AI Drafter 
TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2020 (6) TMI 190
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....ought to have allowed the same considering facts of the case. 3. Learned Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) failed to appreciate the fact that in A.Y.2011.12, Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) allowed our claim of bad debts though facts of both the years were identical. 4. Learned Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) failed to consider the order of Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) of A.Y.2011.12 allowing my claim of bad debts on the identical facts. 5. Learned Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) erred in not allowing our alternate argument that if debt written off is not allowed as bad debt then the same be allowed as business loss u/s 37(1). Your Honour petitioner craves leave to add, alter or amend above grounds of appeal at or before final hearing of the appeal. 2. The only effective issue raised by the assessee is that the learned CIT (A) erred in confirming the disallowances of bad debt amounting to Rs. 6,75,359/- despite the fact that claim of bad debt for the A.Y. 2011-12 has been allowed in similar fact and circumstances. 3. Briefly stated fact is that the assessee is an individual and proprietor of the M/s V.G. Automobile....
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....not ask for details beyond 6 years u/s. 149 and even u/s. 153A, returns are to be filed only for 6 years. These arguments are baseless because the AO on his own had not demanded any details. In fact, it is the appellant who has claimed bad debts for the period beyond six years and hence burden is cast upon him to justify his claim. Moreover, there is no provision under the Act for waiver of conditions mentioned u/s. 36(2) in old cases. In the case of CIT vs. LalWoollen& Silk Mills (P) Ltd. (2011) 333 ITR 254 (P&H), it has been clearly held that forClaiming deduction u/s. 36(l)(vii), conditions of Section 36(2) must be satisfied i.e assessee ought to have depicted that the debt under reference was shown as income during earlier years, 4.2.2 The Ld. AR has also filed another reply in the Dak on 27.06.2018 stating that the favourable order of CIT(A) in AY 2011-12 has been upheld by the Hon'ble ITAT vide order dated 14.09.2017 contained in ITA No.3114/Ahd/2Q14 and hence appeal should be allowed in this year also. This argument is not acceptable because the order of CIT(A) cannot be considered as a binding precedent. Moreover, the conditions of S.36(l)(vii) r.w.s 36(2) have to be sa....
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....36(1)(viia) of the Act but failed to file the evidences to prove with respect to the bad debts amounting to Rs. 6,75,359/- pertaining to F.Y. 1999-00 and 2000-01 whether these were offered to tax in the earlier years as mandated under section 36(2) of the Act. Therefore the claim of the assessee for Rs. 6,75,359/- was denied by the AO which was subsequently confirmed by the learned CIT (A). 7.1 Admittedly, the onus lies on the assessee to prove that he has offered the bad debts claimed by him as income in the income tax return. But the assessee in the case on hand has failed to do so. However, we note that the assessee has classified the impugned bad debts as sundry debtors in his audited balance sheet which is placed on pages 10 to 17 of the paper book. The same amount was shown under the head sundry debtors in all the assessment years till the assessment year under consideration in which the assessee has written off such sundry debtors as bad debts. As per the accounting practice sundry debtors represents the sales made by the assessee. Thus it is transpired that bad debts written of represents the sales made by the assessee in the F.Y. 1999-2000 and 2000-2001 which was offere....
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....idered as real. Apparent must be considered real until it is shown that there are reasons to believe that the apparent is not the real and that the taxing authorities are entitled to look into the surrounding circumstances to find out the reality and the matter has to be considered by applying the test of human probabilities. The Chairman of the Settlement Commission, in his dissenting opinion, had laid emphasis on the fact that the appellant had produced evidence in support of the credits in the form of certificates from the racing clubs giving particulars of the crossed cheques for payment of the amounts for winning of jackpots, etc. The Chairman had rejected the contention regarding lack of expertise in respect of the appellant and had observed that the expertise was the last thing that was necessary for a game of chance and anybody had to go and call for five numbers in counter and obtain a jackpot ticket and that books containing information are available which are quite cheap. This was a superficial approach to the problem. The matter had to be considered in the light of human probabilities. 7.2 Furthermore, we are also not oblivion to the fact that the assessee has shown ....
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....is allowed for the statistical purposes. 13. In the result, the appeal of the assessee is partly allowed for statistical purposes. ITA No. 1911/Ahd/2018 for A.Y. 2014-15. 14. The only issue raised by the assessee is that the learned CIT (A) erred in confirming the disallowances of bad debt amounting to Rs. 4,13,212/- despite the fact that claim of bad debt for the A.Y. 2014-15 has been allowed in similar facts and circumstances. 15. The identical issue has already been decided by us in favour of assessee in ITA No. 1909/Ahd/2018 vide paragraph no.7 of this order. Respectfully, following the same this ground of appeal of the assessee is allowed. 16. Before we part with the issues/appeals as discussed above, it is pertinent to note that the clause (c) of rule 34 of the Appellate Tribunal Rules 1963 requires the bench to make endeavour to pronounce the order within 60 days from the conclusion of the hearing. However the period of 60 days can be extended under exceptional circumstances but the same should not ordinarily be further extended beyond another 30 days. In simple words the total time available to the Bench is of 90 days upon the conclusion of the hearing. 17....
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....ues to operate shall be added and time shall stand extended accordingly", and also observed that "arrangement continued by an order dated 26th March 2020 till 30th April 2020 shall continue further till 15th June 2020". It has been an unprecedented situation not only in India but all over the world. Government of India has, vide notification dated 19th February 2020, taken the stand that, the coronavirus "should be considered a case of natural calamity and FMC (i.e. force majeure clause) maybe invoked, wherever considered appropriate, following the due procedure...". The term 'force majeure' has been defined in Black's Law Dictionary, as 'an event or effect that can be neither anticipated nor controlled' When such is the position, and it is officially so notified by the Government of India and the Covid-19 epidemic has been notified as a disaster under the National Disaster Management Act, 2005, and also in the light of the discussions above, the period during which lockdown was in force can be anything but an "ordinary" period. 10. In the light of the above discussions, we are of the considered view that rather than taking a pedantic view of the rule requiring pronounceme....