TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2012 (5) TMI 846
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....5 with effect from 23/10/2003. 3. Sometime in 2008, one Mr. Vijay Patil, President, Maharashtra Kamgar Ekta Union made a complaint to the Petitioner regarding evasion of employees provident fund contribution of 2000 employees of M/s Pratibha Industries Limited. An inquiry was initiated by the Petitioner on the complaint under section 7A of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (For Short "EPF & MP Act") against the establishment during the year 2008. Record was called from the Enforcement Officer, SRO, Vashi under the EPF & MP Act, 1952. Shri D.M. Ambokar, the Enforcement Officer, submitted inspection report on 03/03/2009 stating therein that the EPF dues of M/s Pratibha Industries Limited were to the tune of ₹ 6,72,455/- for the period October, 2003 to January, 2009 and this was on account of non-payment of provident fund contribution in respect of 475 non-enrolled workers of the Company. Relying on this report, Petitioner passed the order under section 7A on 20/03/2009 for the aforesaid period. 4. According to the Petitioner, Respondent - CBI and its Officers - Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 scrutinized the assessment order passed by....
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....nt Office at Thane and, thereafter, the Petitioner was informed that an FIR was registered against him on 14/07/2010. The Bank Account of the Petitioner including his Salary Account was seized under section 102 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 6. It is an admitted position that no appeal was filed against the order passed by the Petitioner under section 7A to the Appellate Tribunal nor any application for review was filed against the said order till today. Petitioner, therefore, approached this Court by filing this Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Division Bench of this court by order dated 03/12/2010 was pleased to grant rule and interim relief was granted in terms of prayer clause (c) and thus the investigation was stayed. However, Division Bench observed that the pendency of this Petition will not come in the way of initiating departmental action against the Petitioner in view of the allegation that substantial loss of revenue had occurred on account of the act of commission and omission of the Petitioner. CBI filed an SLP in the Apex Court and the Apex Court passed the following order:- "ORDER Heard Mr. H.P. Rawal, learned Additional Solicitor Ge....
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....is manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the criminal proceeding in respect of the offence alleged. Absence of the requisite sanction may, for instance, furnish cases under this category. (ii) Where the allegations in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; in such cases no question of appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the First Information Report to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not. (iii) Where the allegations made against the accused person do constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. In dealing with this class of cases it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusation made and cases where there is legal evidence which on its appreciation may or may not support the accusation ....
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....ted under section 155(2) of the Code. 5. Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 6. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. 7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge." 12. Keeping in view the observations made by the Apex Court in the aforesaid two judgments, the averments made in the FIR will have to be taken into consideration. 13. The learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner has urged that since the FIR has been filed on the basis of judicial o....
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....ted as defence in the trial and, on that basis, the FIR could not be quashed. Thirdly, it was contended that in view of section 19 of the Indian Penal Code, proceedings under the PC Act could not be stayed and fourthly it was contended that the order passed by the Petitioner was not a judicial order and, therefore, protection under section 77 of the Indian Penal Code and under section 3(1) of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 was not available. 15. This being the crux of the rival contentions, three questions which fall for consideration before this Court are :- (i) Whether the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner while passing an order under section 7A is a Judge within the definition under section 19 of the IPC & section 2 of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985? (ii) Whether the averments made in the FIR even if they are taken at its face value, constitute an offence? (iii) Whether the prosecution of the Petitioner only on the basis of the order passed under Section 7A is barred in view of section 77 of the Indian Penal Code or section 3(1) of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 ? 16. In order to consider the said three questions, it will be necessary firstly to take into con....
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.... some other authority, would be definitive; or (b) who is one of a body of persons which body of persons is empowered by law to give such a judgment as is referred in Cl. (a)." Under the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985, "Judge" means not only every person who is officially designated as a Judge but also every person (a) who is empowered by law to give in any legal proceeding a definitive judgment, or a judgment which, if not appealed against, would be definitive, or a judgment which, if confirmed by some other authority, would be definitive; or (b) who is one of a body of persons which body of persons is empowered by law to give such a judgment as is referred to in Cl. (a). From the perusal of the said definition under the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985, it is abundantly clear that the said definition is identical to the definition which is given in section 19 of the Indian Penal Code. 17. So far as Indian Penal Code is concerned, section 6 of the Indian Penal Code lays down that the definitions in the Code are to be understood, subject to exceptions. Section 6 of the Code reads as under:- "6.Definitions in the Code to be understood subject to exceptions.- Th....
