TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1998 (6) TMI 591
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....of Rs. 75,000 in favour of the respondent. The cheque was presented in the bank OH May 17, 1995, for collection. No doubt, the cheque was returned for insufficiency of funds. Apart from the above common case of both sides, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the cheque had been presented in the bank after the expiry of six months and, therefore, it is barred by limitation as contemplated under Section 138, proviso (a) of the Negotiable Instruments Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), when the cheque is barred as per the above provision, no criminal prosecution can be launched against the petitioner. On this contention of learned counsel for the petitioner, a petition, C. M. P. No. 8609 of 1996, was moved before the magi....
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....t, it shall be sufficient, for the purpose of including the first in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word 'from', and, for the purpose of including the last in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word 'to'." 4. The interpretation of learned counsel for the respondent in respect of the words employed in the above Section would be that the limitation must start only from the next date of instrument. In this connection, it is also pertinent to extract hereunder Section 138 of the Act : "138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account.--Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of m....
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...., Section 138, proviso (a), is involved which is so clear (as extracted above) that the date of limitation will commence only from the date found in the cheque or the instrument. This view has already been taken by the Supreme Court in Jiwan-lal Achariya v. Rameshwarlal Agarwalla, AIR 1967 SC 1118. No doubt, in that judgment, among the three judges two of them have taken the view that the period of limitation will commence from the date the instrument bears. Therefore, the majority view of the judges has become the settled proposition of law. This court in a Division Bench in Manoj K. Seth v. R. J. Fernandez [1991] 2 KLT 65 ; [1992] 73 Comp Cas 441 has relied upon the principle pronounced by the Supreme Court in Jiwanlal Achariya v. Rameshw....
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.... [1962] 1 ILR 761 (All), the matter arising for consideration was with reference to a notice issued under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and also with reference to the meaning of a month as defined in Section 3(35) of the General Clauses Act. The view of the judges in the above case would be that though the British calendar month is referred to in Section 3(35) of the General Clauses Act, in common parlance, a month means only a period of 30 days. Therefore, when a month is used in a statute that may be interpreted to mean a period of 30 days as held in Varna Dava Desihar v. Murugesa Mudali [1906] 29 ILR 75 (Mad). The High Court of Andhra Pradesh has taken a different view in this respect in V. S. Metha, In re, AIR 1970 AP 234.....