TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2021 (12) TMI 898
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....ted to be the directors thereof as per the complaints i.e. CC NI Act 12-20 and CC NI Act 100-20 filed by the respondent before the learned Trial Court under Section 138 r/w Section 142 of the NI Act, 1881 were summoned as co-accused therein. 3. Both the said complaints relate to alleged dishonour of the cheques i.e. cheque bearing no.000430 in relation to CC NI Act 12-20 in which the complainant is Mrs. Savita Suryavanshi arrayed as respondent no.2 to CRL.M.C.2730/2021 of which the cheque amount was Rs. 7692000/- and in relation to CC NI Act 100-20 in which the complainant is Mr.Suneel Suryavanshi arrayed as respondent no.2 to CRL.M.C.2663/2021 of which the cheque bearing no.000431 was for an amount of Rs. 5340000/-. 4. Vide the said consolidated impugned order, the learned Trial Court on an application under Section 143A of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as the NI Act, 1881) filed by the complainants seeking the grant of interim compensation pursuant to the accused persons having pleaded not guilty to the notice under Section 251 of the Cr.P.C., 1973 on 29.01.2021 sought the grant of interim compensation from the accused and the learned Trial C....
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.... Chh 1761, CRMP. No.562-2021, a verdict dated 30.06. 2021. 7. The accused persons i.e. the petitioners herein opposed the impugned application and had raised the following grounds:- "(a) There is no legally enforceable liability of the accused persons as there is no default or breach of the alleged loan-cum-guarantee agreement dated 01.12.2019. Further, liability of the accused is also not attracted because the amount paid by the accused persons to the complainant is in excess of the amount received from the complainant, by way of loan. (b) The present complaints are not maintainable since the complainants are not licensed money lenders as per the Punjab Registration of Money Lenders Act, 1938 and therefore, the present complaints are barred by law. (c) The alleged payment of Rs. 45 lakhs, by the complainants to the accused persons, is inconsistent with the alleged loan-cum-guarantee agreement. Further, the complainants have also not been able to show how the cheque amounts in question have been arrived at. (d) Debt or liability in the present case is not a legal debt or liability as the income-tax returns have not been attached. Further, the ....
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....recovered as interim compensation under this section." 10. The learned Trial Court vide paragraph 8 of its impugned order observed to the effect:- "8. It is important to understand the intent behind the introduction of the said provision to the Act. The object and purpose of bringing the NI Act (Amendment) Bill, 2018, reads as: "The Central Government has been receiving several representations from the public including trading community relating to pendency of cheque dishonour cases. This is because of delaying tactics of unscrupulous drawers of dishonoured cheques due to easy filing of appeals and obtaining stay on proceedings." Therefore, the present provision has been introduced with a view to provide relief during the pendency of proceedings, so that genuine complainants are not left waiting for years on account of undue delays and dilatory tactics of the accused." 11. Inter alia the learned Trial Court observed vide paragraphs 11 & 12 of its impugned order to the effect:- "11. Further, a bare perusal of Section 143-A of the NI Act reveals that, at the stage of awarding interim compensation, the Court is not required to consider the strength of ....
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....1 is not to exceed 20% of the amount of the cheque to be directory in nature, the verdict in LGR Enterprises & Ors. (supra) observes to the effect that the said provision is discretionary and the learned Trial Court observes vide paragraph 13 of its impugned order to the effect that in view of the light of the Objects and Reasons behind introduction of this provision, the provision seems to have a mandatory effect. 13. Inter alia the learned Trial Court observes to the effect that even if it is assumed that Section 143A of the NI Act, 1881 is discretionary in nature, the Court is still clothed with the powers to grant interim compensation to the complainant, after providing sufficient reasons and vide paragraph 14 of the impugned order, the learned Trial Court has observed to the effect:- "14. Arguendo, going by the submissions of the accused, if it is assumed that Section 143-A of NI Act is discretionary in nature, the Court is still clothed with the powers to grant interim compensation to the complainant, after providing sufficient reasons. In the present complaint, the Court finds it appropriate to exercise its discretion in favour of the complainants, for the reason....
