TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2021 (12) TMI 898
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....omplaints i.e. CC NI Act 12-20 and CC NI Act 100-20 filed by the respondent before the learned Trial Court under Section 138 r/w Section 142 of the NI Act, 1881 were summoned as co-accused therein. 3. Both the said complaints relate to alleged dishonour of the cheques i.e. cheque bearing no.000430 in relation to CC NI Act 12-20 in which the complainant is Mrs. Savita Suryavanshi arrayed as respondent no.2 to CRL.M.C.2730/2021 of which the cheque amount was Rs. 7692000/- and in relation to CC NI Act 100-20 in which the complainant is Mr.Suneel Suryavanshi arrayed as respondent no.2 to CRL.M.C.2663/2021 of which the cheque bearing no.000431 was for an amount of Rs. 5340000/-. 4. Vide the said consolidated impugned order, the learned Trial Court on an application under Section 143A of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as the NI Act, 1881) filed by the complainants seeking the grant of interim compensation pursuant to the accused persons having pleaded not guilty to the notice under Section 251 of the Cr.P.C., 1973 on 29.01.2021 sought the grant of interim compensation from the accused and the learned Trial Court directed vide paragraphs 16 & 17 of the imp....
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.... accused persons i.e. the petitioners herein opposed the impugned application and had raised the following grounds:- "(a) There is no legally enforceable liability of the accused persons as there is no default or breach of the alleged loan-cum-guarantee agreement dated 01.12.2019. Further, liability of the accused is also not attracted because the amount paid by the accused persons to the complainant is in excess of the amount received from the complainant, by way of loan. (b) The present complaints are not maintainable since the complainants are not licensed money lenders as per the Punjab Registration of Money Lenders Act, 1938 and therefore, the present complaints are barred by law. (c) The alleged payment of Rs. 45 lakhs, by the complainants to the accused persons, is inconsistent with the alleged loan-cum-guarantee agreement. Further, the complainants have also not been able to show how the cheque amounts in question have been arrived at. (d) Debt or liability in the present case is not a legal debt or liability as the income-tax returns have not been attached. Further, the alleged loan-cum-guarantee agreement is a sham document, full of inconsistencies. (e) The comp....
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....to understand the intent behind the introduction of the said provision to the Act. The object and purpose of bringing the NI Act (Amendment) Bill, 2018, reads as: "The Central Government has been receiving several representations from the public including trading community relating to pendency of cheque dishonour cases. This is because of delaying tactics of unscrupulous drawers of dishonoured cheques due to easy filing of appeals and obtaining stay on proceedings." Therefore, the present provision has been introduced with a view to provide relief during the pendency of proceedings, so that genuine complainants are not left waiting for years on account of undue delays and dilatory tactics of the accused." 11. Inter alia the learned Trial Court observed vide paragraphs 11 & 12 of its impugned order to the effect:- "11. Further, a bare perusal of Section 143-A of the NI Act reveals that, at the stage of awarding interim compensation, the Court is not required to consider the strength of defence of the accused and the same is immaterial at this stage. Although, the arguments led on behalf of the accused may seem attractive at the first blush, the same cannot be gone into by the ....
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.... Trial Court observes vide paragraph 13 of its impugned order to the effect that in view of the light of the Objects and Reasons behind introduction of this provision, the provision seems to have a mandatory effect. 13. Inter alia the learned Trial Court observes to the effect that even if it is assumed that Section 143A of the NI Act, 1881 is discretionary in nature, the Court is still clothed with the powers to grant interim compensation to the complainant, after providing sufficient reasons and vide paragraph 14 of the impugned order, the learned Trial Court has observed to the effect:- "14. Arguendo, going by the submissions of the accused, if it is assumed that Section 143-A of NI Act is discretionary in nature, the Court is still clothed with the powers to grant interim compensation to the complainant, after providing sufficient reasons. In the present complaint, the Court finds it appropriate to exercise its discretion in favour of the complainants, for the reasons which will be discussed now. It is admitted by the parties that the complainants and accused no. 2 and 3 are relatives. Moreover, it is not uncommon that relatives lend money to another relatives in cases of ge....
