2022 (4) TMI 1431
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....nuing for monthly tenancy of the appellant. The premises in question was not in the urban area when the suit for possession was filed on 18.4.2013 after serving a notice of termination of tenancy under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 For short, the 'TP Act'. During the pendency of the suit, the State Government issued a notification on 11.7.2014 extending the provisions of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 For short, the 'Act' w.e.f. 11.5.2015. 4. The Civil Court passed the decree for possession against the appellants on 28.5.2015 even though the Act became applicable to the area in question w.e.f. 11.5.2015. Aggrieved against the said judgment and decree, the appellants filed first appeal before the Additional District Judge, Suratgarh which was dismissed on 5.10.2021. In the second appeal before the High Court, the appellants relied on the Division Bench judgment of the Rajasthan High Court reported as K. Ramnarayan Khandelwal v. Shri Pukhraj Banthiya 2017 SCC OnLine Raj 4178 wherein it has been held that the decree in civil suit could not be passed after the applicability of the Act to the area in question. The High Court in the impugned judgment found th....
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.... be called the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001. (2) It shall extend in first instance to such of the municipal areas which are comprising the District Headquarters in the State and later on to such of the other municipal areas having a population exceeding fifty thousand as per 1991 Census as the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify from time to time. xx xx xx 18. Jurisdiction of Rent Tribunal.-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, in the areas to which this Act extends, only the Rent Tribunal and no civil court shall have jurisdiction to hear and decide the petitions relating to disputes between ....
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....bsp; xxx (c) xxx xxx (d) xxx xxx 7. The argument of learned counsel for the appellants is that after the notification of the State Government issued on 11.7.2014, became operative from 11.5.2015, it was the Rent Tribunal alone which would have jurisdiction to hea....
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....ts construction is completed]: 20. Bar of suit for eviction of tenant except on specified grounds. -(1) Save as provided in sub-section (2), no suit shall be instituted for the eviction of a tenant from a building, notwithstanding the determination of his tenancy by efflux of time or on the expiration of a notice to quit or in any other manner: Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall bar a suit for the eviction of a tenant on the determination of his tenancy by efflux of time where the tenancy for a fixed term was entered into by or in pursuance of a compromise or adjustment arrived at with reference to a suit, appeal, revision or execution proceeding, which is either recorded in court or otherwise reduced to writing and signed by the tenant." 11. In Om Prakash Gupta v. DIG Vijendrapal Gupta (1982) 2 SCC 61, a question arose whether the Rent Act would be applicable to a building which was constructed prior to the applicability of the Rent Act and whether the exemption granted to newly constructed buildings would be available to such building. It was held that the Rent Act is not applicable to a building which does not have a standing for ten years, even....
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....nds" and again in the wording of the section itself it provides: "No suit shall be instituted for eviction". This clearly indicates that the restriction put under Section 20 is to the institution of the suit itself and therefore it is clear that if the provisions of this Act applies then no suit for eviction can be instituted except on the grounds specified in the sub-sections of this section. Keeping in view the language of this section if we examine the provisions contained in sub-section (2) of Section 2 it will be clear that for a newly constructed building the provisions of this Act will not apply for 10 years and therefore so far as the restriction under Section 20 is concerned they will not apply and therefore it is clear that within 10 years as provided for in sub-section (2) of Section 2 restriction on the institution of suit as provided for in Section 20 sub-section (1) quoted above will not be applicable and it is thus clear that during the pendency of the litigation even if 10 years expired the restriction will not be attracted as the suit has been instituted within 10 years and therefore restriction as provided for in Section 20 cannot be attracted." 13. Later in Ra....
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....om in execution of a decree passed before or after the commencement of this Act or otherwise and whether before or after the termination of the tenancy, except in accordance with the provisions of this Section, [or in pursuance of an order made under Section 13 of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1947, as subsequently amended]." 15. The Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 For short, the "Haryana Rent Act" provides that a tenant in possession of a building or a rented land shall not be evicted therefrom except in accordance with the provisions of this section. The relevant provisions of the said Act read thus: "1. xx xx xx (3) Nothing in this Act shall apply to any building the construction of w....