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....atleast called upon the respondent no.2 to respond to the documents filed by the petitioners or could have directed the respondent no.2 to file the bank statements showing the amount transferred to his bank account by the petitioner nos.1 & 2 and that the learned Trial Court wrongly assumed that in terms of Section 143A of the NI Act, 1881, the Metropolitan Magistrate is not required to entertain any query, concern, contention or submission of the accused and has to mandatorily direct the payment of 20% of the cheque amount without undertaking any other exercise even qua the aspect as to whether the complainant had played a fraud upon the Court or had concealed the fact of having received substantial money from the accused. The petitioners have further submitted that the learned Trial Court could have directed the respondent no.2 to file their bank statements and income tax returns to show the outstanding amount due against the petitioners and that the learned Trial Court acted as a mute spectator assuming that on an application under Section 143A of the NI Act, 1881, the Magistrate was only required to direct payment of 20% interim compensation and nothing else. 17. Inter alia ....
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....e legislature is to see that no frivolous, meritless or undeserving complainants get unnecessarily enriched at the cost of the innocent victims. Inter alia the petitioners submit that the learned Trial Court failed to consider that there could be unscrupulous litigants who might make false statements by concealing and not stating that they have already received the money from the accused or they might present the cheque which has already been replaced by the accused with another cheque and in such circumstances, the accused at the stage of adjudication of the application under Section 143A of the NI Act, 1881 could therefore show the admitted and unimpeachable documents such as bank statements to prove the story of the complainant to be wrong which could have been considered by the learned Trial Court and in such eventuality, no interim compensation ought to have been granted by the learned Trial Court to the complainant. 20. Inter alia the petitioners submit that the learned Trial Court failed to take into account the factum that proceedings under the NI Act, 1881 are not purely criminal proceedings and have a semblance of a civil nature to it, in as much as, the accused is req....
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....n the merits of the case justifying the award of interim compensation to the complainant/respondent no.2 and that the impugned order was thus a non-speaking order and was liable to be set aside and that the learned Trial Court did not even deal with the response and contentions raised by the petitioners. The said submissions that the petitioners have made through the petition relate to the merits of the complaints and arithmetical calculations with it inter alia being submitted that whereas the complainant in CC No.CC NI Act 100-20 had alleged that a sum of Rs. 1043110.17 was due till 30.09.2020 and in relation to CC No.CC NI Act 12-20 had contended that a sum of Rs. 1738517.04 was due from the petitioners thereof and the total amount thus became payable by Vinod Tondak and Kunti Devi arrayed as petitioner nos.2 & 3 to both petitions worked out to Rs. 2781627.21, in reality the amount paid by the petitioner nos.1 & 2 to the respondent and his wife after 01.12.2019 till 30.09.2020 was Rs. 3770000 by way of bank transfers excluding cash paid to the respondent no.2 and details of the bank statements were submitted by the petitioners to the effect:- "(a) From Bank Account of P....
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....bank statements that have been put forth by the petitioners, an excess payment of Rs. 773540 has been paid by the petitioners to the respondent No.2 and thus, the respondent no.2 was not entitled to any compensation whatsoever. 25. The petitioners also submitted that the learned Trial Court failed to consider that in terms of Section 3 of the Punjab Registration of Money Lenders Act, 1938, lending money with interest is prohibited if the money lender is not registered and does not have a licence and in as much as, the terms of the alleged agreement relied upon on behalf of the respondent no.2 indicate that he is in the business of money lending, the said alleged transactions fall within the ambit of the bar of the Punjab Registration of Money Lenders Act, 1938 and that the loan was not a friendly loan as given to the petitioners but was allegedly a commercial loan. 26. Inter alia, the petitioners submitted that the learned Trial Court had not considered that the respondent no.2 had only made an allegation of a sum of Rs. 5340000 being the outstanding amount as on 30.09.2020 but did not bifurcate the amount of the interest-cum-principal amount and thus, the calculation even in....
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....the Act, 1881, which reads as under:- "The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (the Act) was enacted to define and amend the law relating to Promissory Notes, Bills of Exchange and Cheques. The said Act has been amended from time to time so as to provide, inter alia, speedy disposal of cases relating to the offence of dishonour of cheques. However, the Central Government has been receiving several representations from the public including trading community relating to pendency of cheque dishonour cases. This is because of delay tactics of unscrupulous drawers of dishonoured cheques due to easy filing of appeals and obtaining stay on proceedings. As a result of this, injustice is caused to the payee of a dishonoured cheque who has to spend considerable time and resources in court proceedings to realize the value of the cheque. Such delays compromise the sanctity of cheque transactions. 2. It is proposed to amend the said Act with a view to address the issue of undue delay in final resolution of cheque dishonour cases so as to provide relief to payees of dishonoured cheques and to discourage frivolous and unnecessary litigation which would save time and money. The prop....
