2020 (9) TMI 401

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....ed that assessee had filed return of income for the impugned assessment year on 23/09/2008 declaring total income of Rs. 16,44,220/-. The return of the assessee was processed under section 143(1) of the Act. Thereafter, assessment was reopened on the ground that there was misuse of Client Code Modification. Consequently, notice under section 148 of the Act was issued to the assessee on 31/03/2016. Order under section 143(3) r.w.s. 147 of the Act was passed on 02/05/2016 without any addition. Thereafter, the PCIT invoked the provisions of section 263 of the Act on the ground that Assessing Officer has failed to examine interest expenditure amounting to Rs. 4,94,882/- claimed in the P&L Account. The PCIT observed that the assessee did not hav....

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....d that in reassessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer has failed to examine interest expenditure claimed by the assessee. The balance sheet of the assessee as on 31/03/2009 shows loan of Rs. 46.36 lacs taken by the assessee and at the same time the assessee has advanced loan of Rs. 25.94 lacs. Own interest free funds of the assessee in the form of capital or reserves were not sufficient to advance the loans. 4. We have heard the submissions made by rival sides and have perused the impugned order and the assessment order passed under section 143(3) r.w.s. 147 of the Act. A perusal of the assessment order shows that the assessment was reopened to examine misuse of Client Code Modification for tax evasion. No addition was made by the....

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....d cannot be construed to override it or render the substance and core nugatory. Section 147 has this effect that the Assessing Officer has to assess or reassess the income ("such income") which escaped assessment and which was the basis of the formation of belief and if he does so, he can also assess or reassess any other income which has escaped assessment and which, comes to his notice during the course of the proceedings. However, if after issuing a notice under section 148, he accepted the contention of the assessee and holds that the income which he has initially formed a reason to believe had escaped assessment, has as a matter of fact not escaped assessment, it is not open to him independently to assess some other income. If he inten....

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.... to extra ordinary circumstances caused by world wide spread of COVID-19. Thereafter, the lockdown was extended from time to time. Therefore, the pronouncement of order beyond the period of 90 days from the date of hearing is not under "ordinary" circumstances. The Co-ordinate Bench of the Tribunal in the case of DCIT vs. JSW Ltd., ITA No.6264/Mum/2018 for A.Y 2013-14 decided on 14/05/2020, under identical circumstances, after considering the provisions of Rule 34(5) of the ITAT Rules, 1963, judgements rendered By Hon'ble Apex Court and the Hon'ble Bombay High Court on the issue of time limit for pronouncement of orders by the Tribunal and the circumstances leading to lockdown held:- "10. In the light of the above discussions, we a....

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....Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court and Hon'ble Supreme Court also indicate that this period of lockdown cannot be treated as an ordinary period during which the normal time limits are to remain in force. In our considered view, even without the words "ordinarily", in the light of the above analysis of the legal position, the period during which ITA No. 6103 and lockout was in force is to excluded for the purpose of time limits set out in rule 34(5) of the Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1963. Viewed thus, the exception, to 90-day time-limit for pronouncement of orders, inherent in rule 34(5)(c), with respect to the pronouncement of orders within ninety days, clearly comes into play in the present case. Of course, there is no, and there cannot be a....