2023 (5) TMI 798
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....unsel for the Appellants and Mr. Shyam Divan, learned Senior Counsel for the Respondents. 4. Two loans were obtained by the Respondents, being a housing / KCC overdraft loan and a business loan. The accounts of the Respondents were declared as nonperforming assets ("NPA") on 27.05.2021. Notices under Section 13(2) of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as "SARFAESI Act") were issued on 07.08.2021 and 12.08.2021, respectively, which were duly replied to by the Respondents on 28.10.2021, seeking twelve months' time to repay the loan. 5. Strangely enough, within 3 days of the reply dated 28.10.2021, prior to the expiry of the statutory period prescribed, a challenge was laid to the demand notice issued under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act, by filing Writ Petition No. 23940 of 2021. Entertaining the said lis, a direction was issued to the Appellants to consider the proposal placed. In due compliance of the aforesaid order, the Respondents were allowed to remit the dues accrued in five installments instead of twelve. The extended benefit conferred was not utilized by the Respondents, and t....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....9. Notwithstanding the orders passed above by this Court, the High Court took upon itself to decide the issues raised, on merit, by allowing the Respondents to make deferred payment in 20 installments, a relief which was more than the one prayed for. The installments were modified by the learned Division Bench in Writ Appeal No. 1492 of 2022 and 1497 of 2022, to 12 months as originally prayed for by the Respondents while declining to interfere with the decision of the learned Single Judge on merit. Impugning the aforesaid orders, the lender bank has filed the present appeals. 10. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Appellants fairly submitted that the relief granted by the High Court may not be disturbed while pressing for the reiteration of law which might guide the High Court in not entertaining such writ petitions in the future. It is further submitted that the High Court has exercised writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, even after the Debt Recovery Tribunal became functional, in about 185 cases pertaining to the Appellants alone. After the filing of the Special Leave Petitions, 35 Writ Petitions have been filed. Resultantly, the Appellant....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....es before this Court. One such High Court is that of Punjab & Haryana. 14. A writ of certiorari is to be issued over a decision when the Court finds that the process does not conform to the law or statute. In other words, courts are not expected to substitute themselves with the decision-making authority while finding fault with the process along with the reasons assigned. Such a writ is not expected to be issued to remedy all violations. When a Tribunal is constituted, it is expected to go into the issues of fact and law, including a statutory violation. A question as to whether such a violation would be over a mandatory prescription as against a discretionary one is primarily within the domain of the Tribunal. So also, the issue governing waiver, acquiescence, and estoppel. We wish to place reliance on the decision of this Court in Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque, (1955) 1 SCR 1104, "Then the question is whether there are proper grounds for the issue of certiorari in the present case. There was considerable argument before us as to the character and scope of the writ of certiorari and the conditions under which it could be issued. The question has been considered by t....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
.... of quarter sessions anything which showed that order was erroneous, the Court of Queen's Bench might be asked to have the order brought into it, and to look at the order, and view it upon the face of it, and if the court found error upon the face of it, to put an end to its existence by quashing it." In Rex v. Nat Bell Liquors Ld. [(1922) 2 A.C. 128] Lord Sumner said: "That supervision goes to two points; one is the area of the inferior jurisdiction and the qualifications and conditions of its exercise; the other is the observance of the law in the course of its exercise." The decision in Rex v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Shaw [(1951) 1 K.B. 711] was taken in appeal, and was affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Rex v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Shaw [(1952) 1 K.B. 338]. In laying down that an error of law was a ground for granting certiorari, the learned Judges emphasised that it must be apparent on the face of the record. Denning, L.J. who stated the power in broad and general terms observed: "It will have been seen that throughout all the cases there is one governing rule: certiorari is only available to quash a....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....the Constitution of India. When a statute prescribes a particular mode, an attempt to circumvent shall not be encouraged by a writ court. A litigant cannot avoid the noncompliance of approaching the Tribunal which requires the prescription of fees and use the constitutional remedy as an alternative. We wish to quote with profit a recent decision of this Court in Radha Krishan Industries v. State of H.P., (2021) 6 SCC 771, "25. In this background, it becomes necessary for this Court, to dwell on the "rule of alternate remedy" and its judicial exposition. In Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks (1998) 8 SCC 1, a two-Judge Bench of this Court after reviewing the case law on this point, noted: (SCC pp. 9-10, paras 14-15) "14. The power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provision of the Constitution. This power can be exercised by the High Court not only for issuing writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights contained in Part III of the Constitution but also for "any other purpose". 15. Unde....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....ould have been allowed relief by the High Court itself instead of driving them to the need of initiating arbitration proceedings." (emphasis supplied) 27. The principles of law which emerge are that: 27.1. The power under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue writs can be exercised not only for the enforcement of fundamental rights, but for any other purpose as well. 27.2. The High Court has the discretion not to entertain a writ petition. One of the restrictions placed on the power of the High Court is where an effective alternate remedy is available to the aggrieved person. 27.3. Exceptions to the rule of alternate remedy arise where: (a) the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of a fundamental right protected by Part III of the Constitution; (b) there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice; (c) the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction; or (d) the vires of a legislation is challenged. 27.4. An alternate remedy by itself does not divest the High Court of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution in an appropriate case though ordinarily, a writ petition should not be entertained when an efficacious alternat....