12 In the pre....
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....rudence and adumbrated supra. 16. Be that as it may, we also make it clear that the writ petitioners have raised several points on merits in their campaign against the impugned common order made by the first respondent but as this Court is not entertaining captioned WPs by applying the alternate remedy rule, it is deemed appropriate to not to embark upon the exercise of examining the same. We should also record that learned counsel for petitioners submitted that he is conscious of the alternate remedy rule and therefore, predicated his admission board campaign on the aforementioned 180 days point for our consideration and in this view of the matter also, we deem it appropriate to not to discuss the merits of the writ petitioners' campaign against the impugned common order. There is another perspective to this and this we are now relegating the writ petitioners to the alternate remedy of approaching the Appellate Tribunal under Section 26 of PMLA and therefore, all questions (including the aforementioned 180 days point) should be left open for the writ petitioners to be urged before the Appellate Tribunal. We also make it clear that it is open to the Appellate Tribunal to consi....