TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2010 (2) TMI 1299
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....529 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.25790 of 2005]; C.A.No.1530 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.25792 of 2005]; C.A.No.1531 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.25794 of 2005]; C.A.No.1532 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.25795 of 2005]; C.A.No.1533 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.25895 of 2005]; C.A.No.1534 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.25168 of 2005]; C.A.No.1535 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.1621 of 2006]; C.A.Nos.1536-38 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) Nos.1608-1610 of 2006]; C.A.No.1539 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.25836 of 2005]; C.A.No.1540 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.1611 of 2006]; C.A.No.1541 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.1612 of 2006]; C.A.No.1542 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.1613 of 2006]; C.A.No.1543 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.1614 of 2006]; C.A.No.1544 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.1616 of 2006]; C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05, C.A.No.1545 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.1617 of 2006]; C.A.No.1546 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.26418 of 2005]; C.A.No.1547 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.26431 of 2005]; C.A.No.1548 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.26738 of 2005]; C.A.No.1549 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.1618 of 2006]; C.A.....
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....7 of 2007]; C.A.No.1588 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.167 of 2007]; C.A.No.1589 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.11290 of 2007]; C.A.No.1590 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.18822 of 2007]; C.A.Nos.1591-92 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) Nos.4565-66 of 2010] (CC Nos.10441-10442); C.A.No.1593 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.6912 of 2006]; C.A.No.1594 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.6913 of 2006]; C.A.No.1595 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.7690 of 2007]; C.A.No.1596 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.9394 of 2007]; C.A.No.1597 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.25103 of 2005]; C.A.No.1598 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.25119 of 2005]; C.A.No.1599 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.25141 of 2005]; C.A.No.1600 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.25417 of 2005]; C.A.No.1601 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.25436 of 2005]; C.A.No.1602 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.25440 of 2005]; C.A.No.1603 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.21662 of 2005]; C.A.No.1604 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.22607 of 2005]; C.A.No.1605 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.22722 of 2005]; C.A.No.1606 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.4573 of 2010](CC No. 711); C.A.No.1607 of 2010 [arising out of SLP....
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...., ASG, Ms.S adhna Sandhu, Adv., Ms. Gunwant Dara, Adv., For Mrs. Anil Katiyar, Adv., Mr. Vishnu B. Saharya, Adv, For M/S Saharya & Co., Advs., Mr. V.K. Verma, Adv, Ms. Rachana Srivastava ,Adv, Ms. Indira Jaisingh, ASG, Mr. H.P. Raval, ASG, Ms. Geeta Luthra, Sr.A dv., Mr. D.N. Goburdhan, Adv., Mr. Praveen Swarup, Adv. JUDGMENT Deepak Verma, J. 1. Permission to file Special Leave Petitions is granted. 2. Delay condoned. Substitution allowed. 3. Leave granted. 4. For planned development of Delhi, Lt. Governor issued notifications under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') on 05.11.1980 and 25.11.1980 to acquire more than 50,000 bighas of land situated in 13 different villages falling within Delhi. 5. The land owners, feeling aggrieved by the issuance of the said notifications under Section 4 of the Act, filed writ petitions in the High Court of Delhi challenging the same on variety of grounds. The said judgment rendered on 15.11.1983 in the case of Munni Lal and Ors. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi and Ors. is reported in ILR (1984) I Delhi 469. After considering the arguments advanced by learned Counsel for the petitioners - Munni....
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....other words, there was no order of restraint from issuance of declaration under Section 6 of the Act. 16. According to the appellants, the Act provides that the said declaration should have been issued within a period of three years from the date of issuance of notifications under Section 4 of the Act, that is to say, positively on or before 24.11.1983. But no such declaration having been issued on or before 24.11.1983, i.e., within the statutory period of three years, it is contended that acquisition is illegal and void qua appellants' lands. In the aforesaid appeal, last declaration under Section 6 of the Act was finally issued on 07.06.1985, which according to the appellant, was clearly beyond statutory period of three years. Thus, whole proceedings of acquisition should be rendered illegal and void ab initio. However, the last declaration was still issued on 26.2.1986. 17. It has also been appellants' case that the stay order granted in favour of the other land-owners, who had challenged either the notification issued under Section 4 of the Act or the declaration under Section 6 of the Act, would not be applicable or operative to the appellants' land as obviously ....
