2020 (6) TMI 78
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....earing to the petitioner. 4. This court by an order dated 21.3.2016 disposed the said writ petition and directed the 2nd respondent herein to dispose petitions filed by the petitioner, on merits in accordance with law, within a period of three weeks from the date of receipt of the aforesaid order. 5. Pursuant to the aforesaid directions of this court in W.P.No.5435 of 2016, the 2nd respondent has passed the impugned order and has rejected the petitions filed by the petitioner under Section 119(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. 6. The petitioner had filed Income Tax Returns with a delay of 14 months for the Assessment Year 2012-13 on 27.11.2013 and with a delay of 5 months for the Assessment Year 2013-14 on 31.10.2013. 7. The reasons given by the petitioner for filing the returns belatedly under Section 139 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 was apparently, on account of paucity of funds and account of the amendment to Section 115JB of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and on the assumption that the IT system of Income Tax Department would not accept the Income Tax Returns without payment of tax. 8. The petitioner was heard by the Member (IT) before the impugned order was passed. The petitioner ....
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....en for laymen or if there is incomprehensible indifference the shield of legal opinion may still be vulnerable. The correct legal position has been explained with reference to the Supreme Court decision in a judgment of one of us in State of Kerala v. K.K.M. Kurup [AIR 1971 Ker 211, 215]. "The law is settled that mistake of counsel may in certain circumstances be taken into account in condoning delay although there is no general proposition that mistake of counsel by itself is always a sufficient ground. It is always a question whether the mistake was bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose such as laches on the part of the litigant or an attempt to save limitation in an underhand way. The High Court unfortunately never considered the matter from this angle. If it had, it would have seen quite clearly that there was no attempt to avoid the Limitation Act but rather to follow it albeit on a wrong reading of the situation." [Lala Mata Din v. A Narayanan, (1969) 2 SCC 770, 772] The High Court took the view that Mr Raizada being an advocate of 34 years' standing could not possibly make the mistake in view of the clear provisions on the subject of appeals e....
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....lating to the rejection of the application filed under Section 119(2)(b) of the Act in paragraph No.8 as under: 8. The rejection of the petitioner's application under Section 119(2)(b) is only on the ground that according to the Chief Commissioner's opinion the plea of omission by the auditor was not substantiated. This court has difficulty to understand what more plea or proof any assessee could have brought on record, to substantiate the inadvertence of its advisor. The net result of the impugned order is in effect that the petitioner's claim of inadvertent mistake is sought to be characterised as not bonafide. The court is of the opinion that an assessee has to take leave of its senses if it deliberately wishes to forego a substantial amount as the assessee is ascribed to have in the circumstances of this case. "Bonafide" is to be understood in the context of the circumstance of any case. Beyond a plea of the sort the petitioner raises (concededly belatedly), there can not necessarily be independent proof or material to establish that the auditor in fact acted without diligence. The petitioner did not urge any other grounds such as illness of someone etc., which ....
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....s of cases, by general or special order, authorise any income-tax authority, to admit an application or claim for any exemption, deduction, refund or any other relief under the Act after the expiry of the period specified by or under this Act for making such application or claim and deal with the same on merits in accordance with law. 21. Under Section 119(2)(c) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, the 1st respondent may, if it considers it desirable or expedient so to do for avoiding genuine hardship in any case or class of cases, by general or special order for reasons to be specified therein, relax any requirement contained in any of the provisions of Chapter IV or Chapter VI-A, where the assessee has failed to comply with any requirement specified in such provision for claiming deduction thereunder, subject to the following conditions, namely:- (i) the default in complying with such requirement was due to circumstances beyond the control of the assessee; and (ii) the assessee has complied with such requirement before the completion of assessment in relation to the previous year in which such deduction is claimed : Provided that the Central Government shall cause every order issu....