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....ord 'may' used is beneficial for the complainant because the complainant has already suffered for mass deed committed by the accused by not paying the amount, therefore, it is in the interest of the complainant as well the accused if the 20% of the cheque amount is to be paid by the accused, he may be able to utilize the same for his own purpose, whereas the accused will be in safer side as the amount is already deposited in pursuance of the order passed under Section 143A of the Act, 1881. When the final judgment passed against him, he has to pay allowances on lower side. Section 143A of the Act, 1881 has been drafted in such a manner that it secures the interest of the complainant as well as the accused, therefore, from perusal of aims and object of amended Section 143A of the Act, 1881, it is quite clear that the word 'may' may be treated as 'shall' and it is not discretionary but of directory in nature. 13. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, while examining 'may' used 'shall' and have effect of directory in nature in case of Bachahan Devi v. Nagar Nigam, Gorakhpur, which reads as under:- "18. It is well-settled that the use of word "may" in a statutory provision w....
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....blic interest and that rights of private citizens have been considerably modified and curtailed in the interests of the general development of an area or in the interests or removal of slums and unsanitary areas. Though the power is conferred upon the statutory body by the use of the word "may" that power must be construed as a statutory duty. Conversely, the use of the term 'shall' may indicate the use in optional or permissive sense. Although in general sense 'may' is enabling or discretional and "shall is obligatory, the connotation is not inelastic and inviolate." Where to interpret the word "may" as directory would render the very object of the Act as nugatory, the word "may must mean 'shall'. 21. The ultimate rule in construing auxiliary verbs like "may and "shall" is to discover the legislative intent; and the use of words 'may' and 'shall' is not decisive of its discretion or mandates. The use of the words "may" and 'shall' may help the courts in ascertaining the legislative intent without giving to either a controlling or a determinating effect. The courts have further to consider the subject matter, the purpose of the provisions, the object intended to be secured....
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.... would serve the Objects and Reasons of not only amendment in Section 148 of the N.I. Act, but also Section 138 of the N.I. Act. Negotiable Instruments Act has been amended from time to time so as to provide, inter alia, speedy disposal of cases relating to the offence of the dishonoured of cheques. So as to see that due to delay tactics by the unscrupulous drawers of the dishonoured cheques due to easy filing of the appeals and obtaining stay in the proceedings, an injustice was caused to the payee of a dishonoured cheque who has to spend considerable time and resources in the court proceedings to realise the value of the cheque and having observed that such delay has compromised the sanctity of the cheque transactions, the Parliament has thought it fit to amend Section 148 of the N.I. Act. Therefore, such a purposive interpretation would be in furtherance of the Objects and Reasons of the amendment in Section 148 of the N.I. Act and also Section 138 of the N.I. Act." 15. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in G.J. Raja v. Tejraj Surana , has examined the amended Section 143A of the Act, 1881 and held that it is prospective effect and not retrospective effect. The relevant para....
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....d person would have absconded for a longtime and thereby would have protracted the proceedings or the accused person would have intentionally evaded service for a long time and only after repeated attempts, appears before the Court, or the enforceable debt or liability in a case, is borne out by overwhelming materials which the accused person could not on the face of it deny or where the accused person accepts the debt or liability partly or where the accused person does not cross examine the witnesses and keeps on dragging with the proceedings by filing one petition after another or the accused person absonds and by virtue of a non-bailable warrant he is secured and brought before the Court after a long time or he files a recall nonbailable warrant petition after a long time and the Court while considering his petition for recalling the nonbailable warrant can invoke Section 143A(1) of the Act. This list is not exhaustive and it is more illustrative as to the various circumstances under which the trial Court will be justified in exercising its jurisdiction under Section 143A(1) of the Act, by directing the accused person to pay the interim compensation of 20% to the complainant. ....
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....akes it clear that the Court trying an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act "may" (emphasis supplied) order the drawer of the cheque to pay interim compensation to the complainant. The provision itself shows that the discretion is vested with the Trial Court to direct interim compensation to be paid by the complainant. It is not necessary that in all cases, the trial Court must necessarily direct the complainant to pay interim compensation and such a direction should be given only on a case to case basis, by taking into consideration the facts of each case. The legislature has intentionally not used the word "shall", since it would have prevented the accused persons, even in genuine cases, from defending themselves without paying 20% as interim compensation amount to the complainant. This would have directly affected the fundamental right of an accused person to defend himself in a criminal case. This is the reason why the legislature had thoughfully used the word "may" under Section 143A(1) of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Therefore, it is not possible to read the word "shall" into the word "may" which is used in the provision. 7. In view of the a....