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....rther shows that it placed reliance on another judgment of this Court reported in (1990) 7 SCC 44, Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh Uban and Ors. wherein it has been held that all those land-owners who had not preferred objections under Section 5A of the Act, could not be allowed to contend that either enquiry under Section 5A of the Act was bad or the declaration issued under Section 6 must be struck down on the ground of limitation or consequently, notification issued under Section 4 of the Act would stand lapsed. Thus, the appellant's petition was not entertained and ultimately came to be dismissed. 22. It has neither been disputed here nor before the High Court that some of the appellants herein and many similarly situated land-owners had not preferred objections under Section 5A of the Act. There are other appeals, in which objections were preferred but have been decided against them or even though objections were preferred but were not pressed, on account of subsequent developments that have taken place. We would deal with those type of matters little later. 23. Mr. P.P. Rao, learned senior counsel for appellant contended that in this batch of appeals, broadly three....
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.... Act, 1984 shall be made after the expiry of three years from the date of the publication of the notification; or (ii) published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, shall be made after the expiry of one year from the date of the publication of the notification: Provided further that no such declaration shall be made unless the compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid by a company, or wholly or partly out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority. [Explanation 1. - In computing any of the periods referred to in the first proviso, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the notification issued under Section 4, Sub-section (1), is stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded. [Explanation 2. - Where the compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid out of the funds of a corporation owned or controlled by the State, such compensation shall be deemed to be compensation paid out of public revenues.] (2) Every declaration shall be published in the Official Gazette, [and in two daily newspapers circulating in the locality in which the land is s....
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....n whereas the appellant would suffer a greater loss and injury as with long passage of time he has constructed his house, is residing therein for long number of years and acquisition thereof would lead to serious consequences and would be disastrous to him and other similarly situated land owners. In other words, it has been contended that equitable justice is required to be meted out to the appellant and this Court shall ensure that no injustice is rendered to this appellant and other such hundreds of appellants. 30. In the light of the aforesaid contentions, learned senior counsel for the appellant submitted that following questions of law would arise in this and the connected appeals: (i) Whether proposition of law propounded in Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh Uban and Ors. (Supra), (referred to as No. 1) has correctly been understood by the Division Bench in the impugned order? (ii) Whether the judgment in the case of Abhey Ram and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. (Supra) which approved the Full Bench opinion of Delhi High Court in B.R. Gupta-I, (Supra) has indirectly been over-ruled in the case of Oxford English School v. Government of Tamil Nadu and Ors. (1995) 5 SCC....
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....period or not. In other words, he has contended that irrespective of the fact that there was any stay or there was no stay, in either case, the period of three years should be calculated from the actual date of publication of notification issued under Section 4 of the Act till the date of publication of notification under Section 6 of the Act. 34. Dr. Rajeev Dhawan, learned senior counsel appearing in some appeals contended that primarily petitions of these appellants have been dismissed on the ground of laches. He has contended that in Balak Ram Gupta v. Union of India and Ors. reported in 37 (1989) DLT 150 [hereinafter referred to as 'B.R. Gupta-II'], notification with regard to acquisition of lands situated in 11 villages was quashed and in subsequent judgment, notification with regard to two more villages was quashed. Therefore, there was no occasion on the part of these appellants to have continued to prosecute their objections preferred under Section 5A of the Act. 35. According to him, from the year 1989 to 1997, there was an absolute silence with regard to the acquisition, which had initially commenced in the year 1980. Therefore, no prudent man would have taken l....
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....sal of the petitions of these appellants on the ground of laches. According to him, it would amount to discrimination to these appellants vis-a-vis the other land-owners who have been extended the benefit of quashment of notifications, thereby exempting their lands from being acquired, therefore, the same cannot be allowed to stand. 40. Mr. Mukul Rohtagi, learned Senior Counsel appearing for some other appellants contended that he is appearing for those land-owners, who had actually filed their objections under Section 5A of the Act and belong to village Shayoorpur. The said petitions were filed in the year 1985. 41. However, unfortunately, when the said petitions were heard on 3.3.2005, learned Counsel for the appellants was absent as a result whereof, the petitions came to be dismissed. Thus, they were constrained to file review petitions but same also came to be dismissed on 27.4.2006. 42. It has further been contended that on account of difference of opinion between Hon'ble Mr. Justice Swatanter Kumar (as he then was) and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Madan B. Lokur on the question of import and interpretation of Section 5A of the Act, the matter was referred to Hon'ble Mr....
