TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2008 (5) TMI 43
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....d under the 1992-97 Exim Policy was exigible to sales tax stands impliedly overruled by the Constitution Bench decision in Sunrise Associates Vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi [(2006) 5 SCC 603] that held that lottery tickets were actionable claims and were, therefore, excluded from the definition of 'goods' under the Sales Tax Act and, hence, the sale of lottery tickets was not subject to sales tax and the earlier two-Judge Bench decision of the court in H. Anraj Vs. Govt. of Tamil Nadu [1986) 1 SCC 414] holding otherwise, did not lay down the correct legal position? It is to consider this question that this batch of six cases was referred to the three-Judge Bench. 3. Apparently, lottery tickets are not the same thing as REP licences but on behalf of the appellants it was submitted that the decision in Vikas while upholding the taxability of REP licences, referred approvingly to Anraj which was expressly overruled by Sunrise. Further, the additional reasons given in Vikas for holding that REP licences were 'goods' were also disapproved by the Constitution Bench and, therefore, it must be held that the decision in Vikas too stood impliedly overruled. 4. REP licences were granted under th....
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....wo rights (a) a right to participate in the draw and (b) a right to claim a prize contingent upon his being successful in the draw. Both would be beneficial interests in movable property the former 'in praesenti', the latter 'in futuro' depending on a contingency. Lottery tickets, not as physical articles, but as slips of paper or memoranda evidence not one but both these beneficial interests in movable property which are obviously capable of being transferred, assigned or sold and on their transfer, assignment or sale both these beneficial interests are made over to the purchaser for a price. Counsel for the dealers sought to contend that the concept of a lottery cannot be sub-divided in two parts, namely, a right to participate and a right to receive the prize but the two together constitute one single right. It is not possible to accept this contention for the simple reason that the two entitlements which arise on the purchase of a lottery ticket are of a different character, inasmuch as the right to participate arises in praesenti, that is to say it is a choate or perfected right in the purchaser on the strength of which he can enforce the holding of the draw, while the other i....
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....ition clauses in Chapter I where 'Registered Exporter' was defined to mean a person holding a valid Registration Certificate issued by the specified designated authorities for the purposes of Export Promotion'. Chapter XV of the policy document dealt with the Import Policy for Registered Exporters. Paragraph 164 in that chapter declared that the object of the scheme was to provide to the Registered Exporters by way of import replenishment, the essential inputs required in the manufacture of the products exported and also to allow certain flexibilities to enable diversification of the export products. Paragraph 165(1) provided that all exports subject to certain specified exception would qualify for the grant of import replenishment and paragraph 166(1), dealing with the extent of replenishment read as follows : "The extent of import replenishment permissible against each product enumerated in column 2 of Appendix 17 shall be that set out in column 3 thereof. These percentages will apply in the case of exports made on or after 1.4.1988, except for registered contracts, to which the relevant provisions would apply." The two special features of REP licence were the flexi....
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....ut that if a lottery ticket that gave its holder only the right to participate in the lottery draw was 'goods' (as held by this court in Anraj) there was no reason why REP licence carrying a far more valuable and tangible right may not be 'goods'. 10. The Madras High Court also rejected the challenge to imposition of tax on transfer of REP licences. 11. The matter finally came to this court in a batch of appeals from the High Courts' decisions and writ petitions directly filed here, with the leading case being Vikas Sales Corporation and was decided by a Bench of three-Judges. 12. In Vikas it was noticed at the outset that the High Courts' judgments were influenced mainly by the decision in Anraj (Paragraphs 2 & 6 of the decision reported in SCC) but then this court went on to examine the matter on its own. It referred to Entry 54 in List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution to which the Sales Tax Acts of the different States are referable and also Entry 92-A of List I that is the legislative head for the Central Sales Tax Act (Paragraph 10). It then referred to the definition of 'goods' as given in clause 12 of Article 366 of the Constitution and the expanded definiti....
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....e (12th. Edn. 1966) cited by the counsel for the assesses and observed that in Salmond's there was nothing that would militate against the meanings ascribed to the expression in the authorities earlier referred to by the court and as a matter of fact those were consistent with each other. 15. The court then examined the features of REP licence and in particular it's free transferability for consideration and finally recorded its conclusions in paragraph 29 of the judgment as follows: "The above provisions do establish that REP Licences have their own value. They are bought and sold as such. The original licensee or the purchaser is not bound to import the goods permissible thereunder. He can simply sell it to another and that another to yet another person. In other words, these licences/Exim Scrips have an inherent value of their own and are traded as such. They are treated and dealt with in the commercial world as merchandise, as goods. A REP Licence/Exim Scrip is neither a chose-in-action nor an actionable claim. It is also not in the nature of a title deed. It has a value of its own. It is by itself a property - and it is for this reason that it is freely bought an....
