TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2022 (6) TMI 407
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.... "1. The learned CIT(A) erred in law and on facts in not condoning the delay in filing of appeal without appreciating that there was a sufficient and genuine reason for the delay. 2. The learned CIT(A) erred in law and on facts in confirming levy of fees u/s 234E Rs 42,758/- for non filing of TDS statement in form 26Q/quarter 2. 3. The appellant craves to add, alter, modify or substitute any ground of appeal at the time of hearing." 5. Briefly, the facts of the case are as under : The appellant received intimation u/s 200A dated 26.12.2013 issued by the ACIT, CPC-TDS, Ghaziabad for assessment year 2013-14 levying late fee u/s 234E for delay in submission of TDS returns. 6. Being aggrieved by the said intimation, an appeal was filed with delay of before the ld. CIT(A), who vide impugned order had not condoned the delay on the ground that the assessee had failed to demonstrate sufficient and reasonable cause for delay in filing the appeal. 7. Being aggrieved by the above decision of the ld. CIT(A), the appellant is in appeal before us. 8. During the course of hearing before us, it is submitted that the provisions of section 200A were inserted by only ....
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.... must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so." 11. Similarly, the Hon'ble Jurisdictional High Court in the case of Vijay Vishin Meghani vs. DCIT, 389 ITR 250 (Bom.) held that in the matter of condonation of delay an overall view in the larger interest of justice has to be taken. None should be deprived of an adjudication on merits unless the....
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....endment was made u/s 200A of the Act providing that fee u/s 234E could be computed at the time of processing of the return of income and intimation could be issued specifying the same payable by the dedutor as fee u/s 234E of the Act. The Hon'ble Karnataka High Court in the case of Fatheraj Singhvi vs. Union of India, 73 taxmann.com 252 held that the provisions of section 234E of the Act are substantive in nature and the mechanism for computing the late fee was provided by the Parliament only w.e.f. 01.06.2015. Therefore, late fees u/s 234E of the Act can be levied only prospectively w.e.f. 01.06.2015. The relevant observation of the Hon'ble Karnataka High Court in the case of Fatheraj Singhvi (supra) are extracted hereunder :- "19. Hence, it can be said that, the mechanism provided for enforceability of Section 200(3) or 206C (3) for filing of the statement by making it penal under Section 272A (2) (k) is done away in view of the insertion of Section 271H providing for penal provision for such failure to submit return. When the Parliament has simultaneously brought about Section 234E, Section 271H and the aforesaid proviso to Section 272A(2), it can be said that, the fee ....
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....bar for penalty under Section 272A by insertion of proviso to Section 272A(2), it can be said that a particular set up for imposition and the payment of fee under Section 234E was provided but, it did not provide for making of demand of such fee under Section 200A payable under Section 234E. Hence, considering the aforesaid peculiar facts and circumstances, we are unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for respondent-Revenue that insertion of clause (c) to (f) under Section 200A(1) should be treated as retroactive in character and not prospective. 22. It is hardly required to be stated that, as per the well established principles of interpretation of statute, unless it is expressly provided or impliedly demonstrated, any provision of statute is to be read as having prospective effect and not retrospective effect. Under the circumstances, we find that substitution made by clause (c) to (f) of sub-section (1) of Section 200A can be read as having prospective effect and not having retroactive character or effect. Resultantly, the demand under Section 200A for computation and intimation for the payment of fee under Section 234E could not be made in purported ex....
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....e there would not be any cause on the part of the petitioners to continue to maintain the challenge to constitutional validity under Section 234E of the Act. At this stage, we may also record that the learned counsels appearing for the appellant had also declared that if the impugned notices under Section 200A are set aside, so far as it relates to computation and intimation for payment of fee under Section 234E, the appellant10 petitioners would not press the challenge to the constitutional validity of Section 234E of the Act. But, they submitted that the question of constitutional validity of Section 234E may be kept open to be considered by the Division Bench and the Judgment of the learned Single Judge may not conclude the constitutional validity of Section 234E of the Act. 26. Under these circumstances, we find that no further discussion would be required for examining the constitutional validity of Section 234E of the Act. Save and except to observe that the question of constitutional validity of Section 234E of the Act before the Division Bench of this Court shall remain open and shall not be treated as concluded. 27. In view of the aforesaid observations a....