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....n/sanction was required to be obtained either from Panchayat or Municipal Corporation. 47. As regards laches, it has been tried to be explained by contending that First Master Plan was published on 1.9.1962 but it lapsed in 1981. The second Master Plan was in force upto 2001. On account of serious confusion due to variety of reasons, the land-owners were in a lurch as to what legal steps are required to be taken due to the fact that Delhi Administration itself had dropped further acquisition proceedings. He, therefore, contended that when there was such a massive confusion, not only amongst the litigating public but also amongst the advocates representing them, thus, they were fully justified in not taking up the issue earlier and their petitions could not have been dismissed solely on the ground of delay or laches when the same were sufficiently explained to the Bench. 48. Mr. T.R. Andhyarujina, learned senior counsel appeared for Springdales Educational Society, whose land is also situated in village Chhatarpur. According to him, appellant is the original owner of the land having purchased it in the year 1966-1967. On coming to know about the acquisition proceedings, appellant ....
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....t matters have now been settled by long catena of cases either by High Court or by this Court, ever since the notifications were issued in the year 1980. Thus, it is too late in the day for the appellants to challenge the same on any other grounds. 53. Learned ASG for respondent No. 1, Union of India, Mr. H.S. Rawal has taken us through the aims and objects of Amending Act No. 13 of 1967 and Amending Act No. 68 of 1984, primarily to bring to our notice the purpose and reasons for bringing various amendments in the original Land Acquisition Act 1894. He submitted that vide Amending Act No. 13 of 1967, amending provisions thereof came into operation with effect from 12.4.1967. 54. It has been submitted that the challenge by land owners to the issuance of notifications under Section 4 of the Act stood concluded in favour of the respondents by a Division Bench Judgment in the matter of Munni Lal (supra). Argument was, therefore, advanced that the said judgment has already attained finality as the aggrieved party had not challenged the same by filing any further appeal in the Supreme Court. Thus, it should be deemed that the notifications issued under Section 4 of the Act by responden....
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....i challenging the same issue with regard to period of limitation prescribed between issuance of notification under Section 4 and further declaration under Section 6 of the Act, which came to be dismissed by Division Bench on 25.11.1985. Pursuant to the said order, respondents had taken possession of part of the land sought to be acquired vide order dated 14.7.1987. 60. It has not been disputed before us that Mrs. Gita Sagar had written a letter on 31.3.1989 mentioning therein that on account of several developments and judgment of the High Court of Delhi in B.R. Gupta-II the acquisition proceedings are being dropped. It was followed by another circular issued by respondent on 07.12.1999 but it has been contended before us that they were not addressed to any of the appellants or land owners whose lands were sought to be acquired and by no stretch of imagination it could be said that all further proceedings of acquisition of land were dropped. However, in our opinion, critical reading thereof makes it abundantly clear the proceedings were dropped pursuant to the judgment in the case of the B.R. Gupta-II. Consequently, the benefit of the said communication can be extended qua the pet....
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....r Wire (India) Ltd. v. State of Haryana (1996) 11 SCC 698; and 3) Swaika Properties (P) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan (2008) 4 SCC 695. 65. It was then submitted that as regards grant of permission was concerned, the same has not been issued by the competent authority as prescribed under the Delhi Land (Restrictions on Transfer) Act, 1972. Therefore, advantage thereof cannot be taken by the appellants. To put forth further arguments in this regard, reliance has been placed on a recent judgment of this Court reported in (2008) 9 SCC 177 Meera Sahni v. Lt. Governor of Delhi. It has been brought to our notice that NOCs produced before this Court for perusal, would show that the same have been issued under the seal and signature of Tehsildar and not by the competent authority as defined under Delhi Land (Restrictions on Transfer) Act, 1972. Therefore, no advantage thereof could be claimed by the appellants, who are subsequent purchasers from original owners. 66. To contend further in this regard, we have been taken through the affidavit of Shri U.P. Singh, OSD (Litigation), Building Department of Government of NCT, Delhi, in which it has categorically been mentioned with regard to the....
