TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2020 (12) TMI 791
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....tioner is the distributer of Airtel as engaged by Bharati Hexacom Limited for Dharmanagar jurisdiction. This fact, however, is not under dispute. It is also not in dispute that in terms of Clause-5.7 of the agreement dated 30.10.2010 by which the petitioner has been engaged as the distributor, the petitioner is under obligation for making payment of all taxes, duties, levies, cess, search charge or any other charges that may be applicable on the distributor or for prepaid/service offerings/ products etc. According to the petitioner, the tax invoices used to be prepared by Bharati Hexacom Limited in the name of M/s New Kiran Enterprise, another proprietorship firm owned by the petitioner. On 04.09.2012, when a search was carried out under Section 67(2) of Tripura State Goods and Services Act, 2017 [TSGST Act, 2017 in short] it revealed from GSTTR-3B for the period from July, 2017 to 31st March, 2018 that the taxpayer namely M/s Kiran Enterprise GSTTIN 16ACIPD2157R2Z9 Nayapara Road Dharmanagar has utilized or availed IGST at Rs. 3,690.00, CGST at Rs. 12,67,409.84 and SGST at Rs. 12,67,409.84 but as per Form GSTR- 2A (inward supply), the taxpayer is entitled for utilization Input Tax ....
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....t No.4 has observed as follows : "The taxpayer submitted with her application dated 15.10.2018 M/S Kiran Enterprise & New Kiran Enterprise deals in same products and PAN number is also same. Only GST number is separate. M/S Kiran Enterprise, GSTIN: 16ACIPD2157R2Z9, Nayapara Road, Dharmanagar and M/S New Kiran Enterprise, GSTIN: 16ACIPD2157R1ZA, Nayapara Road, Dharmanagar are separate entity and it should be treated as distinct persons though the proprietor and PAN is same as per provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 25 of the TSGST Act, 2017 as reproduced by the provisions of Section 25(4) of the Act; "A person who has obtained or is required to obtain more than one registration, whether in one State or Union Territory or more than one State or Union territory shall, in respect of each such registration, be treated as distinct persons for the purpose of this Act." Therefore, the taxpayer cannot utilize or avail of Input Tax Credit (ITC) of M/S New Kiran Enterprise, GSTIN: 16ACIPD2157R1ZA against M/S Kiran Enterprise, GSTIN : 16ACIPD2157R2Z9 though both the distinct persons PAN is same. In respect of excess ITC claimed, the taxpayer is also sub....
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....n the proceeding. M/s New Kiran Enterprise has not even been aggaigned in the proceeding as separate entity. The impugned order has been passed against M/s Kiran Enterprise following the showcause notice dated 10.10.2018 [Annexure-2 to the writ petition]. The petitioner filed a petition on 08.11.2019 [Annexure-5 to the writ petition] under Section 161 of the TSGST Act for rectification of the error in the tax invoice. As consequence thereof, the showcause notice dated 10.10.2018 and the order dated 15.11.2018 [Annexure-2 and 3 respectively] be recalled. The delay that occurred in filing such petition was required to be condoned. Accordingly, prayer for condoning the delay was advanced on the ground that the sole proprietor of the petitioner is about ninety six years of age and is suffering from various old age diseases. In the said petition filed under section 161 of the TSGST Act, the petitioner has asserted inter alia that Bharati Hexacom Limited prepared the tax invoices erroneously in the name of M/s Kiran Enterprise (instead of M/s New Kiran Enterprise). It has been stated further that Bharati Hexacom Limited owes payment of SGST as well as CGST and the petitioner does not hav....