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.... order passed under Section 143A(1) of the Act, this Court will now deal with the case on hand. 11. The petitioners in the above petitions are the husband and wife and the respondent/complainant is common in both the cases. The petitioners are said to have drawn a cheque in favour of the respondent towards a legally enforceable debt and the same was dishonoured. It led to the filing of a complaint before the court below for an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Both the cases were at the stage of cross examination of P.W.I. At that point of time, the respondent has proceed to file a petition under Section 143A(1) of the Act, to direct the accused persons to deposit 20% of the cheque amount as interim compensation. The Court below after an elaborate discussion has held that the provision will have a retrospective operation and therefore will apply even to the pending proceedings. The Court, therefore, proceeded to direct the petitioners to pay interim compensation to the respondent within a stipulated time. ...... ...... ...... 17. This Court has carefully considered the submissions made on either side and the ma....
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....e to observations in paragraph 6 of LGR Enterprises & Ors. (supra) to the effect:- "18. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance on the judgment of Madras High Court in the case of LGR Enterprises v. P. Anbazhagan in Cr.O.P. No. 15438 of 2019. The ratio laid down by the Single Judge of the Madras High Court would not be applicable to the case in hand since the case before the Madras High Court was in respect of Section 143A of the Act which empowers the Court to direct interim compensation while trying an offence under Section 138 of the Act. Para 6 of the judgment reads thus:- "6. A reading of the above provision makes it clear that the Court trying an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act "may" (Emphasis supplied) order the drawer of the cheque to pay interim compensation to the complainant. The provision itself shows that the discretion is vested with the Trial Court to direct interim compensation to be paid by the complainant. It is not necessary that in all cases, the trial Court must necessarily direct the complainant to pay interim compensation and such a direction should be given only on a case to case basis, by....
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....is not "shall" and therefore the discretion is vested with the first appellate court to direct the appellant - accused to deposit such sum and the appellate court has construed it as mandatory, which according to the learned Senior Advocate for the appellants would be contrary to the provisions of Section 148 of the N.I. Act as amended is concerned, considering the amended Section 148 of the N.I. Act as a whole to be read with the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the amending Section 148 of the N.I. Act, though it is true that in amended Section 148 of the N.I. Act, the word used is "may", it is generally to be construed as a "rule" or "shall" and not to direct to deposit by the appellate court is an exception for which special reasons are to be assigned. Therefore amended Section 148 of the N.I. Act confers power upon the Appellate Court to pass an order pending appeal to direct the Appellant Accused to deposit the sum which shall not be less than 20% of the fine or compensation either on an application filed by the original complainant or even on the application filed by the Appellant Accused under Section 389 of the Cr.P.C. to suspend the sentence. The aforesaid is r....
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....ate to be exercised judiciously after recording the plea and it is not mandator/ but the learned magistrate is required to exercise his judicious discretion under Section 143 A of the Act. But in the present case, the impugned order disclose that the learned Magistrate has not even applied his mind and in a mechanical way as per the mandatory provisions of Section 143 A he has directed the accused to deposit 20% of the cheque amount. The provisions of Section 143 A are not mandatory but the discretion was given to the magistrate to be exercised judiciously. In the instant case though application was filed prior to the accusation it should be heard only after the accusation but after giving proper opportunity. Admittedly the accused/ petitioner herein has submitted his objections to the said applicants and the learned Magistrate has not passed any speaking order and in a mechanical way he directed the accused /petitioner herein to deposit 20% of the cheque amount. The entire approach of the learned magistrate is against the settled principles of natural justice and he did not even passed a summary speaking order giving reasons for passing such an order. The order itself disclose tha....
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.... to compare the two sections i.e., 143-A and 148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act in a tabular format to get a quick grasp. The grant of interim relief is a common thread running through both the sections. However, they are not identical. The terms and clauses used by the Legislature while drafting these two sections, provide internal aid to understand the sections. Sr.No. Section 143-A of the N.I. Act Section 148 of the N.I. Act 1. The order of payment of interim compensation. The order of depositing the sum out of fine or compensation. 2. Upper limit is maximum 20% of the cheque amount. Lower limit is minimum 20% of the amount of fine or compensation. 3. The order is of payment made directly to the complainant. The Court may direct to release the amount which is deposited to the complainant. 4. If the order of payment is made, the accused shall pay within a period of 60 days and for special reason, further 30 days hence within 90 days. Same provision is made. Maximum 60 days and for special reason, further 30 days for depositing the amount. 5. (i) In summary trials at the stage of plea if ....
