TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2015 (3) TMI 1400
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....on to the Inspector of Police, Central Crime Branch, Team-I, Vepery, Chennai, respondent herein, to defreeze the petitioner's bank accounts (1)Salary account in A/c.No.50100008256170 maintained in HDFC Bank, Tiruvannamalai Branch and (2) Personal account in A/c.No.00000010860298490 maintained in State Bank of India, Tiruvannamalai Branch. 4. The petitioner has contended that he was the absolute owner of the approved plot bearing No.5 to an extent of 3600 sq.ft, comprising in Survey No.317/1 (part), Subramanian Colony, Velachery Village, Chennai, and that he had purchased the same on 02.09.1982, registered in Document No.2963/1982 in the office of the Joint Sub-Registrar, Saidapet. 5. The petitioner has further submitted that when the defacto complainant approached him in the year 2013, with an intention to purchase a plot, the petitioner had disclosed all the facts regarding the existence of development agreement with a builder M/s.Nathan Foundations on 15.12.1999 and also, about an award passed in the Arbitration proceedings initiated by the said developer M/s.Nathan Foundations. Petitioner in CrlMP.No.527 of 2015 has also contended the defacto complainant came forward t....
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....e consideration of Rs. 2,80,00,000/-, he has made two payments by way of Demand Drafts, in the name of the petitioner, for a sum of Rs. 80,00,000/- and Rs. 60,00,000/- respectively. The Demand Drafts have been encashed from the above mentioned Bank account of the petitioner. Thus, for the reasons stated supra, he has objected to the prayer sought for in CrlMP.527 of 2015 filed under Section 451 CrPC for defreezing the accounts. 9. One of the grounds raised by the petitioner, in CrlMP.No.527 of 2015, filed under Section 451 of the Code, is that, the respondent Police, without any knowledge and notice to the petitioner, has frozen the petitioner's Bank accounts, and thus, there is a violation of Section 102 of CrPC. 10. Reading of the impugned order discloses that when the wife of the petitioner, Mrs.Mallika filed a petition before the lower Court, in CrlMP.No.113 of 2015 and sought for a direction from the said Court to defreeze the accounts maiantained in HDFC Bank, vide order dated 29.01.2015 in CrlMP.No.113 of 2015, the prayer sought for, by Mrs.Mallika has been allowed on the ground that she is not an accused in the criminal case. By observing that Mrs.Mallika, is not ....
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....certain property.- (1) Any police officer may seize any property which may be alleged or suspected to have been stolen, or which may be found under circumstances, which create suspicion of the Commission of any offence. (2) Such police officer, if subordinate to the officer in charge of a police station, shall forthwith report the seizure to that officer. (3) Every police officer acting under sub-section (1) shall forthwith report the seizure to the Magistrate having jurisdiction and where the property seized is such that it cannot be, conveniently transported to the court, he may give custody thereof to any person on his executing a bond undertaking to produce the property before the court as and when required and to give effect to the further orders of the court as to the disposal of the same." 13. Offences under Sections 406 and 420 read with 34 IPC have been registered against the petitioner. According to the defacto complainant, knowing fully well, the development agreement dated 15.12.1999 entered into between the petitioner and M/s.Nathan Foundation Private Limited and also the award dated 02.07.2011, in the arbitration proceedings, the petitioner has so....
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....the decisions of the Courts, as to how to interpret, a statute and sections in a statute. 18. In LT.-Col. Prithi Pal Singh Bedi v. Union of India reported in 1983 (3) SCC 140, at Paragraph 8, held as follows: "8. The dominant purpose in construing a statute is to ascertain the intention of the Parliament. One of the well recognised canons of construction is that the legislature speaks its mind by use of correct expression and unless there is any ambiguity in the language of the provision the Court should adopt literal construction if it does not lead to an absurdity. ....If the literal construction leads to an absurdity, external aids to construction can be resorted to. To ascertain the literal meaning it is equally necessary first to ascertain the juxtaposition in which the rule is placed, the purpose for which it is enacted and the object which it is required to subserve and the authority by which the rule is framed. This necessitates examination of the broad features of the Act. " 19. In Narendra H.Khzurana v. Commissioner of Police reported in 2004 (2) Mh.L.R. 72, it is held that it must be noted the proper course in interpreting a statute in the first instance i....
