TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2016 (10) TMI 1353
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....2 of the Share Purchase Agreement dated 12 March 2015 viz. to have an absolute say on the hiring and dismissal of employees of the Society; (b) Direct that the Respondents through their directors (including but not limited to Mr. Shantanu Prakash), officers, agents, representatives and employees (including but not limited to the Respondent No. 3) cease and desist from interfering with any aspect of the hiring and dismissal rights of the Petitioners pursuant to clause 3.1.2 of the Share Purchase Agreement dated 12 March 2015, including interfering in any manner whatsoever with prompt payments to employees hired and/or dismissed by the Society. (c) Direct the Respondent No. 3 (or any other person appointed in his capacity) to forthwith take steps to effect the payment of salaries to Dr. C.S. Sharma and/or take necessary steps to effect prompt payments of salaries to any other employees hired by the Society. (d) Restrain the Respondents No. 1 and 2 including through their affiliates, related parties, directors, officers, agents, representatives and employees (including but not limited to the Respondent No. 3) from taking any steps whatsoever in contravention of clause 3.1.2 of t....
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....ited to the extent that the Purchasers shall have absolute say on the hiring and dismissal of employees (including existing employees); and (ii) to take charge of JRRES' application to the Government of Uttar Pradesh, India for becoming a deemed university. For clarification, upon the Execution Date, funding of the operations of the Company, JRRES, MIDL and MSB shall be the exclusive responsibility of the Purchasers, details of which shall be shared with the Sellers from time to time till closing. In the event the Closing does not take place as envisaged in this Agreement and this Agreement is terminated, the Sellers shall within 30 (Thirty) days, introduce an amount equivalent to the total funding contributed by the Purchasers in JRRES for the operations of JRRES in this period as working capital." 4.4 Certain disputes arose between the parties in relation to the Agreement. Clause 15 of the Agreement provides that the Agreement would be governed and construed in accordance with the laws of Singapore. Further the Arbitration would be held in Singapore under the Arbitration Rules of the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (hereafter 'SIAC Rules'). 4.5 On 15.09.2....
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.... of the Society to act in breach of their fiduciary duty to the Society. 5. It is stated by the petitioners that despite passing of the Emergency Award, the respondents are acting in contravention of the rights of the petitioners under the Agreement inasmuch as respondents have refused to accept the appointment of Dr C.S. Sharma, who was appointed by the petitioners to replace Professor Gandhi and further, respondent No. 3 has also refused to sign the cheques for payment of salary to Dr Sharma. It is further stated the respondents are illegally and mala fidely disrupting the functioning of the Society and the Noida College. It is under these circumstances, the petitioners have filed the present petition under Section 9 of the Act. Submissions 6. At the outset, Mr. Suhail Dutt, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondents submitted that present petition is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed. He contended that since the seat of arbitration was Singapore and the Agreement was entered into after the Supreme Court had delivered the judgment in Bharat Aluminium Company v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc.: (2012) 9 SCC 552, Part I of the Act would not apply....
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....Award and recourse to Section 9 for enforcement of Emergency Award (which is an interim order) was not available. 10. Mr. Vashist, Senior counsel appearing for the petitioners countered the contentions advanced by Mr. Dutt. He submitted that reading the proviso to Section 2(2) of the Amendment Act in the manner as suggested by Mr. Dutt would render the said proviso absolutely redundant. He contended that the very purpose for which Section 2(2) was amended was to confer the jurisdiction on Indian courts in respect of Sections 9 and 27 of the Act, even if the seat of arbitration is outside India. He earnestly contended that in the expression "subject to an agreement to the contrary", the word "agreement" would mean something more than the choice of law and seat of arbitration. He further submitted that the decision in Bhatia International (supra) was No. longer good law for agreements entered into after 06.09.2012 as it was over-ruled prospectively by the constitution bench of the Supreme Court in Bharat Aluminium (supra). He also submitted that mere choosing SIAC Rules for arbitration does not in any way indicate that Part I has been impliedly excluded by the parties. 11. Mr. Vash....