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....ition if not fulfilled, then, amount is recoverable finally, if the conviction is maintained. The amount can be recoverable with interest. If conviction is confirmed, the order of a higher rate of interest or commercial rate of interest, may be passed; or in default maximum sentence may be imposed. Moreover, the fine or compensation is made recoverable as per the provision of section 421 of Code of Criminal Procedure.", which have been set aside as not being good law in so far as the consequences of the non-payment of the amount under Section 148 of the NI Act is concerned. That in so far as Ajay Vinodchandra Shah (supra) states the distinction between Section 143A and Section 148 of the NI Act, it cannot be ignored nor can it be overlooked that the observations therein in relation to the distinction between Section 143A and Section 148 of the NI Act were not set aside by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 39. That Section 143A of the NI Act, 1881 is brought into play during trial is apparent through the provisions of Section 143 A of the NI Act, 1881 itself, when it states that the Court "trying" an offence under Section 138 of the NI Act, 1881 may order the drawer of the cheque to ....
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....e intent is couched. 43. The difference between the provisions of Section 143A and 148 of the NI Act, 1881 has already been spelt out elsewhere hereinabove as detailed in the verdict of the Hon'ble High Court of Bombay in "Ajay Vinodchandra Shah vs. The State Of Maharashtra And Anr." 2019 (4) MHLJ 705. The factum that apart from the recovery of interim compensation as awarded under Section 143A of the NI Act, 1881 being made recoverable as if it were a fine under Section 421 of the Cr.P.C., 1973 and report from the recovery thereof being provided for, there is no further sentence provided under the statute for the same specifically when there is no imprisonment specified in terms of the enactment itself under Section 143A(5) of the NI Act, 1881 of any default sentence in the event of the fine not being recovered, the same itself makes it apparent that the intent of the legislature in using the word "may" in Section 143A(1) thereof for directing the drawer of the cheque to pay the interim compensation to the complainant at the stages as provided therein in Sub-Clauses (a) and (b) thereof which has mandatorily in terms of Section 143A(2) thereof been directed not to exceed 20% of ....
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....t a new section 143A in the said Act to provide that the Court trying an offence under section 138, may order the drawer of the cheque to pay interim compensation to the complainant, in a summary trial or a summons case, where he pleads not guilty to the accusation made in the complaint; and in any other case, upon framing of charge. The interim compensation so payable shall be such sum not exceeding twenty per cent of the amount of the cheque; and (ii) to insert a new section 148 in the said Act so as to provide that in an appeal by the drawer against conviction under Section 138, the Appellate 13 Court may order the appellant to deposit such sum which shall be a minimum of twenty per cent of the fine or compensation awarded by the trial court. 4. The Bill seeks to achieve the above objectives." "148. Power to Appellate Court to order payment pending appeal against conviction.... (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), in an appeal by the drawer against conviction under section 138, the Appellate Court may order the appellant to deposit such sum which shall be a minimum of twenty per cent of th....
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....ime to time so as to provide, inter alia, speedy disposal of cases relating to the offence of dishonour of cheques. However, the Central Government has been receiving several representations from the public including trading community relating to pendency of cheque dishonour cases. This is because of delay tactics of unscrupulous drawers of dishonoured cheques due to easy filing of appeals and obtaining stay on proceedings. As a result of this, injustice is caused to the payee of a dishonoured cheque who has to spend considerable time and resources in court proceedings to realise the value of the cheque. Such delays compromise the sanctity of cheque transactions. 2. It is proposed to amend the said Act with a view to address the issue of undue delay in final resolution of cheque dishonour cases so as to provide relief to payees of dishonoured cheques and to discourage frivolous and unnecessary litigation which would save time and money. The proposed amendments will strengthen the credibility of cheques and help trade and commerce in general by allowing lending institutions, including banks, to continue to extend financing to the productive sectors of the economy. ....