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....disposal of the case within the period of exemption of ten years which is in reality an impossibility, then there would be empty reasons. In our opinion, bearing in mind the well-settled principle that the rights of the parties crystallise to (sic on) the date of the institution of the suit as enunciated by this Court in Om Prakash Gupta v. Digvijendrapal Gupta [(1982) 2 SCC 61 : (1982) 3 SCR 491] , the meaningful construction must be that the exemption would apply for a period of ten years and will continue to be available until suit is disposed of or adjudicated. Such suit or proceeding must be instituted within the stipulated period of ten years. Once rights crystallise the adjudication must be in accordance with law." 17. In a three-judge Bench judgment reported as Shri Kishan & Ors. v. Manoj Kumar & Ors. (1998) 2 SCC 710, the judgment of this Court in Vineet Kumar was specifically overruled. This Court held as under: "20. Thus it is seen that this Court has been consistently taking the view that a suit instituted during the period of exemption could be continued and a decree passed therein could be executed even though the period of exemption came to an end during ....
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.... applicable to the pending suit for eviction of the tenant. 6. The learned counsel for the appellant tenant has placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Nandlal v. Moti Lal [(1977) 3 SCC 500 : AIR 1977 SC 2143] . The said decision is an authority for the proposition that the Order becomes applicable to any area which is notified to be a municipality from the date of such notification because the Order was already applicable in the Province of C.P. and Berar. However, this Court has very specifically held that the provisions of the Order would become applicable from that date i.e. the date on which a particular area within which the suit premises are situated, is notified to be a municipality. The Order is not retrospective in operation. It does not affect the validity of the proceedings initiated before the date on which the Order became applicable. Clause 13 of the Order does not restrain the court from exercising its power to pass a decree of eviction. All that clause 13 provides is to impose a restriction on the right of the landlord to initiate the proceedings for eviction. Inasmuch as the proceedings for eviction were already initiated and the Order is not retro....
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....suit validly instituted prior in point of time when there was no such protection under the Act, it will have the consequence of making the decree, that is obtained prior to the Rent Act becoming applicable to the said area/premises, unexecutable after the application of these Rent Acts in respect of such premises. This would not be in consonance with the legislative intent. xx xx xx 23. When we apply the principles laid down above to the instant case, we find that this case would fall in the category of Atma Ram Mittal [Atma Ram Mittal v. Ishwar Singh Punia, (1988) 4 SCC 284] and Mansoor Khan [Mansoor Khan v. Motiram Harebhan Kharat, (2002) 5 SCC 462] , etc. as under the scheme of the R....
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....ent case as the fact remains that the High Court has taken a view that the decree of the civil court could be validly passed to which we agree. 23. Another judgment referred to is Pandurang Ramchandra Mandlik & Anr. v. Shantibai Ramchandra Ghatge & Ors. 1989 Supp (2) SCC 627 wherein the issue was maintainability of the suit filed by the appellants under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. The finding returned was that the said Act is not applicable to the land in question as only natural grass grew thereon. The issue was whether the civil court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit or the competent authority under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 would have the jurisdiction to decide the suit. The question was regarding the jurisdiction of the civil court and the revenue court not that whether the decree passed by the civil court could be executed. 24. Reference has been made to Dilip v. Mohd. Azizul Haq & Anr. (2000) 3 SCC 607 wherein Section 13-A of the C.P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 as amended on 26.10.1989 barred the passing of a decree of eviction in a suit for proceedings filed and pending. The rele....
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....pective. The same is on the statute-book on the date on which the suit or proceeding is pending for purpose of eviction and cannot ignore the provision on the statute-book. Therefore, the view of the High Court on this aspect of the matter also, is incorrect. The arguments advanced on behalf of the respondents that these amendments are retrospective in character and could not have been made in the absence of an authority under the main enactment by virtue of which such order is made are untenable." 26. The facts of the said case do not go to the extent to say that the decree of the civil court cannot be executed if the Act has been extended to an urban area. 27. Mr. Sankaranarayanan has also referred to the judgment of this Court reported as Subhash Chander & Ors. v. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (BPCL) & Anr. 2022 SCC OnLine SC 98 wherein the landlord had filed a civil suit for possession though the premises was situated in the urban area governed by the Haryana Rent Act. It has been held that such civil suit is not maintainable as the remedy lies under the Haryana Rent Act. This Court held as under: "25. In the given circumstances, we are of the considered view....
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