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....to Section 161 of TSGST Act stipulates that no rectification should be done after expiry of six months from the date of issue of such decision, order or notice. It has been also observed that no rectification can be done by the adjudicating authority after the period prescribed under Section 161 of the TSGST Act if the rectification as contemplated does not involve a clerical or arithmetical error. Accordingly, the said petition was rejected. The revenue has filed their reply on 17.03.2020 by admitting the fact relating to issuance of the showcause notice and imposition of tax, interest and penalty. They have asserted that the petitioner utilized more amount of ITC for which the petitioner was not entitled. The petitioner had submitted the said prayer before the order dated 15.11.2018 was passed, to the respondent No.4 but no document was submitted in support of her said claim. The respondents have restated that the rectification as sought did not involve a clerical or arithmetical error arising from any accidental slip or omission to apply. Proviso to Section 161 of the TSGST Act clearly provides that no rectification can be done after expiry of six months from the date of pass....
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....date of issue of such decision or order or notice or certificate or any other document. However, an exception has been curved out by the second proviso to Section 161 of the TSGST Act that such restriction shall not be applied in the cases where the rectification purely involves a correction of arithmetical error arising from accidental slip or omission. 9. Mr. Bhowmik, learned Advocate General has emphatically stated that no authority has competence to condone the delay as prescribed by Section 161 of the TSGST Act. For purpose of reference, Section 161 of the TSGST Act is reproduced hereunder : "161. Without prejudice to the provisions of section 160, and notwithstanding anything contained in any other provisions of this Act, any authority, who has passed or issued any decision or order or notice or certificate or any other document, may rectify any error which is apparent on the face of record in such decision or order or notice or certificate or any other document, either on its own motion or where such error is brought to its notice by any officer appointed under this Act or an officer appointed under the Central Goods and Services Tax Act or by the affected person....
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....f State Tax being the authority which passed the order dated 15.11.2018 had the authority to condone the delay on the face of the petition filed under Section 161 of the TSGST Act for rectifying the defects or errors in the impugned notice dated 10.10.2018 and the order dated 15.11.2018. Such error is sourced in the tax invoice which has mentioned the name of the petitioner. 13. There is no dispute that the Superintendent of State Tax by the communication dated 17.12.2018 [Annexure-6 to the writ petition] apprised the petitioner that the tax payer‟s petition under Section 161 of the TSGST Act dated 18.11.2018 cannot be entertained for the reasons as recorded in the said communication dated 17.12.2019 which reads as under : "As per record, the order against the taxpayer was passed by the Superintendent of State Tax of Dharmanagar Charge under section 74 of the TSGST Act, 2017 on 15.11.2018. The taxpayer after expiry of approximately twelve months furnished a petition under section 161 of the TSGST Act, 2017 for rectification of defects/errors before the Superintendent of State Tax. The petition under Section 161 of the TSGST Act, 2017 was submitted by the taxpayer ....
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....nil period of limitation for such an appeal. It is now well settled that where a period of limitation is prescribed by a special or local law for an appeal or application and for which there is no provision made in the schedule to the Act, the second condition for attracting Section 29(2) would get satisfied. Thus, Section 29(2) would apply even to a case where a difference between the special law and the Limitation Act arises. For applying Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, the apex Court has observed as follows : "8. Once it is held that the appellate authority functioning under Section 18 of the Rent Act is not a persona designata, it becomes obvious that it functions as a court. In the present case all the District Judges having jurisdiction over the areas within which the provisions of the Rent Act have been extended are constituted as appellate authorities under Section 18 by the Govt. notification noted earlier. These District Judges have been conferred the powers of the appellate authorities. It becomes therefore, obvious that while adjudicating upon the dispute between the landlord and tenant and while deciding the question whether the Rent Control Court&#....
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.... is a court or not are applied to the powers and functions of the appellate authority constituted under Section 18 of the Rent Act, it becomes obvious that all the aforesaid essential trappings to constitute such an authority as a court are found to be present. In fact, Mr. Nariman learned Counsel for respondent also fairly stated that these appellate authorities would be courts and would not be persona designata. But in his submission as they are not civil courts constituted and functioning under the Civil Procedure Code as such, they are outside the sweep of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. It is therefore, necessary for us to turn to the aforesaid provision of the Limitation Act. It reads as under : "29(2). Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only insofar as....