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.... facts of the case therefore, it is neither legally permissible nor warranted to take a different view. 71. Coming to the question of legitimate expectation, it was contended that no advantage of noting on the files or inter se circulars issued by Departments can be taken by the parties. It was also submitted that the letter of Mrs. Gita Sagar as also the Circular issued thereafter would show that none was addressed to any of the appellants and the same had died their own natural death, on which appellants cannot build up their cases invoking the doctrine of 'Legitimate Expectation'. She has also submitted that as the cause of action had actually accrued to the appellants in the year 1985 unless they are able to successfully show to this Court and reasonably explain the delay caused in filing the writ petitions in the High Court, the High Court was fully justified in dismissing the same on the ground of delay and laches. 72. In the light of the aforesaid contentions, several authorities have been cited by her but in nutshell they are the same which have already been cited by the learned Counsel for other side. Nevertheless, we would deal with the same in the latter part o....
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....i, matter was referred to a Full Bench, referred to as B.R. Gupta-I, the only question posed before it for opinion was with regard to effect of grant of stay, where challenge is to the issuance of notification under Section 4 of the Act vis-a-vis other land owners who had not challenged it. After considering the ambit, scope and nature of stay granted especially in land acquisition matters, Full Bench has expressed its opinion in paragraphs 26 to 31, reproduced hereinbelow: 26. Learned Counsel for the petitioners is to some extent right in his contention that broad as the above observations are, these cases are slightly different in that they all dealt with the effect of the operation of stay order only vis-a-vis one of the parties to the litigation in which the stay order is passed. But we are of opinion that these decisions are of guidance as to the proper approach to such a question. In the first place, they show that a stay of execution of a decree can be pleaded as a ground for conclusion of the period of stay even by a judgment-debtor who did not seek the stay. To that extent, the insistence by the petitioners that the exclusion can operate only against the party who obtain....
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....le owner succeeds in establishing a vitiating element in the S.4 notification and in getting it quashed by the Supreme Court, the whole proceeding of acquisition will fail and the government will have to retrace the steps they may have taken in respect of other lands. (See: Shenoy v. Commercial Tax Officer AIR 1985 SC 621 and Gauraya v. Thakur AIR 1986 SC 1440). Assuming that where such final order is by a High Court the position is not free from difficulty, the debate as to whether, in law, the quashing of the order enures only to the benefit of the party who filed the writ petition and obtained the order is futile, for the moment the Government seeks to enforce the acquisition against the others, they would come up with similar petitions which cannot but be allowed. In other words, in many of the present day notifications, the acquisition scheme is an integral one and the stay or quashing of any part thereof is a stay or quashing of the whole. This aspect should not be lost sight of. 28. It is true that the object of having contiguity of all plots sought to be acquired may fail for various reasons. For instance, there may be items of properties exempt from acquisition in betwee....
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....ing personal to the particular landholder but are, more often than not, grounds common to all or substantial blocks of the land owners. In fact, this group of petitions now listed before us raise practically the same contentions just as the previous batch of writ petitions challenging the notifications under S. 4 raised certain common contentions. To accept the contention that the challenges and interim orders in such petitions should be confined to the particular petitioners and their lands would virtually provide persons with common interests with a second innings. If the initial challenge succeeds, all of them benefit; and if for some reason that fails and the second challenge succeeds on a ground like the one presently raised, the first batch of petitioners also get indirectly benefited because of the impossibility of partial implementation of the scheme for which the acquisition is intended. 31. We have, therefore, to give full effect to the language of the section and the stay orders in question, in the above context and background. The use of the word "any" in the explanation considerably amplifies its scope and shows clearly that the explanation can be invoked i....
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....consequences would be that the declaration published under Section 6 should stand upheld. 11. It is seen that before the Division Bench judgment was rendered, the petition of the appellants stood dismissed and the appellants had filed the special leave petition in this Court. If it were a case entirely relating to Section 6 declaration as has been quashed by the High court, necessarily that would enure the benefit to others also, though they did not file any petition, except to those whose lands were taken possession of and were vested in the State under Sections 16 and 17(2) of the Act free from all encumbrances. But it is seen that the Division Bench confined the controversy to the quashing of the declaration under Section 6 in respect of the persons qua the writ petitioners before the Division Bench. Therefore, the benefit of the quashing of the declaration under Section 6 by the division Bench does not ensure to the appellants. 12. It is true that a Bench of this Court has considered the effect of such a quashing in Delhi Development Authority v. Sudan Singh (1997) 5 SCC 430. But, unfortunately, in that case the operative part of the judgment referred to earlier has not bee....
