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2022 (8) TMI 631
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....e Limited Company incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 and engaged in the business of manufacturing iron and steel products. The appellant had filed TRAN-1 to claim CGST input credit of Rs.30,74,436/-. However, the Adjudicating Authority by an order dated 26.06.2019 had disallowed the CGST input credit of Rs.25,33,950/-. 4. Against the aforesaid order, the appellant preferred an appeal on 16.12.2019 under Section 107 (1) of the Chhattisgarh Goods and Service Tax Act, 2017 (for short, 'CGST Act') before respondent No.3 and had deposited 10% of the amount in dispute. 5. The appeal was rejected by an order dated 20.12.2019 passed by respondent No.3 on the ground of the same being barred by limitation. 6. Writ petition was filed assailing the said order dated 20.12.2019 passed by respondent No.3 with a further prayer to direct the respondent No.3 to hear the appeal preferred by the appellant on merits. 7. It will be appropriate to extract relevant provisions of Section 107 of the CGST Act : "107. Appeals to Appellate Authority.-(1) Any person aggrieved by any decision or order passed under this Act or the State Goods and Services Tax Act or ....
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....ious ailment, and therefore, an application for condonation of delay had been filed. In such circumstance, respondent No. 3 ought to have considered the application for condonation of delay. He has drawn our attention to Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for short, 'Limitation Act') and submits that there being no express exclusion of provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 of Limitation Act under the CGST Act, respondent No.3 had power to condone the delay on satisfaction being arrived at that there was sufficient cause for the delay. 10. Mr. Vikram Sharma, learned Deputy Government Advocate, appearing for the respondents, submits that the CGST Act is a special law and same is a complete code by itself and the relevant provisions make it abundant clear that the provisions of Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, and therefore, the submission of Mr. Pandey that there is power to condone delay even beyond the period prescribed is entirely misplaced. He relies on the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Patel Brothers v. State of Assam, reported in (2017) 2 SCC 350, P. Radha Bai and Others v. P. Ashok Kumar and Another, reported in (2019) 13 SCC 445 ....
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....ts conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Act in question. Accordingly, it was held that even in a case where the special law does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it would nonetheless be open to the Court to examine whether and to what extent the nature of those provisions or the nature of subject matter and scheme of the special law exclude their operation. 16. The aforesaid principle was reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise v. Hongo India Private Limited & Another , reported in (2009) 5 SCC 791. At paragraph 35, it was observed as follows: "It was contended before us that the words "expressly excluded" would mean that there must be an express reference made in the special or local law to the specific provisions of the Limitation Act of which the operation is to be excluded. In this regard, we have to see the scheme of the special law which here in this case is the Central Excise Act. The nature of the remedy provided therein is such that the legislature intended it to be a complete code by itself which al....
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.... other party may, within one hundred and eighty days of the date upon which he is served with notice of an order under Section 35-C passed before the 1st day of July, 2003 (not being an order relating, among other things, to the determination of any question having a relation to the rate of duty of excise or to the value of goods for purposes of assessment), by application in the prescribed form, accompanied, where the application is made by the other party, by a fee of two hundred rupees, apply to the High Court to direct the Appellate Tribunal to refer to the High Court any question of law arising from such order of the Tribunal." 19. Unamended Section 35-H of the C.E. Act dealt with reference application to the High Court. Under sub-section (1) thereof, such reference application could be preferred within a period of 180 days of the date upon which the aggrieved party is served with notice of an order under Section 35-C of the C.E. Act. There was no provision to extend the period of limitation for filing the application to the High Court beyond the said period and to condone the delay. Pertinently, under the scheme of the C.E. Act itself, in case of appeal to the Commissioner....
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....#39;ble Supreme Court held that the approach to be adopted by the High Court in such cases is to examine the provisions of special law to arrive at a conclusion as to whether there was legislative intent to exclude the operation of Limitation Act. As Section 84 of the VAT Act made only Sections 4 and 12 of the Limitation Act applicable to the proceedings under the VAT Act, it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the apparent legislative intent, which can be clearly evinced, is to exclude other provisions, including Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It was observed that if the intention of the legislature was to make Section 5, or for that matter, other provisions of the Limitation Act applicable to the proceedings under the VAT Act, there was no necessity to make specific provision like Section 84 thereby making only Sections 4 and 12 of the Limitation Act applicable to such proceedings, inasmuch as these two Sections would also have become applicable by virtue of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. 23. In P. Radha Bai (Supra), the inquiry conducted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court was whether the text or the scheme and object of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1....
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....ted by sufficient cause from presenting the appeal within the aforesaid period of sixty days, allow it to be presented within a further period of thirty days. (2) Every appeal under this section shall be in the prescribed form and shall be verified in the prescribed manner. 7. It is to be noted that the periods sixty days and thirty days have been substituted for within three months and three months by Act 14 of 2001, with effect from 11.5.2001. 27. It was observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals) as also the Tribunal being creatures of Statute are vested with jurisdiction to condone the delay beyond the permissible period provided under the Statute. The period upto which the prayer for condonation can be accepted is statutorily provided. The first proviso to Section 35 makes the position clear that the appeal has to be preferred within three months from the date of communication to him of the decision or order. However, if the Commissioner is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the appeal within the aforesaid period of 60 days, he can allow it to be presented within a furt....
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....9;ble Supreme Court that it is evident that the statutory appeal was required to be filed within 30 days from the date on which the order or proceeding was served on the assessee. If the appeal is filed after expiry of prescribed period, the appellate authority is empowered to condone the delay in filing the appeal, only if it is filed within a further period of not exceeding 30 days and sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within prescribed time is made out. The appellate authority is not empowered to condone delay beyond the aggregate period of 60 days from the date of order or service of proceeding on the assessee, as the case may be. It is to be noted, at this juncture, that in the aforesaid case, admittedly, the appeal was filed beyond the total 60 days' period specified in terms of Section 31 of the AP VAT Act. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the AP VAT Act is a special legislation within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act and, therefore, the prescription with regard to the limitation has binding effect and the same has to be followed regard being had to its mandatory nature. It was also explained that the prescription of limitation in th....