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....s states (at page 134) that procedural laws regulating proceedings in court are to be construed as to render justice wherever reasonably possible and to avoid injustice from a mistake of court. He further states (at pages 135 and 136) that: "Consideration of hardship, injustice or absurdity as avoiding a particular construction is a rule which must be applied with great care. "The argument ab inconvenienti", said LORD MOULTON, "is one which requires to be used with great caution"." (ii) In the words of Tindal, C.J., in Sussex Peerage case [(1844) 11 Cl & F 85], wherein, he said thus, "If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves so alone in such cases best declare the intent of the lawgiver. (iii) In Nairin v. University of St. Andrews reported in 1909 AC 147, the Apex Court held that, "Unless there is any ambiguity it would not be open to the Court to depart from the normal rule of construction which is that the intention of the Legislature should be primarily gathered from the words which are used. It is only when the word....
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.... intended, Where, within the framework of the ordinary acceptation of the word, every single requirement of the definition clause is fulfilled, it would be wrong to take the definition as destroying the essential meaning of the word defined." (ix) In Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan reported in AIR 1957 SC 907, the Supreme Court held that, "it must always be borne in mind that the first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the Legislature must be found in the words used by the Legislature itself. If the words used are capable of one construction only then it would not be open to the courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such hypothetical construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. ] The words used in the material provisions of the statute must be interpreted in their plain grammatical meaning and it is only when such words are capable of two constructions that the question of giving effect to the policy or object of the Act can legitimately arise. When the material words are capable of two constructions, one of which is likely to defeat or impair the policy of th....
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....llows: "It was observed by Pollock C. B. in Waugh v. Middleton, 1853-8 Ex 352 (356):-- "It must, however, be conceded that where the grammatical construction is clear and manifest and without doubt, that construction ought to prevail, unless there be some strong and obvious reason to the contrary. But the rule adverted to is subject to this condition, that however plain the apparent grammatical construction of a sentence may be, if it be properly clear from the contents of the same document that the apparent grammatical construction cannot be the true one, then that which, upon the whole, is the true meaning shall prevail, in spite of the grammatical construction of a particular part of it." And substantially the same opinion is expressed by Lord Selborne in Caledonian Ry, v. North British Ry. (1881) 6 AC 114 (222):-- "The mere literal construction of a statute ought not to prevail if it is opposed to the intentions of the legislature as apparent by the statute, and if the words are sufficiently flexible to admit of some other construction by which, that intention can be better effectuated." Again Lord Fitzgerald in Bradlaugh v. Clarke, (1883) 8 AC 354 at p. 384 observed a....
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....e is supposed to be an authentic repository of the legislative will and the function of a court is to interpret it "according to the intent of them that made it". From that function the court is. not to resile. It has to abide by the maxim, "ut res magis valiat quam pereat", lest the intention of the legislature may go in vain or be left to evaporate into thin air." (xvi) In C.I.T., Madras v. T.Sundram Iyengar (P) Ltd., reported in 1976 (1) SCC 77, the Supreme Court held that, if the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and if two interpretations are not reasonably possible, it would be wrong to discard the plain meaning of the words used, in order to meet a possible injustice. (xvii) If the words are precise and unambiguous, then it should be accepted, as declaring the express intention of the legislature. In Ku.Sonia Bhatia v. State of U.P., and others reported in 1981 (2) SCC 585 = AIR 1981 SC 1274, the Supreme Court held that a legislature does not waste words, without any intention and every word that is used by the legislature must be given its due import and significance. (xviii) In Philips India Ltd., v. Labour Court reported in 1985 (....
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....s arising therefrom.... 37. The court's jurisdiction to interpret a statute can be invoked when the same is ambiguous. It is well known that in a given case the court can iron out the fabric but it cannot change the texture of the fabric. It cannot enlarge the scope of legislation or intention when the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. It cannot add or subtract words to a statute or read something into it which is not there. It cannot rewrite or recast legislation. It is also necessary to determine that there exists a presumption that the legislature has not used any superfluous words. It is well settled that the real intention of the legislation must be gathered from the language used. ......But the intention of the legislature must be found out from the scheme of the Act." (xxiii) In Indian Dental Association, Kerala v. Union of India reported in 2004 (1) Kant. LJ 282, the Court held that, "The cardinal rule for the construction of Acts of Parliament is that they should be construed according to the intention expressed in the Acts themselves. The object of all interpretation is to discover the intention of Parliament, "but the intention of Parl....