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....itioner nos.1 & 2 and that the learned Trial Court wrongly assumed that in terms of Section 143A of the NI Act, 1881, the Metropolitan Magistrate is not required to entertain any query, concern, contention or submission of the accused and has to mandatorily direct the payment of 20% of the cheque amount without undertaking any other exercise even qua the aspect as to whether the complainant had played a fraud upon the Court or had concealed the fact of having received substantial money from the accused. The petitioners have further submitted that the learned Trial Court could have directed the respondent no.2 to file their bank statements and income tax returns to show the outstanding amount due against the petitioners and that the learned Trial Court acted as a mute spectator assuming that on an application under Section 143A of the NI Act, 1881, the Magistrate was only required to direct payment of 20% interim compensation and nothing else. 17. Inter alia the petitioners contend that the learned Trial Court failed to consider that the words used in Section 143A of the NI Act, 1881 to the effect that the interim compensation under sub Section (1) shall not exceed 20% of the amoun....
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.... there could be unscrupulous litigants who might make false statements by concealing and not stating that they have already received the money from the accused or they might present the cheque which has already been replaced by the accused with another cheque and in such circumstances, the accused at the stage of adjudication of the application under Section 143A of the NI Act, 1881 could therefore show the admitted and unimpeachable documents such as bank statements to prove the story of the complainant to be wrong which could have been considered by the learned Trial Court and in such eventuality, no interim compensation ought to have been granted by the learned Trial Court to the complainant. 20. Inter alia the petitioners submit that the learned Trial Court failed to take into account the factum that proceedings under the NI Act, 1881 are not purely criminal proceedings and have a semblance of a civil nature to it, in as much as, the accused is required to disclose its defence before the start of the trial and interim compensation can also now be awarded and that thus, therefore it was incumbent on the Trial Court to find out whether the amounts were due to the complainant hav....
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.... deal with the response and contentions raised by the petitioners. The said submissions that the petitioners have made through the petition relate to the merits of the complaints and arithmetical calculations with it inter alia being submitted that whereas the complainant in CC No.CC NI Act 100-20 had alleged that a sum of Rs. 1043110.17 was due till 30.09.2020 and in relation to CC No.CC NI Act 12-20 had contended that a sum of Rs. 1738517.04 was due from the petitioners thereof and the total amount thus became payable by Vinod Tondak and Kunti Devi arrayed as petitioner nos.2 & 3 to both petitions worked out to Rs. 2781627.21, in reality the amount paid by the petitioner nos.1 & 2 to the respondent and his wife after 01.12.2019 till 30.09.2020 was Rs. 3770000 by way of bank transfers excluding cash paid to the respondent no.2 and details of the bank statements were submitted by the petitioners to the effect:- "(a) From Bank Account of Petitioner no.1 Company to the Bank Account of Mr. Suneel Suryavanshi /Respondent no .2 S. No. Date Amount Bank 1. 06.12.19 2,50,000/- Canara 2. 17.01.20 1,00,000/- Canara 3. 05.03.20 ....
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....egistered and does not have a licence and in as much as, the terms of the alleged agreement relied upon on behalf of the respondent no.2 indicate that he is in the business of money lending, the said alleged transactions fall within the ambit of the bar of the Punjab Registration of Money Lenders Act, 1938 and that the loan was not a friendly loan as given to the petitioners but was allegedly a commercial loan. 26. Inter alia, the petitioners submitted that the learned Trial Court had not considered that the respondent no.2 had only made an allegation of a sum of Rs. 5340000 being the outstanding amount as on 30.09.2020 but did not bifurcate the amount of the interest-cum-principal amount and thus, the calculation even in relation to the interest amount made by the respondent no.2 was incorrect. The petitioners further submitted that the learned Trial Court failed to consider that the issuance of the directions for payment of interim compensation is within the discretion of the Court and has to be exercised in an objective manner. 27. The petitioners further placed reliance on the verdict of the Hon'ble High Court of Madras in LGR Enterprises & Ors. (supra) to submit to the effec....
