TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2020 (8) TMI 288
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....957 are bad in law as notice u/s.17 is issued without acquiring valid jurisdiction. 2. Learned C.I.T.(Appeals) erred in law and on facts in holding that residential plots held by assessee are assets as per section 2(ea) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957. 3. The assessee in the 1st ground of appeal has challenged the validity of the assessment framed under section 16(3) read with section 17 of the Act. 4. The facts in brief are that the assessee in the present case is an individual and filed his wealth tax return declaring wealth at nil. However, the wealth tax officer was in possession of the information about the acquisition of 2 adjoining residential plots of urban land at Bopal, near VasanthVihar amounting to Rs. 2,75,63,810/- which were....
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....f acquisition of the certificate of the membership relates to such date of agreement i.e. 20thof June 2008. 10. Being aggrieved by the order of the learned CIT (A), the assessee is in appeal before us. 11. The learned AR before us filed the balance sheet of the BopalShobhan Cooperative Housing Society Limited as on 31 March 2014 and contended that the impugned land has been shown by it which evidences that such lands do not belong to the assessee. 12. On the other hand the learned DR vehemently supported the order of the authorities below. 13. We have heard the rival contentions of both the parties and perused the materials available on record before us. The learned AR for the assessee before us contended that the assessee has acquired ....
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....sessee is allowed for statistical purposes. 16. In view of the above, the grounds raised by the assessee on merit do not require any separate adjudication at this stage. As such these grounds on merit become infructuous. Hence we dismiss the same. 17. Before we part with the issue/appeal as discussed above, it is pertinent to note that the clause (c) of rule 34 of the Appellate Tribunal Rules 1963 requires the bench to make endeavour to pronounce the order within 60 days from the conclusion of the hearing. However the period of 60 days can be extended under exceptional circumstances but the same should not ordinarily be further extended beyond another 30 days. In simple words the total time available to the Bench is of 90 days upon the co....
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....of judicial machinery, that Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, in an unprecedented order in the history of India and vide order dated 6.5.2020 read with order dated 23.3.2020, extended the limitation to exclude not only this lockdown period but also a few more days prior to, and after, the lockdown by observing that "In case the limitation has expired after 15.03.2020 then the period from 15.03.2020 till the date on which the lockdown is lifted in the jurisdictional area where the dispute lies or where the cause of action arises shall be extended for a period of 15 days after the lifting of lockdown". Hon'ble Bombay High Court, in an order dated 15th April 2020, has, besides extending the validity of all interim orders, has also observed that,....
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.... by excluding at least the period during which the lockdown was in force. We must factor ground realities in mind while interpreting the time limit for the pronouncement of the order. Law is not brooding omnipotence in the sky. It is a pragmatic tool of the social order. The tenets of law being enacted on the basis of pragmatism, and that is how the law is required to interpreted. The interpretation so assigned by us is not only in consonance with the letter and spirit of rule 34(5) but is also a pragmatic approach at a time when a disaster, notified under the Disaster Management Act 2005, is causing unprecedented disruption in the functioning of our justice delivery system. Undoubtedly, in the case of Otters Club Vs DIT [(2017) 392 ITR 244....