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....ther law for the time being in force and subject to the provisions of sub-sec. (2), no Court shall entertain or continue any civil or criminal proceeding against any person who is or was a Judge for any act, thing or word committed, done or spoken by im when, or in the course of, acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official or judicial duty or function. (2) Nothing in sub-sec.(1) shall debar or affect in any manner the power of the Central Government or the State Government or the Supreme Court of India or any High Court or any other authority under any law for the time being in force to take such action (whether by way of civil, criminal, or departmental proceedings or otherwise) against any person who is or was a Judge." Section 4 makes it clear that the provisions of this Act would be in addition to, and not in derogation of, the provisions of any other law, meaning thereby that the said protection is given in addition to protection given under section 77 of the Indian Penal Code. Section 4 of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 reads as under:- "4. The Provision of this Act shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of, the provisions of any oth....
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....dent Fund Commissioner, any Regional Provident Fund Commissioner or any Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner may by order,- (a) in a case where a dispute arises regarding the applicability of this Act to an establishment, decide such dispute; and (b) determine the amount due from any employer under any provision of this Act, the Scheme or the Pension Scheme or the Insurance Scheme, as the case may be, and for any of the aforesaid purposes may conduct such inquiry as he may deem necessary. (2) The Officer conducting the inquiry under sub-section (1) shall for the purposes of such inquiry, have the same powers as are vested in a Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), for trying a suit in respect of the following matters, namely- (a) enforcing the attendance of any person or examining him on oath; (b) requiring the discovery and production of documents; (c) receiving evidence on affidavit; (d) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses; and any such inquiry shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of Sections 193 and 228, and for the purpose of Section 196, of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) (3) No order shall....
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....peals to Tribunal.- (1) Any person aggrieved by a notification issued by the Central government, or an order passed by the Central Government or any authority, under the proviso to Sub-section (3), or subsection (4), of section 1, or section 3, or subsection (1) of section 7A, or section 7B except an order rejecting an application for review referred to in sub-section (5) thereof, or section 7C, or section 14B, may prefer an appeal to a Tribunal against such notification or order. (2) Every appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed in such form and manner, within such time and be accompanied by such fees, as may be prescribed." Section 7N lays down that the orders passed by the Tribunal shall be final. Section 8 of the EPF & MP Act lays down the mode of recovery of moneys due from employers. Section 14 prescribes penalties for non- payment of contribution as fixed by the provident fund scheme or determined under section 7A. 19. Perusal of the relevant provisions, therefore, in our view clearly reveal that the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner is empowered by law under section 7A in a case where a dispute arises regarding the applicability of the Act to establishment, ....
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....n 77 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3(1) of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 are attracted. The only question which, therefore, remains to be seen is : whether the averments in the FIR are such that the legal bar under the aforesaid provisions is attracted as envisaged under category (i) in R.P. Kapur's case AIR 1960 SC 866 (supra) and other subsequent judgments. In this context, therefore, it will be relevant to see the averments which are made in the FIR. 22. The FIR was registered on 14/07/2010 and the gist of the FIR is that the Petitioner alongwith some unknown officials of Navi Mumbai Municipal Corporation and CIDCO and some unknown officials of EPFO entered into conspiracy with M/s Pratibha Industries Ltd to cheat EPFO by passing a favourable order and abused their official positions and caused wrongful gain to M/s Pratibha Industries Ltd and corresponding loss to the EPFO to the tune of ₹ 24.91 crores. In the FIR, it is alleged that one Vijay Patil, President of Maharashtra Kamkar Akta Union made a complaint regarding evasion of EPF contribution of 2000 employees by M/s Pratibha Industries and, accordingly, the inquiry was initiated by the Petitioner and a....
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.... 4. Interest u/s.7Q @ 12% p.a. : ₹ 278,57,127/- 5. Total (2+3+4) : ₹ 25,07,14,147/- Therefore the total benefit was allowed to M/s Pratibha Industries Ltd. is ₹ 24,91,27,177/- (Rupees Twenty Four Crores Ninety One Lacs Twenty Seven Thousand One Hundred & Seventy Seven Only)." According to the complainant, therefore, in view of the said facts, the Petitioner had committed an offence punishable under section 120B read with section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 13(2) read with section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act. 23..From the averments which are made in the complaint, it is abundantly clear that the complainant had made the order passed by the Petitioner under Section 7A as fulcrum on the basis of which the complainant - CBI relying on the balance-sheets for the period from 2004-05 to 2008-09, came to be conclusion that the dues ought to have been calculated at ₹ 43,52,67,618/. The manner in which the said figure is arrived at is mentioned in paras 9, 10 and 11 of the complaint; the sole basis being the balance-sheet between the period 2004-05 and 2008-09. The CBI practically, therefore, acted as an appellate court and on the basis of the or....