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....heque dishonour cases. This is because of delay tactics of unscrupulous drawers of dishonoured cheques due to easy filing of appeals and obtaining stay on proceedings. As a result of this, injustice is caused to the payee of a dishonoured cheque who has to spend considerable time and resources in court proceedings to realize the value of the cheque. Such delays compromise the sanctity of cheque transactions. 2. It is proposed to amend the said Act with a view to address the issue of undue delay in final resolution of cheque dishonour cases so as to provide relief to payees of dishonoured cheques and to discourage frivolous and unnecessary litigation which would save time and money. The proposed amendments will strengthen the credibility of cheques and help trade and commerce in general by allowing lending institutions, including banks, to continue to extend financing to the productive sectors of the economy." 10. From perusal of the Act, 1881 as well as amended Section 143A of the Act, 1881, it is clear that the Act, 1881 has played a substantial role in the Indian commercial landscape and has given rightful sanction against defaulters of the due process of trade who engage in ....
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....passed against him, he has to pay allowances on lower side. Section 143A of the Act, 1881 has been drafted in such a manner that it secures the interest of the complainant as well as the accused, therefore, from perusal of aims and object of amended Section 143A of the Act, 1881, it is quite clear that the word 'may' may be treated as 'shall' and it is not discretionary but of directory in nature. 13. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, while examining 'may' used 'shall' and have effect of directory in nature in case of Bachahan Devi v. Nagar Nigam, Gorakhpur, which reads as under:- "18. It is well-settled that the use of word "may" in a statutory provision would not by itself show that the provision is directory in nature. In some cases, the legislature may use the word 'may' as a matter of pure conventional courtesy and yet intend a mandatory force. In order, therefore, to interpret the legal import of the word "may", the court has to consider various factors, namely, the object and the scheme of the Act, the context and the background against which the words have been used, the purpose and the advantages sought to be achieved by the use of this word, and the like. It is equally w....
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....otation is not inelastic and inviolate." Where to interpret the word "may" as directory would render the very object of the Act as nugatory, the word "may must mean 'shall'. 21. The ultimate rule in construing auxiliary verbs like "may and "shall" is to discover the legislative intent; and the use of words 'may' and 'shall' is not decisive of its discretion or mandates. The use of the words "may" and 'shall' may help the courts in ascertaining the legislative intent without giving to either a controlling or a determinating effect. The courts have further to consider the subject matter, the purpose of the provisions, the object intended to be secured by the statute which is of prime importance, as also the actual words employed." 14. The Supreme Court in Surinder Singh Deswal alias Colonel S.S. Deswal v. Virender Gandhi , has examined provision of Section 148 of the Act, 1881 and held that it is mandatory provision. The relevant para of the judgment is reproduced below: - "8. Now so far as the submission on behalf of the Appellants that even considering the language used in Section 148 of the N.I. Act as amended, the appellate Court "may" order the Appellant to deposit such su....
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....ble time and resources in the court proceedings to realise the value of the cheque and having observed that such delay has compromised the sanctity of the cheque transactions, the Parliament has thought it fit to amend Section 148 of the N.I. Act. Therefore, such a purposive interpretation would be in furtherance of the Objects and Reasons of the amendment in Section 148 of the N.I. Act and also Section 138 of the N.I. Act." 15. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in G.J. Raja v. Tejraj Surana , has examined the amended Section 143A of the Act, 1881 and held that it is prospective effect and not retrospective effect. The relevant para of the judgment is reproduced below:- "19. It must be stated that prior to the insertion of Section 143-A in the Act there was no provision on the statute book whereunder even before the pronouncement of the guilt of an accused, or even before his conviction for the offence in question, he could be made to pay or deposit interim compensation. The imposition and consequential recovery of fine or compensation either through the modality of Section 421 of the Code or Section 357 of the code could also arise only after the person was found guilty of an offe....