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....aforesaid two limbs are not exhaustive. This is so because the first limb - which is in the negative form - only refers to proceedings commenced in accordance with Section 21 of the Act prior to the commencement of the Amendment Act (23.10.2015). Section 21 is in Part I of the Act and, indisputably, applies only to arbitral proceedings in India. There is No. reference to arbitral proceedings that have commenced other than under Part-I of the Act. Thus, clearly, the first limb of Section 26 of the Amendment Act would not cover arbitral proceedings commenced outside India - arbitral proceedings to which Part I of the Act does not apply. In the context of those arbitral proceedings clearly the provisions of Part II of the Act as amended by the Amendment Act would be applicable and nothing in Section 26 of the Amendment Act bars the applicability of the Amendment Act to those proceedings. 17. If the arbitral proceedings that have commenced under Section 21 of the Act prior to 23.10.2015 and those that are commenced after 23.10.2015 do not exhaust the entire statutory space to which the Amendment Act is applicable, then plainly the provisions of Section 26 as to the applicability of th....
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....ation to', as is used for the second limb of Section 26, is material. The use of the word 'to' clearly restricts the import of the first limb of Section 26. 22. The distinction between the expression 'to' and 'in relation to' was highlighted by the Supreme Court in Thyssen Stahlunion Gmbh v. Steel Authority of India Ltd: (1999) 9 SCC 334 in the context of Section 85(2) of the Act. Section 85 of the Act is the repeal and savings clause. By virtue of Section 85(1) of the Act, the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act, 1937, the Arbitration Act, 1940 and the Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act, 1961 were repealed. However, by virtue of Section 85(2)(a) of the Act, the provisions of the aforesaid enactments were expressly made applicable "in relation to" arbitral proceedings, which had commenced before the Act coming into force. In that context the Supreme Court, inter alia, held as under:- "The provisions of the old Act (Arbitration Act, 1940) shall apply in relation to arbitral proceedings which have commenced before the coming into force of the new Act (the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996). The phrase "in relation to arbitral ....
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....ment Act should not be applied to any proceedings in relation to arbitral proceedings commenced before 23.10.2015, is unpersuasive. It is well settled that if the legislature uses different words in respect of the same subject matter, it must be understood that they were not used to convey the same meaning. In The Member, Board of Revenue v. Arthur Paul Benthall: AIR 1956 SC 35 a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court observed that "When two words of different import are used in a statute in two consecutive provisions, it would be difficult to maintain that they are used in the same sense". In D.L.F. Qutab Enclave Complex Educational Charitable Trust v. State of Haryana and Ors.: (2003) 5 SCC 622, the Supreme Court held that "When different terminologies are used by the legislature it must be presumed that the same had been done consciously with a view to convey different meanings." 25. To summarise, Section 26 of the Amendment Act is silent as to, (i) arbitral proceedings commenced before 23.10.2015 to which Part-I of the Act does not apply; (ii) proceedings in courts in relation to arbitral proceedings commenced before 23.10.2015 to which part-I of the Act applies; and (iii) pr....
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....ndicates, it would not be applied retrospectively to impair a vested right or impose a fresh burden based on past transaction/events. However, procedural laws are presumed to apply retrospectively; this is so because as explained by the Supreme Court in Anant Gopal Sheorey v. State of Bombay : AIR 1958 SC 915, "no person has any right in any course of procedure". In Amireddi Raja Gopala Rao v. Amireddi Sitharamamma and Ors.: (1965) 3 SCR 122, the Supreme Court had observed that "It is a well-recognised rule that a statute should be interpreted, if possible, so as to respect vested rights." These principles have to be kept in mind while addressing the above issue. 31. The Act embodies the Indian Law as applicable to arbitrations. The nature of arbitration law is essentially procedural but it also includes provisions with regard to matters that cannot be classified as mere procedural matters. This would include the question as to whether the disputes are arbitrable; the question as to jurisdiction; the scope of challenge to the awards; and, to some extent even the supportive and supervisory roles of Courts in relation to arbitrations. Thus, the Amending Act does to certain extent af....