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....ate tribunal under the SARFAESI Act has to dispose an appeal in accordance with the provisions of Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institution Act, 1993 (RDDB Act). In this respect, the provisions of RDDB Act stands incorporated in the SARFAESI Act for disposal of an appeal. In view of that in corporation, it is held by the apex court that there is no reason as to why the SARFAESI appellate tribunal cannot maintain an appeal beyond the prescribed period. Even on being satisfied that there is sufficient cause for not filing such appeal within that period, power of condonation by means of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act was held not to be available. Proviso of Section 20(2) of the RDDB Act would apply in view of the provisions made in Section 18(2) of SARFAESI Act. This interpretation is clearly borne in two statutes, as stated. But that advances the cause of justice. It has been emphatically observed that unless the scheme of the statute expressly excludes the power of condonation, there is no reason to deny such power to an appellate tribunal when the statutory scheme so warrants. It has been observed in Baleshwar Dayal Jaiswal (supra) as follows : "11. We ....
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.... court for purposes of Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure. We are of the view that for purposes of decision of these appeals, it is not necessary to decide the question whether the Tribunal under the Banking statutes in question was court for purposes of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. 14. We have already held that the power of condonation of delay was expressly applicable by virtue of Section 18(2) of the SARFAESI Act read with proviso to Section 20(3) of the RDB Act and to that extent, the provisions of Limitation Act having been expressly incorporated under the special statutes in question, Section 29(2) stands impliedly excluded. To this extent, we differ with the view taken by the Andhra Pradesh High Court as well as Madras and Bombay High Courts. We are also in agreement with the principle that even though Section 5 of the Limitation Act may be impliedly inapplicable, principle of Section 14 of the Limitation Act can be held to be applicable even if Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act does not apply, as laid down by this Court in Consolidated Engineering Enterprises v. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department : (2008) 7 SCC 169 and M.P. Steel Corporatio....
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....t cannot therefore be said that the legislative intent was to exclude the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to the proceeding under Section 19 of the 1983 Act. In Anshuman Shukla (supra) it has been observed by the apex court as follows : "21. The Limitation Act, 1963 is the general legislation on the law of limitation. Section 5 of the Limitation Act provides that an appeal may be admitted after the limitation period has expired, if the Appellant satisfies the court that there was sufficient cause for delay. 22. Section 29 of the Limitation Act is the saving section. Sub-section (2) reads as follows: "29.(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded b....
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....phasis supplied] 25. Further, in the case of Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra: (1974) 2 SCC 133, a three judge Bench of this Court, while examining whether the Limitation Act would be applicable to the provisions of Representation of People Act, observed as under: "17..... but what we have to see is whether the scheme of the special law, that is in this case the Act, and the nature of the remedy provided therein are such that the Legislature intended it to be a complete code by itself which alone should govern the several matters provided by it. If on an examination of the relevant provisions it is clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Act. In our view, even in a case where the special law does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it would nonetheless be open to the Court to examine whether and to what extent the nature of those provisions or the nature of the subject-matter and scheme of the special law exclude their operation." 26. According to Hu....
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.... that Act. Parliament did not need to go further. To hold that the Court could entertain an application to set aside the Award beyond the extended period under the proviso, would render the phrase 'but not thereafter' wholly otiose. No principle of interpretation would justify such a result." 21. On the aspect of application of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act vis a vis Section 161 of the Tripura State Goods and Services Act, 2017 Mr. Deb, learned counsel has further relied on another decision of the apex court in Mohinder Singh versus Paramjit Singh and Others reported in (2018) 5 SCC 698 where it has been held that the Limitation Act deprives or restricts the right of an aggrieved person to have recourse to legal remedy, and where its language is ambiguous, that construction should be preferred which preserves such remedy to the one which bars or defeats it. A court ought to avoid an interpretation upon a statute of limitation by implication or inference as it may have a penalizing effect unless it is driven to do so by the irresistible force of the language employed by the legislature. 22. In Mahinder Singh (supra), the Civil Judge by a judgment discarded the ob....