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....cused person absonds and by virtue of a non-bailable warrant he is secured and brought before the Court after a long time or he files a recall nonbailable warrant petition after a long time and the Court while considering his petition for recalling the nonbailable warrant can invoke Section 143A(1) of the Act. This list is not exhaustive and it is more illustrative as to the various circumstances under which the trial Court will be justified in exercising its jurisdiction under Section 143A(1) of the Act, by directing the accused person to pay the interim compensation of 20% to the complainant. 9. The other reason why the order of the trial Court under Section 143A(1) of the Act, should contain reasons, is because it will always be subjected to challenge before this Court. This Court while considering the petition will only look for the reasons given by the Court below while passing the order under Section 143A(1) of the Act. An order that is subjected to appeal or revision, should always be supported by reasons. A discretionary order without reasons is, on the face of it, illegal and it will be set aside on that ground alone." 18. The judgment cited by learned counsel for the ....
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....hall", since it would have prevented the accused persons, even in genuine cases, from defending themselves without paying 20% as interim compensation amount to the complainant. This would have directly affected the fundamental right of an accused person to defend himself in a criminal case. This is the reason why the legislature had thoughfully used the word "may" under Section 143A(1) of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Therefore, it is not possible to read the word "shall" into the word "may" which is used in the provision. 7. In view of the above finding, the word "may", gives the discretion to the Trial Court to direct the accused to pay interim compensation to the complainant. The exercise of discretion must always be supported by reasons, failing which the exercise of discretion will become arbitrary. 8. Therefore, whenever the trial Court exercises its jurisdiction under Section 143A (1) of the Act, it shall record reasons as to why it directs the accused person (drawer of the cheque) to pay the interim compensation to the complainant. The reasons may be varied. For instance, the accused person would have absconded for a longtime and thereby would have protracted the proc....
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....t the accused persons to deposit 20% of the cheque amount as interim compensation. The Court below after an elaborate discussion has held that the provision will have a retrospective operation and therefore will apply even to the pending proceedings. The Court, therefore, proceeded to direct the petitioners to pay interim compensation to the respondent within a stipulated time. ...... ...... ...... 17. This Court has carefully considered the submissions made on either side and the materials available on record. This Court has already derived the scope and purport of Section 143A of the Negotiable Instruments Act, supra. It has to be now applied to the facts of the present case. 18. A careful reading of the order passed by the Court below shows that the Court below has focussed more on the issue of the prospective/retrospective operation of the amendment. The Court has not given any reason as to why it is directing the accused persons to pay an interim compensation of 20% to the complainant. As held by this Court, the discretionary power that is vested with the trial Court in ordering for interim compensation must be supported by reasons and unfortunately in this case, it ....
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....iable Instruments Act "may" (Emphasis supplied) order the drawer of the cheque to pay interim compensation to the complainant. The provision itself shows that the discretion is vested with the Trial Court to direct interim compensation to be paid by the complainant. It is not necessary that in all cases, the trial Court must necessarily direct the complainant to pay interim compensation and such a direction should be given only on a case to case basis, by taking into consideration the facts of each case. The legislature had intentionally not used the word "shall", since it would have prevented the accused persons, even in genuine cases, from defending themselves without paying 20% as interim compensation amount to the complainant. This would have directly affected the fundamental right of an accused person to defend himself in a criminal case. This is the reason why the legislature had thoughtfully used the word "may" under Section 143A(1) of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Therefore, it is not possible to read the word "shall" into the word "may" which is used in the provision." 19. It has been observed by the Madras High Court that as per Section 143A of the Act, discretion is ....