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....f any. 35. Thus, in my view, a more appropriate approach would be to consider the nature of arbitration law and effect of the Amendment Act as a whole. Essentially, the provisions of an arbitration law can be classified into four broad categories. The first being the provisions which relate to matters which define the scope of arbitrations; this includes provisions defining the matters that are arbitrable; the scope of arbitration agreements, etc. Such provisions define the entire scope of arbitration and the legal policy of the Alternate Dispute Resolution Mechanism. The second category of provisions relate to the conduct of arbitrations. These provisions essentially provide for the manner in which arbitration shall be conducted. The provisions under chapter V of the Act clearly fall within this category. The parties are free to derogate from most of such provisions and agree to a separate set of rules for conduct of arbitrations. The parties are also free to adopt the rules of any institutional arbitration such as International Chambers of Commerce (ICC), London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA), Delhi International Arbitration Centre (DIAC) etc. The third category of pr....
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....ly the Supreme Court of India). In some cases, the courts had pointed out certain anomalies while in the other cases, the courts had interpreted the law, which the Government felt was different from India's legal policy relating to arbitration. Thus, several amendments have also been introduced to overcome the decisions rendered by the courts. 39. The amendment to Section 2(2) of the Act has been introduced principally to strengthen the view of the Supreme Court in Bharat Aluminium (supra) in respect of lex arbitri being the law that is applicable at the seat of arbitration; at the same time also enable courts to pass interim orders. The amendment is also to overcome the view in Bhatia International (supra). The object of the said amendment is clearly to enable a party to take recourse to the courts to assist the arbitral process being conducted overseas. 40. Significant amendments have been introduced to Section 11 of the Act principally to restrict the judicial intervention at pre-arbitral stage in conformity with Section 8 and 45 of the Act and further to promote institutional arbitrations. Section 11A and IVth Schedule to the Act have been introduced in respect of the arb....
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....e Court had criticized the provision of automatic suspension of execution of the award on filing of a petition under Section 34 of the Act. 43. It is thus, seen that most of the amendments introduced in the Act were either clarificatory or to address certain anomalies in the Act or to remove difficulties. 44. The essential purpose of the Act is to provide the legal framework for an Alternate Dispute Resolution (ADR) mechanism. And, as stated above, the Amendment Act has been enacted for removing the difficulties and the lacunae in the Act. The entire purpose of the Amendment Act is to improve the efficacy of the ADR. Whilst it is understandable that the arbitral proceedings that have already commenced, should be continued in accordance with the procedure as adopted; it is difficult to understand the rationale as to why the supportive and supervisory role of Courts in regard to those proceedings be not provided as per the Amendment Act. If the contention as advanced by the respondents is accepted, it would mean that the courts would adopt different approach in lending their aid to proceedings and enforcement of awards depending upon when the arbitral proceedings commenced. 45. As....
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.... the Court held that an arbitral award would be executable in United Kingdom if the foreign State was a party to the New York Convention, notwithstanding that such State was not a party to the convention when the award was made. Therefore, lifting the stay of enforcement on an award would essentially be an alteration in the procedure. 48. The amendments to Section 36 of the Act, although affects the rights of parties, cannot be read as being retrospective law and, therefore, interpreted as inapplicable for enforcement of awards rendered in relation to the arbitral proceedings commenced before 23.10.2015. The amendments introduced to Section 34 of the Act are also substantive, however, it is seen that the same have been introduced to bring the defence of "public policy" within the scope of that defence, as explained by the Supreme Court in Renu Sagar (supra). The suggestion that changes introduced in Section 34 of the Act are substantial therefore affect the vested rights of the parties, is also inconsiderable. The extent of impairment to extant rights is an essential measure to evaluate whether the law should be interpreted in a manner so as to exclude from its scope the extant ri....
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....rior to insertion of Section 13A as the said provision could not have any retrospective operation. The Court rejected the aforesaid contention. The following passage from the concurring opinion of Lord Mustill is instructive:- "If there were any doubt about this the loud and prolonged chorus of complaints about the disconformity between practices in arbitration and in the High Court, and the increasing impatience for something to be done about it, show quite clearly that s. 13A was intended to bite in full from the outset. If the position were otherwise it would follow that, although Parliament has accepted the advice of all those who had urged that this objectionable system should be brought to an end, and has grasped the nettle and provided a remedy, it has reconciled itself to the continuation of arbitral proceedings already irrevocably stamped with a risk of injustice. I find it impossible to accept that Parliament can have intended any such thing, and with due respect to those who have suggested otherwise I find the meaning of s. 13A sufficiently clear to persuade me that in the interests of reform Parliament was willing to tolerate the very qualified kind of hardship implie....