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....and unambiguous language..... 15. Where, however, the words were clear, there is no obscurity, there is no ambiguity and the intention of the legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for the court to innovate or take upon itself the task of amending or altering the statutory provisions. In that situation the judges should not proclaim that they are playing the role of a lawmaker merely for an exhibition of judicial valour. They have to remember that there is a line, though thin, which separates adjudication from legislation. That line should not be crossed or erased. This can be vouchsafed by "an alert recognition of the necessity not to cross it and instinctive, as well as trained reluctance to do so". (See Frankfurter: "Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes" in Essays on Jurisprudence, Columbia Law Review, p. 51.) 16. It is true that this Court in interpreting the Constitution enjoys a freedom which is not available in interpreting a statute and, therefore, it will be useful at this stage to reproduce what Lord Diplock said in Duport Steels Ltd. v. Sirs [(1980 (1) All.ER 529] (All ER at p. 542cd): "It endangers continued public confidenc....
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....legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used. Attention should be paid to what has been said in the statute, as also to what has not been said. (xxviii) In State of Haryana v. Suresh reported in 2007 (3) KLT 213, the Supreme Court held that, "One of the basic principles of Interpretation of Statutes is to construe them according to plain, literal and grammatical meaning of the words. If that is contrary, to or inconsistent with any express intention or declared purpose of the Statute, or if it would involve any absurdity, repugnancy or inconsistency, the grammatical sense must then be modified, extended or abridged, so far as to avoid such an inconvenience, but no further. The onus of showing that the words do not mean what they say lies heavily on the party who alleges it must advance something which clearly shows that the grammatical construction would be repugnant to the intention of the Act or lead to some manifest absurdity." (xxix) In Visitor Amu v. K.S.Misra reported in 2007 (8) SCC 594, the Supreme Court held that, "It is well settled principle of interpretation of the statute that it is incumbent upon the Court to avoid a construction, i....
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....ion is enacted by the legislature, which prescribes a condition at one place but not at some other place in the same provision, the only reasonable interpretation which can be resorted to by the courts is that such was the intention of the legislature and that the provision was consciously enacted in that manner. In such cases, it will be wrong to presume that such omission was inadvertent or that by incorporating the condition at one place in the provision the legislature also intended the condition to be applied at some other place in that provision." (xxxiii) In Satheedevi v. Prasanna reported in (2010) 5 SCC 622, the Supreme Court held as follows: "12. Before proceeding further, we may notice two well-recognised rules of interpretation of statutes. The first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the legislature must be found in the words used by the legislature itself. If the words used are capable of one construction, only then it would not be open to the courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such hypothetical construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. The words used in t....
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....Act, held that, "55. It is well settled as a canon of construction that a statute has to be read as a whole and in its context. In Attorney General v. Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover [1957 AC 436], Lord Viscount Simonds very elegantly stated the principle that it is the duty of court to examine every word of a statute in its context. The learned Law Lord further said that in understanding the meaning of the provision, the Court must take into consideration "not only other enacting provisions of the same statute, but its preamble, the existing state of the law, other statutes in pari materia, and the mischief which I can, by those and other legitimate means, discern that the statute was intended to remedy." (All ER p. 53 I) 57. These principles have been followed by this Court in its Constitution Bench decision in Union of India v. Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth [1977 (4) SCC 193]. At SCC p. 240, Bhagwati, J. as His Lordship then was, in a concurring opinion held that words in a statute cannot be read in isolation, their colour and content are derived from their context and every word in a statute is to be examined in its context. His Lordship explained that the word....