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.... assigned. Therefore amended Section 148 of the N.I. Act confers power upon the Appellate Court to pass an order pending appeal to direct the Appellant Accused to deposit the sum which shall not be less than 20% of the fine or compensation either on an application filed by the original complainant or even on the application filed by the Appellant Accused under Section 389 of the Cr.P.C. to suspend the sentence. The aforesaid is required to be construed considering the fact that as per the amended Section 148 of the N.I. Act, a minimum of 20% of the fine or compensation awarded by the trial court is directed to be deposited and that such amount is to be deposited within a period of 60 days from the date of the order, or within such further period not exceeding 30 days as may be directed by the appellate court for sufficient cause shown by the appellant. Therefore, if amended Section 148 of the N.I. Act is purposively interpreted in such a manner it would serve the Objects and Reasons of not only amendment in Section 148 of the N.I. Act, but also Section 138 of the N.I. Act. Negotiable Instruments Act has been amended from time to time so as to provide, inter alia, speedy disposa....
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....said applicants and the learned Magistrate has not passed any speaking order and in a mechanical way he directed the accused /petitioner herein to deposit 20% of the cheque amount. The entire approach of the learned magistrate is against the settled principles of natural justice and he did not even passed a summary speaking order giving reasons for passing such an order. The order itself disclose that he carried on impression that Section 143 (A) of the Act is a mandatory provision of law but ignored the fact that the word used in the Section is 'may' and not 'shall' which gives a discretion to the Court to be exercised in a judicious way. Hence, the entire approach of the learned magistrate is against the settled principles and the impugned order calls for interference. Accordingly, I proceed to pass the following: ORDER The petition is allowed. The impugned order passed by the learned I Addl. Civil Judge and JMFC-I at Vijayapura in C.C.No.3049/ 2019 dated 18.11.2020 is quashed. Matter is remitted back to the learned magistrate with a direction to pass a judicious order on the application submitted by the complainant/ respondent herein under Section 143A o....
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....er of payment is made, the accused shall pay within a period of 60 days and for special reason, further 30 days hence within 90 days. Same provision is made. Maximum 60 days and for special reason, further 30 days for depositing the amount. 5. (i) In summary trials at the stage of plea if not pleaded guilty. The order directing to deposit the money can be passed any time during the appeal. (ii) upon framing of charge in any other case. 6. Sub-section (4) of 143-A states about recovery of the money with interest from the complainant in case of acquittal of the accused within a period of 60 days or maximum 90 days. In proviso of section 148, similar provision is made for the recovery of money with interest from the complainant in case of acquittal of the accused within a period of 60 days or maximum 90 days. 7. Sub-section (5) of section 143-A, the provisions of recovery of interim compensation should be as if a fine under section 421 of the Cr.P.C. No such provision is mentioned but to be governed by the provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure. bring forth the apparent difference under Section 1....
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....ion 143A of the NI Act, 1881 is brought into play during trial is apparent through the provisions of Section 143 A of the NI Act, 1881 itself, when it states that the Court "trying" an offence under Section 138 of the NI Act, 1881 may order the drawer of the cheque to pay interim compensation to the complainant in summary trial or in a summons case where he pleads not guilty to the accusation made in the complaint and in any other case upon framing of charge with directions in terms of Section 143A(2) of the NI Act, 1881 that the interim compensation under sub-Section (1) of Section 143A shall not exceed 20% of the amount of the cheque. 40. That an accused is not guilty until proved to be so and is presumed to be innocent till held guilty is implicit through Section 143A of the NI Act, 1881 sub Clause (4) thereof itself, whereby it has been directed as under:- "S. 143 A: Power to direct interim compensation ...... ...... ...... 4. If the drawer of the cheque is acquitted, the Court shall direct the complainant to repay to the drawer the amount of interim compensation, with interest at the bank rate as published by the Reserve Bank of India, prevalent at the begi....