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.... the decree becomes enforceable from that date and not from the date of the judgment/decree. But where no extraneous event is to happen on the fulfillment of which alone the decree can be executed it is not a conditional decree and is capable of execution from the very date it is passed (Yeshwant Deorao v. Walchand Ramchand: AIR 1951 SC 16). Secondly, when there is a legislative bar for the execution of a decree then enforceability will commence when the bar ceases. Thirdly, in a suit for partition of immovable properties after passing of preliminary decree when, in final decree proceedings, an order is passed by the court declaring the rights of the parties in the suit properties, it is not executable till final decree is engrossed on non-judicial stamp paper supplied by the parties within the time specified by the Court and the same is signed by the Judge and sealed. It is in this context that the observations of this Court in Shankar Balwant Lokhande v. Chandrakant Shankar Lokhande: (1995) 3 SCC 413 have to be understood. These observations do not apply to a money decree and, therefore, Appellant can derive no benefit from them." 21. As in the present case, eve....
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....ause of a like nature' within the meaning of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. It is true that the writ petition was not dismissed by the High Court on the ground of defect of jurisdiction. However, Section 14 of the Limitation Act is wide in its application, inasmuch as it is not confined in its applicability only to cases of defect of jurisdiction but it is applicable also to cases where the prior proceedings have failed on account of other causes of like nature. The expression 'other cause of like nature' came up for the consideration of this Court in Roshanlal Kuthalia v. R.B. Mohan Singh Oberai : (1975) 4 SCC 628 and it was held that Section 14 of the Limitation Act is wide enough to cover such cases where the defects are not merely jurisdictional strictly so called but others more or less neighbours to such deficiencies. Any circumstances, legal or factual, which inhibits entertainment or consideration by the Court of the dispute on the merits comes within the scope of the Section and a liberal touch must inform the interpretation of the Limitation Act which deprives the remedy of one who has a right. 23. Thereafter, the apex Court having noticed the facts of t....
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....x and penalty as imposed on the ground of availing wrongful input tax credit has created a huge liability for the petitioner. This mistake has been clarified in the reply to the showcause as well as in the petition that has been filed under Section 161 of the TSGST Act. But the respondent No.3 did not appreciate that explanation as according to him, the said petition under Section 161 of the TSGST Act was time-barred. In this regard, Mr. Deb, learned counsel has relied on decision of the apex court in M/s Hindustan Steel Ltd. versus State of Orissa reported in 1970 (25) STC 211:1969(2) SCC 627 to contend that the liability as to pay the penalty does not arise merely upon proof of fault in the order imposing penalty for failure to carry out a statutory obligation. Penalty will not ordinarily be imposed unless the party so penalised either acted deliberately in defiance of law or acted in conscious disregard of its obligation. Penalty will not be imposed merely it is lawful to do so. Where the penalty should be imposed for failure to perform the statutory obligation is a matter of discretion of the authority. Discretion is to be exercised judicially and on consideration of all releva....
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....ition is time-barred there is no reason to consider the core of the controversy as projected in the petition, inasmuch as being barred by limitation forecloses the jurisdiction of the authority to decide the controversy on merit. Even if, Mr. Bhowmik, learned Advocate General has submitted, it is assumed that the Superintendent of State Tax or the Superintendent of State Tax could have condoned the delay, then decision on merit could have been taken by the said authority which has the jurisdiction for determining whether rectification of errors can be permitted to be corrected or not. 26. Mr. Bhowmik, learned Advocate General has categorically submitted that the second proviso to Section 161 of the TSGST Act has no relevance in the present controversy inasmuch as it provides for rectification or correction of a clerical or arithmetical error arising from any accidental slip or omission. The provision of Section 161 provides rectification only of the decision or order or notice or certificate or any other document as issued by any authority under the TSGST Act. Thus, the clerical or arithmetical error from any accidental slip or omission would mean rectification in the decision o....