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....el appearing on behalf of the petitioner invited our attention to the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in State of M.P. vs. Rajeev Jain 2001(4) MPHT 58. In the said case, the accused Rajeev Jain at the relevant time was Collector, Stamps appointed under the provisions of Indian Stamp Act, 1899 and the other accused persons were the sellers and purchasers of certain immovable properties which were sold/purchased under five different sale deeds and these sale deeds were registered under the Indian Registration Act at the Office of Sub-Registrar, Ujjain. The said sale deeds were referred to the Collector, Stamps for determination of the market value of the property and for the payment of proper stamp duty payable thereon. The accused Rajeev Jain after holding an inquiry passed the order determining market value of the said property. A complaint was made against the accused Rajeev Jain to the Lok Ayukta, Madhya Pradesh, Bhopal which led to enquiry and, ultimately, offence was registered by Special Police Establishment. Application for discharge was filed and the Trial Court passed an order of discharge against which Revision Application was filed in the High Court. The High Co....
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....t, or has perverted the course of justice, he can certainly be prosecuted and punished in Criminal Courts. However, in the instant case, there is not even an iota of evidence beyond the said two Orders passed by accused Collector to show that he accepted any bribe or been in the least degree corrupt. The prosecuting agency cannot be allowed to sit in judgment over the orders passed on judicial or quasi-judicial side by a Judge. May be that the accused Collector has mistaken even grossly mistaken, yet he acted judicially and for that reason no action shall lie against him. The wrong, if any, committed by him could be corrected in appeal. That cannot always form a basis for initiating criminal proceedings against him while he is acting as a judicial or quasi-judicial authority. It must be kept in mind that he being a quasi-judicial authority he is always subjected to judicial supervision in appeal or by the High Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution [See : Zunjarrao (1999) 7 SCC 409]. The prosecution against him should, therefore, fail on merit also." The Madhya Pradesh High Court in para 9 of its judgment has specifically observed that the prosecuting agency cannot ....
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....ial proceeding as defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure. If so, I doubt whether that would affect the result. But as "judicial proceeding" is an expression used in other parts of the Indian Penal Code, we are not at liberty to say, unless absolutely driven to it, that "legal proceeding" is exactly equivalent to "judicial proceeding" and that the Legislature carelessly used two different expressions to convey exactly the same idea; nor is the definition of "judicial proceeding" in the Code of Criminal Procedure necessarily applicable to that expression when used in the Penal Code. If we confine ourselves to s.19 of the Penal Code, "legal proceeding" there is obviously a proceeding in which a judgment may or must be given, a judgment being not an arbitrary decision but a decision arrived at judicially. In my opinion, "legal proceeding" in s.19 of the Penal Code means a proceeding regulated or prescribed by law, in which a judicial decision may or must be given. And in my opinion it is clear that a President when accepting or rejecting a nomination under r.4 is giving a definitive judicial decision in such a proceeding : ....
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.... Counsel for the Petitioner is in Anwar Hussain vs. Ajoy Kumar Mukherjee and Others AIR 1965 SC 1651. In the said case, a Petition was filed seeking compensation for false imprisonment against the order passed by the Sub- Divisional Officer. The Apex Court held and observed in para 8 of its judgment as under:- "(8) In this appeal, the only question raised is that in ordering the arrest of the respondent the appellant acted in discharge of his judicial duties, and he was on that account protected by the Judicial Officers' Protection Act, 1850. Section 1 of the Act, in so far as it is material, provided: "No Judge, Magistrate * * * Collector or other person acting judicially shall be liable to be sued in any Civil Court for any act done or ordered to be done by him in the discharge of his judicial duty, whether or not within the limits of his jurisdiction: Provided that he at the time, in good faith, believed himself to have jurisdiction to do or order the act complained of: * * *". The statute is clearly intended to grant protection to Judicial Officers against suits in respect of acts done or ordered to be done by them in discharge of their duties as such o....