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.... interim compensation to the complainant at the stages as provided therein in Sub-Clauses (a) and (b) thereof which has mandatorily in terms of Section 143A(2) thereof been directed not to exceed 20% of the amount of the cheque, can only be termed to be directory in nature and cannot be held to be mandatory as sought to be interpreted by the learned Trial Court vide the impugned order. 44. Though, the other aspect, which cannot be overlooked is that the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the amendment in Section 148 of the NI Act, 1881 as amended by way of the Amendment Act No. 20 of 2018 as referred to in paragraph 7.2 of the verdict in Surender Singh Deswal @ Col. S.S. Deswal (supra) which reads to the effect:- "7.2 While considering the aforesaid issue/question, the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the amendment in Section 148 of the N.I. Act, as amended by way of Amendment Act No. 20/2018 and Section 148 of the N.I. Act as amended, are required to be referred to and considered, which read as under: "The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (the Act) was enacted to define and amend the law relating to Promissory Notes, Bills of Exchange and Cheques. The said Act has been am....
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....under section 138, the Appellate Court may order the appellant to deposit such sum which shall be a minimum of twenty per cent of the fine or compensation awarded by the trial Court: Provided that the amount payable under this subsection shall be in addition to any interim compensation paid by the appellant under section 143A. (2) The amount referred to in subsection (1) shall be deposited within sixty days from the date of the order, or within such further period not exceeding thirty days as may be directed by the Court on sufficient cause being shown by the appellant. (3) The Appellate Court may direct the release of the amount deposited by the appellant to the complainant at any time during the pendency of the appeal: Provided that if the appellant is acquitted, the Court shall direct the complainant to repay to the appellant the amount so released, with interest at the bank rate as published by the Reserve Bank of India, prevalent at the beginning of the relevant financial year, within sixty days from the date of the order, or within such further period not exceeding thirty days as may be directed by the Court on sufficient cause being shown by the complainant.", maki....
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...., to continue to extend financing to the productive sectors of the economy. 3. It is, therefore, proposed to introduce the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Bill, 2017 to provide, inter alia, for the following, namely:- (i) to insert a new section 143A in the said Act to provide that the Court trying an offence under section 138 may order the drawer of the cheque to pay interim compensation to the complainant, in a summary trial or a summons case, where he pleads not guilty to the accusation made in the complaint; and in any other case, upon framing of charge. The interim compensation so payable shall be such sum not exceeding twenty per cent. of the amount of the cheque; and (ii) to insert a new section 148 in the said Act so as to provide that in an appeal by the drawer against conviction under section 138, the Appellate Court may order the appellant to deposit such sum which shall be a minimum of twenty per cent. of the fine or compensation awarded by the trial court. 4. The Bill seeks to achieve the above objectives." 46. As regards the observations of the learned Trial Court to the effect that the Court at the stage of awarding the interim compensation, is not requir....
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....t to the effect:- "......... .......... III (i) When the respondent first enters appearance in a complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act, before proceeding further with the case, the Magistrate may proceed to record admission and denial of documents in accordance with Section 294 of the Cr.P.C., and if satisfied, at any stage before the complaint is taken up for hearing, there exist elements of settlement, the magistrate shall inquire from the parties if they are open to exploring possibility of an amicable resolution of the disputes....." 48. That Section 294 of the Cr.P.C., 1973 is applicable to the proceedings in relation to complaints filed under Section 138 of the NI Act, 1881 has been so observed by the Hon'ble High Court of Calcutta in "Gouranga Sarkar Versus Biswajit Sarkar & Anr." 2005 SCC OnLine Cal 15 vide observations in paragraph 8 thereof, which reads to the effect:- "8. It further appears to me that the learned Magistrate did not mark the cheques as exhibit though the cheques were lying in Court record. P.W. 1 in his evidence stated that he has filed all the papers in Court. The learned Magistrate was totally unaware of the provisions of section 294 of the....