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....actor, or Plaintiff, who complains or an injury done; the reus, or Defendant, who is called upon to make satisfaction for it; and the judex, or judicial power, which is to examine the truth of the fact, and to determine the law arising upon that fact, and if any injury appears to have been done, to ascertain, and b its officers to apply, the remedy," (3 Steph. Comm. 6th Ed., pp. 383, 385). See also Manavals Goundan v. Kumarappa Reddy:ILR(1907)30 Mad 326, Court is a body in the government to which the public administration of justice is delegated; an organised body, with defined powers, meeting at certain times, and places, for the hearing and decision of causes and other matters brought before it, and aided in this, its proper business, by its proper officers, viz., attorneys and counsels, to present and manage the business, clerks to record and attest its acts and decisions, and ministerial officers to execute its commands and secure order in its proceedings." 14. The constitution of Court in this country has been by legislative enactments. For constituting Civil Courts, the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887 was enacted which provided classes of civil courts a....
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....itution or relates to any of the matters specified in Section 66." 28. While considering the applicability of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act vis a vis Section 69 of Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959 (the Act of 1959, in short) the apex court has observed inter alia : 23. The Limitation Act, 1963 is an Act to consolidate and amend the law for the limitation of suits and other proceedings and for purposes connected therewith. The law of Limitation before enactment of Act, 1963 was governing by the law of limitation under Indian Limitation Act, 1908. The different provisions of Limitation Act, 1963 refers to 'Court'. Section 4 provides where the prescribed period for any suit, appeal or application expires on a day when the court is closed, the suit, appeal or application may be instituted, preferred or made on the day when the court reopens. Similarly, Section 5 provides that any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the Appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he has sufficient ca....
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....ecial or local laws came for consideration before this Court in large number of cases. This Court had occasion to consider the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, in reference to different statutes which contain provisions of suits, appeals or applications to the courts/authorities/tribunals. There are series of judgments of this Court holding that provisions of the Limitation Act are directed only when suit, appeal or application are to be filed in a Court unless there are express provisions in a special or local law. 28. Section 29(2) also came for consideration before this Court in several cases. There is another set of cases where it was held that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 is to be applied even for suit, appeal or application under special/local law is to be filed before statutory authorities and the tribunal. We shall notice both sets of cases to find out the ratio which need to be applied in the present case. 29. The first case to be noticed is Town Municipal Council, Athani v. The Presiding Officer, Labour Courts, Hubli,: (1969) 1 SCC 873. In the above case applications Under Section 33(c)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 were fi....
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....may contain an express provision conferring on the Appellate Authority, such as the Collector, the power to extend the prescribed period of limitation on sufficient cause being shown by laying down that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act shall be applicable to such proceedings. Hence it becomes necessary to examine whether the Act contains any such provision entitling the Collector to invoke the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of the delay in the filing of the appeal. The only provision relied on by the Appellant in this connection is Section 93 of the Act which, as it stood at the relevant time, was in the following terms: "93. Limitations.--Every appeal and every application for revision under this Act shall be filed within sixty days from the date of the order against which the appeal or application is filed and the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 shall apply for the purpose of the computation of the said period.' On a plain reading of the Section it is absolutely clear that its effect is only to render applicable to the proceedings before the Collector, the provisions of the Limitation Act relating to "comp....
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....essly excluded" would mean that there must be an express reference in the special or local law to the specific provisions of Limitation Act of which the operation has to be excluded. It has been stated that the approach that has to be adopted by the court in such a case is to examine the provisions of the special statute to arrive at a conclusion as to whether there is legislative content to exclude the operation of the Limitation Act. It can be gathered from the legislation the provision is to exclude the other provisions relating to condonation including Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Section 29(2) stipulates that in absence of any express provisions, provisions of Sections 4-24 inclusive of the Limitation Act would apply but that will not be the same, when the special statute excludes the applicability of Section 29(2) even by implication. In this context it has been observed in Patel Brothers(supra) as follows : 21. The judgment in Mangu Ram(supra) would not come to the aid of the Appellant as the Court found that there was no provision under the Code of Criminal Procedure. from which legislative intent to exclude Section 5 of the Limitation Act could be discerned an....