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....ngs" and, therefore, it was submitted that the proceedings may be legal even if they are not judicial proceedings if they are authorized by law. It was submitted by relying on the said judgment that, in any event, the order passed by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner under Section 7A was in a legal proceeding and, therefore, he would be squarely covered under the definition of "Judge" which refers to every person who is empowered by law to give a definitive judgment in any legal proceeding. Reliance was also placed by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner on the judgment in Rachapudi Subba Rao vs. Advocate General, Andhra Pradesh (1981) 2 SCC 577. Ratio of the said judgment would squarely apply to the facts of the present case, though the appeal was filed against the judgment passed by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh whereby the appellant was convicted for committing gross contempt of Court under section 12 read with sections 10 and 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act. In the said case, the appellant had filed suit in the subordinate court, Vijayawada and the First Additional Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit of the appellant and d....
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....ned act was done or ordered by him in his judicial capacity, the act, even if erroneous will not put it beyond his 'jurisdiction'. Error in the exercise of jurisdiction is not to be confused with lack of jurisdiction in entertaining the cause or proceeding It follows that if the judicial officer is found to have been acting in the discharge of his judicial duties, then, in order to exclude him from the protection of this statute, the complainant has to establish that (1) the judicial officer complained against was acting without any jurisdiction whatsoever, and (2) he was acting without good faith in believing himself to have jurisdiction." These observations are very much relevant and, therefore, the ratio of the said judgment would also squarely apply to the facts of the present case. 26. On the other hand, the learned Additional Solicitor General on the aspect of the power of the High Court to quash the FIR and stay the investigation in cases registered under the P.C. Act, has relied upon the following judgments:- 1. State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal AIR 1992 SC 604, Para 108 2 . State of Bihar vs. Mohd. Kalique (2002) 1 SCC 652, Para 4 3. M. Narayandas vs. St....
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....on 3(1), this was restricted to the acts done in the discharge of his official or judicial duty or function and it was further subject to the provisions of section 3(2). It was submitted that in section 3(2), it is made clear that nothing in section 3(1) would debar or affect the power of the Central Government or the State Government or the Supreme Court of India or any High Court or any other authority under law to take action whether civil, criminal or departmental against the person who is a Judge or was a Judge. It was submitted that, therefore, the provisions under section 2 of the 1985 JP Act and Section 77 of the IPC would give immunity to the Judge, provided the Judge was acting judicially and in good faith. Lastly, it was submitted that the judicial independence and judicial accountability are both equally important public interests and judicial independence could never be at the cost of judicial accountability. In support of this submission, he relied upon the following Judgments. (1) E. Giri Yadav, M.A. vs. Union of India 2009(2) ALD 608, Paras 17, 18, 26 to 33, 35, 36 (2) Advocate General, Andhra Pradesh vs. Rachapudi Subba Rao 1991 Cri.LJ. 613, Paras 14 and 15 (....
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....J 502, para 11 3. Tulsi Ram vs. State of U.P. 1963 (1) Cri.LJ 623, paras 14-17 4. State vs. Ramados Naidu 1977 Cri. LJ 2048, para 7 29. In view of the submissions made by the learned Additional Solicitor General, the question which falls for consideration is : whether the provisions of section 3(2) overrides section 3(1) of 1985 JP Act. It has been strenuously urged after relying on number of judgments that section 3(2) being a substantive provision, it expressly overrides section 3(1). It was further submitted that section 3(1) also expressly states that it is subject to provisions of section 3(2). It is, therefore, necessary to decide the scope and ambit of section 3(1) and 3(2). The said section is already reproduced hereinabove. However, for the sake of convenience, it would be appropriate if it is reproduced again:- "3(1) Not withstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force and subject to the provisions of sub-sec. (2), no Court shall entertain or continue any civil or criminal proceeding against any person who is or was a Judge for any act, thing or word committed, done or spoken by him when, or in the course of, acting or purporting to....
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.... and under inherent jurisdiction under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code was not competent to quash the proceedings. In support of the said submission, reliance was placed on number of judgments which have been mentioned hereinabove. 31. In our view, it will not be possible to accept the submissions canvassed by the learned Additional Solicitor General. If the said submission is accepted, it would render the protection given to a Judge under section 3(1) nugatory and the provision would be otiose or meaningless. It is a very well settled position in law that while interpreting the provision the words have to be interpreted in a harmonious manner and the words also have to be interpreted in a contextual manner after ascertaining the intention of the legislature. If the submission made by the Additional Solicitor General is accepted, it would mean that the legislature on the one hand had given protection to a Judge who was acting in the discharge of his official duty and, on the other hand, the same protection was taken away under section 3(2) of the said Act. If the provision is so interpreted, it would be rendered meaningless. 32. The said two provisions viz. sub-section....