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....nature of an actionable claim. The said argument was rejected after an elaborate discussion of law on the subject. We agree with the said decision and on that basis hold that the REP Licences/Exim Scrips are not in the nature of actionable claims." The court then considered the decisions relied upon on behalf of the assessees and held those were of no assistance to the appellants/petitioners before the court. Then commenting upon the decision relied upon by the counsel for the State of Tamil Nadu the court made the following observation in paragraph 42 of the judgment: "....Having regard to the context in which the said question had arisen, we do not think it necessary to refer to the observations relied upon since the material referred to by us on the meaning of the expression "moveable property" and the decision in Anraj is more to the point." The court also rejected the various other ancillary submissions made on behalf of the assessees and finally upheld the levy of tax on the transfer of REP licences under Karnataka and Tamil Nadu Sales Tax Acts. 16. This was Vikas. 17. Coming back to the lottery tickets, the decision of this court in Anraj was understood and ....
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....on the expression must have the same meaning as given to it in section 4 (1) of the Sales of Goods Act where it is defined as a "contract whereby the seller transfers or agrees to transfer the property in goods to the buyer for a price". The narrow meaning ascribed to the expression by this court was naturally followed by courts all over the country and this led to the amendment of Article 366 by insertion of clause 29A, defining 'Sale of Goods' so as to include the six kinds of transactions which, as a result of the Court's decision in Gannon Dunkerley, were excluded from the expression. It took note of sub-clause (a) of clause 29-A which is as follows: "29-A "tax on the sale or purchase of goods" includes- (a) a tax on the transfer, otherwise than in pursuance of a contract, of property in any goods for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration; and such transfer, delivery or supply of any goods shall be deemed to be a sale of those goods by the person making the transfer, delivery or supply and a purchase of those goods by the person to whom such transfer, delivery or supply is made." The Court summed up the legal position emerging from the insertion of cla....
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....e various definitions of the word "lottery" in dictionaries and authoritative text books and decisions of the courts and held that a lottery was composed of three essential elements, namely, (1) chance, (2) consideration; and (3) prize. As we have mentioned earlier, according to the learned Judges a sale of a lottery ticket conferred on the purchaser two rights viz. (a) the right to participate in the draw, and (b) the right to claim a prize contingent upon the purchaser being successful in the draw. Both were held to be beneficial interests in movable property, the former in praesenti, the latter in futuro depending on the contingency." The Sunrise decision then proceeded to note how the decision in Anraj was interpreted by the Karnataka Court (paragraph 19 of the judgment) and quite differently to it by the Delhi High Court (paragraph 23 of the decision). 21. The Court then noted the plea of the appellants/dealers in the sale of lottery tickets that Anraj was wrong in drawing a distinction between the right to participate in the draw and the chance to win the prize; that such bifurcation was artificial as both were part of the same transaction and further that even on the "two ....
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.... and (b) the right to claim a prize contingent upon the purchaser being successful in the draw. Further, for the purpose of levy of sales tax, lottery ticket could be regarded as 'goods' properly so called insofar as it entitled its holder to take part in the draw. In other words, lottery ticket, to the extent it evidenced the right to claim the prize, was not 'goods' but an actionable claim and, therefore, expressly excluded from the definition of 'goods' under the sales tax laws. A transfer of it was consequently not a sale. The lottery ticket per se had no innate value. The Delhi High Court was, therefore, plainly in error in interpreting and following Anjar. 23. Having thus settled the precise ratio of the decision in Anjar, the Court turned to the meaning of 'goods' for the purposes of imposition of sales tax and in paragraph 35 of the judgment observed as follows: "The word "goods" for the purposes of imposition of sales tax has been uniformly defined in the various sales tax laws as meaning all kinds of movable property. The word "property" may denote the nature of the interest in goods and when used in this sense means title or ownership in a thing. The word may also be u....
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.... It referred to Webster's Words and Phrases, Permanent Edn., Vol.25-A and in paragraph 43 came to hold as follows: "The sale of a ticket does not necessarily involve the sale of goods. For example, the purchase of a railway ticket gives the right to a person to travel by railway. It is nothing other than a contract of carriage. The actual ticket is merely evidence of the right to travel. A contract is not property, but only a promise supported by consideration, upon breach of which either a claim for specific performance or damages would lie (Said v. Butt) [1920 (3) KB 497]. Like railway tickets, a ticket to see a cinema or a pawnbroker's ticket are memoranda or contracts between the vendors of the ticket and the purchasers. Cases on whether the terms specified on such tickets bind the purchaser are legion. It is sufficient for our purpose to note that tickets are themselves, normally evidence of and in some cases the contract between the buyer of the ticket and its seller. Therefore a lottery ticket can be held to be goods if at all only because it evidences the transfer of a right." (Emphasis added) It further pointed out that the purchaser of lottery ticket simply acquir....
