TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2020 (3) TMI 1360
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....isition cases of similar nature were being adjudicated by subordinate judicial officers in the state of Uttar Pradesh. [Agra Development Authority v. State of UP, 2004 All LJ 1853.] A copy of the judgment was placed by the Registrar before the Administrative Committee of High Court for appropriate action. The Administrative Committee constituted a committee comprising of two Judges to probe into complaints of collusion in land acquisition matters. This enquiry committee after visiting numerous districts of western Uttar Pradesh (UP) and examination of many judgments, submitted a report on 19.09.2004 recommending initiation of disciplinary action against certain judicial officers, including the Appellant. 5. Accordingly, a Charge Sheet was served upon the Appellant with regard to two judicial orders delivered by her during her stint as Additional District Judge at Ghaziabad. Following were the charges attributed to the Appellant: Charge No. 1 - That you on 10.02.2003 while posted as IInd Additional District Judge Ghaziabad decided Land Acquisition Reference No. 193/1996 Lile Singh v. State of U.P. and 35 others illegally and against all judicial norms and propriety awarding to the....
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....ecommendation to the State (Respondent No. 1), which through an office memorandum issued by its Appointments Department on 17.01.2006, dismissed the Appellant from service with immediate effect. The Appellant challenged the order of dismissal before the High Court on judicial side invoking the writ jurisdiction. 7. The Division Bench of the HC took note of the two land acquisition references which had been decided by the Appellant. With regards to the first case of Lile Singh v. State [Land Acquisition Reference No. 193 of 2006, delivered on 10.02.2003.] it held that the Appellant had wrongly relied upon a compromise deed of two other claimants to enhance compensation from Rs. 74.40/sq yd (as determined by the Special Land Acquisition Officer) to Rs. 264/sq yd. Additionally, she had awarded solatium and interest over and above the said determined rate, which led to a steep escalation to Rs. 720/sq yd. Holding such reliance on compromise deeds as being incomprehensible owing to the statutory bar of Section 11(3) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the escalation was deemed disproportionate and against judicial propriety. 8. With regard to the second reference in Umesh Chandra v. St....
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....doubts upon the decision-making process were adduced, except for merely the two land acquisition reference orders. This, as per PC Joshi v. State of UP (2001) 6 SCC 491, was clearly impermissible. Even otherwise, determining appropriateness of the substance of the judicial orders was said to be the domain of appellate courts and not the enquiry committees. 12. Even on merits, it was contended that the High Court erred in holding that the Appellant had illegally relied upon compromise deeds while authoring the order in Liley Singh, for the supposed bar Under Section 11(3) of the LA Act was applicable only to awards by Collectors. Reference Courts were guided by distinct legal provisions Under Sections 23 and 24, per which compromise deeds were not excluded. The escalations were also shown as not being arbitrary, but rather founded upon the Compromise Policy of the New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, which was tweaked to grant statutory dues of solatium and interest instead of the additional 10% developed land being granted by the State authorities. Hence, it was pleaded, that if anything, the net compensation of Rs. 720/sq yd was effectively lower in cost to the State than ....
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.... Court (Respondent No. 2) contended that judicial officers are not ordinary government servants, and that they must adhere to a higher standard of probity and ought to be above suspicion. Persons occupying such high posts should have high integrity, honesty, moral vigour, fairness and must be impervious to corrupt or venial influences. The limited scope of interference in matters of domestic enquiry where the allegations founded upon specific facts have been proved, was also highlighted. 17. The scope of the present proceedings, thus was sought to be restricted, by drawing attention to constitutional provisions which bestowed exclusive control of the High Court over the subordinate judges, with the aim of preserving independence of judiciary. Given the fact that opportunities of being heard and placing on record written submissions were duly accorded to the Appellant, and her detailed replies had been considered and rejected, it was not open for her to seek re-determination of her case through this Court. Both the enquiry committee and the Full Court were contended to have applied their minds and passed reasoned orders wherein it was unequivocally found that the Appellant had utte....
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....udiciary is much higher than in other institutions. The judiciary is an institution whose foundations are based on honesty and integrity. It is, therefore, necessary that judicial officers should possess the sterling quality of integrity. This Court in Tarak Singh v. Jyoti Basu [Tarak Singh v. Jyoti Basu, (2005) 1 SCC 201] held as follows: (SCC p. 203) Integrity is the hallmark of judicial discipline, apart from others. It is high time the judiciary took utmost care to see that the temple of justice does not crack from inside, which will lead to a catastrophe in the justice-delivery system resulting in the failure of public confidence in the system. It must be remembered that woodpeckers inside pose a larger threat than the storm outside. 6. The behaviour of a Judge has to be of an exacting standard, both inside and outside the court. This Court in Daya Shankar v. High Court of Allahabad [Daya Shankar v. High Court of Allahabad, (1987) 3 SCC 1 : 1987 SCC (L & S) 132] held thus: (SCC p. 1) Judicial officers cannot have two standards, one in the court and another outside the court. They must have only one standard of rectitude, honesty and integrity. They cannot act even remotely ....
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.... is not performing his duty in accordance with law. 10. In our view the word "gratification" does not only mean monetary gratification. Gratification can be of various types. It can be gratification of money, gratification of power, gratification of lust etc., etc. ... (emphasis supplied) 21. We are also not oblivious to the fact that mere suspicion cannot constitute 'misconduct'. Any 'probability' of misconduct needs to be supported with oral or documentary material, even though the standard of proof would obviously not be at par with that in a criminal trial. While applying these yardsticks, the High Court is expected to consider the existence of differing standards and approaches amongst different judges. There are innumerable instances of judicial officers who are liberal in granting bail, awarding compensation under MACT or for acquired land, backwages to workmen or mandatory compensation in other cases of tortious liabilities. Such relief-oriented judicial approaches cannot by themselves be grounds to cast aspersions on the honesty and integrity of an officer. 22. Furthermore, one cannot overlook the reality of ours being a country wherein countless compla....
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.... mattered as much. However, a perusal of the charges extracted above makes it evident that the exclusive cause of enquiry, inference of dishonesty as well as imposition of penalty was only on the basis of the conclusion of enhancement of compensation. Given how the challenge to one of those two orders had been turned down at the High Court stage, and the other was both affirmed and furthered in principle by this Court, the very foundation of the charges no longer survives. 27. We can find no fault in the proposition that the end result of adjudication does not matter, and only whether the delinquent officer had taken illegal gratification (monetary or otherwise) or had been swayed by extraneous considerations while conducting the process is of relevance. Indeed, many-a-times it is possible that a judicial officer can indulge in conduct unbecoming of his office whilst at the same time giving an order, the result of which is legally sound. Such unbecoming conduct can either be in the form of a judge taking a case out of turn, delaying hearings through adjournments, seeking bribes to give parties their legal dues etc. None of these necessarily need to affect the outcome. However, imp....