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..... Gupta-I would clearly indicate with regard to interpretation of the word 'any' in Explanation 1 to the first proviso to Section 6 of the Act which expands the scope of stay order granted in one case of land owners to be automatically extended to all those land owners, whose lands are covered under the notifications issued under Section 4 of the Act, irrespective of the fact whether there was any separate order of stay or not as regards their lands. The logic assigned by Full Bench, the relevant portions whereof have been reproduced hereinabove, appear to be reasonable, apt, legal and proper. 88. It is also worth mentioning that each of the notifications issued under Section 4 of the Act was composite in nature. The interim order of stay granted in one of the matters, i.e., Munni Lal (supra) and confirmed subsequently have been reproduced hereinabove. We have also been given to understand that similar orders of stay were passed in many other petitions. Thus, in the teeth of such interim orders of stay, as reproduced hereinabove, we are of the opinion that during the period of stay respondents could not have proceeded further to issue declaration/notification under Section....
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.... that was the intention of the Parliament. That being so, scheme of the Act as has been legislated, has to be given full effect to. 93. We find no ground to grant the same reliefs to those appellants to whom on earlier occasions, same relief was granted. At this long distance of time, it would neither be proper nor legally justified to grant that benefit to the appellants. If it is granted to even those who had not approached the court, then it would frustrate the very purpose and scope of the Act. In the light of the aforesaid, we are of the considered opinion that final quashment of the declaration under Section 6 of the Act by any Court, in some other matter, cannot be extended to the benefit of the present appellants. In any case, there is no ground for us, to rise to the occasion to do so, much less to the benefits of the appellants. In our considered opinion, it is not a fit case where situation or circumstances call upon us to rise to the occasion and to grant such inequitable reliefs to the appellants, after such a long delay. 94. Obviously, the appellants cannot be rewarded on account of their own lapse as they should have been vigilant enough to get their matters also l....
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....-1981 as well. In doing so, the provision could well have taken into account even S.4 notifications issued prior to 29-1- 1967 for it was quite conceivable that, though the two year period for following these up with declaration under S.6 had elapsed by 28-1-1969, the failure to make a S.6 declaration may have been the consequence of a stay order from a court. But the Legislature decided to exclude this category from the provision for extension in the explanation, and decided to confine itself to all notifications under S.4 made after 29-1-1967. This is very important and the manner in which Clause (a) of the proviso is worded so as to cover all notifications after 29-1-1967 and before 24-9-1984 precludes the contention urged on behalf of the petitioners seeking to limit the operation of the explanation. This contention is that the amendments of 1984 can at best only affect cases in which the three year period prescribed in 1967 had not expired by 24-9-1984. In other words, the argument is that only cases covered by notifications under S.4 issued after 25-9- 1981 can be affected by the amendments and have the benefit of the extended period contemplated in the explanation. This cont....
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.... was referred to third learned Judge Hon'ble Mr. Justice T.S. Thakur, (as he then was). In his separate judgment, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Thakur concurred with the view expressed by Hon'ble Mr. Justice Madan B. Lokur titled Chatro Devi v. Union of India and Ors. reported in 137 (2007) DLT 14 known as Chatro Devi-II. 102. We have been given to understand that, feeling aggrieved by the majority opinion as expressed by two learned Judges in the matter of Chatro Devi II, the Union of India had filed 39 Special Leave Petitions in this Court wherein leave has been granted and appeals are now pending disposal in accordance with law. 103. At the first instance, we thought of getting those matters also listed before us for hearing so that once for all, the dispute pertaining to the notifications issued in the year 1980 would come to an end, but we have been informed that many of the respondents have not yet been served and some matters cannot be listed on account of technical defaults. We also requested learned Counsel appearing for appellants to appear for those respondents but they showed their inability in doing so as the respondents of those appeals are not the same, who are a....
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....rd and find that Land Acquisition Collector had heard the objections and thereafter had forwarded the same to Lt. Governor for his opinion. The dates from which the objections were heard have already been given hereinabove. Similarly, the manner in which the same were dealt with by Lt. Governor has also been scrutinized. We do not find any infirmity or illegality in the procedure adopted in the same. We are of the considered opinion that there has been full, complete and strict compliance of the provisions contained in the Act by the respondents. 107. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, it is not necessary for us to consider the judgment of this Court in the case of Oxford English School (supra). This was a judgment by two learned Judges of this Court whereas the judgment in the case of Abhey Ram (supra) is by three learned Judges of this Court. Secondly, the question as to whether an order of stay passed in one case would be applicable to other similarly situated persons who had not been granted stay was not directly in issue in Oxford School Case (supra) decided by this Court. The question in the said case was primarily with regard to the period of limitation of three year....