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.... another" 2008 SCC OnLine Bom 924 also so holds qua the applicability of Section 294 of the Cr.P.C., 1973 in proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act, 1881 vide observations in paragraphs 13, 14 & 15 thereof, which read to the effect:- "13. That takes me to the main issue which is canvassed in these petitions regarding procedure to be followed regarding marking the documents as exhibits. I am dealing with a case where the parties lead evidence by filing affidavits. Whenever, an affidavit in lieu of examination-in-chief is filed, the witness has to enter the witness box and formally depose to the contents of the affidavit and only thereafter an affidavit can be read as examination-in-chief [See Shelatkar Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. Creative Enterprises, 2008 All MR (Cri) 475]. After the said formal examination-in-chief is recorded, the stage contemplated by section 294 of the said Code of 1973 will come in the picture. The documents are required to be tendered along with a list and the rival party is called upon to admit or deny genuineness of such documents. As per sub-section (3) of section 294 where the genuineness of any document is not disputed, such document may be read in ....
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....f. My attention was invited to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Bipin Panchal (supra). Paragraphs 12 to 15 of the said decision read thus: "12. It is an archaic practice that during the evidence collecting stage, whenever any objection is raised regarding admissibility of any material in evidence the Court does not proceed further without passing order on such objection. But the fall out of the above practice is this: Suppose the trial Court, in a case, upholds a particular objection and excludes the material from being admitted in evidence and then proceeds with the trial and disposes of the case finally. If the appellate or revisional Court, when the same question is re-canvassed, could take a different view on the admissibility of that material in such cases the appellate Court would be deprived of the benefit of that evidence, because that was not put on record by the trial Court. In such a situation the higher Court may have to send the case back to the trial Court for recording that evidence and then to dispose of the case afresh. Why should the trial prolong like that unnecessarily on account of practices created by ourselves. Such practices, when realised thr....
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....ourt of Punjab & Haryana in "Joginder Singh Vs. Anurag Malik" in CRM-M-4629 of 2015, a verdict dated 23.02.2015 also in relation to proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act, 1881 observes categorically to the effect that in case the petitioner who was facing proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act, 1881 in case of a dishonoured cheque seeks to establish some documents, it would be open to the petitioner to avail the benefit of the provisions of Section 294(3) of the Cr.P.C., 1973. 51. Furthermore, the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Suo Moto Writ (CRL) No.(s) 1/2017 categorically observes vide order dated 20.04.2021 that the Draft Rules of Criminal Practice, 2021 annexed to this order be finalized in terms of the discussion in the order with it having been directed vide paragraph 19(a) thereof to the effect:- "(a) All High Courts shall take expeditious steps to incorporate the said Draft Rules, 2021 as part of the rules governing criminal trials, and ensure that the existing rules, notifications, orders and practice directions are suitable modified, and promulgated (wherever necessary through the Official Gazette) within 6 months from today. If the state government'....
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....nsation to the tune of 20% of the amount of the cheque invoked. 52. The applicability of Section 294 of the Cr.P.C., 1973 has been made essential in all proceedings in criminal trials and undoubtedly, the proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act, 1881 are termed to be quasi criminal in nature. 53. Furthermore, the observations of the learned Trial Court to the effect that even if it be assumed that the provisions of Section 143A of the NI Act, 1881 is discretionary in nature, the Court is still clothed with the powers to grant interim compensation to the complainant after providing sufficient reasons, it is essential to observe that the award of interim compensation in terms of Section 143A of the NI Act, 1881 has to be after providing sufficient reasons and whilst taking the same into account, the determination of interim compensation directed to be paid by the petitioners herein to the extent of the maximum of 20% of the cheque amount to the complainants without even considering the submissions that have been sought to be raised by the petitioners in relation to bank statements of the complainant and without resorting to the provisions of Section 294 of the Cr.P.C., 1973 cann....