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.... there is any other material which is available with the State or Central Government or higher judicial authorities which could show that the act of the Judge was not in discharge of his official duty then the protection was not available and the said Judge could be prosecuted. Therefore, if there is material to show that the judgment which was delivered was passed on extraneous considerations then on the basis of that material criminal case could be instituted against the said Judge and the said protection which is given under sub-section (1) would not be available. However, at the same time, it would not be open to entertain or continue the proceeding which is based solely on the judgment which is delivered by the Court. Thus, it will not be open for the prosecuting agency to say that the judgment which is delivered is wrong because, according to the prosecution, the judgment should have been "X" and not "Y" more particularly since against the impugned order there is a remedy of filing appeal or Writ Petition in the High Court or SLP in the Supreme Court. 34. Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code lays down that sanction to prosecute has to be obtained ag....
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....anindra Chandra vs. King AIR 1954 SC 455 and by the Supreme Court in Shreekantiah Ramayya Munipalli vs. State of Bombay AIR 1955 SC 287 and in Amrik Singh vs. State of Pepsu AIR 1955 SC 309 35. In our view, therefore, sub-section (1) of section (3) of the said Act has to be interpreted to mean that the protection which is afforded to a Judge is for an act which has been performed during the course of his official duties and that cannot form a basis for instituting criminal case against him and, therefore, ratio of the judgments of the Apex Court which has interpreted the term "discharge of official duty" in the judgments referred to above would also on the same analogy apply to the protection which is afforded under section 3(1) of the said Act. In the present case, the Petitioner who was a Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, was called upon to decide the dispute and, accordingly, after holding the enquiry, he was pleased to pass the said order. It became final since no appeal or review was filed. CBI has held that the actual liability of the employer was much higher which conclusion has been arrived at on the basis of the balance-sheet and other accounts on which reli....
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....e of the offence alleged in the private complaint against the Judge of the High Court in respect of his acts in the discharge of judicial functions and, in this context, Full Bench held that so far as the Judges of the High Court and Supreme Court are concerned the Central Government or the State Government had no power to grant sanction to prosecute since they are constitutional authorities. It was, however, held that so far as members of subordinate judiciary are concerned, the State Government, after obtaining the concurrence of the High Court has power to accord previous sanction for the prosecution of a member of subordinate judiciary. Ratio of this Judgment also, therefore, is of no assistance to the Respondents. 37. Provisions of section 3(1) and 3(2), therefore, if they are construed harmoniously, it would be clear that if the allegation in the complaint is made on the basis of a judgment which is given by a Judge while discharging his official duties as a Judge and that is made the basis of the criminal complaint, as has been done in the present case, then, in that case, the Judge would be entitled to get protection as laid down under section 3(1) of the said Act. However....
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....oned that from the statement of facts given in the plaint itself it was clear that the suit is one the cognizance of which is forbidden by the provisions of the Judicial Officers' Protection Act No. XVIII of 1850. The Allahabad High Court held in the facts of the said case that in the plaint the cause of action was stated to be that the Defendant took the Plaintiff into custody and, secondly, he brought a false charge against the Plaintiff, knowing the said charge to be false. It was held that the order was passed on preliminary point. It was held that the plaint could be struck out and a suit dismissed on the ground that the plaint discloses no cause of action. But, for that purpose, it was necessary to look at the plaint and nothing else. However, it was observed that on reading the plaint, it is clear that if the allegations are proved in accordance with the plaint, there is any sort of cause of action, however, trivial, frivolous and doubtful it may be, it is the duty of the Court to hear the evidence and decide it on merits. Under these circumstances, it was observed that defence was really a defence which goes to the merits and could only be tested when the facts relied u....
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.... 4). It was further submitted that even if contextual interpretation is adopted the word 'entertain' must be given the aforesaid meaning, otherwise provisions of section 3(2) would be defeated. In our view, ratio of the said judgments would not apply to the facts of the present case. In the present case, if contextual interpretation is adopted the word 'entertain' or 'continue" will have different connotation and the said words would clearly reflect the intention of the Parliament imposing a bar on the Court to entertain these proceedings. Once the Court comes to the conclusion that the averments made in the FIR are such which would be hit by legal bar to proceed further, High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure within the ambit and scope of the power of the High Court, as laid down in R.P. Kapur vs State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866, Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal AIR 1992 SC 604 and in State of Bihar vs. Mohd. Khalique (2002) 1 SCC 652, is entitled to quash the FIR and, therefore, submission made by the Counsel for the Respondents is without any substance. 40. In support of the submission that ....