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....ation or dominant participation of the State in managing the affairs of the company. But in the present case we are concerned with a banking company which has its own resources to raise its funds without any contribution or shareholding by the State. It has its own Board of Directors elected by its shareholders. It works like any other private company in the banking business having no monopoly status at all. Any company carrying on banking business with a capital of five lakhs will become a scheduled bank. All the same, banking activity as a whole carried on by various banks undoubtedly has an impact and effect on the economy of the country in general. Money of the shareholders and the depositors is with such companies, carrying on banking activity. The banks finance the borrowers on any given rate of interest at a particular time. They advance loans as against securities. Therefore, it is obviously necessary to have regulatory check over such activities in the interest of the company itself, the shareholders, the depositors as well as to maintain the proper financial equilibrium of the national economy. The banking companies have not been set up for the purposes of building the ec....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....tutes of the like nature which fasten certain duties and responsibilities statutorily upon such private bodies which they are bound to comply with. If they violate such a statutory provision a writ would certainly be issued for compliance with those provisions. For instance, if a private employer dispenses with the service of its employee in violation of the provisions contained under the Industrial Disputes Act, in innumerable cases the High Court interfered and has issued the writ to the private bodies and the companies in that regard. But the difficulty in issuing a writ may arise where there may not be any non-compliance with or violation of any statutory provision by the private body. In that event a writ may not be issued at all. Other remedies, as may be available, may have to be resorted to." United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon, (2010) 8 SCC 110, "42. There is another reason why the impugned order should be set aside. If Respondent 1 had any tangible grievance against the notice issued under Section 13(4) or action taken under Section 14, then she could have availed remedy by filing an application under Section 17(1). The expression "any person" used in Section 17(....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....son why the High Court should entertain a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution and pass interim order ignoring the fact that the petitioner can avail effective alternative remedy by filing application, appeal, revision, etc. and the particular legislation contains a detailed mechanism for redressal of his grievance. xxx xxx xxx 55. It is a matter of serious concern that despite repeated pronouncement of this Court, the High Courts continue to ignore the availability of statutory remedies under the DRT Act and the SARFAESI Act and exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 for passing orders which have serious adverse impact on the right of banks and other financial institutions to recover their dues. We hope and trust that in future the High Courts will exercise their discretion in such matters with greater caution, care and circumspection." State Bank of Travancore v. Mathew K.C., (2018) 3 SCC 85, "5. We have considered the submissions on behalf of the parties. Normally this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution is loath to interfere with an interim order passed in a pending proceeding before the High Court, except in specia....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....na Committee constituted by the Central Government Act had suggested enactment of new legislation for securitisation and empowering banks and financial institutions to take possession of securities and sell them without court intervention which would enable them to realise long-term assets, manage problems of liquidity, asset liability mismatches and improve recovery. The proceedings under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as "the DRT Act") with passage of time, had become synonymous with those before regular courts affecting expeditious adjudication. All these aspects have not been kept in mind and considered before passing the impugned order. 9. Even prior to the SARFAESI Act, considering the alternate remedy available under the DRT Act it was held in Punjab National Bank v. O.C. Krishnan [(2001) 6 SCC 569] that: (SCC p. 570, para 6) "6. The Act has been enacted with a view to provide a special procedure for recovery of debts due to the banks and the financial institutions. There is a hierarchy of appeal provided in the Act, namely, filing of an appeal under Section 20 and this fast-track procedure cannot be all....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....ld have serious adverse impact on the financial health of such bodies/institutions, which (sic will) ultimately prove detrimental to the economy of the nation. Therefore, the High Court should be extremely careful and circumspect in exercising its discretion to grant stay in such matters. Of course, if the petitioner is able to show that its case falls within any of the exceptions carved out in Baburam Prakash Chandra Maheshwari v. Antarim Zila Parishad [AIR 1969 SC 556], Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks [(1998) 8 SCC 1] and Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. [(2003) 2 SCC 107] and some other judgments, then the High Court may, after considering all the relevant parameters and public interest, pass an appropriate interim order." Phoenix ARC (P) Ltd. v. Vishwa Bharati Vidya Mandir, (2022) 5 SCC 345, "18. Even otherwise, it is required to be noted that a writ petition against the private financial institution - ARC - the appellant herein under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against the proposed action/actions under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act can be said to be not maintainable. In the present case, the ARC proposed to take action/actions under....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....f court. It appears that the High Court has initially granted an ex parte ad interim order mechanically and without assigning any reasons. The High Court ought to have appreciated that by passing such an interim order, the rights of the secured creditor to recover the amount due and payable have been seriously prejudiced. The secured creditor and/or its assignor have a right to recover the amount due and payable to it from the borrowers. The stay granted by the High Court would have serious adverse impact on the financial health of the secured creditor/assignor. Therefore, the High Court should have been extremely careful and circumspect in exercising its discretion while granting stay in such matters. In these circumstances, the proceedings before the High Court deserve to be dismissed." Varimadugu Obi Reddy v. B. Sreenivasulu, (2023) 2 SCC 168, "36. In the instant case, although the respondent borrowers initially approached the Debts Recovery Tribunal by filing an application under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, but the order of the Tribunal indeed was appealable under Section 18 of the Act subject to the compliance of condition of pre-deposit and without exhausting th....