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....on Section 29 of the Limitation Act, even assuming that Section 29(2) would be attracted, what we have to determine is whether the provisions of this Section are expressly excluded in the case of reference to the High Court. 35. It was contended before us that the words "expressly excluded" would mean that there must be an express reference made in the special or local law to the specific provisions of the Limitation Act of which the operation is to be excluded. In this regard, we have to see the scheme of the special law which here in this case is the Central Excise Act. The nature of the remedy provided therein is such that the legislature intended it to be a complete code by itself which alone should govern the several matters provided by it. If, on an examination of the relevant provisions, it is clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Act. In our considered view, that even in a case where the special law does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it would nonetheless be open to the cou....
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.... proposition of law is somewhat deviated from what has been observed in Mukri Gopalan(supra). Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act which provides that the special or local law described therein should prescribe for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation, different from the period prescribed by the schedule to the Limitation Act. This would necessarily mean or imply that such special or local law would have to lay down that the suit, appeal or application to be instituted under it, should be a suit, appeal or application of the nature described in the schedule to the Limitation Act. 34. In M.P. Steel Corporation(supra) the edges have been sought to be ironed out holding that Parson Tools(supra) is the authority for the proposition that the Limitation Act will not apply for the quasi judicial bodies or the tribunal : 29. Quite apart from Mukri Gopalan's case being out of step with at least five earlier binding judgments of this Court, it does not square also with the subsequent judgment in Consolidated Engg. Enterprises v. Principal secy., Irrigation Deptt.: (2008) 7 SCC 169. A 3-Judge Bench of this Court was asked to decide whether Section 14 of the Li....
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....plication, for setting aside an arbitral award, has to be made is not unusually long. Section 34 of the Act of 1996 would be unduly oppressive, if it is held that the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act are not applicable to it, because cases are no doubt conceivable where an aggrieved party, despite exercise of due diligence and good faith, is unable to make an application within a period of four months. From the scheme and language of Section 34 of the Act of 1996, the intention of the legislature to exclude the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act is not manifest. It is well to remember that Section 14 of the Limitation Act does not provide for a fresh period of limitation but only provides for the exclusion of a certain period. Having regard to the legislative intent, it will have to be held that the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would be applicable to an application submitted Under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 for setting aside an arbitral award." 30. While discussing Parson Tools, this Court held: 25...In appeal, this Court held that (1) if the legislature in a special statute prescribes a certain period of lim....
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....tribunals, unless expressly provided." While dealing with Parson Tools, the learned Judge held: "56. In Parson Tools: (1975) 4 SCC 22] this Court did not hold that Section 14(2) was excluded by reason of the wording of Section 10(3-B) of the Sales Tax Act. This Court was considering an appeal against the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court. Two Judges of the High Court had held that the time spent in prosecuting the application for setting aside the order of dismissal of appeals in default, could be excluded when computing the period of limitation for filing a revision Under Section 10 of the said Act, by application of the principle underlying Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act. The minority view of the third Judge was that the revisional authority Under Section 10 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act did not act as a court but only as a Revenue Tribunal and therefore the Limitation Act did not apply to the proceedings before such Tribunal, and consequently, neither Section 29(2) nor Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act applied. The decision of the Full Bench was challenged by the Commissioner of Sales Tax before this Court, contending that the Limitation Act di....
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....To the extent that Mukri Gopalan is in conflict with the judgment in the Consolidated Engineering Enterprises case, it is no longer good law." 35. Finally, Mr. Bhowmik, learned Advocate General has referred to a decision of the apex court in International Asset Reconstruction Company of India Limited versus Official Liquidator of Aldrich Pharmaceuticals Limited and Others reported in (2017) 16 SCC 137 where the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act qua Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 was considered in the context of condoning the delay by the Debt Recovery Tribunal for an appeal under Section 30 of the Recovery Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993. It has been observed, having referred to Sakuru(supra) that the proceeding under the said Act before the statutory tribunal cannot be place at par with proceedings before a court. The tribunal has therefore had no power to condone the delay. It has been observed by the apex Court in the International Asset Reconstruction Company of India Limited (supra) as follows : "13. The RDB Act is a special law. The proceedings are before a statutory Tribunal. The scheme of the Act manifestly provides that the Legislature ....