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....dments in its 176th Report to the Government of India. The Government of India decided to accept most of the recommendations and accordingly, the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Bill, 2003 was introduced in the Rajya Sabha on 22.12.2003. Thereafter, in July, 2004, the Government constituted a Committee under the Chairmanship of Justice Dr B.P. Saraf to undertake the study of implications of the recommendations of the Law Commission relating to Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Bill, 2003. The Bill was thereafter referred to the Departmental Standing Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances, Law and Justice. The said Committee after taking evidence of eminent advocates, representatives of Trade and Industry and other stake holders submitted a report on 04.08.2005. The Committee also recommended that the Bill of 2003 may be withdrawn to bring a fresh legislation. The said Bill of 2003 was thereafter withdrawn for further examination. In 2010, the Government of India issued the Consultation Paper inviting suggestions from public and other stakeholders. 56. Thereafter, the Ministry of Law and Justice asked the Law Commission of India to undertake a study of the propos....
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....e arbitral award that may follow would be enforced according to the Amended Act. 59. As mentioned hereinbefore, there is No. indication in Section 26 of the Amendment Act that it would not be applicable to the proceedings instituted in courts after the Amendment Act came into force. As stated earlier, the Amendment Act is based on the amendments as provided by the Law Commission in its 246th Report. In the said report, the Law Commission had proposed that a new section-Section 85A-be inserted in the Act, which reads as under:- "Transitory provisions.--(1) Unless otherwise provided in the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amending) Act, 2014, the provisions of the instant Act (as amended) shall be prospective in operation and shall apply only to fresh arbitrations and fresh applications, except in the following situations- (a) the provisions of section 6-A shall apply to all pending proceedings and Arbitrations. Explanation: It is clarified that where the issue of costs has already been decided by the court/tribunal, the same shall not be opened to that extent. (b) the provisions of section 16 sub-section (7) shall apply to all pending proceedings and arbitrations, except where....
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..... Tufan Chatterjee v. Sri Rangan Dhar Although, I have some reservation as to the manner in which the esteemed Court has interpreted Section 9(3) of the Act, I respectfully concur with the following conclusion:- "A careful reading of the provisions of the 1996 Act, and in particular Sections 21 and 32 thereof, makes it amply clear that the expression 'arbitral proceedings' in Section 26 of the Amendment Act of 2015 cannot be construed to include proceedings in a Court under the provisions of the 1996 Act, and definitely not any proceedings under Section 9 of the 1996 Act, instituted in a Court before a request for reference of disputes to arbitration is made. Arbitral proceedings can be said to commence, when a request for reference to arbitration is received by the respondent and/or the authority competent under the arbitration agreement, upon notice to the respondent. The arbitral proceedings, which so commence, terminate with a final award as provided in Section 32(1) of the 1996 Act or with an order under Section 32(2) of the 1996 Act Proceedings in Court under the 1996 Act whether initiated before, during or after the termination of the arbitral proceedings, would ....
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....if appropriate, shall determine whether and when any termination shall become effective. 15.3 The Arbitral Tribunal shall consist of one arbitrator to be appointed by the Chairman of SIAC. 15.4 Language of Arbitration. The language of the arbitration shall be in English. 15.5 Survival: The provisions contained in this Clause 15 shall survive the termination of this Agreement." 65. Clause 15.1 of the agreement expressly indicates that the agreement would be governed by and construed in accordance with the law of Singapore. Thus, clearly, the substantive law as applicable to the contract between the parties is the law as applicable in Singapore. The seat of arbitration is also Singapore and therefore the law as applicable to the arbitral proceedings, lex arbitri, is also the law as applicable in Singapore. The legal principle that the law as applicable to arbitral proceedings would be the law as applicable where the seat of arbitration is situated has been authoritatively settled by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Bharat Aluminium (supra). 66. The Supreme Court in Bhatia International (supra) had considered the question whether Part I of the Act would be applicab....