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.... very significant points and to us it appears that the decision mainly turns on those two points. The first is with regard to the two different meanings of 'property', as highlighted in paragraph 35 of the judgment and the second is with regard to the distinction between interests in goods and a contract as highlighted in paragraph 43 of the judgment. In paragraph 35 of the decision the court explained that the word 'property' occurring both in the definitions of 'goods' and 'sale' carries different meanings. In the definition of 'goods' the word 'property' is used to mean the subject matter of ownership, that is to say, the thing itself. In the definition of 'sale' the same word is used to mean the nature of interests in goods, that is, title or ownership. 25. In paragraphs 42 and 43 of the decision, the court examined the nature of a ticket and by giving illustrations of a railway ticket, a ticket to see a cinema or a pawnbroker's ticket pointed out that the tickets were normally evidence of and in some cases the contract between the buyer of the ticket and its seller. Being a contract or evidence of a contract, naturally a ticket can not be property eith....
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....hin the definition of goods quite independently. The court found and held that REP licenses had their own value; they were freely bought and sold in the market for their intrinsic value and for that reason alone those were goods. (See paragraph 29 of the decision in Vikas that is reproduced above). It was only after coming to the conclusion that the Court proceeded to examine the matter in light of the observations made in Anraj relating to lottery tickets and that too because the Karnataka and Madras High Courts had heavily relied upon the Anraj decision for holding that the sale of REP licences was exigible to sales tax. On a careful reading of the decision in Vika it is apparent that it was the intrinsic value of REP licence that brought it within the definition of goods. 29. At this stage we feel obliged to put in a caveat in regard to the observations made in Sunrise about marketability being a feature of distinction between 'goods' proper and actionable claims. What was said in Vikas, as we understand it, was that the innate value of REP licence and its free transferability made it into a market commodity. The illustrations given in paragraphs 39 and 40 of the d....
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....made elaborate arguments to bring out the points of distinction between REP licence and DEPB. But before proceeding to examine what is DEPB and how far it is different from REP licence it will be useful to take a look at the provisions of law under which the present cases arise and to establish their similarity with the statutory provisions that came up for consideration in Vikas and Sunrise. As noted above, the present appeals arise under the Delhi Sales Tax Act, 1975, the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963 and the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959. 31. In the Delhi Sales Tax Act `goods' is defined in Section 2(g) as follows: ""goods" includes all materials, articles, commodities and all other kinds of movable property, but does not include newspapers, actionable claims, stocks, shares, securities or money." The expression "sale" is defined in Section 2(l) as follows: ""sale" with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions, means any transfer of property in goods by one person to another for cash or for deferred payment or for any other valuable consideration, and includes --- In the Kerala General Sales Tax Act "goods" is defined in Section 2 (xii) as follows: ""goods" mea....
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....is entered with sales tax or purchase tax leviable at the rate of four per cent. 32. A perusal of the aforesaid provisions would show that the definitions of "goods" and "sale" under the Delhi, Bombay and Kerala Acts are much the same as the definitions of the two expressions in the Tamil Nadu, Karnataka and West Bengal enactments. Hence, what is said in Vikas and Sunrise in regard to the legal provisions fully applies to the cases in hand. 33. Coming now to DEPB it may be recalled that it was part of the export and import policy for the period April 1, 1997 to March 31, 2002 issued under the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation)Act, 1992. In order to appreciate the differences between DEPB and REP licences it needs to be borne in mind that after the regimen of licences and permits was greatly relaxed it became possible to import goods free from licencing control apart from a few items which were under the negative list, requiring a licence for import. In the changed circumstances the 'licence' part of REP licence became useless and REP licence was, therefore, replaced by DEPB broadly retaining the other features of REP licence. 34. The 1997 export and import policy in Chap....
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....e non-transferable and also subject to actual user condition but in this case we are not concerned with pre-export DEPB. 36. It is thus to be seen that in two vital aspects, relevant to the issue under consideration, DEPB is exactly the same as REP licence. Like REP license it has an innate value and for which it freely sells in the market. Much argument was advanced on the point that DEPB, unlike REP licence was not a licence for import of goods but the submission is clearly misconceived and unacceptable. DEPB is not a licence simply because under the liberal import policy no licence is required to import a very large number of goods and very few items, placed under the negative list, require a licence for import. We are, therefore, unable to accept the submission that DEPB is materially different from REP licence and its transfer by way of sale would not be exigible to sales tax. 37. Mr.Soli J. Sorabjee, learned senior advocate, appearing in Civil Appeal No.6893 of 2003 led the arguments on behalf of the appellants. Mr. Sorabjee referred to Entry 26(6) in Schedule C of the Bombay Sales Tax and submitted that what was sought to be taxed was the transfer of "Credit" in Duty....