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....ce with the provisions; the fact that the non-compliance with the provisions is or is not visited by some penalty; the serious or the trivial consequences, that flow therefrom; and above all, whether the object of the legislation will be defeated or furthered". In the same judgment, the Hon'ble Judge has further held that when a statute uses the word 'shall', prima facie it is mandatory but the Court may ascertain the real intention of the legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute. 27. The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Hidayatullah, in M/s.Sainik Motors v. State of Rajasthan reported in AIR 1961 SC 1480, observed that ordinarily though the word "shall" is mandatory, it can be interpreted as directory if the context and intention otherwise demands. 28. In P.T.Rajan v. T.P.M.Sahir reported in 2003 (8) SCC 498, the following conclusions are relevant, "45. A statute as is well known must be read in the text and context thereof. Whether a statute is directory or mandatory would not be dependant on the user of the words 'shall' or 'may'. Such a question must be posed and answered having regard to the purpose and object it seeks to achiev....
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....onstruing it the one way or the other; the impact of the other provisions whereby the necessity of complying with the provisions in question is avoided; the circumstances, namely, that the statute provides for a contingency of the non- compliance with the provisions; the fact that the noncompliance with the provisions is or is not visited by some penalty; the serious or the trivial consequences, that flow therefrom; and above all, whether the object of the legislation will be defeated or furthered". If object of the enactment will be defeated by holding the same directory, it will be construed as mandatory, whereas if by holding it mandatory, serious general inconvenience will be created to innocent persons without very much furthering the object of enactment, the same will be construed as directory. But all this does not mean that the language used is to be ignored, but only that the prima facie inference of the intention of the Legislature arising from the words used may be displaced by considering the nature of the enactment, its design and the consequences flowing from alternative construction. Thus, the use of the words 'as nearly as may be' in contrast to the....
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....is what is called imperative or only directory." 119. In a recent judgment of this Court, May George v. Tahsildar [(2010) 13 SCC 98], the Court stated the precepts, which can be summed up and usefully applied by this Court, as follows: "(a) While determining whether a provision is mandatory or directory, somewhat on similar lines as aforenoticed, the Court has to examine the context in which the provision is used and the purpose it seeks to achieve; (b) To find out the intent of the legislature, it may also be necessary to examine serious general inconveniences or injustices which may be caused to persons affected by the application of such provision; (c) Whether the provisions are enabling the State to do some things and/or whether they prescribe the methodology or formalities for doing certain things; (d) As a factor to determine legislative intent, the court may also consider, inter alia, the nature and design of the statute and the consequences which would flow from construing it, one way or the other; (e) It is also permissible to examine the impact of other provisions in the same statute and the consequences of noncomplian....
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...., whether the object of the legislation will be defeated or furthered.' 22. In B.S.Khuna and Ors. v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Ors. [(2000) 7 SCC 679], this Court considered the provisions of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, particularly those dealing with transfer of immovable property owned by the Municipal Corporation. After considering the scheme of the Act for the purpose of transferring the property belonging to the Corporation, the Court held that the Commissioner could alienate the property only on obtaining the prior sanction of the Corporation and this condition was held to be mandatory for the reason that the effect of nonobservance of the statutory prescription would vitiate the transfer though no specific power had been conferred upon the Corporation to transfer the property. 23. In State of Haryana and Anr. v. Raghubir Dayal [(1995) 1 SCC 133], this Court has observed as under: '5. The use of the word 'shall' is ordinarily mandatory but it is sometimes not so interpreted if the scope of the enactment, or consequences to flow from such construction would not so demand. Normally, the word 'shall' prim....
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....ant consideration. The word 'shall' raises a presumption that the particular provision is imperative but this prima facie inference may be rebutted by other considerations such as object and scope of the enactment and the consequences flowing from such construction. 125. Where a statute imposes a public duty and proceeds to lay down the manner and timeframe within which the duty shall be performed, the injustice or inconvenience resulting from a rigid adherence to the statutory prescriptions may not be a relevant factor in holding such prescription to be only directory. For example, when dealing with the provisions relating to criminal law, legislative purpose is to be borne in mind for its proper interpretation. It is said that the purpose of criminal law is to permit everyone to go about their daily lives without fear of harm to person or property and it is in the interests of everyone that serious crime be effectively investigated and prosecuted. There must be fairness to all sides. (Attorney General's Reference (No. 3 of 1999) (2001) 1 All ER 577 Reference : Justice G.P. Singh on 'Principles of Statutory Interpretation', 11th Edition 2008). In a cri....
