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2022 (7) TMI 2
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....the sentence of imprisonment imposed on the petitioner by the lower Court alone is hereby suspended till the disposal of the appeal and the petitioner is ordered to be enlarged on bail on his executing a bond for Rs.10,000/- with two sureties each for a likesum to the satisfaction of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, FTC-III, Saidapet, Chennai within two weeks from the date of this order and further condition that the petitioner shall deposit 15% of the cheque amount (Rs.3,18,000/-) to the credit of C.C. number on the file of the Trial Court within 60 days from the date of this order." 3. The complainant is aggrieved by the said order inasmuch as Section 148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 lays down that 20% of the compensation/fine amount has to be deposited and in the instant case, while double the cheque amount has been ordered as compensation, the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Chennai ordered 15% of the cheque amount alone to be deposited in terms of Section 148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. And hence the revision. 4. Heard Mr.Bijesh Thomas, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Mr.G.R.Hari, learned Counsel for the respondent. 5. Mr.Bijesh Th....
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....hether the order impunged is an interlocutory order and whether any revision would lie against the same. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra (1977) 4 SCC 551, considered the aspect in detail and after considering the nature of the powers of revision of the High Court in paragraph No.8 and the fact that the revisional jurisdiction is being routinely invoked and only to put fetters on such unmindful and repeated approach to the High Courts, the embargo under sub-section (2) of 397 was introduced, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, thereafter, from paragraph No.12 onwards, proceeded to consider what can be meaning of the term "interlocutory order" and first considered the definition contained in Halsbury's Laws of England, in paragraph No.12, which is extracted hereunder:- "12. Ordinarily and generally the expression "interlocutory order" has been understood and taken to mean as a converse of the term "final order". In volume 22 of the third edition of Halsbury's Laws of England at p. 742, however, it has been stated in para 1606: "... a judgment or order may be final for one purpose and interlocutory for anoth....
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....ion if this strict test were to be applied in interpreting the words 'interlocutory order' occurring in Section 397(2), then the order taking cognizance of an offence by a Court, whether it is so done illegally or without jurisdiction, will not be a final order and hence will be an interlocutory one. Even so, as we have said above, the inherent power of the High Court can be invoked for quashing such a criminal proceeding. But in our judgment such an interpretation and the universal application of the principle that what is not a final order must be an interlocutory order is neither warranted nor justified. If it were so it will render almost nugatory the revisional power of the Sessions Court or the High Court conferred on it by Section 397(1). On such a strict interpretation, only those orders would be revisable which are orders passed on the final determination of the action but are not appealable under Chapter XXIX of the Code. This does not seem to be the intention of the Legislature when it retained the revisional power of the High Court in terms identical to the one in the 1898 Code. In what cases then the High Court will examine the legality or the propriety of an order or ....
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....s construction, we think that the bar in sub-section (2) of Section 397 is not meant to be attracted to such kinds of intermediate orders. They may not be final orders for the purposes of Article 134 of the Constitution, yet it would not be correct to characterise them as merely interlocutory orders within the meaning of Section 397(2). It is neither advisable, nor possible, to make a catalogue of orders to demonstrate which kinds of orders would be merely, purely or simply interlocutory and which kinds of orders would be final, and then to prepare an exhaustive list of those types of orders which will fall in between the two. The first two kinds are well-known and can be culled out from many decided cases. We may, however, indicate that the type of order with which we are concerned in this case, even though it may not be final in one sense, is surely not interlocutory so as to attract the bar of sub-section (2) of Section 397. In our opinion it must be taken to be an order of the type falling in the middle course. 10. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, thereafter, considered the decisions in Amar Nath and Ors. Vs. State of Haryana and Another (1977) 4 SCC 137 case, then, M....
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.... in L.G.R. Enterprises and Ors. vs. P. Anbazhagan MANU/TN/4768/2019, this Court had enunciated the purpose of the Parliament bringing in Section 148 of the Negotiable Instrument Act and paragraph No.8(i) of the said judgment is extracted as hereunder:- "8.1. Having observed and found that because of the delay tactics of unscrupulous drawers of dishonoured cheques due to easy filing of appeals and obtaining stay on proceedings, the object and purpose of the enactment of Section 138 of the N.I. Act was being frustrated, the Parliament has thought it fit to amend Section 148 of the N.I. Act, by which the first appellate Court, in an appeal challenging the order of conviction under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, is conferred with the power to direct the convicted accused - appellant to deposit such sum which shall be a minimum of 20% of the fine or compensation awarded by the trial Court. By the amendment in Section 148 of the N.I. Act, it cannot be said that any vested right of appeal of the accused - appellant has been taken away and / or affected." 14. In Surinder Singh Deswal @ Col. S.S.Deswal and Ors. Vs. Virender Gandhi and Anr. (cited supra), the nature of power exerci....