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.... Court shall apply prospectively, to all the arbitration agreements executed hereafter." 68. Plainly, this position stands amended by enactment of Section 2(II) of the Amendment Act by virtue of which Section 2(2) of the Act stands amended by introduction of a proviso that expressly provides that provisions of Section 9, 27 & 37(1)(a) and 37(3) of the Act would also apply to international commercial arbitrations even if the place of arbitration is outside India and the arbitral award is enforceable under the provisions of Part II of Act. 69. As is apparent from the plain language of the proviso, it is subject to an agreement to the contrary. In other words the proviso is applicable only if there is No. agreement to the contrary; that is, there is No. agreement, which excludes the applicability of sections 9, 27, 37(1)(a) and 37(3) of the Act. 70. It is relevant to note that the Law Commission in its 246th report had proposed the following amendments to Section 2(2) of the Act: "(vi) In sub-section (2), add the word "only" after the words "shall apply" and delete the word "place" and insert the word "seat" in its place. [NOTE: This amendment ensures that an Indian Court can o....
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....ld be applicable unless the same was expressly or impliedly excluded by the parties. In that case, the Shareholder's Agreement between the parties therein included the following clauses:- "11.05 (a) xxxx xxxx .xxxx xxxx (b) This Agreement shall be construed in accordance with and governed by the laws of the State of Michigan, United States, without regard to the conflicts of law rules of such jurisdiction. Disputes between the parties that cannot be resolved via negotiations shall be submitted for final, binding arbitration to the London Court of Arbitration. (c) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this agreement, the Shareholders shall at all times act in accordance with the Companies Act and other applicable Acts/Rules being in force, in India at any time." 73. In the aforesaid context, the Court, inter alia, held that the non obstante clause - clause (c) as quoted above - would override the entirety of the contract including clause (b) which deals with the settlement of disputes by arbitration. The Court rejected the contention that the afore-quoted clause (c) could not be construed to mean that Indian law was the substantive law of contract or the Indian law ....
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.... with the laws of The Republic of Korea. Article 23. Arbitration - 23.1 : All disputes arising in connection with this Agreement shall be finally settled by arbitration in Seoul, Korea (or such other place as the parties may agree in writing), pursuant to the rules of agreement then in force of the International Chamber of Commerce." In the aforesaid context, the Supreme Court held as under:- "In the backdrop of these conflicting claims, the question boils down to as to what is the true interpretation of Article 23. This Article 23 will have to be read in the backdrop of Article 22 and more particularly, Article 22.1. It is clear from the language of Article 22.1 that the whole Agreement would be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of The Republic of Korea. xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx If we see the language of Article 23.1 in the light of the Article 22.1, it is clear that the parties had agreed that the disputes arising out of the Agreement between them would be finally settled by the arbitration in Seoul, Korea. Not only that, but the rules of arbitration to be made applicable were the Rules of International Chamber of Commerce. This gives the prima facie impre....
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....d shall be conducted in the English Language. The arbitration agreement contained in this Article 33 shall be governed by the laws of England. Insofar as practicable, the Parties shall continue to implement the terms of this Contract notwithstanding the initiation of arbitral proceedings and any pending claim or dispute." 79. In Harmony Innovation Shipping Ltd. (supra), the Supreme Court was concerned with interpretation of a clause that read as under: "5. If any dispute or difference should arise under this charter, general average/arbitration in London to apply, one to be appointed by each of the parties hereto, the third by the two so chosen, and their decision or that of any two of them, shall be final and binding, and this agreement may, for enforcing the same, be made a rule of Court. Said three parties to be commercial men who are the members of the London Arbitrators Association. This contract is to be governed and construed according to English Law. For disputes where total amount claim by either party does not exceed USD $ 50,000 the arbitration should be conducted in accordance with small claims procedure of the London Maritime Arbitration Association." 80. The Supre....
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....proper law governing the arbitration. The two are mutually exclusive. 84. In the present case, there is No. dispute as to the law governing the arbitration. Clause 15.1 of the Agreement expressly provides that the laws as applicable in Singapore will apply to the entire contract. Further the seat of the arbitration is also in Singapore. The petitioners had also applied under Section 12(6) of the International Arbitration Act, (IAA) - the law as applicable to the International Arbitration in Singapore - for the judgment in terms of the order passed by the Arbitral tribunal. In paragraph 41 of the petition filed before the Singapore High Court, the petitioner has stated as under:- "41. It is undisputed that the IAA applies to SIAC 179 as Singapore is the seat of the arbitration (as confirmed by the Emergency Arbitrator in paragraph 10 of the Emergency Award [TAB 1]). The Plaintiffs understand that this Honourable Court has supervisory and/or curial jurisdiction over SIAC 179 and Section 12(6) of the IAA specifically provides that "all orders or directions made or given by an arbitral tribunal in the course of an arbitration shall, by leave of the High Court or a Judge thereof, be ....