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....ngan and R. v. Bullock, [(1964)1 QB 481]) 127. One school of thought has accepted that the word 'shall' raises a presumption that the particular provision is imperative, while the other school of thought believes that such presumption is merely prima facie, subject to rebuttal by the other considerations mentioned above. For example, in M/s. Sainik Motors, Jodhpur & Others v. The State of Rajasthan [AIR 1961 SC 1480], the word 'shall' has been held to be merely directory. 128. G.P. Singh in the same edition of the abovementioned book, at page 409, stated that the use of the word 'shall' with respect to one matter and use of word 'may' with respect to another matter in the same section of a statute will normally lead to the conclusion that the word 'shall' imposes an obligation, whereas the word 'may' confers a discretionary power. But that by itself is not decisive and the Court may, having regard to the context and consequences, come to the conclusion that the part of the statute using 'shall' is also directory. It is primarily the context in which the words are used which will be of significance and rel....
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....itio or it would result in imposition of smaller penalties or in issuance of directions to further protect and safeguard the interests of the individual against the power of the State. The language of the statute, intention of the legislature and other factors stated above decide the results and impacts of non-compliance in the facts and circumstances of a given case, before the Court can declare a provision capable of such strict construction, to term it as absolutely mandatory or directory." 31. In R. Sivaraj v. State rep. by Inspector of Police, District Crime Branch, Salem, reported in 2013 (3) MWN (Cr.)450, certain depositors were cheated; on their complaints, a case was registered; the District Crime Branch, Salem, has registered Crime Nos.24, 25 and 26 of 2012, for the offences under Sections 420 IPC and Section 4 and 5 of Prize Chits and Money Circulation (Banning) Act, 1978. Subsequently, investigation has been transferred to EOW-II Unit, Salem. Offence has been intially registered under Section 420 IPC, had been altered into Section 420 IPC and Section 5 of TNPID Act. The petitioner therein was maintaining two bank accounts in IDBI Bank Ltd and his wife was also mainta....
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....to his superior. Section 102(3) mandates that every seizure of property under Section 102(1) Cr.P.C. shall be reported to the jurisdiction Magistrate. 17. For the purpose of Section 102(1) Cr.P.C. cash on hand and cash at bank in bank account are properties. 18. In R.CHANDRASEKAR VS. INSPECTOR OF POLICE, SALEM [2002 (5) CTC 598], it was held that seizure of bank account by the investigating officer must be reported to the Magistrate as it is a mandatory requirement of law. 19. In Dr.SHASHIKANT D. KARNIK VS. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [2008 CRL.L.J. 148], it was held that seizure of property under Section 102 Cr.P.C has to be reported to the Magistrate. 20. CHANDRASEKAR (supra) was subsequently followed in PADMINI VS. THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE, DCB, TIRUNELVELI [2008 (3) CTC 657]. 21. In VINOSHKUMAR RAMACHANDRAN VALLUVAR VS. THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [2011 (1) MWN (Cr.) 497 (FB)(Bom.)], a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court held that the requirement of reporting of freezing of bank account to the Magistrate prescribed under Section 102(3) Cr.P.C is mandatory in nature. 22. In pursuing their investigation under Section 102 Cr.P.C., the Cod....
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.... reasons for not fully complying with the requirements to that sub-section, and, in the case mentioned in clause (b) of the said proviso, the officer shall also forthwith notify to the information, if any, in such manner as may be prescribed by the State Government, the fact that he will not investigate the case of cause it to be investigated. 38. Section 158 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which deals with Report how submitted states that (1) Every report sent to a Magistrate under section 157 shall, if the State Government so directs, be submitted through such superior officer of police as the State Government, by general or special order, appoints in that behalf. (2) Such superior officer may give such instructions to the officer in charge or the police station as he thinks fit, and shall, after recording such instructions on such report, transmit the same without delay to the Magistrate. 39. Section 159 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which deals with Power to hold investigation or preliminary inquiry states that Such Magistrate, on receiving such report, may direct an investigation, or, if he thinks fit, at once proceed of depute any Magistrate subordinate to him to ....