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.... inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code without proof of the signature of the person to whom it purports to be signed: Provided that the Court may, in its discretion, require such signature to be proved." 47. Furthermore, as laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in "Dayawati Vs. Yogesh Kumar Gosain" in CRL.REF.No.1/2016 decided on 17.10.2017, the question No.III reads to the effect:- "Question III: In cases where the dispute has already been referred to mediation - What is the procedure to be followed thereafter? Is the matter to be disposed of taking the very mediated settlement agreement to be evidence of compounding of the case and dispose of the case, or the same is to be kept pending, awaiting compliance thereof (for example, when the payments are spread over a long period of time, as is usually the case in such settlement agreements)? In the context of reference of the parties, in a case arising under Section 138 of the NI Act, to mediation is concerned, the following procedure is required to be followed:", referred by the Metropolitan Magistrate vide order dated 13.01.2016 has been answered by the Division Bench of this Court to the effect:....
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.... not reveal that the accused or his lawyer questioned genuineness of the documents filed by the complainant in Court on 6.3.99. The learned Magistrate by his order did not reveal that the said cheques or other documents filed on 6.3.99 requires proof of signature. It is clear, therefore, the learned Magistrate did not at all follow the provisions of law and was totally oblivious of provisions of section 294 of the Code. The learned Magistrate had duty to examine any witness under section 311 of the Code to reveal truth for just decision of the case if he had any doubt in mind regarding issue of cheques. There was no suggestion also to P.W. 1 that the signature appearing on the cheques were not the signature of accused. When the accused or his lawyer did not dispute genuineness of the documents which were filed in Court the learned Magistrate committed error by coming to the conclusion that accused denied issue of cheques. In fact, there was nothing in case record to show that the accused denied issue of cheques and, the accused did not challenge filing of the documents by the complainant." 49. Likewise, the verdict of the Hon'ble High Court of Bombay in "Geeta Marine Services Pv....
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....dispense with its formal proof thereof. In fact after indication of no dispute as to the genuineness, proof of documents is reduced to a sheer empty formality. The section is obviously aimed at undoing the judicial view by legislative process." (Emphasis supplied) 14. The issue before the Full Bench was answered in paragraph 18 which reads thus: "18. We accordingly hold that sub-section (3) of section 294 of the Code covers post- such documents can be read in evidence as genuine without the formal proof. In our view, Ganpat Raoji's case is not correctly decided."0 (Emphasis added) Therefore, the document which is admitted under subsection (3) of section 294 of the said Code of 1973 can be read in evidence as genuine without the formal proof of the said document. Therefore, after affidavit in lieu of examination-in-chief is filed and formal evidence of the witness is recorded, the exercise provided by section 294 of the said Code of 1973 will have to be completed by the learned Magistrate. 15. The real issue arises when a dispute is raised regarding the proof of a document or admissibility of a document in evidence which is tendered along with a lis....
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....above can be followed. 14. The above procedure, if followed, will have two advantages. First is that the time in the trial Court, during evidence taking stage, would not be wasted on account of raising such objections and the Court can continue to examine the witnesses. The witnesses need not wait for long hours, if not days. Second is that the superior Court, when the same objection is re-canvassed and reconsidered in appeal or revision against the final judgment of the trial Court, can determine the correctness of the view taken by the trial Court regarding that objection, without bothering to remit the case to the trial Court again for fresh disposal. We may also point out that this measure would not cause any prejudice to the parties to the litigation and would not add to their misery or expenses. 15. We, therefore, make the above as a procedure to be followed by the trial Courts whenever an objection is raised regarding the admissibility of any material or any item of oral evidence." (Emphasis supplied) against which an SLP was filed in the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India which was dismissed vide order dated 05.12.2008 in Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) 8....
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....nesses are material, or eyewitnesses, or formal witnesses or are experts. The court then shall draw up a schedule indicating the consecutive dates, when witnesses would be examined; it is open to schedule recording of a set of witness' depositions on one date, and on the next date, other sets, and so on. The court shall also, before commencement of trial, ascertain if the parties wish to carry out admission of any document under Section 294, and permit them to do so, after which such consecutive dates for trial shall be fixed. ..... ......", thus, the same also in view of the observations in "Geeta Marine Services Pvt. Ltd. and another Versus State and another" 2008 SCC OnLine Bom 924, "Gouranga Sarkar Versus Biswajit Sarkar & Anr." 2005 SCC OnLine Cal 15, "Joginder Singh Vs. Anurag Malik" in CRM-M-4629 of 2015 & Suo Moto Writ (CRL) No.(s) 1/2017, it becomes apparent that the provision of Section 143A of the NI Act, 1881 has essentially to be held to be "directory' and cannot be termed to be "mandatory' to the effect that the Trial Court has mandatorily to award the interim compensation under Section 143A of the NI Act, 1881 in all proceedings tried under Secti....