TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1986 (6) TMI 245
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....h a long lapse of time? That is the question that has come up for our consideration in this case arising out of a petition filed under Article 227. 2. Under Section 23 of the Registration Act, an award, like any other non-testamentary instrument, is to be presented for registration before the Sub-Registrar within 4 months from the date of its execution. If, however, owing to urgent necessity or unavoidable accident, an award or other non-testamentary instrument is not presented for registration within 4 months of its execution, the Registrar, but not the Sub-Registrar, may direct that such document shall be accepted for registration on payment of fine provided the delay in presentation beyond the period of 4 months as aforesaid, does not....
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....sdiction" to proceed with registration of a document which was already 4 months old and any such registration would be bad. In the Punjab decision it has been held (supra, at 102) that a document presented for registration after the period of 8 months as provided in Section 25 of the Registration Act "could not, under any circumstances be registered". 4. If the matter rested there then we would have, with respect, dissented from the Rangoon and the Punjab view and would have held that there can be circumstances when a Registration Officer would have jurisdiction to admit a document to registration, even though presented after the period fixed under Section 23 or Section 25. But the two Division Bench decisions of this Court, on which str....
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.... the learned Munsiff of 26-7-78 directing the parties, including the Arbitrators, to maintain status quo. Even though it is not quite clear to us as to how the aforesaid order directing maintenance of status quo could prevent or restrain the Arbitrators or the parties from taking back the award filed in court and to present the same for registration, we must take the matter to have been clinched by the order of the Division Bench in Civil Rule No. 621 of 1980 (Tarapada Dey v. Rajkumar Dey - decided on 6-3-81). That Civil Rule was directed against an earlier order dated 16-1-80 passed by the Subordinate Judge, Hooghly in Misc. Case No. 28 of 1977 which arose out of an application filed by some of the opposite parties for direction upon the A....
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.... 5 thereof authorising extension of the prescribed period and of Section 15 thereof providing for exclusion of time in certain cases are available to matters governed by the special Law of Limitation. But even if those provisions are so available, those would apply to matters in or before Courts. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Nityananda Joshi v. Life Insurance Corporation (1969) IILLJ 711 SC, "the scheme of the Limitation Act is that it only deals with application to courts". Even though the powers under Section 5 or Section 15 of the Limitation Act are to be read in a special or local law of Limitation by reasons of the provisions of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, that power is exercisable by Courts only. A Registration Offi....
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....ismissed solely on the ground that the period prescribed therefore has expired as a result of running of time during the operation of the said interim order. As observed by the Supreme Court in Director of Inspection of Income Tax v. Pooran Mall, [1974] 96 ITR 390 (SC), "it is a well established principle of judicial procedure that where any proceedings, are stayed by an order of a court or by an injunction issued by any court, that period should be exclude in computing any period of limitation laid down by law". Therefore, if, as held by the Division Bench in Civil Rule No. 621 of 1980, proceeding with the registration of the award was stayed by the interim order in Misc. Case No. 74 of 1977, then, as pointed out by the Supreme Court in Di....