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....b) Sections 8, 9 and 27 of this Part shall apply to international arbitration (whether commercial or not) where the place of arbitration is outside India or where such place is not specified in the arbitration agreement." 87. The Consultation Paper placed by the Government of India in public domain also highlighted the need for amending Section 2 of the Act to enable the parties to approach the Courts in India for interim relief under Section 9 of the Act in the following words:- "(xvii) It may be stated that it is the broad principle in International Commercial arbitration that a law of the country where it is held, namely, the Seat or forum or laws arbitri of the arbitration, governs the arbitration. However, if all the provisions of Part I are not made applicable to International Commercial arbitration where the seat of arbitration is not in India, some practical problems are arising. There may be cases where the properties and assets of a party to arbitration may be in India. Section 9 of the Act which falls in Part I provide for interim measures by the Court. As per Section 9, a party may, apply to a court for certain interim measures of protection including for preservatio....
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....o realize that the entity against which it has to enforce the award has been stripped of its assets and has been converted into a shell company. (ii) While the decision in BALCO was made prospective to ensure that hotly negotiated bargains are not overturned overnight, it results in a situation where Courts, despite knowing that the decision in Bhatia is No. longer good law, are forced to apply it whenever they are faced with a case arising from an arbitration agreement executed pre-BALCO." 89. It is also necessary to reiterate that amendment to Section 2(2) of the Act was made on the basis of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law as adopted on 21.06.1985 and as amended on 07.07.2006. Article 1.2 of UNCITRAL Model Law reads as under:- "Article 1. Scope of Application (1) xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx (2) The provisions of this Law, except articles 8, 9, 17H, 17I, 17J, 35 and 36, apply only if the place of arbitration is in the territory of this State. (Article 1(2) has been amended by the Commission at its thirty-ninth session, in 2006)" 90. The Article 9, 17H, 17I and 17J, of the Model Law are relevant and are set out below:- "Article 9. A....
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....e court on any ground in paragraph (1) of this article shall be effective only for the purposes of the application to recognize and enforce the interim measure. The court where recognition or enforcement is sought shall not, in making that determination, undertake a review of the substance of the interim measure. Article 17J. Court-ordered interim measures A court shall have the same power of issuing an interim measure in relation to arbitration proceedings, irrespective of whether their place is in the territory of this State, as it has in relation to proceedings in courts. The court shall exercise such power in accordance with its own procedures in consideration of the specific features of international arbitration." 91. The Article 17-J of the Model Law specifically provides that the Court shall have the same powers for issuing interim measures in relation to the arbitral proceedings irrespective of the seat of such arbitral proceedings. In terms of the UNCITRAL Model Law, arbitral proceedings are governed by the law as applicable at the seat of the arbitration; nonetheless, it would be open for the Courts to issue interim orders even in respect of the arbitral proceedings ....
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....erms of the interim order from the Singapore High Court. 98. It is relevant to mention that Article 17H of the UNCITRAL Model Law contains express provisions for enforcement of interim measures. However the Act does not contain any provision pari materia to Article 17H for enforcement of interim orders granted by an Arbitral Tribunal outside the India. Section 17 of the Act is clearly not applicable in respect of arbitral proceedings held outside India. 99. In the circumstances, the emergency award passed by the Arbitral Tribunal cannot be enforced under the Act and the only method for enforcing the same would be for the petitioner to file a suit. 100. However, in my view, a party seeking interim measures cannot be precluded from doing so only for the reason that it had obtained a similar order from an arbitral tribunal. Needless to state that the question whether the interim orders should be granted under section 9 of the Act or not would have to be considered by the Courts independent of the orders passed by the arbitral tribunal. Recourse to Section 9 of the Act is not available for the purpose of enforcing the orders of the arbitral tribunal; but that does not mean that the ....