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....whether the authority is a Court or not is to see whether it has power to give a decision or a definitive judgment which has finality and authoritativeness which are the essential tests of a judicial pronouncements. In our view, ratio of the said judgment does not assist the case of the Respondents. We have already considered the provisions of the Act and have observed that the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner who passes an order under section 7A, attains finality and can be executed against the employer and the said order can be executed by following the procedure which is similar to the procedure of execution of a decree and it also entails penal consequences. In Iqbal Singh Narang AIR 2012 SC 466, paras 13 and 14 (supra), which is a very recent judgment, the question which fell for consideration before the Apex Court was : whether any private complaint could be maintainable in respect of the statements alleged to have been made falsely before the Rent Controller even if he is held "not to be a Court". The Apex Court, after taking into consideration the consistent view which was taken by the Apex Court, held that though Rent Controller discharges quasi-judicial fun....
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....ourt of Appeal in Lancaster Motor Co. (London) Ltd. v. Bremith Ltd. (1941) 1 KB 675 and it was laid down that when non consideration was given to the question, the decision cannot be said to be binding and precedents sub silentio and without arguments are of no moment" [See also State of U.P. v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. (1991) 4 SCC 139, Arnit Das v. State of Bihar (2000) 5 SCC 488 (SCC para 20), Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mills (P) Ltd. (2003) 2 SCC 111, Cement Corpn. of India Ltd. v. Purya (2004) 8 SCC 270, Bharat Forge Co. Ltd. v. Uttam Manohar Nakate (2005) 2 SCC 489 and Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan (2005) 2 SCC 42, See para 42.]" Similarly, in Punjab National Bank vs. R.L. Vaid and others AIR 2004 SC 4269 the Apex Court in para 5 has observed as under:- "5. We find that the High Court has merely referred to the decision in R.K. Jain's case AIR 1993 SC 1769 : 1993 AIR SCW 1899 (supra) without even indicating as to applicability of the said decision and as to how it has any relevance to the facts of the case. It would have been proper for the High Court to indicate the reasons and also to spell out clearly as to the applicabilit....
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.... not ratio decidenti. In B. Shama Rao v. Union Territory of Pondicherry it was observed, 'it is trite to say that a decision is binding not because of its conclusions but in regard to its ratio and the principles, laid down therein'. Any declaration or conclusion arrived without application of mind or preceded without any reason cannot be deemed to be declaration of law or authority of a general nature binding as a precedent. Restraint in dissenting or overruling is for sake of stability arid uniformity but rigidity beyond reasonable limits is inimical to the growth of law." 42. It is, therefore, not open for the party to rely on some of the observations made in the judgment which is given in the context of some other facts which are not similar to the facts of the case in issue. 43. Moreover, distinction will have to be drawn between the definition of the word "Court" and of "Judge". The Indian Penal Code has clearly made distinction between these two words and the words "Judge" & "Court" are separately defined and, as such, the judgment in which the decision revolves around the question as to whether the authority is Court or....
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.... case in respect of the Judgment in Regional Provident Fund Commissioner vs. Bhavani AIR 2008 SC 2957, Para 21. There, the question was: whether the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner was liable for prosecution under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and, in that context, it was held that the Act was applicable in the case of the Scheme on the ground that its member was a 'consumer' under section 2(1)(d) and the Scheme was a 'service' under section 2(1)(o). The issue as to whether the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner is a 'Judge" or not did not fall for consideration before the Apex Court in the said case. 45. It was also very strenuously urged that the protection under JP Act, 1985 and section 77 of the Indian Penal Code could not be extended to acts which are negligent or reckless and that there was no blanket or absolute protection to a Judge from criminal prosecution and that the criminal act is not an official act. Reliance was placed on the judgments of the Apex Court in Union of India vs. K.K. Dhawan AIR 1993 SC 1478 (Para 28), Veeraswamy vs Union of India (1991) 3 SCC 655 (Paras 9 & 56) and the Judgment in Harihar Prasad vs. State of Bihar (1....