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.... so recorded.(6) The Magistrate recording a confession or statement under this section shall forward it to the Magistrate by whom the case is to be inquired into or tried. 41. Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which deals with Procedure when investigation cannot be completed in twenty-four hours states that - (1) Whenever any person is arrested and detained in custody, and it appears that the investigation cannot be completed within the period of twenty-four hours fixed by section 57, and there are grounds for believing that the accusation or information is well-founded, the officer in charge of the police station or the police officer making the investigation, if he is not below the rank of sub-inspector, shall forthwith transmit to the nearest Judicial Magistrate a copy of the entries in the diary hereinafter prescribed relating to the case, and shall at the same time forward the accused to such Magistrate. (2) The Magistrate to whom all accused person is forwarded under this section may, whether he has or not jurisdiction to try the case, from time to time, authorise the detention of the accused in such custody as such Magistrate thinks fit, a te....
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....the entry in the diary hereinafter prescribed relating to the case, and shall, at the same time, forward the accused to such Executive Magistrate, and thereupon such Executive Magistrate, may, lot reasons to be recorded in writing, authoress the detention of the accused person in such custody as he may think fit for a term not exceeding seven days in the aggregate; and on the expiry of the period of detention so authorized, the accused person shall be released on bail except where an order for further detention of the accused person has been made by a Magistrate competent to make such order; and, where an order for such further detention is made, the period during which the accused person was detained in custody under the orders made by an Executive Magistrate under this subsection, shall be taken into account in computing the period specified in paragraph (a) of the proviso to sub-section (2): Provided that before the expiry of the period aforesaid, the Executive Magistrate shall transmit to the nearest Judicial Magistrate the records of the case together was a copy of the entries in the diary relating to the case which was transmitted to him by the officer in charge of t....
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....mpowered to take cognizance of the offence upon a police report and to try the accused or commit him for trial, or, if the offence is bailable and the accused is able to give security from him for his appearance before such Magistrate on a day fixed and for his attendance from day to day before such Magistrate until otherwise directed. (2) When the officer in charge of a police station forwards an accused person to a Magistrate or takes security for his appearance before such Magistrate under this section, he shall send to such Magistrate any weapon or other article which it may be necessary, to produce before him, and shall require the complainant (if any) and so many of the persons who appear to such officer to be acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case as he may think necessary, to execute a bond to appear before the Magistrate as thereby directed and prosecute or give evidence (as the case may be) in the matter of the charge against the accused. (3) If the court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate is mentioned in the bond, such court shall be held to include any court to which such Magistrate may refer the case for inquiry or trial, provided reasonable notice of su....
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.... of all the persons whom the prosecution proposes to examine as its witness. (6) If the police officer is of opinion that any part of any such statement is not relevant to the sub-matter of the proceeding or that its disclosure to the accused is not essential in the interests of justice and is inexpedient in the public interest, he shall indicate that part of the statement and append a note requesting the Magistrate exclude that part from the copies to be granted to the accused and stating his reasons for making such request. (7) Where the police officer investigating the case finds it convenient so to do, he may furnish to the accused copies of all or any of the documents referred to in sub-section (5). (8) Notwithstanding in this section shall be deemed to preclude further investigation in respect of an offence after a report under sub-section (2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate and, where upon such investigation, the officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall forward to the Magistrate a further report or reports regarding such evidence in the form prescribed and the provisions of' sub-sectio....
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....FC Bank. 50. For the reasons stated supra, this Court is of the view that no manifest illegality is committed by the learned XI Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai, in dismissing CrlMP No.527 of 2015 in Central Crime Branch, Team-I, Vepery P.S. Crime No.131 of 2014, dated 18.02.2015. 51. Salary or subsistence allowance to the petitioner, an agriculture officer working in Government of Tamilnadu, cannot at any stretch of imagination be included as part of money transaction, involved in the crime registered against the petitioner. That stands apart,as to whether the petitioner is an accused or not and he is entitled to subsistence allowance, in accordance with the rules. 52. On the facts and circumstances of this case, instead of directing the petitioner/accused to seek for a direction against the employer to credit of subsistence allowance, which is now stated to be lying in the District Treasury, Thiruvannamalai, this Court, in exercise of powers under Section 482 of CrPC, deems it fit to suo motu implead the Director of the Agriculture Department, Ezhilagam, Chennai, as a party respondent to this revision case, only for the purpose of enabling him to credit the sub....